Legris v. Industrial Comm'n
Case Date: 07/31/2001
Court: Industrial Commission
Docket No: 4-00-1037WC Rel
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NO. 4-00-1037WC
____________________________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of thecourt: Claimant Terry Legris appeals from the order of thecircuit court of McLean County reversing a decision of the IllinoisIndustrial Commission (Commission). The arbitrator found the claimwas untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. With onecommissioner dissenting, the Commission reversed and awardedclaimant $329.75 per week for 37.5 weeks for permanent partialdisability to the extent of 7.5% loss of the man as a whole. 820ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West 1998). The respondent employer is InterlakeMaterial Handling. The issues are whether (1) "compensation" as used in thelimitation provision of section 6(d) of the Workers' CompensationAct (Act) (820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 1998)) includes payment ofmedical expenses incurred as a result of an accidental injury; (2)the payment of medical bills relating to an accidental injury by aworkers' compensation carrier extends the statute of limitationspursuant to section 8(j) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(j) (West1998)); and (3) the Commission's finding that respondent isestopped from raising the statute of limitations is against themanifest weight of the evidence. We reverse the order of thecircuit court and reinstate the Commission's decision. Claimant's application for adjustment of claim alleged anaccidental injury to his back on July 2, 1989. The application foradjustment of claim was filed on February 3, 1997. It is undisputed that claimant treated with multiple physicians, includingcompany doctor Dr. John Purnell and doctors to whom he referredclaimant, from shortly after the date of the accident in 1989through 1996. It is also undisputed that, until August 1996,respondent paid all of claimant's medical expenses by submittingthem to his worker compensation carrier under the same claim numberassigned to claimant in 1989. In December 1996, claimant receiveda letter from Eric Buttner, a claim supervisor with respondent'sworkers' compensation carrier, referring to a telephone conversation he had with claimant in August 1996 in which claimant wasadvised that the back injury would no longer be covered underworkers' compensation. The letter also asked claimant to contacthim regarding possible settlement. Subsequent to that letter,respondent refused payment of claimant's medical expenses. The arbitrator found that the statute of limitationsexpired on July 2, 1992, the application for adjustment of claimwas not timely filed, and respondent made no representations thatmisled or prevented claimant from filing the application foradjustment of claim in a timely manner. The Commission, findingpayment of medical benefits amounted to "compensation" within themeaning of section 6(d) of the Act, concluded that the applicationfor adjustment of claim was timely filed because it was filedwithin "three" years of the last payment of medical benefits inAugust 1996. The Commission also found that respondent wasestopped from raising the statute of limitations defense because itengaged in a course of conduct that lulled claimant into a falsesense of security by making continuous and repeated payments ofmedical benefits through the workers' compensation carrier forseven years and giving claimant a workers' compensation claimnumber for payment of bills. The circuit court found the Commission's interpretation of "compensation" in section 6(d) of the Actwas incorrect and that the Commission's finding on estoppel wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. The first issue is whether "compensation" as used in thelimitation provision of section 6(d) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/6(d)(West 1998)) includes payment of medical expenses incurred as aresult of an accidental injury. Section 6(d) provides that anapplication for compensation is timely if filed within three yearsafter the date of accident or two years after the last payment ofcompensation, whichever is later. 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 1998). Statutory construction presents a question of law that this courtconsiders de novo. Norris v. Industrial Comm'n, 313 Ill. App. 3d993, 995, 730 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (2000). Section 6(d) of the Actprovides, in relevant part: "In any case, other than one where theinjury was caused by exposure to radiologicalmaterials or equipment or asbestos unless theapplication for compensation is filed with theCommission within 3 years after the date ofthe accident, where no compensation has beenpaid, or within 2 years after the date of thelast payment of compensation, where any hasbeen paid, whichever shall be later, the rightto file such application shall be barred." 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 1998). In Wherry v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Ill. App. 3d 192,194-96, 599 N.E.2d 8, 9-11 (1992), construing an earlier version ofthe same statute of limitation, this court held that medicalexpenses were included in the term "compensation" for purpose ofdetermining whether the statute of limitations was tolled. InWherry, the question was whether the statute of limitations appliedat all because the claimant argued that a claim for medicalexpenses was not a claim for compensation and therefore there wasno statute of limitations. In Wherry, the court noted a number ofcases that had recognized a distinction between medical expensesand compensation under other provisions of the Act. Wherry, 233Ill. App. 3d at 194-96, 599 N.E.2d at 9-10. One of those cases,Childress v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Ill. 2d 144, 148-51, 442 N.E.2d841, 843-44 (1982), wherein the court held that attorney fees werenot recoverable under sections 16 and 19(k) of the Act (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.16, 138.19(k)) for delay in thepayment of medical expenses, has been expressly overruled since theWherry decision. McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499,510-14, 702 N.E.2d 545, 550-52 (1998). The McMahan decision addseven greater support to the holding in Wherry. Although the language of the statute of limitations haschanged somewhat since Wherry, even under the current statute oflimitations as hereinabove quoted, Wherry provides precedentregarding whether compensation includes medical expenses. Wherepossible, a word repeated in a statute is given the same meaning,absent anything in the context indicating a different legislativeintent. People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 422, 153 N.E. 693, 695-96(1926). Here, to define "compensation" differently in the samesentence would seem an absurd result. See McMahan, 183 Ill. 2d at513-14, 702 N.E.2d at 552 (statutes should be construed to avoid anabsurd result). Here, as did the claimant in Wherry, the respondentattempts to avoid the result by referring to cases interpreting"compensation" as used in other sections of the Act as not toinclude medical expenses. Most of those cases were discussed inWherry. The respondent argues that in Kaskaskia Constructors v.Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ill. 2d 532, 534, 337 N.E.2d 713, 714 (1975),the supreme court, after quoting the applicable version of thestatute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par.138.6(c)(3)), stated, "The Act furthermore provided that thefurnishing of medical services is not the payment of compensation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).)" The last paragraphof section 8(a), pertaining to the payment for medical services,continues to provide that, "The furnishing of any such services orappliances or the servicing thereof by the employer is not thepayment of compensation." 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1998). In thiscase, this court need not decide what the last paragraph of section8(a) means. Section 8 of the Act begins, "The amount of compensation which shall be paid to the employee for an accidental injurynot resulting in death is:" and then proceeds with the varioussubsections, including subsection 8(a) dealing with medical expensebenefits. 820 ILCS 305/8 (West 1998). Section 8 has beenconstrued as including medical expenses within the term "compensation." McMahan, 183 Ill. 2d at 512, 702 N.E.2d at 551. To theextent it is inconsistent with the reasoning in McMahan, Kaskaskiais no longer viable. The Commission properly found that the payment of medicalbenefits in this case amounted to "compensation" within the meaningof section 6(d) of the Act and the claimant's application foradjustment of claim was timely filed within two years of the lastpayment of said medical benefits in August 1996. We find additional support for this result in thelanguage of section 8(j) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(j) (West1998)). Section 8(j) provides in relevant part: "In the event the injured employee receives benefits, including medical, surgicalor hospital benefits under any group plancovering non-occupational disabilities contributed to wholly or partially by the employer, which benefits should not have beenpayable if any rights of recovery existedunder this Act, then such amounts so paid tothe employee from any such group plan as shallbe consistent with, and limited to, the provisions of paragraph 2 hereof, shall be creditedto or against any compensation payment fortemporary total incapacity for work or anymedical, surgical or hospital benefits made orto be made under this Act. In such event, theperiod of time for giving notice of accidentalinjury and filing application for adjustmentof claim does not commence to run until thetermination of such payments. This paragraphdoes not apply to payments made under anygroup plan which would have been payableirrespective of an accidental injury underthis Act. Any employer receiving such creditshall keep such employee safe and harmlessfrom any and all claims or liabilities thatmay be made against him by reason of havingreceived such payments only to the extent ofsuch credit." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS305/8(j) (West 1998). We find no logical distinction between the payment ofmedical benefits under a group plan covering nonoccupationaldisabilities and the payment of medical benefits under a workers'compensation insurance policy. Because of this court's determination of the first twoissues, we do not discuss whether the Commission's finding thatrespondent is estopped from raising the statute of limitations isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. The order of the circuit court of McLean County reversingthe Commission's decision is reversed, and the Commission'sdecision is reinstated. Circuit court reversed; Commission decision reinstated. HOFFMAN, O'MALLEY, HOLDRIDGE, and RARICK, JJ., concur. |
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