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JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

After arbitration, Joseph Kost and Deborah Kost (plaintiffs), coadministrators of theestate of Robert S. Kost, deceased, made an underinsured-motorist claim under a policyissued by The Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (defendant). After arbitration,plaintiffs filed suit in the circuit court of Franklin County and sought a trial on the issue ofdamages, pursuant to the trial de novo clause of the insurance policy. Upon defendant'smotion, the court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs raisethe issue of whether they should be precluded from invoking the trial de novo clause. Wereverse and remand.

Robert S. Kost entered into a contract for automobile insurance with defendant. Subsequently, Kost was fatally injured in an automobile accident. The limits of liability forthe insurance of the driver involved in the accident were paid to plaintiffs as administratorsof Kost's estate. Plaintiffs then presented a claim for underinsured-motorist coverage todefendant.

The insurance policy provides that if the insured and the insurer do not agree as to theamount of damages, either party may make a written demand for arbitration. The policystates:

"A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding as to:

a. Whether the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover damages; and

b. The amount of damages. This applies only if the amount does not exceed theminimum limit for 'bodily injury' liability specified by the Illinois SafetyResponsibility Law. If the amount exceeds that limit, either party may demand theright to a trial. This demand must be made within 60 days of the arbitrator's decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed to by the arbitrators willbe binding."

Plaintiffs' claim was submitted to arbitration. A panel of arbitrators issued an award. Thearbitrators found the total amount of damages resulting from Kost's injury to be $300,000,and they found Kost to be 50% negligent. Recoverable damages were assessed at $150,000.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Franklin County and requested thatthe arbitration award be vacated in accordance with the trial de novo clause of the insurancepolicy. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted defendant's motion anddismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.

The trial court discussed plaintiffs' complaint and cited to cases in which trial de novoprovisions similar to the one at bar have been voided as being against public policy. SeeFireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v. Bugailiskis, 278 Ill. App. 3d 19, 662 N.E.2d 555 (1996);Parker v. American Family Insurance Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 431, 734 N.E.2d 83 (2000). Plaintiffs contend that such clauses have been voided because of unfair drafting by insurersand that insureds should still be able to seek a trial de novo. Because the issue raised is aquestion of law, our standard of review is de novo. Magna Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R.R.Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d 375, 380, 728 N.E.2d 797, 803 (2000).

In Bugailiskis, the plaintiff made an underinsured-motorist claim after receiving thepolicy limits of the tortfeasor's insurance. The underinsured-motorist policy contained a trialde novo clause identical to the one in this case. After arbitration, the insurer sought a jurytrial. The insured's motion to dismiss was denied, and the insured appealed. On appeal, theinsured raised the issue of whether the clause violated public policy by discriminating againstthe insured.

The Bugailiskis court began by stating that, although Illinois law encouragesarbitration in order to reduce litigation, trial de novo clauses are not against public policy. Bugailiskis, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 21, 662 N.E.2d at 557 (citing American Family MutualInsurance Co. v. Baaske, 213 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688, 572 N.E.2d 308, 310 (1991); MayflowerInsurance Co. v. Mahan, 180 Ill. App. 3d 213, 217, 535 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1988)). The courtdetermined that the clause unfairly and unequivocally favors the insurer because it allows theinsurer to avoid a high award while binding the insured to a lower one. Bugailiskis, 278 Ill.App. 3d at 22, 662 N.E.2d at 557. The court further noted that the provision bears theearmarks of an adhesion contract by lacking a mutuality of remedy and because it wasentered into by parties possessing unequal bargaining power with little or no opportunity forarms-length negotiation. The court concluded, "When considering that cost and delay [whenan award is rejected], the unequal application of the escape clause, and the fact that thecontract possesses many of the earmarks of a contract of adhesion, we are persuaded, as arethe majority of the courts that have considered the issue, that the trial de novo clause violatespublic policy and is unenforceable." Bugailiskis, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 662 N.E.2d at 558.

In Parker v. American Family Insurance Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 431, 734 N.E.2d 83(2000), the Third District found a similar clause to be unenforceable. In Parker, the plaintiffcollected the policy limits from a tortfeasor in an automobile accident and soughtunderinsured-motorist coverage from the defendant. After receiving an award in arbitration,the plaintiff filed a petition for a judgment on the award. The defendant moved to dismissthe petition and filed a claim for a trial according to the trial de novo provision. The trialcourt found the clause to be one of adhesion that violated public policy, and the decision wasaffirmed by the appellate court. Parker v. American Family Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d110, 694 N.E.2d 211 (1998) (Parker I).

The Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order requiring the Third District toreconsider in light of Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 188 Ill. 2d 168, 720 N.E.2d 1052(1999). Parker v. American Family Insurance Co., 186 Ill. 2d 571, 722 N.E.2d 194 (1999)(supervisory order) (Parker II). In Reed, a case involving uninsured-motorist coverage, thecourt found a similar provision to be valid.

Upon its reconsideration of Parker I, the appellate court began by distinguishing thetwo different lines of reasoning that have been used by states to find trial de novo clausesagainst public policy. Parker v. American Family Insurance Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433,734 N.E.2d 83, 85 (2000) (Parker III). The court noted that in several states the provisionhas been found to be repugnant to the policy of binding arbitration. However, the courtfound that this line of reasoning did not apply in Illinois because Illinois encouragesarbitration even when it is nonbinding. Instead, Illinois and other states have voided suchclauses because they unfairly favor the insurer by binding only low awards. Citing toBugailiskis, the court found the trial de novo clause unenforceable and against public policybecause the provision was inequitably drafted to favor the insurer.

The Parker III court distinguished Reed on the basis that it involved an uninsured-motorist claim, not an underinsured-motorist claim. Reed did not find a violation of publicpolicy because the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1998)) explicitlycalled for such a provision in the context of uninsured-motorist coverage. Reed, 188 Ill. 2dat 175, 720 N.E.2d at 1057; 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 1998). The Reed court distinguishedBugailiskis on the ground that the Illinois Insurance Code does not require a similararbitration provision for underinsured-motorist coverage. As the legislature had not alteredthe Illinois Insurance Code in response to Bugailiskis and the supreme court had notaddressed the issue, the Parker III court found the clause to be unconscionable and contraryto public policy in the context of underinsured-motorist claims.

Bugailiskis and Parker III establish that insurers may not enforce unfairly drafted trialde novo provisions. The question raised by this appeal is whether an insured may use sucha trial de novo provision to seek a trial after arbitration. Defendant claims that in other statesboth parties have been barred from enforcing such provisions. Slaiman v. Allstate InsuranceCo., 617 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1992) (citing Pepin v. American Universal Insurance Co., 540 A.2d21 (R.I. 1988)); U.S.A.A. v. Compton, 270 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1990). The cases relied upon bydefendant, however, are in states that have found the provisions to be contrary to the policyof favoring binding arbitration. Pepin, 540 A.2d at 22; Compton, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Incontrast, Bugailiskis and Parker III make clear that nonbinding arbitration is permissible inIllinois and that the reason such clauses are not enforced in Illinois is a concern for fairnessto the insured.

Defendant claimed in its brief, and vociferously stated at oral argument, that allowingplaintiffs to invoke the trial de novo clause would be contrary to the policy considerationsunderlying the Uniform Arbitration Act (Act) (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Defendant contends that Parker III, Bugailiskis, and the Act all are based on the policy offavoring binding arbitration. Defendant's contention is totally without merit. The Act statesthat agreements to arbitrate are valid, enforceable, and irrevocable; however, the Act doesnot preclude the parties from agreeing that arbitration be nonbinding. Thus, the courts inBugailiskis and Parker III had no reason to discuss the Act. Bugailiskis and Parker III,instead, clearly state that Illinois enforces fairly drafted nonbinding arbitration agreements.

Allowing an insurer who has placed a biased trial de novo provision in a policy to thenclaim that the provision is void against public policy when an insured attempts to enforce theprovision should not be sanctioned by the courts. Policies with such clauses bear the earmarkof adhesion because they lack a mutuality of remedy for the insured and because the insuredhas little opportunity for arms-length negotiation. Such clauses create a manifest inequityby allowing the insurer to escape an unwary but meritorious claimant. Parker III, 315 Ill.App. 3d at 433-34, 734 N.E.2d at 85.

The benefit of a trial de novo should not be withheld from an insured simply becausethe insurer drafted the provision unfairly. The court should not shelter defendant's duplicity. Defendant unfairly attempted to limit a benefit paid for by the decedent and should not beallowed to enforce this clause. In contrast, the decedent's expectation that he would beallowed a trial de novo after arbitration was legitimate. Allowing plaintiffs to enforce thisprovision does not frustrate public policy. Refusing to allow plaintiffs to enforce theprovision would deny a benefit contracted for by the decedent and would reward defendantfor drafting an unconscionable provision.

Although the result we reach would be mandated regardless of the time the policy wasissued, we would be remiss if we did not note one other fact that strengthens our opinion. The policy was effective on the date of the accident, July 24, 1997. Bugailiskis, whichdefendant cites as holding that such provisions are void, was rendered on February 28, 1996. After defendant had been informed that the clause was against public policy, the clauseremained in the policy it issued to insurers. If defendant had believed the clause to be void,as it argues here, then the clause should not have remained in the policy. The presence of theclause after Bugailiskis naturally leads to questions about defendant's motives. Defendantmay have hoped that unwary claimants would accept lower arbitration awards or that theclause could be used as a tool in negotiation after arbitration to lower insureds' expectationof success and increase the costs of pursuing the claim. In fact, defendant appears to havegained some advantage in this instance by delaying plaintiffs' claim while the enforceabilityof the clause is further litigated. In any event, it is of the highest irony that a provision thatour courts have found to be against public policy because of manipulative drafting byinsurers should now be claimed by defendant to be a shield against an insured's suit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County ishereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with thisopinion.

Reversed; cause remanded.

MAAG, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.