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PRESIDING JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves an election contest challenging the nominations of Republicancandidates for the offices of sheriff, county clerk, county treasurer, and member of the boardof review in St. Clair County, Illinois. The St. Clair County Electoral Board (ElectoralBoard) heard objections to the candidates' nominating papers, sustained the objections, anddetermined that the candidates should not be placed on the ballot. The candidates petitionedfor judicial review of the Electoral Board's decision. The St. Clair County circuit courtfound that several findings of the Electoral Board were against the manifest weight of theevidence, and the court reversed the board's decisions and ordered the county clerk to printthe names of the nominees on the ballot for the November 2002 general election. Theobjector appeals.

The St. Clair County Republican Central Committee, through its executivecommittee, slated individuals to fill vacancies as party nominees for several St. Clair Countyoffices. Devin Kaemmerer was selected as the Republican nominee for the board of review. Fernando Calvarese was selected as the Republican nominee for Sheriff. Neal Connors wasselected as the Republican nominee for county treasurer. Larry Massey was selected as theRepublican nominee for county clerk. On May 20, 2002, Stephen McGlynn, the RepublicanParty's county chairman, filed nominating papers with the St. Clair County clerk's office foreach nominee. On May 24, 2002, Virgil Kemp (the objector) filed objections to eachnominee with the Electoral Board. According to the record, the objector filed the sameobjections with regard to each nominee's nominating papers.

On May 30, 2002, the Electoral Board convened. The objections to the nominationof the candidate for county clerk, Larry Massey, were the first to be considered by theElectoral Board. Bob Delaney, the St. Clair County clerk, was a statutorily designatedmember of the Electoral Board. He recused himself from the proceeding because he is theDemocratic nominee for the office of county clerk. Charles Suarez, the St. Clair Countytreasurer, was designated to serve in his place. However, Mr. Suarez is the Democraticnominee for the office of county treasurer. As previously noted, the Republican nomineefor the office of county treasurer was subject to the same objections made against thenominee for county clerk. Stephen McGlynn, counsel for the candidates, objected to Mr.Suarez's service on the Electoral Board, on the grounds that the factual circumstancessurrounding the nomination of and the objections to each candidate were identical and thatMr. Suarez would, in effect, be deciding the objections to his own opponent, if he wereallowed to decide the objections to Mr. Massey's nomination. Mr. McGlynn asked that thechief judge of the St. Clair County circuit court appoint a person to sit in place of Mr.Suarez. The objection was denied and the hearing proceeded.

Elections by their very nature are adversarial proceedings and frequently involvehostility and claims of impropriety by opposing candidates. In most instances, these disputesdo not involve illegality or impropriety but merely involve differences of opinion that areamplified by the heat of the debate. Fortunately, the Illinois legislature has provided us witha set of rules, the Illinois Election Code (Code) (10 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)), that inmost instances allows the parties to obtain an impartial resolution of these disputes throughadministrative and judicial mechanisms. We recognize that the Code does not provide forall the contingencies that may arise. In such cases the courts are regularly called upon toclarify statutory deficiencies.

In this case our task is to apply the relevant provisions of the Code as they relate tothe disputed issues in this case. We must first consider a contention raised in the nominee'sbrief that challenges the composition of the Electoral Board.

The nominees claim that the participation of certain Electoral Board members wasfundamentally unfair and violated the due process rights of the candidates. In order that wedo not misstate their position, we quote from their brief as follows:

"There was no legitimate basis for Suarez and Delaney to serve on that panel. TheElectoral Board should have allowed the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court todesignate a person to serve who did not have a conflict. Even if the Electoral Board'sreason for moving forward with a tainted panel was because it wanted to expedite theresolution of the challenges, speed and efficiency cannot trump the constitutionalrights of Massey, Kaemmerer, Calvarese[,] and Connors."

Essentially, the nominees claim that the objections in all four election challenges werethe same. Therefore, while a given Electoral Board member recused himself when theobjections concerned the Republican opponent of that board member, that Electoral Boardmember did not recuse himself from considering the same objections against Republicannominees for the other offices at issue. It is on this basis that the nominees contend that theElectoral Board was improperly constituted in violation of their due process rights. Inresponding to questions from the bench during oral argument, the nominees' counsel, Mr.McGlynn, agreed that decisions of an improperly constituted Electoral Board are null andvoid.

Under certain situations, the rule of necessity requires that persons interested in thecontroversy also must serve as decision makers. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 66 L.Ed. 2d 392, 101 S. Ct. 471 (1980) (the United States Supreme Court held that it wasrequired, under the rule of necessity, to hear and decide an action filed by the United Statesdistrict judges in regard to the validity of federal statutes involving benefits for all ArticleIII federal judges). In Will, the United State Supreme Court quoted from a 1870 decisionof the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which discussed the rule:

" 'The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for a judge tosit even where he has an interest-where no provision is made for calling another in,or where no one else can take his place-it is his duty to hear and decide, howeverdisagreeable it may be.' Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870)." Will, 449 U.S.at 214, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 101 S. Ct. at 480.

Fortunately, we need not apply the rule of necessity in this case with respect to the ElectoralBoard. The Code provides a means to substitute a statutorily designated person to replacean "interested" board member. Section 10-9(2) of the Code provides that objections tonominations of candidates for county offices shall be decided by the county officers electoralboard, and that section sets forth the county officers who shall constitute the board. 10 ILCS5/10-9(2) (West 1992). Also, section 10-9(6) establishes a process for the substitution ofa member of the Electoral Board in the event of a conflict. 10 ILCS 5/10-9(6) (West 1992). Section 10-9(6) provides in pertinent part as follows:

"In the event that any member of the appropriate board is a candidate for theoffice with relation to which the objector's petition is filed, he shall not be eligible toserve on that board and shall not act as a member of the board and his place shall befilled as follows:

a. In the county officers electoral board by the county treasurer, and if he orshe is ineligible to serve, by the sheriff of the county."

Any vacancies on an electoral board not otherwise filled pursuant to thisSection shall be filled by public members appointed by the Chief Judge of the CircuitCourt for the county wherein the electoral board hearing is being held uponnotification to the Chief Judge of such vacancies. The Chief Judge shall be sonotified by a member of the electoral board or the officer or board with whom theobjector's petition was filed." 10 ILCS 5/10-9(6) (West 1992).

A literal application of this section would lead to a conclusion that the ElectoralBoard properly substituted Electoral Board members as specified under the Code. That is,once Mr. Delaney, who is both the Democratic candidate for county clerk and the currentcounty clerk, recused himself from taking part in the consideration of the Republicanaspirant's nominating papers for the office of county clerk, he was replaced by Mr. Suarez,the county treasurer. Even though the provisions of section 10-9(6) were literally followed,the conflict that these provisions were enacted to resolve remained, under the circumstancesof this case. Thus, Mr. Suarez was required to consider the same objections lodged againsthis own opponent's nominating papers, albeit with regard to a different candidate.

While this section of the Code does not expressly address the factual situation thathas arisen in this case, the policy considerations underlying the statute, and the interest inavoiding the appearance of impropriety, dictate that each member of the Electoral Boardwhose opponent was being challenged should have recused himself from all electoralchallenges at issue in this case. It is not our intention to denigrate the Electoral Boardmembers who in good faith recused themselves only when their opponent's petition wasbeing considered. We have reached our conclusion in this case to vindicate the goal of thestatute and to ensure the integrity of the process.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court in this case is strictly derivative. Because theElectoral Board was improperly constituted, its decisions must be vacated and the objectionsmust be heard and considered by a properly constituted board. The circuit court should nothave reached the merits of the underlying dispute. In this case, both the circuit court'sdecision to reinstate the Republican nominees and the prior decisions of the Electoral Boardto remove them from the ballot must be vacated. Both the nominees and the objector havea due process right to be heard before a properly constituted board. See Anderson v.McHenry Township, 289 Ill. App. 3d 830, 682 N.E.2d 1133 (1997). This is not a case wherewe, as an appellate court, can review the record and make an independent determination ofthe objections. There are material issues of fact that must be decided by the appropriatehearing body. Just as with the circuit court, our jurisdiction is not original; it is limited andderivative. Before this court can act, there must be a decision from a validly constitutedboard, followed by a review by and an order of the circuit court in regard to that decision.

In light of our resolution of this issue, we will not consider the remaining issuesraised in this case, because that would require us to make factual findings and wouldconstitute an advisory opinion. These are fundamental precepts: appellate courts may notexercise original jurisdiction, and no court should issue advisory opinions.

Accordingly, the judgment of the St. Clair County circuit court is vacated. Pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)), we remand this case to theElectoral Board for a hearing de novo before an Electoral Board composed of impartialmembers, and we direct the chief judge of the St. Clair County circuit court to appointreplacement members to the Electoral Board pursuant to section 10-9(6) of the Code. Thechief judge and the Electoral Board shall each act at the earliest practicable date to ensurea timely resolution.

Judgment vacated; cause remanded to the Electoral Board with directions.

1. Justice Welch participated in oral argument. Justice Chapman was later substitutedon the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the tape of oral argument.