Find Legal Information

No. 3-02-0418WC

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION
 

Justice Hoffman delivered the Opinion of the Court: 

The claimant, Jean Joiner, appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Will County which confirmed a decision of theIndustrial Commission (Commission), denying her benefits under theWorkers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West2000)) for injuries she sustained on February 23, 2000. For thereasons which follow, we affirm.

The claimant filed an application for adjustment of claimunder the Act for injuries she alleged arose out of and in thecourse of her employment with the Will County Circuit Clerk(Clerk). The following is a summary of the relevant evidencepresented at the arbitration hearing.

The claimant was employed as a deputy clerk at the Will Countycourthouse in Joliet, Illinois. In addition to its courthouse,Will County (County) also owns and maintains an office buildinglocated several blocks away. Adjacent to the office building is aparking lot which is owned by the County and in which Countyemployees are able to park without charge. In contrast, there isno free parking facility available for use by employees of theClerk working at the courthouse. However, the Clerk has enteredinto a collective bargaining agreement with the union representinga group of her employees which provides, in relevant part, that, ifthe County does not provide free parking for bargaining-unitemployees assigned to the courthouse, the Clerk will reimburse theemployees for parking costs at a specified monthly rate upon beingpresented with the employees' parking receipts. The claimant is amember of the bargaining unit and, therefore, entitled to parkingcost reimbursement in accordance with the collective bargainingagreement.

Located within one block of the courthouse is a public parkingfacility at 12 South Chicago Street (hereinafter referred to as the"Chicago Street Lot"). This parking lot is neither owned normaintained by the County or the Clerk. Title to the property isheld by a land trust of which Holly Weitendorf is the beneficiary. Weitendorf's father, John Weitendorf, maintains the parking lot andcollects the parking fees. The lot is open to the general publicon a monthly or daily fee basis and is used regularly by courthouseemployees, members of the public having business at the courthouse,and commuters traveling by train from a nearby station. The Clerkhas no agreement with the lot's owner regarding the fees charged tocourthouse employees. The Clerk's employees using this parking lotare charged the same fees as are members of the general public.

The claimant testified that she normally took public transportation to work but, in December 1999, she injured her knee in anunrelated accident and began receiving a ride to work from a co-worker, Lee Chess. Chess regularly parked her vehicle in theChicago Street Lot and paid a monthly fee to do so. Chess receivedreimbursement for her monthly parking fees from the Clerk pursuantto the collective bargaining agreement.

On February 23, 2000, after the claimant left work in thecourthouse at 4:30 p.m., she was walking across the Chicago StreetLot on her way to Chess's vehicle when she slid on loose gravel,fell into a pothole, and fractured her right patella. Thereafter,the claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim seekingbenefits under the Act, asserting that the injuries she sustainedon February 23, 2000, arose out of and in the course of heremployment with the Clerk.

After a hearing, an arbitrator issued a decision in which hefound that the claimant's accident on February 23, 2000, did notarise out of and in the course of her employment with the Clerkand, as a consequence, denied her claim for benefits under the Act. The claimant sought a review of the arbitrator's decision beforethe Commission. On April 21, 2001, the Commission issued aunanimous decision, affirming and adopting the decision of thearbitrator. Thereafter, the claimant sought a judicial review ofthe Commission's decision in the circuit court of Will County. Thecircuit court confirmed the Commission's decision, and this appealfollowed.

In urging reversal of the circuit court's judgment, theclaimant argues that the decision of the Commission is against themanifest weight of the evidence and erroneous as a matter of law. We disagree.

To be compensable under the Act, a claimant's injury mustarise out of and in the course of her employment. 820 ILCS 305/2(West 2000). The statutory phrase "arising out of" refers to theorigin or cause of the accident giving rise to an employee's injuryand presupposes a causal connection between her employment and theinjury suffered. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,131 Ill. 2d 478, 483, 546 N.E.2d 603 (1989). "In the course of"refers to the time, place and circumstance under which the accidentoccurred. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 483. Bothelements must be present at the time of an employee's injury inorder to justify compensation under the Act. Orsini v. IndustrialComm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44-45, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987).

Generally, the question of whether a claimant's injury aroseout of or in the course of her employment is a question of fact forthe Commission to resolve, and its determination will not bedisturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute v.Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 164, 731 N.E.2d 795(2000). However, when, as in this case, the facts are undisputedand susceptible of but a single inference, the question is one oflaw and subject to a de novo review. Technology ResearchInstitute, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 165.

Our supreme court has repeatedly held that, when an employeeslips and falls at a point off the employer's premises whiletraveling to or from work, the resulting injuries do not arise outof and in the course of the employment and are not compensableunder the Act. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 483-84;Reed v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 Ill. 2d 247, 248-49, 347 N.E.2d 157(1976); Browne V. Industrial Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 193, 194, 230N.E.2d 181 (1967). This rule has come to be known as the "generalpremises rule." See Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at484. Two exceptions to the general premises rule have developed,however. Recovery has been permitted for off-premises injurieswhen "the employee's presence at the place where the accidentoccurred was required in the performance of his duties and theemployee is exposed to a risk common to the general public to agreater degree than other persons." Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,131 Ill. 2d at 484. Additionally, recovery under the Act has beenpermitted for injuries sustained by an employee in a parking lot"provided by" the employer. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill.2d at 484; DeHoyos v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ill. 2d 110, 114, 185N.E.2d 885 (1962).

The facts of this case do not establish a basis for compensation under the first exception to the general premises rule asthere is no evidence in the record that the claimant's employmentrequired her to enter the parking lot where she was injured, norhas the claimant argued that this exception applies. Rather, theclaimant's entire argument on appeal is based upon the applicability of the second exception.

The claimant asserts that the Clerk "provided" parking for heremployees at the Chicago Street Lot. She reasons that the Clerk,by contractually obligating herself to reimburse certain of heremployees for parking expenses up to a specified maximum amountmonthly, "provided" parking for the employees entitled to seekreimbursement, including the claimant. Relying primarily upon thesupreme court's decisions in Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v.Industrial Comm'n 41 Ill. 2d 429, 244 N.E.2d 179 (1968) and DeHoyos v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ill. 2d 110, 185 N.E.2d 885(1962), and this court's decision in County of Cook v. IndustrialComm'n, 165 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 520 N.E.2d 896 (1988), the claimantargues that the Commission erred in finding that her injuries onFebruary 23, 2000, did not arise out of or in the course of heremployment. She contends that she falls within the secondexception to the general premises rule and is, therefore, entitledto compensation under the Act. We reject the claimant's assertionthat the Clerk "provided" parking for her employees in the ChicagoStreet Lot and find the cases upon which she relies to be readilydistinguishable.

In applying the second exception to the general premises rule,the supreme court has determined that, so long as the employer hasprovided a parking lot for use by its employees, the fact that theemployer does not own the lot is immaterial. DeHoyos, 26 Ill. 2dat 114; C. Iber & Sons, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ill. 2d 130,135, 407 N.E.2d 39 (1980). However, the supreme court has alsoheld that the employer's control or dominion over the parking lotis a significant factor in the analysis. See Maxim's of Illinois,Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 35 Ill. 2d 601, 604, 221 N.E.2d 281(1966); see also Doyle v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 103, 108,447 N.E.2d 310 (1983). In this case, the Clerk did not exerciseany dominion or control over the Chicago Street Lot.

The claimant's assertion that the Clerk "provided" parking forher employees in the Chicago Street Lot rests entirely upon thereimbursement provision in the collective bargaining agreemententered into by the Clerk. However, as the arbitrator noted, theClerk's parking cost reimbursement obligation under the collectivebargaining agreement only arose if free parking for the employeesassigned to work in the courthouse was not provided. As a factualmatter, nothing in this record supports the conclusion that theClerk provided parking for her employees at the Chicago Street Lotwhere the claimant was injured. It is uncontradicted that theClerk did not: own, operate or maintain the parking lot; lease anyparking spaces therein for use by her employees; assign any parkingspaces in the lot for use by her employees; tell any of heremployees to park in that lot, or any other parking lot for thatmatter; or enter into any agreement with the lot's owner regardingthe parking fees that her employees would be charged. The flaw inthe claimant's reasoning is her attempt to equate providingreimbursement for parking expenses with providing the parkingfacility itself.

The three cases upon which the claimant primarily relies arereadily distinguishable. In DeHoyos, the employer actuallyprovided, for use by its employees, the parking lot in which theclaimant was injured. DeHoyos, 26 Ill. 2d at 113-14. In thiscase, the Clerk provided reimbursement for parking costs, but didnot provide any parking lot for her employees' use. The parkinglot in which the claimant was injured was a public parking facilityover which the Clerk exercised no dominion or control.

In Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., the parking lot in which theclaimant fell was used as an adjunct of the employer's plant, itwas furnished and maintained by the employer to facilitate arrivaland departure from work, and it was contemplated that employeeswould use the lot in going to and from their employment. HiramWalker & Sons, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d at 430. In the instant case,although it is fair to say that the Clerk was aware that a numberof her employees parked in the Chicago Street Lot, she did notdirect them to do so. The Chicago Street Lot was not used as anadjunct to the courthouse; rather, it was a privately owned publicparking lot which was neither furnished nor maintained by theClerk.

In County of Cook, the claimant was stabbed and robbed in aparking lot adjacent to the building in which her employer leasedspace. The claimant in that case had a reserved parking space inthe lot which was several feet from a door to the building whichwas not open to the public. County of Cook, 165 Ill. App. 3d at1008-09. In contrast, the Chicago Street Lot is not adjacent tothe courthouse, the Clerk does not lease space in the lot, theclaimant was not told to park in the lot, and the Clerk did notassign any space in the lot for the claimant's use.

The facts of this case establish that the claimant was injuredin a public parking lot that was not provided, owned, maintained orcontrolled by the Clerk, nor was the claimant required to enter thelot in furtherance of her employment. As such, the injuries thatthe claimant suffered were not the result of an occurrence fallingwithin either exception to the general premises rule and theCommission correctly determined that her injuries did not arise outof and in the course of her employment. For these reasons, weaffirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County whichconfirmed the Commission's decision to deny the claimant benefitsunder the Act.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, Jack, and HOLDRIDGE, JJ.,concur.

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH dissenting:

After careful consideration, I find that claimant's accidentarose out of and in the course of her employment with the WillCounty circuit clerk (clerk); therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I agree that when an employee has an accident on propertywhich is neither provided by nor owned or controlled by theemployer, the resulting injuries do not arise from her employment. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 131 Ill. 2d 478,483-84, 546 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1989). I also recognize that thegeneral rule is that "[w]hen an employee slips and falls, or isotherwise injured, at a point off the employer's premises whiletraveling to or from work, his injuries are not compensable." Reedv. Industrial Comm'n., 63 Ill. 2d 247, 248-49, 347 N.E.2d 157, 58(1976). However, whether the employer owns or maintains theparking lot is immaterial as long as it is "provided" for the useof the employee. De Hoyos v. Industrial Comm'n., 26 Ill. 2d 110.114, 185 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1962); County of Cook v. IndustrialComm'n., 165 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 520 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1988).

The parking lot in question is located less than one blockfrom the Will County courthouse where claimant works. Will Countymaintains offices in both the courthouse and in a county buildingwhich is located a few blocks from the courthouse. There is aparking lot adjacent to the county building in which countyemployees can park for free. There is no free parking adjacent tothe courthouse. A review of the testimony reveals that there areactually five parking lots located near the courthouse. Variousprices are charged to park in these lots. The discrepancy betweencounty employees who could park for free in the county building lotand those who are required to pay to park in one of the other lotsled to a reimbursement agreement between the clerk and the union ofwhich claimant is a member. The agreement provides that if thecounty is unable to provide free parking, the clerk will reimburseemployees up to $20 per month for parking upon proof of payment. While the lot where claimant fell is open to the public, it isclear that nearly all of the people who park in the lot arecourthouse employees. It is the only lot in the immediate vicinityof the courthouse which falls within the $20 parking reimbursementallowance set forth in the union's collective bargaining agreement. Under the circumstances, I disagree with my colleagues that theclerk did not provide parking for her employees. Instead, I agreewith claimant that this lot was, for all practical purposes, anemployee lot which was "provided" for the use of county employeesand that claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits forinjuries she sustained when she fell in a hole in the parking lotin question.

The majority fails to address claimant's assertion thatdenying her compensation under the Act results in a "lottery ofcompensation." As it now stands, any county employee who parks forfree in a county lot and sustains a fall because of the surfacecondition of the lot will have full protection under the Act,whereas an employee who must park in another lot and be reimbursedby the county will not be denied coverage for the same type offall. I agree with claimant that this is not only inconsistentwith the spirit of the Act, but also inconsistent with the clerk'sintentions to rectify parking inequities that exist among countyemployees. The clerk attempted to correct such inequities when itsigned the collective bargaining agreement to allow employees to bereimbursed for parking expenses. For all the reasons stated above,the circuit court's order confirming the Commission's decisionshould be reversed.