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JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Charles Jines (plaintiff) sought visitation with minor children he had fathered withAnna Jurich (defendant). After a hearing, the circuit court of Franklin County entered anorder awarding visitation to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (1)whether the trial court erred in placing a burden on defendant to prove that no visitationshould be awarded and (2) whether the trial court's decision was against the manifest weightof the evidence. We affirm.

On September 29, 1999, plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court of JacksonCounty, Illinois, to establish parentage and visitation. Subsequent to a motion to transfervenue, the case was transferred to the circuit court of Franklin County. At a hearing onDecember 16, 1999, the court determined that plaintiff was the father of the children, basedon the parties' compliance with the Vital Records Act (410 ILCS 535/12 (West 1998)). Thecourt then entered a temporary order awarding defendant custody and plaintiff visitationrights. On January 18, 2001, plaintiff filed a petition to establish a parent-child relationshipand a petition for visitation. A hearing was held on May 9, 2001.

At the beginning of the hearing, the trial judge informed the parties of the burdens hewas placing on them. Regarding visitation, the court stated:

"We are going to go into this with the thought in mind that visitation will beordered, okay. It's going to be up to your client to show me, as she would have tounder [s]ection 607-I think that's the section of the divorce act, which applieshere-that there is a serious endangerment to the child's mental, emotional, moral[,]or physical health that would require me to restrict [plaintiff's] visitation. In otherwords, going into this, he is going to get visitation, okay."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court commented on the evidence regarding visitation:

"The burden of proof was on her to show a serious endangerment to thesechildren's moral, emotional, [and] physical health. She has fallen more than woefullyshort of the mark; she hasn't even made out a case.

I have got a picture of the front of your house, which I guess I am supposed toconclude from that it's not a very attractive house, I don't know. Maybe there is someclutter in there, I don't know. They have been dancing around the edge of the penabout marijuana. There has been no evidence other than this photograph. And,incidentally, since I was in [sic] the only one in this room besides the [c]ourt[r]eporter and these two people-the lawyers weren't there at the last hearing-themarijuana wasn't just put in because of [plaintiff]; it was put in because of[defendant].

I made the finding, based on the evidence, that there had been marijuana usageby both parties, okay. If you will read the order, it doesn't say '[defendant].' It saysno marijuana is to be used in front of the children. Now, I know one of them deniedit, and the other denied it, but I am telling you I heard the evidence in the case. Allright.

So, moving back here, I have got photographs of sores on feet. I have gottestimony about a sore eye. I have got a little bit here, and a little bit there. What Idon't have is[-]I don't have any medical evidence[;] I don't have any evidence ofneglect or abuse. I don't have any psychological evidence. I don't have anything. Idon't have diddly squat to show serious endangerment, unless I am just guessing thatthat might be the case."

The court entered a written order filed May 21, 2001. In the order, the court stated,"[T]he [c]ourt views [the order] as an initial determination of custody, visitation, and support,pursuant to [section 14 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/14 (West 2000))],which requires the [c]ourt to make such determination in accordance with the relevant factorsset forth in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et[] seq.[(West 2000)])." The court then proceeded to award custody to defendant and orderedplaintiff to pay child support.

The order established a visitation schedule for plaintiff that included alternateweekends, summer visitation, certain weekday evenings, and holidays and special days. Theorder stated:

"That the visitation schedule and privileges recited herein and awarded to[plaintiff] are found to be reasonable visitation rights in the best interests of the minorchildren, and no evidence has been presented which would lead the [c]ourt toconclude that such visitation would endanger seriously the children's physical, mental,moral[,] or emotional health, all as provided for in [s]ection 607 of [the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2000))]."

Defendant appeals.

Plaintiff did not file a brief in this matter. The record is simple and this court is ableto decide the merits of the case without the aid of a responding brief. See First CapitolMortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495(1976).

The resolution of this case involves an interpretation of the provisions for determiningvisitation under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (the Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/14(West 2000)). Section 14(a)(1) establishes the requirements for a judicial determination ofvisitation. This section reads, in part, as follows:

"The judgment shall contain or explicitly reserve provisions concerning anyduty and amount of child support and may contain provisions concerning the custodyand guardianship of the child, visitation privileges with the child, [and] the furnishingof bond or other security for the payment of the judgment, which the court shalldetermine in accordance with the relevant factors set forth in the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act and any other applicable law of Illinois, to guide thecourt in a finding in the best interests of the child. In determining custody, jointcustody, or visitation, the court shall apply the relevant standards of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act." 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(1) (West 2000).

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly failed to place the burden uponplaintiff to prove that visitation was in the best interests of the child. Section 607 of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/607 (West2000)) creates a presumption in favor of visitation, in effect placing the burden on thecustodial parent. This section reads as follows:

"A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitationrights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriouslythe child's physical, mental, moral[,] or emotional health." 750 ILCS 5/607(a) (West2000).

The trial court's statements before the hearing indicate that it placed the burden on plaintiff. Defendant contends that in a parentage case, as opposed to a divorce, the burden should beupon the noncustodial father.

Defendant relies upon Department of Public Aid ex rel. Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon, 288Ill. App. 3d 424, 680 N.E.2d 509 (1997). In Gagnon, the Fourth District held that unlike acase involving the dissolution of a marriage, the father in a parentage action bears the burdenof proving that visitation is in the best interests of the child. In that case, a father soughtvisitation rights for a girl shortly after blood tests determined that the girl was his daughter. The court addressed the interplay between the Parentage Act and the Marriage Act. Thecourt quoted the relevant portion of section 14(a)(1) of the Parentage Act and rejected theconclusion that this incorporated section 607(a) of the Marriage Act. The court describedthe endangerment standard set forth in this section as "an onerous one." Gagnon, 288 Ill.App. 3d at 428, 680 N.E.2d at 512 (citing In re Marriage of Hanson, 112 Ill. App. 3d 564,568, 445 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1983)).

The court explained its rationale for not incorporating this section of the MarriageAct:

"The reference in section 14(a)(1) of the Parentage Act to the factors set forthin the Marriage Act to determine the best interest of the child is a reference to section602 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/602 (West 1994)), not to section 607 of theMarriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1994)). The section 14(a)(1) reference to'relevant standards' makes it clear that not every rule a court would apply to a parentin a dissolution of marriage case applies with equal force to a parent in a parentagecase. (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(1) (West 1994). There is nopresumption that it is in the best interest of a child to have visitation with a biologicalfather who has had nothing to do with the child for eight years. In fact, the parentalrights of an unmarried father may be terminated where he does not seek to establishpaternity or pay birth expenses or provide support. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n)(2) (West1994) (definition of 'unfit person'). It would be inconsistent to legislatively mandatevisitation for a biological father whose parental rights could be terminated if a petitionseeking that relief were filed." Gagnon, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 680 N.E.2d at 512.

Gagnon held that the burden of proof should be on the noncustodial parent seekingvisitation. The court noted that in some cases the request for visitation might be a vindictiveresponse to a request for child support. The court then concluded that when the noncustodialparent has a genuine interest in the child, the benefit may justify the court awarding visitationbased on the best interests of the child. The court proceeded to find that the trial court'saward of visitation was appropriate because it was supported by the evidence.

We disagree with Gagnon. The Parentage Act requires the court to apply the "relevantstandards" of the Marriage Act to determine custody. The clear import of referring to thestandards that are "relevant" is to direct the court in a parentage case to the sections of theMarriage Act that address the issue raised by the case. If the issue in a case is visitation, thenthe court is to apply the portions of the Marriage Act that establish standards for visitation,and likewise for custody or joint custody.

The Parentage Act makes no distinction between the standards for these issues inparentage cases and those in cases where a marriage is dissolved. Indeed, under the plainlanguage of the Parentage Act, the same standards are to apply in both instances. If section14(a)(1) of the Parentage Act is read as a whole, it is clear that the use of the phrase "relevantstandards" is a directive to apply the corresponding standard outlined in the Marriage Act.The directional prefix to apply the standard that is "relevant" is not an invitation for a courtto select only the portions of the Marriage Act it wishes to apply-it is an instruction to applythe corresponding standard established by the Marriage Act.

The structure of section 14(a)(1) further supports our stance. Section 14(a)(1) beginsby requiring the court to apply the "relevant factors" of the Marriage Act "and any otherapplicable law of Illinois" when determining the best interests of the child for visitation,support, and bond for security. 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(1) (West 2000). In the next sentence, thesection states that the "relevant standards" of the Marriage Act are to be applied whendetermining custody, joint custody, and visitation. The structure of the first two sentencesof this section reinforce the literal application of the standards of the Marriage Act forvisitation in two ways. First, the distinction between "factors" and "standards" makes it clearthat both the factors for assessing the best interests of a child and the standards of proof andpresumption outlined in the Marriage Act are to be applied for visitation. Further, thecontrast between the first two sentences of the section illustrates that courts are limited to thestandards of the Marriage Act when determining visitation. Unlike factors where "otherapplicable law of Illinois" may also be applied, the standards a court must use are limited tothose established by the Marriage Act.

Our decision is supported by the opinion of the First District in In re Parentage ofMelton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476, 479, 732 N.E.2d 11, 13 (2000). In In re Parentage of Melton,a paternity action, a mother petitioned to remove her child from Illinois. The First Districtvacated a ruling by the trial court that had enjoined the mother from leaving the state. Theappellate court held that the trial court lacked authority under the Parentage Act to make suchan injunction.

The In re Parentage of Melton court addressed the interplay between the ParentageAct and the Marriage Act. The court noted that proceedings under both the Parentage Actand the Marriage Act are entirely statutory in origin and that courts have no inherent powersin parentage or divorce actions. Instead, judicial action on such matters is limited to theauthority granted by the respective acts. The court noted that while the Parentage Act adoptssome of the factors, standards, and guidelines of the Marriage Act, it does not broadly conferto the court the powers granted under the Marriage Act. In particular, the Parentage Actgives no power to enjoin parents from removing children from the state.

The In re Parentage of Melton court discussed the nature of visitation under theParentage Act, and it criticized Gagnon for ignoring the language of the Parentage Act. Thecourt pointed out that there was no statutory authority for the shift in the burden of proofannounced in Gagnon. The court stated that it could not accept Gagnon's "strainedconstruction of the phrase 'relevant standards.' " In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3dat 480, 732 N.E.2d at 14. Instead, as explained by In re Parentage of Melton, the ParentageAct requires courts to use the standards for visitation outlined in section 607(a) of theMarriage Act.

In re Parentage of Melton then addressed how the policy concerns alluded to inGagnon did not provide a basis for altering the relevant standards for visitation. The courtsaw no inconsistency between the provisions for terminating the parental rights of unmarriedfathers and the statutory presumption in favor of visitation. If a parent's rights areterminated, he or she no longer benefits from the presumption in favor of visitation. On theother hand, not applying the Marriage Act's presumption in favor of visitation would be inviolation of legislative directive. The court stated:

"The court in Gagnon stated policy grounds for not incorporating the MarriageAct's standards for visitation into the Parentage Act. But the arguments concerningwhat the legislature should have done cannot change the express language of thestatute incorporating 'the relevant standards' of the Marriage Act for determiningvisitation and 'the relevant factors' of the Marriage Act for modifying visitation. Inlight of the arguments presented in Gagnon[,] the legislature might prefer to changethe Parentage Act. But we must enforce the laws enacted by the legislature, not thelaws the legislature ought to have enacted." In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App.3d at 480-81, 732 N.E.2d at 15.

See Wenzelman v. Bennett, 322 Ill. App. 3d 262, 265, 748 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (2001)(Gagnon was not distinguished on the question of wedlock, but on the matter of parentalinvolvement).

The resolution of this issue resolves the other questions presented by defendant in thisappeal. Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in determining, prior to hearing theevidence, that plaintiff was entitled to visitation is based on the trial court's comments at thebeginning of the hearing that the endangerment standard of the Marriage Act applied and thatdefendant had the burden of overcoming a presumption of visitation. As our opinion makesclear, these comments were appropriate.

Defendant also contends that the award of visitation was against the manifest weightof the evidence. Defendant contends that plaintiff discussed legal issues with the children,using them as tools in the litigation, cussed and yelled in an incident, and discussedinappropriate topics with the children. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted thatthe litigation was acrimonious and that it was obvious that both parties had difficulty workingwith each other. The court pointed out that defendant had contested plaintiff's parentage ofthe children despite there being signed birth certificates. The court also stated that it foundsome of the testimony presented on behalf of defendant to lack credence.

Defendant claims that plaintiff abused drugs, pointing specifically to a photograph ofplaintiff with a baggie and plaintiff having taken the children to a Bob Dylan concert. Thecourt did not let the answer to this question go adrift, because the court found that, althoughboth parties denied culpability, both were admonished to refrain from substance abuse. Areview of the record supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant fell short of provingthat visitation was not warranted. See In re Marriage of Dafoe, 324 Ill. App. 3d 254, 259,754 N.E.2d 419, 424 (2001) (the trial court is in best position to evaluate the credibility ofwitnesses and the needs of a child).

Accordingly, the order of the circuit is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

KUEHN and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed:  December 23, 2002

Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J., and

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

Concur

Attorneys John D. Drew, Bryan A. Drew, Drew & Drew, P.C., 905 West Washington,

for Benton, IL 62812

Appellant

Attorney Charles Jines, 646 North 9th Street, Murphysboro, IL 62966 (PRO SE - NO BRIEF

for FILED)

Appellee