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The respondent, K.S., was found to be a delinquent minor based upon her admissionsof guilt for two misdemeanor thefts (720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 2002)). She was placedon probation, and her probation was subsequently revoked. She was placed in the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until her twenty-first birthday. On appeal, therespondent contends that the judgment must be corrected because she has been placed in theDepartment of Corrections (DOC) for a longer period of time than that an adult would haveto serve for committing the same offenses. She also contends that she is entitled to an as-yet-undetermined number of days' credit toward her placement in the DOC. The State confesseserror on the first issue and responds that this court should modify the trial court'sdispositional order to show that she has been placed in the DOC for a period not to exceed364 days.

On February 25, 2003, a petition for an adjudication of wardship was filed. It allegedtwo counts of misdemeanor theft.

On April 28, 2003, the respondent admitted the allegations contained in the juvenilepetition, and the court found her to be a delinquent minor, made her a ward of the court, andplaced her on 18 months' probation.

On November 25, 2003, a petition to revoke probation was filed. It alleged that therespondent violated school rules by leaving school without authority on November 24, 2003.

On April 12, 2004, another petition to revoke probation was filed. It alleged that therespondent was not in the place where she was supposed to be.

On April 26, 2004, the respondent admitted the allegations contained in each of thepetitions to revoke probation, and for each petition the court found that she had violated herprobation. The court set May 10, 2004, for the entry of a dispositional order.

On May 10, 2004, the respondent, age 16, was placed in the DOC "for anindeterminate term."

On appeal, the respondent initially contends that the judgment must be correctedbecause she has been placed in the DOC for a longer period of time than that an adult wouldhave to serve for committing the same offenses. The State responds that this court shouldmodify the trial court's dispositional order to show that the respondent has been placed in theDOC for a period not to exceed 364 days.

The minor relies on her construction of section 5-710(7) of the Juvenile Court Act of1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2002)). Section 5-710(7) provides:

"In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division[,] for a period of time in excess of that period forwhich an adult could be committed for the same act." 705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West2002).

We agree with the minor that the plain language of section 5-710(7) prohibits thecommitment of a juvenile offender to the DOC for a period greater than the maximum adultsentence for the same offense. See In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640, 644, 773 N.E.2d 188,190 (2002).

In this case, the minor admitted committing misdemeanor theft, a Class Amisdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 2002)). The maximum period of incarcerationfor an adult who commits a Class A misdemeanor is 364 days. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(a)(1)(West 2002). Therefore, under section 5-710(7), the maximum period for which the trialcourt could commit the minor to the DOC was the maximum sentence that an adult couldreceive for misdemeanor theft, i.e., 364 days.

The dispositional order committed the minor to the DOC for an indeterminate period. This was in accordance with section 5-750(3) of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:

"[T]he commitment of a delinquent to the Department of Corrections shall befor an indeterminate term which shall automatically terminate upon the delinquentattaining the age of 21 years unless the delinquent is sooner discharged from paroleor custodianship is otherwise terminated in accordance with this Act or as otherwiseprovided for by law." 705 ILCS 405/5-750(3) (West 2002).

Thus, under the plain language of section 5-750(3) of the Act, the indeterminate period forwhich the minor has been committed to the DOC will not automatically terminate until sheattains the age of 21 years.

The trial court entered the dispositional order on May 10, 2004. The minor will attainthe age of 21 years on April 28, 2009. Therefore, if the minor remains committed to theDOC until she attains the age of 21 years, she will have been committed for a period greaterthan the 364-day maximum period for which an adult could be incarcerated for misdemeanortheft. If that occurs, the minor's period of commitment would violate section 5-710(7). SeeIn re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 644, 773 N.E.2d at 191.

For these reasons, we conclude that a trial court that enters a dispositional ordercommitting a minor to the DOC for an indeterminate period must consider whether, if theminor remains in the DOC until she attains the age of 21 years, the commitment periodwould exceed the maximum sentence that an adult could receive for the same offense. If so,to comply with section 5-710(7), the dispositional order must include a limitation on theperiod of the commitment so that it does not exceed the maximum period of incarcerationfor a comparable adult. See In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 645, 773 N.E.2d at 191.

In this case, the trial court did not include in the dispositional order the maximumperiod for which the minor may be committed to the DOC for the offense of misdemeanortheft. Consequently, the order did not comply with section 5-710(7). The minor is thereforeentitled to the modification of the dispositional order to include a limitation on the period ofher commitment to a period that is no greater than the maximum sentence for a comparableadult, i.e., 364 days. See In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 645, 773 N.E.2d at 191.

The respondent lastly contends that she is entitled to a credit for the time she spentin detention toward the time she is required to serve in the DOC. The State responds that therespondent is not entitled to a credit for the time she spent in detention prior to her beingplaced in the DOC. The State alleges that a conflict exists among the districts of the IllinoisAppellate Court and that neither this district nor the Illinois Supreme Court has decided thespecific issue. The State draws our attention to the following cases that granted a credit: Inre E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 696 N.E.2d 846 (4th Dist. 1998); In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App.3d 1070, 762 N.E.2d 717 (4th Dist. 2002); and In re Jermaine J., 336 Ill. App. 3d 900, 784N.E.2d 428 (3d Dist. 2003). The State also draws our attention to In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App.3d 640, 773 N.E.2d 188 (2d Dist. 2002), and In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 701 N.E.2d1170 (2d Dist. 1998), in which the respondents were not granted a credit. The State contendsthat section 5-710(1)(a)(v) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v) (West 2002)) issupportive of its position. Section 5-710(1)(a)(v) provides, in part:

"The court may grant credit on a sentencing order of detention entered under aviolation of probation or violation of conditional discharge under Section 5-720 ofthis Article [(705 ILCS 405/5-720 (West 2002))] for time spent in detention beforethe filing of the petition alleging the violation." 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v) (West2002).

The State is aware of In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 782 N.E.2d 217 (2002), but insists theIllinois Supreme Court found that cases involving juvenile commitments for indeterminateperiods are distinguishable from habitual-juvenile-offender cases, in which determinatecommitments are required.

Section 5-710(1)(b) of the Act provides in relevant part:

"A minor found to be guilty may be committed to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division, under Section 5-750 ***. The time during which aminor is in custody before being released upon the request of a parent, guardian[,] orlegal custodian shall be considered as time spent in detention." 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2002).

This court believes that section 5-710(1)(b) is applicable to the respondent's situation. Thesection of the Act on which the State relies is applicable to "the sentencing order ofdetention." The respondent is not seeking a credit on a "sentencing order of detention" butis seeking a credit for the time she spent in detention toward the time she is required to servein the DOC.

In In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 701 N.E.2d 1170 (1998), the respondent wasadjudicated a delinquent minor due to his commission of aggravated discharge of a firearm(720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West 1996)). He was placed in the DOC for an indeterminateterm. On appeal, the respondent argued that, like adult offenders, he was entitled to receivecredit against the maximum term of "incarceration" for the time he spent in predispositioncustody at the youth home as a result of the offense for which the subsequent "sentence" wasimposed. The appellate court found that juveniles are accorded favorable treatment notnormally available to adult criminal defendants and that a delinquency proceeding is not inthe usual sense an adversarial proceeding but is one to be administered in a spirit of humaneconcern for and to promote the welfare of the minor. In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 331-32, 701 N.E.2d at 1173. The court contrasted certain provisions of the Act with similarprovisions of the Criminal Code of 1961. The court held, "Because proceedings under theJuvenile Court Act [of 1987] are not criminal, and juvenile offenders are not consideredcriminals, do not suffer the consequences of a conviction, and are not given 'sentences' as incriminal proceedings, *** the credit-against-sentence provision of section 5-8-7(b) of theUnified Code [of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 1996))] does not apply to a case*** where a juvenile delinquent ward has been committed for an indeterminate term in theDOC." In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 332, 701 N.E.2d at 1174. This court respectfullydisagrees with the holding of In re J.J.M. This court believes that fundamental fairnessrequires that adults and juveniles be treated similarly when credit toward their incarcerationin the DOC is at issue.

In In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 782 N.E.2d 217 (2002), the respondent wasadjudicated a habitual juvenile offender and committed to the DOC until his twenty-firstbirthday, as mandated by section 5-815(f) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000)). The appellate court held that the respondent was entitled to a credit for the time he spent incustody before sentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a habitual juvenile offenderis entitled to receive predisposition credit against a determinate sentence. In re B.L.S., 202Ill. 2d at 512-13, 782 N.E.2d at 219. While the court expressly stated that the issue beforeit was confined to whether a habitual juvenile offender sentenced to a determinate term isentitled to receive a credit for predisposition detention (In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 516, 782N.E.2d at 221), this court believes that certain statements made by the court in In re B.L.S.allows this court to grant the respondent in the case at bar a credit for time she spent indetention.

The Illinois Supreme Court referred to section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code ofCorrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2000)) and the council commentary thereunder (730ILCS Ann. 5/5-8-7, Council Commentary, at 622 (Smith-Hurd 1997)). The court found thatthe council commentary indicates that the legislature's intent is that offenders receive a creditfor all the time spent in confinement. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 517, 782 N.E.2d at 222. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that it had stated that the credit requirement of section 5-8-7(b) is meant to account for all the time served in confinement for a particular offense andthat the purpose of the credit requirement of section 5-8-7(b) is to ensure that offenders donot ultimately remain incarcerated for periods in excess of their eventual sentences. In reB.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 518, 782 N.E.2d at 222. The court also noted that section 5-8-7(b) doesnot restrict the right to a credit for time served to adult offenders. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2dat 518, 782 N.E.2d at 223. The court further noted that it has previously recognized thatamendments to the Act represented a fundamental shift from the singular goal ofrehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenileoffenders accountable and that virtually all the constitutional requirements of a criminal trialhave been introduced into juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 519,782 N.E.2d at 223. The court lastly noted that the incarcerated juvenile's liberty is restrainedjust as effectively as that of an adult offender. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 519, 782 N.E.2dat 223.

In light of the Illinois Supreme Court's comments in In re B.L.S., this court doubts thecurrent validity of the reasoning in In re J.J.M. for denying a juvenile offender a creditagainst his or her commitment time in the DOC. No issue is raised concerning the revocationof the respondent's probation and her placement in the DOC; therefore, that aspect of thejudgment is affirmed. That portion of the judgment placing the respondent in the DOC foran indeterminate period is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the circuit court to entera new judgment in conformity with this opinion and to award the respondent a credit for thetime she spent in detention prior to her placement in the DOC.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

GOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.