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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case where the circuit court rejected a request to assign a future structured-settlement payment in exchange for a lump-sum payment. We are asked to decide whetherthe trial judge erred in doing so.

In early 1988, William Powless (Powless ) sustained injuries when he was accidentlystruck in the eye with a chain by a childhood friend. Powless was nine years old. His parentand natural guardian brought a claim and settled it under a homeowner's policy issued byPekin Insurance Company (Pekin). Pursuant to the settlement agreement, a structured-payment plan was set up on behalf of Powless.

The structured-settlement agreement provided that Powless would receive a lump-sum payment of $30,000. In addition, he was to receive the following payments uponreaching majority age: $20,000 on January 14, 1998; $20,000 on January 14, 2000; $20,000on January 14, 2005; $20,000 on January 14, 2010; $20,000 on January 14, 2015; and$20,000 on January 14, 2020. The settlement agreement also provided that Pekin would"purchase an Annuity Contract through or with SAFECO Life Insurance Company."

Pekin complied and purchased the annuity contract through Safeco Life InsuranceCompany (Safeco). Under the annuity contract, Powless was the named beneficiary, butPekin was the owner of the annuity. The annuity contract contained a provision thatprovided, "[b]enefit payments may not be advanced, accelerated, or commuted."

On December 15, 1998, Powless entered into an agreement to assign his January 14,2000, structured-settlement payment to J.G. Wentworth (Wentworth) in exchange for alump-sum payment at that time and an additional lump-sum payment upon Wentworth'sreceipt of the full $20,000 on January 14, 2000.

Shortly after entering into the agreement to assign, Powless petitioned the trial courtfor its approval of the assignment. His request was made pursuant to section 155.34(b) ofthe Illinois Insurance Code, a provision that reads as follows:

"No person who is the beneficiary of a structured settlement of a claim for personalinjury may assign in any manner the payments of the settlement without priorapproval of the circuit court of the county where an action was or could have beenmaintained." 215 ILCS 5/155.34(b) (West 1998).

Initially, the trial court was not troubled with the request. On January 20, 1999,Powless received court approval to assign his January 14, 2000, payment. However, shortlythereafter, Safeco filed a motion for relief from the court order approving the assignment andfor leave to file objections to the petition to assign. Next, Wentworth petitioned to interveneand to participate in the hearing on the petition to approve the assignment.

On June 9, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the pending motion. During thehearing, the trial court learned the reason behind Powless's decision to assign the futurepayment. Powless had a six-month-old child. He intended to marry the child's mother andsupport the two of them with his full-time job, at which he earned $11.34 per hour. Heneeded to assign the structured-settlement payment due in the year 2000 in order to pay billsassociated with the birth of his child. The trial court also learned that Powless consultedwith the attorney who originally represented him and his mother on the personal injury suit. His attorney advised him of the ramifications of such an assignment. The attorney alsoinformed the court that he believed that Powless's need for the immediate cash waslegitimate.

Finally, the trial court heard that in exchange for the assignment of the one payment,Wentworth would initially pay Powless $10,012.25, and upon receipt of the full $20,000,Wentworth would pay Powless an additional $7,174.34. Wentworth would actually receive$2,813.41 of the structured-settlement payment.

On June 16, 1999, the trial court granted Wentworth's petition to intervene, grantedSafeco's motion for relief from its January 20, 1999, order, and sustained Safeco's objectionsto the petition for assignment. We do not know what convinced the trial court to reverseitself and to sustain Safeco's objections. It did not explain the reasons for its decision.Therefore, we will address all of the arguments that Safeco advanced in its objections to theassignment.

Before we address the issues raised in this appeal, we note that the date on whichSafeco would have been required to make its next payment to Powless-January 14, 2000- has passed. The briefing schedule in this court extended beyond that date. No party in thiscase raises the issue of this appeal's mootness.

Even though we cannot render relief to the parties, we believe we should address thequestions that this appeal presents. The language of Safeco's annuity contract could beraised again in this case on later payments or in other Safeco cases statewide and furthercould be raised by other structured-settlement companies in efforts to thwart assignments. For these reasons, we will address the issues raised in this appeal.

Initially, we must address Safeco's challenge over Wentworth's standing to bring thisappeal. Safeco argues that Wentworth lacks standing because the trial court's ordersustaining its objections "has no direct, immediate, or substantial effect" on Wentworth-anonparty. See Success National Bank v. Specialist Eye Care Center, S.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d74, 76, 710 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1999). We find that this argument lacks merit.

Wentworth sought and received the right to intervene at the trial court level becauseWentworth's business relationship with Powless was clearly going to be affected by the trialcourt's ultimate determination. In fact, because the trial court sustained Safeco's objectionafter having previously granted Powless's request for leave to assign one of hisstructured-settlement payments, Wentworth is out the $2,813.41 it would have earned. Thisloss of income is clearly sufficient to show that Wentworth was directly and immediatelyprejudiced by the trial court's judgment and that Wentworth would potentially benefit by areversal of that judgment. See St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital v. Kuczaj, 174 Ill. App. 3d268, 271, 528 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1988).

The fact that Powless did not appeal the trial court's decision is not relevant to thisparticular standing issue because the trial court's order directly interfered with Wentworth'sown business interests. As Wentworth meets the requirements for standing, we address themerits of Wentworth's appeal.

On appeal, Wentworth contends that the trial court erroneously interpreted thepurpose of section 155.34 of the Illinois Insurance Code, failed to apply the appropriatecontract law criteria, and erroneously sustained Safeco's objections to Powless's petition forassignment.

Section 155.34 of the Illinois Insurance Code grants the circuit court discretion toapprove or disapprove an assignment of structured-settlement payments. Therefore, asdiscretion is vested in the circuit court, we shall review its disapproval of the assignmentunder an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Green v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 312 Ill.App. 3d 577, 580, 727 N.E.2d 393, 396 (2000).

The first argument that Safeco advanced in opposition to the assignment was that thelanguage of the structured-settlement contract and the annuity contract prohibited Powlessfrom assigning his right to benefit payments.

Construing a settlement and/or annuity contract involves questions of law, and ourduty is to effectuate the intent of the parties to the contract. See Henderson v. RoadwayExpress, 308 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (1999). "The intent of theparties must be determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of thecontract, unless the contract is ambiguous." Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 548, 720 N.E.2dat 1110. The parties to a contract are free to include any terms they choose, as long as thoseterms are not against public policy and do not contravene some positive rule of law. SeeMcMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d 935, 945, 582 N.E.2d 1313,1319 (1991). Such a contract is binding on both parties, and it is the duty of the court toconstrue it and enforce the contract as made. See McMahon, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 582N.E.2d at 1319.

Few Illinois decisions have addressed the precise assignment question at issue in thiscase. The cases that Safeco relies upon in support of its argument are clearly different fromthis one because of the language used in the settlement and annuity contracts. In Henderson,the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision denying a request for the approval ofan assignment of structured-settlement payments. The settlement agreement in Hendersonhad an antiassignment provision that clearly and unambiguously prohibited the plaintiff fromassigning any of his periodic payments. Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 547, 720 N.E.2d at1109. In Green, the court also upheld an antiassignment clause that contained the samelanguage as the clauses in the Henderson case, where a plaintiff attempted to sell hisperiodic payments from a structured settlement to a factoring company in exchange for alump-sum payment. Green, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 581, 727 N.E.2d at 396-97.

What distinguishes our case from the Henderson and Green cases is a total absenceof any antiassignment language in either the structured-settlement agreement or the annuitycontract. Safeco argued to the trial court and in its appellate brief that the contracts at issuespecifically preclude assignment. However, the structured-settlement agreement betweenPowless and Pekin contains no antiassignment clause of any kind. The annuity contractbetween Pekin and Safeco, by which Pekin financed the structured settlement, only containsa clause that states, "[b]enefit payments may not be advanced, accelerated, or commuted." The annuity contract contains no language specifically addressing an assignment.

Safeco contends that as Pekin owns the annuity contract and Powless is merely thebeneficiary, Powless has no authority to assign any payments owed to him pursuant to thatcontract. Safeco cites Allstate Insurance Co. v. American Bankers Insurance Co., 882 F.2d856 (4th Cir. 1989), and Johnson v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227(C.D. Calif. 1998).

Safeco is correct that Powless is only the beneficiary under its annuity contract withPekin. However, Powless did not attempt to assign his rights to future payments under theannuity contract. Powless's contract with Wentworth clearly contemplates an assignmentof his rights pursuant to his settlement agreement. This simple fact clearly distinguishes thiscase from Allstate Insurance Co. In Allstate Insurance Co., the federal court of appealsdetermined that the beneficiary could not assign rights to future payments and the court onlymentioned the underlying settlement in the context that the annuity contract was purchasedas a result of a structured settlement. Allstate Insurance Co., 882 F. 2d at 858-60. This casecan also be distinguished from Johnson, on the basis that the annuity contract in that caseclearly prohibited assignments by the personal injury victims. Johnson, 26 F. Supp. 2d at1227. Here, there is no language prohibiting assignments in either legal document.

Powless and Wentworth were not asking the court to advance, accelerate, or commutea benefit payment. This Safeco prohibitive-benefits clause deals with the timing, duration,or amount of a payment-not with the assignment of a payment. Judging from the clear andlogical meaning of the language of the settlement agreement and the annuity contract, itappears that the parties did not intend to forbid Powless from assigning benefit payments. The clause that Safeco likens to an antiassignment clause only intended to preclude benefitpayments on any date other than that contained within the contracts.

We will not find an ambiguity in the contractual language where none exists. See Inre Estate of Constantine, 305 Ill. App. 3d 256, 260, 711 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (1999), citingAir Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 706 N.E.2d 882 (1999). Thus, tothe extent that the trial court relied upon Safeco's contractual arguments, it failed to upholdthe clear terms of the structured-settlement agreement and the annuity contract. Accordingly, the order that sustained Safeco's objections amounted to an abuse of discretion.

Safeco pointed out in its objections that section 155.34 restricts transfers byassignment. Of course, Safeco was absolutely correct. However, since our legislature didnot prohibit transfers by assignment, it clearly contemplated situations in which anassignment would be permissible. Rather than forbid assignments, the law merely requiresthat the party seeking to assign a benefit first seek and receive permission. 215 ILCS5/155.34(b) (West 1998).

The intent of the Illinois House of Representatives in enacting section 155.34 is clearfrom a transcript of the house debate. The transcript reveals that the legislators had nointention of prohibiting a beneficiary from assigning a structured-settlement payment to athird party. In response to that question, the legislators stated that "[the beneficiaries] could[assign their rights to payments] but they would have to go back to court ***." 90th Ill.Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 10, 1997, at 95 (statements of Representatives Langand Leitch). The legislators also noted that this bill would simply serve as a precaution tothe beneficiaries in that "before anyone could [assign their rights], *** they would have togo back to court and have it reviewed and approved." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, April 10, 1997, at 96 (statement of Representative Leitch).

We can find nothing in the statutory language, or in the debates that led to it, thatwould seek to restrict an assignment of a future benefit payment under the circumstances presented here.

In its objections to the assignment, Safeco also contended that it could possibly loseits favorable tax treatment pursuant to section 130(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code(26 U.S.C.