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JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Harry Cain (respondent) was found to be a sexually violent person under the SexuallyViolent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Inaccordance with section 55 of the Act (725 ILCS 207/55 (West 2000)), Cain underwent a 30-month evaluation. Cain filed a motion to appoint an independent expert for purposes of thisevaluation. The circuit court of Christian County found that no probable cause existed towarrant a full hearing to determine whether Cain still was a sexually violent person, and thecourt further denied Cain's request for an expert. Cain appeals these adverse rulings.

While his appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Kansas v.Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002). Based on his understandingof Crane, Cain filed a motion for his immediate release from custody. The circuit courtdenied Cain's motion. Cain appeals this ruling also, and his appeals have been consolidatedfor review. We affirm.

Cain originally pled guilty to the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and wassentenced to five years' imprisonment. Days before Cain's scheduled release date, the Statefiled a petition to detain Cain under the Act. Cain subsequently was found by a jury to be asexually violent person and was committed to the Department of Human Services. Thisjudgment was upheld on direct appeal. In re Detention of Cain, No. 5-99-0197 (March 30,2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). In April 2000,Cain filed his first petition for conditional release under section 60 of the Act (725 ILCS207/60 (West 2000)). Initially, the circuit court found that probable cause existed to believethat it was not substantially probable that Cain would engage in acts of sexual violence ifreleased, and the court ordered a full hearing. At the full hearing, however, the courtdetermined that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Cain was still asexually violent person and should not be released. Cain appealed this ruling, whichultimately was consolidated with his appeal from the finding that no probable cause existedto warrant a full hearing to determine whether he still was a sexually violent person after his18-month evaluation. Our court subsequently affirmed the judgments of the circuit court. In re Detention of Cain, No. 5-01-0083 (January 15, 2003) (unpublished order under Rule23).

Cain next underwent his 30-month evaluation as mandated by section 55 of the Act. The court again found that probable cause did not exist to warrant a full hearing to determinewhether Cain was still a sexually violent person. The court also denied Cain's request for theappointment of an independent expert. Cain appealed these adverse rulings and furthercomplained that he had been denied due process because he had not been present for thehearing. The same day, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Crane. UnderCrane, the permissible civil commitment of a person as sexually violent requires a findingthat the individual has "serious difficulty in controlling [his or her] behavior." Crane, 534U.S. at 413, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 122 S. Ct. at 870. Cain filed a motion for his immediaterelease from custody, based on Crane. The court denied Cain's motion. Cain's appeal fromthis denial was, in turn, consolidated with the appeal from the adverse rulings based on his30-month evaluation.

Cain argues on appeal that probable cause exists to warrant a hearing on whether heis still a sexually violent person, given that his expert opined he no longer is a sexuallyviolent person. Cain also finds fault with the court's refusal to appoint an independent expertfor his 30-month evaluation when the State was allowed to have an expert. Cain furtherargues that due process required his presence at the probable cause hearing. For his finalpoint on appeal, Cain asserts that the State failed to show "proof of serious difficulty incontrolling behavior" as mandated by Crane (534 U.S. at 413, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 122 S.Ct. at 870).

The Act provides for the periodic reexamination of those individuals subject to civilcommitment under the Act and allows the individual at the time of each reexamination theright to petition the court for a discharge from commitment. 725 ILCS 207/55(a), 65(b)(1)(West 2000). The circuit court then sets a probable cause hearing to determine whether factsexist that warrant a hearing on whether the person is still a sexually violent person. 725ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Whether or not probable cause exists to warrant a furtherevidentiary hearing is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court. In re Ottinger,333 Ill. App. 3d 114, 120, 775 N.E.2d 203, 208 (2002). Absent an abuse of that discretion,we will not disturb the court's probable cause determination. In re Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3dat 120, 775 N.E.2d at 208. We find no abuse of discretion in this instance.

At the probable cause hearing, the State offered the 30-month psychologicalreexamination report submitted by Dr. Phil Reidda. The reexamination consisted of a reviewof Cain's treatment progress, psychological testing, a clinical interview, and risk analysis. Dr. Reidda, consistently with his previous evaluations, diagnosed Cain with pedophiliatoward males and females and a personality disorder with antisocial traits. He further notedthat Cain remained exceedingly resistive to clinical treatment and instead focused his effortsprimarily on legal issues. According to Dr. Reidda, the risk analysis also demonstrated thatCain has a substantial and continuing risk of reoffending. He therefore opined that Cain wasstill a sexually violent person in need of clinical treatment in a secure facility. Based on Dr.Reidda's report alone, the court properly found that probable cause did not exist to concludethat Cain was no longer a sexually violent person entitled to a discharge. The court,however, did not rely solely on this report; it also reviewed prior reexamination reports tomeasure Cain's treatment progress. We agree that each report represents an individual partof a person's treatment history, which must be considered as a whole. We therefore concludethat the court properly considered past reports. We also find no fault with the court's decisionnot to appoint another expert. The court specifically noted that appointing Cain's expert atthat point would have been of no assistance to the court, given that there had been absolutelyno change in Cain's condition and he had been resistant to sex offender treatment. In thecourt's own words, "[The expert], you know, can't say that facts are happening that aren'thappening." While the Act allows for the appointment of an expert for an indigent person,it certainly does not require a court to take such action. The use of the term "may" in section55(a) reveals a clear intent by the legislature to provide courts with the discretion to appointsuch an expert. We cannot say that the court improperly exercised its discretion in denyingCain's motion to appoint an expert at this stage of the proceedings. See In re Ottinger, 333Ill. App. 3d at 118, 775 N.E.2d at 207 (section 25 does not apply to sections 55, 60, and 65of the Act (725 ILCS 207/25, 55, 60, 65 (West 2000))); cf. People v. Botruff, 331 Ill. App.3d 486, 771 N.E.2d 570 (2002), appeal allowed, 201 Ill. 2d 579, 786 N.E.2d 188 (2002). Accordingly, we find no error under the circumstances presented.

We likewise conclude that procedural due process does not entitle a committed personto attend the probable cause hearing for a postcommitment reexamination, as Cain contends. Section 65(b)(1) clearly states, "The committed person has a right to have an attorneyrepresent him or her at the probable cause hearing, but the person is not entitled to be presentat the probable cause hearing." 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Section 65(b)(1)adequately protects a person's liberty interest by explicitly providing the committed personwith the right to have an attorney represent him at the probable cause hearing. Civilcommitment is nonpunitive and lasts only so long as is necessary to address an individual'sproblems. "Because this is a lesser intrusion on the liberty of the [individual] than a criminalconviction, it triggers lesser procedural due process rights." In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d755, 765, 690 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (1998). Our conclusion is supported by the fact that Cain'spresence at the hearing would have added no value to the proceedings. The probable causehearing consists only of a review of the reexamination reports and arguments on behalf ofthe parties. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). The committed person has sufficientopportunity to consult with counsel about the reexamination report prior to the hearing, andany possible false statements made at the hearing can be corrected by counsel, who certainlywould be familiar with the contents of the report. We believe that the concerns raised inBotruff, and relied upon by Cain in making his argument, are unsubstantiated. We thereforedecline to follow Botruff. We further note that the Act contains numerous otherpostcommitment procedural safeguards against the erroneous deprivation of a person's libertyinterest. We therefore conclude that Cain was not deprived of any procedural due processin this instance and that the court did not err in conducting the probable cause hearing inCain's absence.

For his final point on appeal, Cain argues the court erred in denying his petition forhis immediate release under the reasoning of Crane. Specifically, Cain contends that theState has yet to provide proof of a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Severalcases have determined that the Act satisfies the requirements of due process and that theAct's definition of mental disorder sufficiently narrows the class of individuals eligible forcommitment to those who are unable to control their dangerousness. Due process thereforedoes not require a jury to make an additional finding that a person lacks the capacity tocontrol his sexually violent behavior. See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 117,123, 780 N.E.2d 342, 347 (2002), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 95397; People v.Kastman, 335 Ill. App. 3d 87, 101-02, 779 N.E.2d 333, 345 (2002); In re Detention of Isbell,333 Ill. App. 3d 906, 912-13, 777 N.E.2d 994, 999 (2002); People v. Hancock, 329 Ill. App.3d 367, 375, 771 N.E.2d 459, 465 (2002). These cases primarily relied upon the IllinoisSupreme Court's opinion in In re Detention of Varner, 198 Ill. 2d 78, 84-86, 759 N.E.2d 560,563-64 (2001). In re Detention of Varner, however, is no longer settled law, in that theUnited States Supreme Court vacated the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment and remandedthe cause for further consideration in light of Crane. Varner v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 154L. Ed. 2d 3, 123 S. Ct. 69 (2002) (mem.); see also In re Detention of Traynoff, No. 2-01-0880(Ill. App. May 8, 2003). We believe, however, that Cain's commitment as a sexually violentperson necessarily involved "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior" consistentwith Crane (334 U.S. at 413, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 122 S. Ct. at 870). See Swanson, 335 Ill.App. 3d at 123, 780 N.E.2d at 347; In re Detention of Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 912-13, 777N.E.2d at 999. In order to commit a person, the State must first prove that the individualsuffers from a mental disorder that affects his or her ability to control his or her conduct. See725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2000). And to find the individual sexually dangerous under theAct, the trier of fact must find that the State proved that the person is dangerous because heor she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that he or she willengage in further acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000). There istherefore no need for the trier of fact to make additional findings regarding that individual'sability to control his or her conduct. See Swanson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 123, 780 N.E.2d at347. The same can be said for his postcommitment proceedings. The State had the burdenof proving under section 65 of the Act, by clear and convincing evidence, that Cain was stilla sexually violent person, which necessarily involved "proof of serious difficulty incontrolling behavior" by definition. Accordingly, the court correctly denied Cain's petitionfor his immediate release. We find no error.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court ofChristian County.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: June 18, 2003

Justices: Honorable James K. Donovan, J.

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J., and

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.,

Concur

Attorney Quinn M. Broverman, Broverman Professional Corporation, 113 East Main Cross,

for Taylorville, IL 62568

Appellant

Attorneys James E. Ryan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Joel D.Bertocchi, Solicitor

for General, State of Illinois, William L. Browers, Lionel W. Weaver, Assistant

Appellee Attorneys General, 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601