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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

Carolyn Hester appeals from the trial court's July 12, 2002, order dismissing her caseon the basis of the running of the statute of limitations and the statute of repose, and she alsoappeals from the trial court's August 28, 2002, order denying her motion to reconsider theearlier order. We reverse and remand.

Carolyn Hester (Carolyn) was an employee of Collinsville Unit 10 School District. On November 14, 1990, while working, she fell down a flight of stairs and sustained bodilyinjuries and damages.

She retained David Dugan as her attorney on March 14, 1991. The record does notdetail if he was a sole practitioner or worked in a firm at the time of this retention. Anapplication for adjustment of claim was filed with the Illinois Industrial Commission onAugust 2, 1991, by attorney Theodore Diaz of Lakin & Herndon, P.C.

On August 19, 1993, a stipulation was filed with the Illinois Industrial Commissionto substitute Theodore Diaz, and the law firm of Pitts, Dugan & Diaz, P.C., for The LakinLaw Firm as Carolyn's attorneys.

On October 31, 1994, the case was called for hearing. No one appeared on Carolyn'sbehalf and the arbitrator dismissed the case for want of prosecution. A notice of thisdismissal was mailed to Carolyn's attorneys, the defendants herein, on December 9, 1994. The notice stated, "[U]nless a petition to reinstate is filed with the Industrial Commissionwithin 60 days of receipt of this dismissal, this cause cannot be reopened." A motion toreinstate the case was filed on February 2, 1995. On March 7, 1995, the arbitrator heard themotion to reinstate and continued the motion until December 3, 1996, noting on the orderthat the "case may be reinstated at trial only."

On September 20, 1995, attorney Theodore Diaz made a settlement demand, thedetails of which are not contained within the record. On May 13, 1996, Theodore Diazreceived a $10,000 offer to settle from the attorney for the school district. The file containsno reference that this offer was ever conveyed to Carolyn. On September 4, 1996,Collinsville Unit 10 School District filed a petition to strike the motion to reinstate. Themotion was denied on October 1, 1996. On November 6, 1996, the school district submittedto Theodore Diaz a reduced $5,000 offer to settle the case.

Nothing happened on December 3, 1996, which was the date the arbitrator hadindicated was the final reinstatement date and the date the trial was supposed to have beenheld.

On January 8, 1997, Theodore Diaz conveyed to Carolyn the $5,000 offer to settle thecase. By this time, Carolyn resided in Arkansas. She rejected the offer on January 20, 1997. By a letter from attorney Rod Pitts to Carolyn, dated April 13, 2000, we know thatTheodore Diaz's secretary reported that Carolyn had frequently called the office forinformation from October 1997 to January 29, 1999. This secretary spoke with Carolyn onseveral occasions and also reported that Carolyn had spoken with Theodore Diaz on occasionbut that the content of these discussions was unknown. The letter from attorney Rod Pittswas in response to a letter Carolyn had written to the firm. Rod Pitts advised Carolyn to hirean attorney to review this matter.

Finally, on December 10, 2001, attorney Theodore Diaz and his firm, Dugan & Diaz,P.C., notified Carolyn by letter that her workers' compensation case had been dismissed withprejudice, apologetically stating that they had no "legitimate excuse" for failing to advise herof that fact. Theodore Diaz provided Carolyn with his malpractice insurance company'sname and address and his policy number.

On March 1, 2002, Carolyn filed a legal malpractice case against Theodore Diaz,David Dugan, and Dugan & Diaz, P.C. The complaint alleged malpractice in allowing hercase to be dismissed in 1994 and also contained allegations of misrepresentation related tothe failure to advise her of the true status of her case.

On May 28, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations and the statute of repose began running on October 31, 1994, when the orderof dismissal was entered, and that neither the discovery rule nor equitable estoppel wasavailable to expand either statute.

Carolyn responded on June 13, 2002, and in this response asked the trial court to granther request to amend her complaint to add the additional facts contained within the April 13,2000, letter from Rod Pitts. The defendants replied to the response on July 9, 2002.

The motion to dismiss was argued and granted on July 12, 2002. Carolyn filed amotion to reconsider on July 24, 2002. On August 28, 2002, the trial court denied themotion. Carolyn appeals.

On an appeal from a trial court's involuntary dismissal of a complaint pursuant tosection 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), we mustdetermine " 'whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precludedthe dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter oflaw.' " Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 186 Ill. 2d 104, 109-10, 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (1999)(quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17, 619N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993)). In other words, our review is de novo. In re Estate of Mayfield,288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 542, 680 N.E.2d 784, 789 (1997). If a motion to dismiss is filed uponany of the possible bases listed in section 2-619, the party opposing the motion can present"affidavits or other proof denying the facts alleged or establishing facts obviating thegrounds of defect." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(c) (West 2000).

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is two years "from the time the personbringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for which damagesare sought." 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) (West 2000). The statute of limitations incorporatesthe "discovery rule," which serves to toll the limitations period to the time when a personknows or should reasonably know of his or her injury. Sorenson v. Law Offices of TheodorePoehlmann, 327 Ill. App. 3d 706, 708, 764 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (2002). At issue in this caseis the statute of repose for legal malpractice. Section 13-214.3 of the Code of CivilProcedure provides as follows: "An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise*** against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professionalservices" "may not be commenced in any event more than 6 years after the date on which theact or omission occurred." 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 2000). The statute of reposeis designed "to place an outer limit on the time for commencing an action." Sorenson, 327Ill. App. 3d at 708, 764 N.E.2d at 1230. The statute of repose operates to " 'curtail the 'longtail' of liability that results from the discovery rule.' " Sorenson, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 764N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting Meyers v. Underwood, 316 Ill. App. 3d 970, 985-86, 738 N.E.2d118, 129 (2000)). If the statute of repose did not exist, then the statute of limitations, withits discovery rule, would essentially be limitless in certain undiscovered situations. Sorenson, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 764 N.E.2d at 1230 (relying on Meyers, 316 Ill. App. 3dat 986, 738 N.E.2d at 129 (relying on Goodman v. Harbor Market, Ltd., 278 Ill. App. 3d684, 691, 663 N.E.2d 13, 19 (1995))).

A statute of repose is not tied in any way to an accrual of a cause of action, andtherefore, the " 'injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.' " Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 663 N.E.2d at 18 (quoting Bradway v. American NationalRed Cross, 992 F.2d 298, 301 (11th Cir. 1993)).

Initially, we must address the question of when the statutes began to run. Carolynfiled her cause of action on March 1, 2002. The defendants argue that the relevant date wasthe date when the workers' compensation case was dismissed for want ofprosecution-October 31, 1994. Applying that date, the defendants argue that the statute oflimitations ran on October 31, 1996, while the statute of repose expired on October 31, 2000. Carolyn argues that the relevant date was December 3, 1996, the date by which the arbitratorindicated that the case could be reinstated "at trial only." Utilizing this later date, the statuteof limitations would not have run until December 3, 1998, while the statute of repose wouldnot have expired until December 3, 2002.

With respect to the arguments presented by counsel, there seems to be no doubt thatthe statute of limitations expired in this case prior to the malpractice suit's filing date.⁽¹⁾ Atissue, then, is the expiration of the statute of repose. The statute of repose for legalmalpractice begins upon "the last act of representation with regard to the omission uponwhich the malpractice is founded." O'Brien v. Scovil, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1090, 774N.E.2d 466, 468 (2002). "Although omissions may cause the injury, those omissions mustoccur in the context of some affirmative acts of representation. When the acts ofrepresentation end, the period of repose must begin, even if the continuing omissions maycontribute to injury." Fricka v. Bauer, 309 Ill. App. 3d 82, 87, 722 N.E.2d 718, 722 (1999).

We conclude that the applicable date is the earlier, October 31, 1994, date. We reachthis determination because of the finality of the dismissal. Malpractice occurred at that timewhen the case was allowed to be dismissed for want of prosecution. While there was caseactivity both within and without the workers' compensation file after that date, that activitydoes not change the status of the case, which was "dismissed." If filing a motion forreinstatement, without the occurrence of an actual reinstatement, bumped back the beginningof the statute of repose, then, conceivably, there might never be an effective termination tolitigation. That is especially true in this case, where the setting leaves us to wonder if thecase could not yet be resurrected. We cannot conclude that the failure to appear at theDecember 3, 1996, setting was the relevant act or omission. As of that date, the case hadbeen dismissed. There were no guarantees relative to reinstatement on that date. We willnot speculate that simply because reinstatement is freely allowed in the workers'compensation arena, this particular case would have enjoyed that treatment. No one canknow that for certain.

The filing of the lawsuit on March 1, 2002, was not timely under either the statute of limitations or the statute of repose.

The final matter to be determined on appeal is whether the trial court appropriatelydismissed this case in light of the estoppel allegations. Did Carolyn adequately raise theestoppel issue, and if so, did the actions of the defendants equitably bar the defendants fromraising the statute of limitations and the statute of repose? In her complaint, Carolyn allegesthat during the seven years following the dismissal of her case, her attorneys failed to adviseher that her case had been dismissed. She alleges that attorney Theodore Diaz "continuedto tell and reassure Carolyn that her case was pending before the Illinois IndustrialCommission and was proceeding as it should, knowing when he made these representationsthat they were untrue." She also alleged that in making those statements, attorney TheodoreDiaz "intended or reasonably expected that she would believe and rely on the representationshe made to her." Carolyn stated that she relied in good faith on his statements, had no reasonto disbelieve him, and "was not in a position to inspect her file at the Illinois IndustrialCommission[,] which is located in Chicago, Illinois." She alleged prejudice in her good-faithreliance upon Theodore Diaz's misrepresentations. Carolyn finally alleged that TheodoreDiaz "was fully aware of the statutory time limit for making this claim throughout the timethat he was misrepresenting the status of her underlying claim to [her][] and intended orreasonably expected Carolyn Hester to rely on misrepresentations made by him throughoutthat time, so that her time for bringing this claim would expire."

It seems clear that while the allegations are not precisely labeled as being designedto equitably estop the defendants from raising the statutes of limitations and repose inresponse to her complaint, the allegations are sufficiently clear that such a claim is raised.

The defendants argue that they should not be equitably estopped from raising theargument because Carolyn could have independently discovered the dismissal of her claimat any time, and they cite McIntosh v. Cueto, 323 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390, 752 N.E.2d 640, 644(2001), in support of this position.

In McIntosh v. Cueto, this court found that the claim was barred by both the statuteof limitations and the statute of repose and that the defendants were not equitably estoppedfrom raising those defenses because the plaintiffs' complaint was somewhat deficient in itspleading of the claim and because they should have discovered the failings of their attorney. McIntosh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 391-92, 752 N.E.2d at 645-46. Specifically, the plaintiffsaccused their attorney of not responding to their numerous calls and letters relative towhether or not a medical malpractice case had been filed on their behalf. McIntosh, 323 Ill.App. 3d at 390, 752 N.E.2d at 645. We concluded that because all the plaintiffs had to dowas contact the circuit clerk's office to ascertain whether or not a case had been filed, it wasunreasonable to place trust and confidence in the unanswered calls and letters of thisattorney. McIntosh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 752 N.E.2d at 645.

We find that this case is factually distinguishable from McIntosh v. Cueto, in thatCarolyn's case was actually filed, her attorney and his staff did not ignore her calls andletters, from Theodore Diaz's own admission via correspondence he neglected to advise herthat her case had been dismissed, and the ascertainment of the status of her case was not assimple as a check of the courthouse records. For these reasons, we conclude that Carolynis not barred from raising the issue of equitable estoppel. We further conclude that given thisrather unique set of facts, a genuine issue of material fact precluded a dismissal at this stageof the pleadings on the basis of the statutes of limitations and repose. See Hopewell v.Vitullo, 299 Ill. App. 3d 513, 516, 701 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1998).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County ishereby reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed; cause remanded.

HOPKINS and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

1. Although it would not be relevant in light of the applicable statute of repose, Carolyncould argue, utilizing the discovery rule, that she did not discover the legal malpractice untilher receipt of the April 13, 2000, letter from attorney Rod Pitts and that, therefore, the March1, 2002, filing of her complaint was timely.