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JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

After a trial involving the Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS55/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, LloydGalloway, and against the defendants, Raymond Kuhl, Kuhl Farms, Mike Kuhl, Fred Kuhl,John Kuhl, and Henry Kuhl, and reduced the plaintiff's damages by 50% for the plaintiff'scomparative negligence. Although the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for disfigurementand pain and suffering, it failed to award damages for the plaintiff's medical expenses. Afterthe parties filed posttrial motions, the trial court determined that the jury's award wasirreconcilably inconsistent, and upon the defendants' request, the trial court entered anadditur for the plaintiff's claimed medical expenses, reduced by half for the plaintiff'scomparative negligence.

On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly allowed the jury toconsider the plaintiff's comparative negligence. On cross-appeal, the defendants assert thatthe trial court improperly determined that the jury's verdict was inconsistent.

We affirm.

On February 6, 2001, the plaintiff filed his complaint against the defendants, allegingthat the defendants' cattle had strayed onto the highway, in violation of the Illinois DomesticAnimals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and collided with theplaintiff's vehicle, causing him injury. On May 18, 2001, the defendants filed their answer,asserting, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiff had negligently operated his vehicle. On June 7, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants' affirmative defenses,which the trial court denied. Over the plaintiff's objections at the trial, the trial courtinstructed the jury concerning the plaintiff's comparative negligence.

At the trial, the plaintiff testified to the following:

"Q. And I ask you if this is a correct summary of all of your medical bills?

A. Like I [said] before, I never saw any of my medical bills.

Q. They are all paid for?

A. By Cox [B]rothers.

Q. Is this the full amount [$18,501.49] that you verify as accurate as to what your medical bills are?

A. As far as I know, yes."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and allocated to the plaintiff $4,400 fordisfigurement, $20,000 for pain and suffering, and $5,600 for the value of salaries lost. Thejury awarded the plaintiff $0 for the reasonable expenses of necessary medical treatment andservices received. The jury found the plaintiff 50% negligent and assessed the plaintiff'srecoverable damage as $15,000.

On September 25, 2002, the plaintiff filed his posttrial motion, asserting that the juryhad improperly considered the plaintiff's comparative fault and that the jury's verdict wasinconsistent because the jury had failed to award the reasonable expenses of necessarymedical care. On October 8, 2002, the defendants filed their response to the plaintiff'sposttrial motion and, alternatively, a motion for an additur. With relation to their alternativemotion for an additur, the defendants requested that the trial court enter an additur, in theamount of $9,250.75, to correct the jury's alleged mistake of failing to award the plaintiffmedical expenses.

At the posttrial hearing, on December 20, 2002, the trial court held that the jury'sverdict was inconsistent, and it entered an additur increasing the jury's award by $9,250.75,which was 50% of the total medical expenses in evidence.

On January 16, 2003, the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, and on January 22, 2003,the defendants filed their notice of cross-appeal.

The plaintiff asserts that because his cause of action involved the Illinois DomesticAnimals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the trial courtimproperly allowed the jury to consider the plaintiff's comparative negligence. Whethercomparative negligence principles apply to the Illinois Domestic Animals Running at LargeAct is a question of law that we review de novo. See Lepkowski v. Laukemper, 317 Ill. App.304 (1943).

The Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act provides:

"No person or owner of livestock shall allow livestock to run at large in theState of Illinois. All owners of livestock shall provide the necessary restraints toprevent such livestock from so running at large and shall be liable in civil action forall damages occasioned by such animals running at large; Provided, that no owner orkeeper of such animals shall be liable for damages in any civil suit for injury to theperson or property of another caused by the running at large thereof, without theknowledge of such owner or keeper, when such owner or keeper can establish that heused reasonable care in restraining such animals from so running at large." 510 ILCS55/1 (West 2002).

The Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act provides the livestock owner anopportunity to avoid strict liability if he can prove that he had no knowledge his animal wasrunning at large and that he used reasonable care in restraining such animal. Corona v.Malm, 315 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697 (2000); Christenson v. Rincker, 288 Ill. App. 3d 185, 191(1997) (this interpretation of the statute "clearly reflects the intent of the General Assemblyin amending what would otherwise be a strict liability statute").

Illinois courts have applied the doctrine of contributory negligence in cases involvingthe Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act. See Guffey v. Gale, 332 Ill. App. 207(1947) (the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, whose truck turned over afterattempting to avoid the defendant's pig that was running at large on the highway, because thequestion of contributory negligence was not fairly left to the determination of the jury); DeBuck v. Gadde, 319 Ill. App. 609 (1943) (the plaintiff's violation of the Domestic AnimalsRunning at Large Act and the defendant's negligent driving were matters to be determinedby the jury); Fugett v. Murray, 311 Ill. App. 323 (1941) (the court considered thecontributory negligence of the passenger of the vehicle, which collided with a horse, whoseowner was in violation of the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act); Weide v. Thiel, 9Ill. App. 223 (1881) (because it was the plaintiff's fault that the defendant's bull had escapedthe pasture, she materially contributed to her own injury and cannot recover); Ewing v.Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 72 Ill. 25 (1874) (although a violation of the statute preventinganimals from running at large is evidence of negligence, the negligence of the plaintiff mustbe compared with the negligence of the defendant to determine its effect in preventingrecovery).

In Beiter v. Erb, 259 F.2d 911, 912 (7th Cir. 1958), the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals rejected the plaintiff's contention that contributory negligence was not a defense toan action for negligence based upon the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1957, ch. 8, par. 1 et seq.). The court in Beiter held that despite the defendants'violation of the statute, the plaintiff must prove that he was exercising due care and cautionfor his own safety, i.e., that he was free from contributory negligence. Beiter, 259 F.2d at913. In particular, the court in Beiter noted:

"[I]n an extended argument [the plaintiff] cites and discusses many cases in anattempt to demonstrate that mere contributory negligence is not a defense to an actionfor negligence based upon a statutory violation. We need not cite or discuss suchcases because we are convinced there is no case in Illinois which sustains plaintiff'scontention. ***

More important is the fact that the [a]ppellate [c]ourts of Illinois in not fewerthan five cases have either held or recognized that contributory negligence is adefense to an action for negligence predicated upon the statute relied upon on theinstant case." Beiter, 259 F.2d at 912-13.

In holding that contributory negligence was not a defense to claims brought under other safety statutes, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the legislature's use of thewilfulness standard of liability indicated an intention to foreclose the use of contributorynegligence, fixing a broad and distinct exception from the general rule of contributorynegligence. Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (1984); Vegich v.McDougal Hartmann Co., 84 Ill. 2d 461 (1981) (when the safety statute's purpose ofprevention is frustrated by a wilful violation and an accident follows, the full burden of theloss must be laid on the wrongdoer, even if the victim was himself negligent); Rost v. F.H.Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357 (1925) (contributory negligence does not apply to injuries wilfullyor intentionally inflicted); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156 (1914) (the reason forcasting aside contributory negligence applies equally to all safety statutes that limit violationsof the statute to wilful acts). Unlike these safety statutes, the Illinois Domestic AnimalsRunning at Large Act is not a safety statute that enumerates wilfulness as the standard ofliability, and it is therefore distinguishable.

In 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the common law doctrine ofcontributory negligence, which barred the plaintiff from recovering for his injuries if hisnegligence contributed to the accident, and adopted in its place the doctrine of comparativenegligence, which reduces the plaintiff's damages by the percentage of fault attributable tohim. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 28 (1981) (the comparative negligence formula wasmodified by the enactment of section 2-1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat.,1986 Supp., ch. 110, par. 2-1116). We hold that the doctrine of comparative negligence, likeits predecessor, the doctrine of contributory negligence, may be applied in cases involvingthe Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act to reduce or bar the plaintiff's recovery. See Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119 (1983) (even in cases involving strictliability, the comparative fault principle will operate to reduce the plaintiff's recovery by thatpercentage for which the trier of fact finds him at fault).

The trial court properly allowed the defendants' affirmative defenses and properlyinstructed the jury regarding the plaintiff's comparative negligence.

On cross-appeal, the defendants assert that the trial court incorrectly held that thejury's verdict was inconsistent. Illinois courts express great reluctance to interfere with ajury's determination of the monetary amount that adequately compensates a plaintiff for hispersonal injuries. Butkewicz v. Chicago Transit Authority, 252 Ill. App. 3d 914, 918 (1993). However, where a verdict is legally inconsistent, it should be set aside. Wottowa InsuranceAgency, Inc. v. Bock, 104 Ill. 2d 311, 316 (1984). The additur is appropriate in cases wherethe inadequacy of the verdict is due to the omission of a specific, definitely calculable item. Ross v. Cortes, 95 Ill. App. 3d 772, 777 (1981); Rice v. McDonald's Corp., 268 Ill. App. 3d201, 206 (1994) (the trial court properly used an additur to compensate the personal injuryplaintiff for medical expenses when the jury left the space blank on the itemized verdict formand there was no dispute about the plaintiff's medical expenses or their relation to the injury).

At the trial, the plaintiff testified that Cox Brothers, under workers' compensation,paid his medical bills. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and allocated to theplaintiff $30,000 for disfigurement, pain and suffering, and the value of salaries lost; yet, thejury awarded the plaintiff $0 for the reasonable expenses of necessary medical treatment andservices received. If the jury relied on the fact that the plaintiff's medical expenses were paidby insurance, it improperly denied the plaintiff medical expense damages. See Ross, 95 Ill.App. 3d at 774 (whether the bill was paid by insurance is immaterial because the plaintiffcould properly recover the entire amount of damages under the collateral source rule).

The jury's verdict demonstrates that it believed that the plaintiff had compensable painand suffering, in addition to disfigurement, and its failure to award medical expenses waswholly unwarranted and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury's verdictdisregarded the evidence that the plaintiff had incurred medical expenses in the amount of$18,501.49. The trial court properly found that the jury's verdict, awarding damages for painand suffering and for disfigurement resulting from the injury but failing to award the plaintiffthe reasonable expenses of necessary medical treatment and services received, was legallyinconsistent.

Upon the defendants' motion, the trial court properly cured the jury's error by grantingan additur in the amount of $9,250.75, which represented the plaintiff's $18,501.49 medicalexpenses reduced by 50% for the plaintiff's comparative negligence.

We affirm the trial court's decision to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff'scomparative negligence, its decision finding the jury's verdict legally inconsistent, and itsdecision, per the defendants' stipulation, to grant an additur in the amount of $9,250.75.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Jasper County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

WELCH and MAAG, JJ., concur.