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JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the extent of a taking in condemnation and the nature ofcompensation. The ultimate issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff, theIllinois Department of Transportation (the Department), an agency of the State,took the defendants' outdoor advertising signs in addition to the defendants'leasehold interests, to be used in a road construction project. The Departmentargues that it only condemned the defendants' leasehold interests. Thedefendants argue that their signs were also taken. A St. Clair County juryawarded defendant Drury Displays, Inc. (Drury), damages of $80,730 and defendantNational Advertising Company (National) damages of $146,640. On March 17, 1999,the circuit court entered judgments on the verdicts. The Department appeals fromthe judgments, and Drury cross-appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm thejudgments and deny the cross-appeal.

On July 13, 1994, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), a railroad and thelandowner, in exchange for $49,180, executed a quitclaim deed conveyingapproximately 4.2 of its 60 acres to the Department for highway construction.The Department acquired the property as a part of a project to construct two newright-hand exit lanes off westbound Interstate 55/70/64 onto the Illinois end ofthe Martin Luther King Bridge. On the subject property, Drury had leased spacefor a single billboard, and National had leased space for two billboards.(1)On August 31, 1994, the Department filed its complaint seeking to condemnDrury's and National's leasehold interests in the property. CSX was named butlater was dismissed as a party.

The April 17, 1991, lease between CSX(2) and Druryallowed Drury to erect and maintain a sign on the property. The November 15,1990, and November 15, 1993, leases between CSX and National permitted Nationalto erect and maintain signs on the property. All the leases were terminable byeither party upon 60 days' written notice.

According to the Drury lease, Drury was to pay CSX $19,000 per year or 25% ofits gross advertising revenue, whichever was greater. The lease provided thatany billboard erected on the property by Drury would remain Drury's propertyupon the termination of the lease. The lease also provided that if Drury failedor refused to remove its billboard within 30 days after the termination of theagreement, then the billboard would become CSX's or CSX could remove thebillboard and bill Drury for the costs of the removal. Neither party couldassign the lease without the written approval of the other.

According to the November 15, 1993, National lease, National was to pay CSX$8,400 per year or 25% of its gross advertising revenue, whichever was greater.The remaining terms were virtually identical to the Drury lease.

According to the November 15, 1990, National lease, National was to pay CSX$8,000 per year or 25% of its gross advertising revenue, whichever was greater.The remaining terms were similar to the Drury lease, except that CSX couldassign its interest without National's consent. However, National could notassign its interest without CSX's consent.

We pause to note that the Department did not exercise any rights it mighthave possessed, as a successor in interest to CSX, against Drury or National.Instead, in the circuit court it filed a condemnation complaint to terminate thedefendants' interests. Given this turn of events, we point out that the rightsbetween condemnor and condemnee are different from the rights between landlordand tenant.

At the trial, evidence placed all three billboards quite close to theinterstate roadway, making them highly visible prior to the construction of thenew ramp. Traffic counts were very high and may have exceeded 120,000 cars perday. These outdoor advertising structures could not be disassembled and removedwithout damaging the integrity of the structures, and such structures could notbe economically relocated.

Although there were 60-day-termination provisions in the leases, railroadsrarely exercised such provisions, according to the testimony. Exercising suchprovisions would stop the income stream from the tenant billboard company on theland that the railroad had rented because it was not being used. The short-termnature of the termination provision, common in the outdoor-advertising industry,permitted railroads to lease without board-of-director approval.

The provision in each lease permitting the billboard to remain the propertyof the billboard company and permitting its removal by the billboard companyupon the termination of the lease was present so that the railroad-lessor wouldnot terminate the lease, acquire the billboard, and thereby become a competitorin the outdoor-advertising industry.

Neither Drury nor National possessed deeds for the real property, acquiredtitle insurance, or paid real property taxes for the billboards. On the otherhand, these billboards were made of steel, were attached to the real property inapproximately 20 feet of concrete, and would last "forever" ifregularly maintained. Billboards, in general, are custom-built in conformancewith building and safety codes and in consideration of site location andwind-load.

The following text summarizes the testimony given by the expert witnesses atthe trial. We omit, here, any discussion of the experts' qualifications, becausethe subject is not at issue. We do, however, summarily address thequalifications of the Department's expert witness who was precluded fromtestifying by the circuit court, but we do so in the unpublished portion of thisopinion.

Dwain Stoops, a real estate appraiser and valuation consultant, testified onbehalf of the Department. Stoops testified that he appraised the three leaseholdinterests at issue in this case but that he did not value the advertisingbusinesses being conducted on the leased premises. In his opinion, billboardsare personal property and are best characterized as trade fixtures, notleasehold improvements. Thus, he concluded that the billboards contributed novalue to the underlying land and were worth nothing as real estate in acondemnation action or in terms of the leasehold value.

In valuing the defendants' leasehold interests, Stoops examined the threeleases, among other things, to determine if the leasehold interests had any"bonus value." Bonus value is merely the difference, if any, betweenthe market rent and the actual rent. For example, if a tenant's actual rent waslower than the market rent for the space being rented, then the tenant wouldhave bonus value in his interest and would be entitled to the monetarydifference. In a similar vein, bonus value could also extend to a landlord whowas receiving actual rent from a tenant that was higher than the market rent.

Stoops considered the three traditional methods of valuation-cost, income,and comparable sales-but was unable to fully apply them in this situation. Itappears that in his valuation Stoops considered the leasehold interests but notthe improvements. He concluded that there was no bonus value.

Stoops acknowledged, though, that the defendants had a right to sell theirleasehold interests as improved, that such sales occurred in theoutdoor-advertising industry, and that such property interests had a marketvalue based on income and income multipliers in the industry. Stoops admittedthat he was aware of no situation in which a railroad had refused to approve theassignment of a billboard property lease from one owner to another and that itwas very rare for a railroad to exercise the 60-day-termination provision.

Linda Truitt testified on behalf of Drury. Truitt characterized and appraisedDrury's interest as a leasehold improved with outdoor advertising by using thethree traditional methods of valuation-cost, income, and comparable sales.Truitt testified that the fair market value of a leasehold interest improvedwith an outdoor advertising structure is tied to its income-producing potentialwithin the industry.

The cost method of valuation measures the cost to replace property interests,less depreciation. Using this method, Truitt valued Drury's interests at$74,225. However, Truitt testified that this method was the least appropriatemethod of valuation because it did not take into account the value added by thelocation.

The income method of valuation is based on the property's income-producingpotential. This method, in summary, divides the property's net income by acapitalization rate (a return on and of capital) as determined by market data.The quotient is used as an income valuation. Using this method, Truitt valuedDrury's interests at $135,000.

The comparable-sales method of valuation requires a review of prices actuallypaid in the marketplace for similar properties, an extraction of thegross-income multiplier reflected in those sales, and an application of anappropriate gross-income multiplier to the property being appraised. Thegross-income multiplier of a similar property is calculated merely by dividingthe sale price by the annual gross income produced by the advertising structure.Using this method, Truitt valued Drury's interests at $142,000.

Truitt characterized Drury's interests in this case as real property, andusing these three valuation methods, she concluded that the fair market value ofDrury's leasehold interest as improved by an outdoor advertising structure was$140,000.

R.J. Ruppert testified on behalf of National. He characterized National'sbillboard property as a real estate capital improvement, with its value beingseparate from the business value of its owner. Ruppert valued National'sinterests at $210,000 under the cost method, at $208,000 under the incomemethod, and at $211,000 to $214,000 under the comparable-sales method. Usingthese three valuation methods and placing the most weight on how the marketplacevalues billboard property interests, Ruppert concluded that the fair marketvalue of National's interests was $210,000.

We turn now to the applicable standards of review and to the issues presentedon appeal.

The Department presents three separate issues on appeal. The first issue iswhether the circuit court erred in denying the Department's motion for judgmentin the amount of $0 notwithstanding the verdict. The second issue is whether thecircuit court erred under several enumerated grounds, entitling the Departmentto a new trial. The third issue is whether the circuit court erred in denyingthe Department's motion for a new trial where the verdicts were against themanifest weight of the evidence.

The Department first argues that the circuit court erred in denying theDepartment's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We disagree. Ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate only in those cases whereall of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, sooverwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidencecould ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 511(1967). We review de novo the trial court's decision to deny a motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, applying the same standard used by thecircuit court. Hernandez v. Schittek, 305 Ill. App. 3d 925, 930 (1999).

The Department contends that the defendants' only compensable propertyinterest under the condemnation statute (735 ILCS 5/7-101 (West 2000)) is theleasehold interest. Moreover, it claims that it did not even condemn thebillboards, because they are personal property.(3) TheDepartment reasons that, because the experts agree the leases had no bonusvalue, no compensation is due. National and Drury contend that the evidenceshowed that outdoor advertising structures are bought and sold in the industrymarketplace for more than simply the bonus value of the lease. We believe thatthe Department's interpretation overlooks the plain language of the statute.

Our resolution of this matter is based upon language added by a 1993amendment to the compensation section of the Eminent Domain Act (Pub. Act87-1205, effective July 1, 1993 (1992 Ill. Laws 3569) (amending 735 ILCS 5/7-101(West 1992)). It appears that this language has not yet been construed by anIllinois court, making this a case of first impression. After the amendment, thestatute read as follows, with the new language italicized:

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