Bracy v. Industrial Comm'n

Case Date: 04/22/2003
Court: Industrial Commission
Docket No: 3-02-0198WC Rel

NO. 3-02-0198WC

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

Industrial Commission Division

JILL BRACY,
                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
                     v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS
(Dental Arts Laboratory, Appellee)
                     Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Peoria
County
No. 00MR116

Honorable
John A. Barra
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Judge Presiding.



PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant Jill Bracy appeals pro se from an order of thecircuit court of Peoria County confirming a decision of theIndustrial Commission of Illinois (Commission). Respondentemployer is Dental Arts Laboratory.

The arbitrator found that claimant failed to prove anaccidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with respondent and that her conditions of ill-being werecausally related to the alleged accidental injury. The Commissionaffirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. Taken with thecase are respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal and claimant'sresponse thereto. Finding the circuit court had no jurisdiction,we vacate the order of the circuit court and dismiss this appeal.

This is a judicial review proceeding pursuant to section19(f) of the Workers Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(West 2000)). The jurisdiction of the circuit court is statutory,and compliance with statutory prerequisites is necessary for thecircuit court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Boalbey v.Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 217, 218, 362 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1977);Franks v. Industrial Comm'n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 214, 217, 658 N.E.2d488, 490 (1995). Compliance with the statutory requirements forissuance of summons must appear of record. Arrington v. IndustrialComm'n, 96 Ill. 2d 505, 508, 451 N.E.2d 866, 867 (1983); Perry v.Industrial Comm'n, 304 Ill. App. 3d 284, 286, 710 N.E.2d 497, 498(1999). Pro se litigants are required to comply with the samerules of procedure as are required of litigants represented bycounsel. See Kole v. Brubaker, 325 Ill. App. 3d 944, 952, 759N.E.2d 129, 135 (2001).

Section 19(f)(1) of the Act sets forth the procedures tobe followed in a proceeding for review.

The Commission decision was issued on March 20, 2000, andrespondent's attorney received a copy of the decision on March 27,2000. The office of respondent's attorney is located in Peoria,Illinois. The record reflects that claimant informed the Commission that her copy of the decision should be mailed to her at "POBox 6164, Peoria, IL, 61601." In her response to the motion todismiss, claimant did not include an affidavit stating the date onwhich she received her copy of the Commission decision. In herresponse, claimant incorrectly states that the Commission decisionwas filed on March 7, 2000. She then states that the decision wasmailed to her by certified mail on March 31, 2000, and received byher on April 5, 2000. Attached to claimant's response to themotion to dismiss as exhibit 5 was a copy of an envelope addressedto claimant from the Commission with a certified mail returnreceipt requested tag No. P562185 and a postmark from Chicago,Illinois, of March 31, 2000. However, the record and the claimant's response to the motion to dismiss do not contain the returnreceipt showing when claimant received the envelope. The recorddoes not establish that the judicial review proceeding wasinstituted within the 20-day statutory period.

Claimant did not follow the procedures set forth bysection 19(f)(1), but instead filed a complaint, demanding jurytrial, praying for judgment against respondent for neglect andrestitution. Claimant filed the complaint on April 24, 2000. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the Commission decision. With the complaint, claimant filed a "Notice of Appeal/Right toSue." Both of those pleadings contained a proof of serviceindicating that on April 24, 2000, she mailed copies of thosedocuments to respondent. On April 24, 2000, claimant also filed inthe circuit court an application to proceed as a poor person. OnMay 1, 2000, claimant filed four 30-day summonses to be served onrespondent and each of the Commissioners that participated in theCommission decision.

The record does not contain a request for summons filedby claimant in the circuit court or evidence that claimant filed inthe circuit court a receipt from the Commission for payment of therecord preparation cost. Pursuant to section 19(f)(1), theCommission's decision set the fee to prepare the record at $35. Afailure to file proof of payment for record preparation to theCommission deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction. Perry, 304Ill. App. 3d at 287, 710 N.E.2d at 498. The record also does notshow that claimant filed in the circuit court an affidavitindicating that she had paid the Commission for record preparation. See Lasley Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 274 Ill. App. 3d890, 894, 655 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1995).

Section 19(f)(1) of the Act does permit a review toproceed, in lieu of payment of the fee, if the Commission shall besatisfied that the employee is a poor person, and unable to pay thecosts and expenses provided for by the Act (820 ILCS 305/20 (West2000)). When a claimant files in the circuit court proof of theCommission granting her section 20 status, even though such proofwas not filed at the time of instituting the judicial reviewproceeding, this court has found jurisdiction based on the factthat the Commission granted section 20 status within the 20-daytime limit for instituting the judicial review. Jackson v.Industrial Comm.n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299, 719 N.E.2d 1159,1165-66 (1999). See, First Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 Ill.App. 3d 685, 689, 691 N.E.2d 134, 137 (1998) (evidence of compliance with the statute may be filed outside the 20-day statutorilyrequired period in order to address a motion challenging thejurisdiction of the court).

Claimant did attach to her response to the motion todismiss a copy of a notice of motion she filed in the Commission onApril 1, 1999, seeking section 20 status. Commissioner Douglas F.Stevenson granted the motion on April 29, 1999, some ten monthsprior to the Commission's March 20, 2000, decision. Claimant'smotion and the transcript of the motion hearing before CommissionerStevenson were included in the record prepared by the Commissionand certified to the circuit court. Because claimant had section20 status at the time she filed the pleadings in the circuit court,we decline to find that the circuit court was deprived of jurisdiction on the basis that she failed to file proof of payment orexcuse from payment of record preparation costs at the time ofinstituting the judicial review proceeding.

However, claimant failed to file a written request forsummons. The failure to file a written request for issuance ofsummons deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Fisher v. Industrial Comm'n, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1064-65, 596N.E.2d 831, 833-34 (1992). In Fisher, the appellate court reliedupon Whitmer v. Industrial Comm'n, 187 Ill. App. 3d 409, 411, 549N.E.2d 353, 354 (1989), and Taylor v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Ill.App. 3d 701, 703, 583 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1991). We have reviewed all ofthe documents filed by claimant in the circuit court on April 24,2000, and none of those documents request the issuance of summons. Claimant's filing of the four 30-day summonses on May 1, 2000,directed to respondent and each of the commissioners, is notcompliance with the Act. As in Whitmer, Taylor, and Fisher, thefact that summons issued does not excuse the statutory requirementof filing a request for summons.

The order of the circuit court of Peoria County isvacated, and this appeal is dismissed.

Judgment vacated; appeal dismissed.

HOFFMAN, O'MALLEY, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ.,concurring.