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June 28, 2001

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Adam Woolums, Darrell Woolums, and BrendaWoolums, appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of MaconCounty granting summary judgment to defendants M. Stephen Huss,M.D.; M. Stephen Huss, M.D., S.C., a corporation; Gordon Cross,M.D., and Decatur Radiology Physicians Service Corporation inplaintiffs' medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs contend (1)the trial court erred in (a) striking an affidavit filed withtheir response to the motions for summary judgment, and (b)granting summary judgment and (2) abused its discretion infailing to consider amended and additional affidavits and itsmotion to reconsider the summary judgment order. We affirm.

On March 27, 1995, 16-year-old Adam Woolums was broughtto see Dr. Huss, an orthopedic surgeon, by his father, Darrell,complaining of pain in his right ankle and heel. Adam reportedhe had fallen after a collision in gym class about a week beforeand injured the ankle. Approximately a year before, he hadinjured the same ankle in a trampoline accident and it had neverfully resolved as he continued to suffer intermittent discomfortin the ankle. Adam's ankle and heel were not swollen ordiscolored but were extremely painful to the touch. Dr. Hussdiagnosed posttraumatic spastic right ankle and a sprain of thehind foot. Traumatically induced sprains generally cause painand swelling immediately though there can be a delay in swelling. Dr. Huss interpreted Adam's reported lack of immediate pain as amistake in reporting on Adam's part or the fact it was of such alow-grade nature at first that it did not bother him enough toacknowledge. Dr. Huss ordered physical therapy.

Adam returned to Dr. Huss on March 31 and reportedswelling and inability to bear weight on his right foot. X raystaken from March 23-31 revealed nothing. Dr. Huss continued totreat Adam's condition as a sprain.

On April 7, Adam returned to Dr. Huss, who noted largeblack and blue swelling on the sides of Adam's hindfoot, theposterior portion of the foot. Dr. Huss reported suchdiscoloration can be delayed several days after a traumaticsprain. Dr. Huss ordered a computerized tomography (CT) scan tosee if there had been a bone injury to Adam's hindfoot because ofhis generally slow progress. When he ordered the CT scan, Dr.Huss gave the radiologist, Dr. Cross, a clinical history oftraumatic injury to the hindfoot. The CT scan was performed andinterpreted by Dr. Cross on April 7, 1995. Dr. Cross'interpretation was nondisplaced comminuted fracture through thecalcaneus, a bone near the ankle joint. Dr. Huss then changedhis diagnosis to traumatic fracture of the calcaneus.

Adam showed little improvement and needed treatment foropen blisters caused by the cast placed on his ankle. Dr. Hussprescribed antibiotics as a precaution against infection from theblisters but discontinued them by April 19 to check for theexistence of bacteria causing the swelling. On April 21, Dr.Huss performed a fine needle aspiration in the soft and swollentissue surrounding the ankle and found no evidence of anyinfection.

Dr. Huss continued to treat Adam and on May 10diagnosed an infection. He first diagnosed osteomyelitis on May12 and ordered intravenous antibiotics. While a sprain orfracture can be expected to heal through rest and/or physicaltherapy, osteomyelitis, a bone infection, is healed only throughantibiotics. As far as a complete cure of osteomyelitis, thesooner that antibiotics are started, the better.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants on June19, 1998, alleging medical negligence. Plaintiffs claimed Dr.Huss was negligent in failing to timely diagnose an infection ofthe right heel and failing to adequately treat the infectionafter plaintiff initially saw him on March 27, 1995. Plaintiffsallege negligence on the part of Dr. Cross in failing to includeinfection as part of the differential diagnosis of the bonetissue and soft tissue changes allegedly present when heperformed and interpreted the CT scan of Adam's ankle. A second-amended complaint was filed on March 16, 1999, with essentiallythe same allegations but with the addition of certificates ofmerit of reviewing health care professionals, David Schurman,M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, and Lynne Steinbach, M.D., aradiologist, pursuant to section 2-622(a)(1) of the Code of CivilProcedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 1998).

On July 12, 1999, the trial court entered a case-management order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 218 (166 Ill. 2dR. 218). The scheduling order set December 15, 1999, as thedeadline for plaintiffs' disclosure of opinion witnesses andMarch 31, 2000, as the defendants' deadline. The trial courtnever modified the case-management order nor does evidence showan agreement between the parties to modify the order. No opinionwitnesses were ever disclosed by plaintiffs, and in response tointerrogatories propounded by defendants they stated theiridentity had not yet been determined. Defendants disclosed theiropinion witnesses on March 31, 2000.

Discovery depositions of defendants were taken on March28, 2000. Thereafter, transcripts of these depositions wereattached to the summary judgment motions of Dr. Huss and Dr.Cross filed April 10 and April 11, respectively. The motionswere set for hearing on May 8.

On April 19, plaintiffs filed a motion to reset thecase-management schedule. Written responses to that motion werefiled by defendants but the motion was never set for hearing. Plaintiffs filed written responses to Dr. Huss' and Dr. Cross'motions for summary judgment on May 1 and May 3, respectively. They included affidavits from Drs. Schurman and Steinbach.

Dr. Huss received plaintiffs' response to his motionfor summary judgment on Thursday, May 4, 2000. On Friday, May 5,he faxed plaintiffs a copy of a motion to strike Dr. Schurman'saffidavit, which he intended to file on Monday, May 8, the day ofthe hearing. The motion pointed out the insufficiencies of theaffidavit, including failure to comply with the requirements ofRule 191(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a)). Dr. Cross joined in thatmotion at the hearing.

On May 8, the trial court heard arguments ondefendants' motion to strike and their motions for summaryjudgment. Before commencing argument, the trial court askedplaintiffs' counsel if they were seeking a continuance or if theyhad any motions pursuant to Rule 191(b) on file (145 Ill. 2d R.191(b)). Plaintiffs sought no continuance, nor did they file amotion pursuant to Rule 191(b) stating they were unable to obtainnecessary affidavits. Plaintiffs never asked for leave to amendor supplement Dr. Schurman's affidavit. Instead, they stood onDr. Schurman's and Dr. Steinbach's affidavits and argued whysummary judgment was not proper as to either defendant.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court tookthe matter under advisement as well as plaintiff's motion toreset the case-management schedule. Plaintiffs requested leaveto submit additional legal authority with regard to Dr. Cross'motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted thisrequest. Plaintiffs then filed a written response to Dr. Huss'motion to strike on May 15 and attached a "supplementalaffidavit" by Dr. Schurman to this written response. The trialcourt never granted leave to file the supplemental affidavit, norwas such leave ever sought.

The trial court issued a memorandum order on May 31striking Dr. Schurman's original affidavit pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 191(a) as being too speculative to form the basis forthe orthopedic opinions expressed therein. The court found,because such testimony would be inadmissible at trial, summaryjudgment was appropriate as to Dr. Huss. As to Dr. Cross, thecourt granted summary judgment in his favor also because noexpert testimony was offered to establish that a breach of theradiologist's standard of care contributed to the injuryplaintiffs alleged.

On June 29, plaintiffs filed a timely motion toreconsider and vacate the summary judgment orders. To thismotion plaintiffs attached a new affidavit from Dr. Schurman aswell as an affidavit from radiologist Dr. Phillip Lang. Thetrial court held a hearing on this motion on September 13, 2000,and denied it. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs first argue the trial court erred instriking Dr. Schurman's original affidavit. Plaintiffs contendthe motion to strike should not have been heard at all on May 8as it was filed that day and, thus, a hearing on it was untimelypursuant to local court rule 2.1(f), which provides:

"Time of Notice. Unless otherwiseordered by the court, notice by personalservice or by U.S. Mail shall be made notless than fourteen (14) days prior to thehearing." 6th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(f)(eff. November 1, 1992.)

When a party moves to strike an affidavit filed insummary judgment proceedings, it is that party's duty to bringhis motion to the attention of the trial court and to get aruling on the motion. Failure to obtain such a ruling willoperate as a waiver of the objections to the affidavit. Intercontinental Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 260 Ill. App.3d 1085, 1090, 631 N.E.2d 1258, 1263 (1994).

Dr. Huss attempted to give plaintiffs as much notice aspossible for his motion to strike. He filed his motion forsummary judgment on April 10 and set it for hearing on May 8. Plaintiffs did not file a response to the motion until May 1,including Dr. Schurman's affidavit, which was not received by Dr.Huss until Thursday, May 4. Dr. Huss then faxed plaintiffs'attorneys his motion on Friday, May 5. The motion to strikepointed out insufficiencies in the affidavit pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 191(a).

The evidence before the trial court on the day of thehearing included Dr. Huss' deposition testimony and Dr.Schurman's affidavit. Plaintiffs should not have been surprisedwhen Dr. Huss attacked the sufficiency of the affidavit presentedin opposition to his motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffsshould have been aware their affidavit would be examined by thetrial court and that the court would consider only affidavitscomplying with Rule 191(a). Dr. Huss would not even have neededto file a motion to strike but could merely have argued theinsufficiencies of the affidavit during the hearing. Instead,plaintiffs benefitted from advance notice of exactly whatdeficiencies Dr. Huss would claim against Dr. Schurman'saffidavit. Plaintiffs were not harmed by failure to comply withlocal rules on setting motions for hearing.

Plaintiffs argue they were not allowed leave tocontinue the hearing to correct Dr. Schurman's affidavit. However, no attempt was made by plaintiffs to gain additionaltime to obtain sufficient affidavits in view of the objectionsraised by the motion to strike. At the outset of the hearing,the trial court itself raised this issue with plaintiffs.

"THE COURT: I don't have plaintiff's[sic] motion--Mr. Lumb, have you filed anymotion or affidavit under Rule 191 tocontinue these matters?

MR. LUMB: Actually what I did, I filedaffidavits from my consultants, who I hopedto make testifying experts, and then thematter requested to modify case[-]managementschedule. I responded to summary judgmentswith affidavits from experts under Rule 11A-1(a)(b). I didn't need information fromother parties. It wasn't under my control. I needed my experts to have time to readdefendant's depositions. They weren'tdeposed until March 28, which is essentiallythe crux of the matter. I was operatingunder the distinct impression, good-faithbelief there was agreement to adjust the 213disclosure after the defendants weredepose[d], but within the maximum time tokeep the pretrial date the same; but I didknow I had to be safe, and filed responseswith affidavits."

Plaintiffs elected to stand on the affidavit of Dr.Schurman rather than request a continuance under Rule 191(b). Because no such relief was requested, the discretion inherent inthe trial court in the determination of motions for continuanceswas not abused. Delgatto v. Brandon Associates, Ltd., 131 Ill.2d 183, 195, 545 N.E.2d 689, 695 (1989)

In addition to their argument that Dr. Schurman'saffidavit should be stricken as it does not comply with Rule 191,defendants argued it should be stricken as he was not timelydisclosed as an expert opinion witness pursuant to Supreme CourtRules 213 and 218 (177 Ill. 2d R. 213; 166 Ill. 2d R. 218). Thetrial court refused to strike the affidavit on that ground anddefendants argue it here simply as an alternative way for thiscourt to uphold striking Dr. Schurman's affidavit. While therecord indicates plaintiffs failed to comply with discovery in atimely manner across the board, we will not uphold striking Dr.Schurman's affidavit on that ground as it can be upheldsubstantively.

Plaintiffs argue Dr. Schurman's original affidavit wassufficient to withstand attack on the basis of being speculativeand not specific. The sufficiency of affidavits offered insupport of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment isgoverned by Supreme Court Rule 191. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d229, 241, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1986).

Rule 191 is satisfied "if from the document as a wholeit appears that the affidavit is based upon the personalknowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference thatthe affiant could competently testify to its contents." BurksDrywall, Inc. v. Washington Bank & Trust Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d569, 576, 442 N.E.2d 648, 654 (1982). The granting of a motionto strike a Rule 191 affidavit is within the sound discretion ofthe trial court. Lake County Trust Co. v. Two Bar B, Inc., 238Ill. App. 3d 589, 599, 606 N.E.2d 258, 265 (1992).

Rule 191 provides in pertinent part:

"Affidavits in support of and in oppositionto a motion for summary judgment undersection 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure*** shall be made on the personal knowledgeof the affiants; shall set forth withparticularity the facts upon which the claim,counterclaim, or defense is based; shall haveattached thereto sworn or certified copies ofall papers upon which the affiant relies;shall not consist of conclusions but of factsadmissible in evidence; and shall affirma-tively show that the affiant, if sworn as awitness, can testify competently thereto. Ifall of the facts to be shown are not withinthe personal knowledge of one person, two ormore affidavits shall be used." 145 Ill. 2dR. 191(a).

Dr. Schurman's affidavit states Dr. Huss deviated fromthe applicable standard of care by (a) failing to includeinfection in his differential diagnosis on and after March 27,1995; (b) failing to rule in or rule out infection on or afterMarch 27, 1995; (c) failing to timely diagnose infection; and (d)failing to timely begin appropriate antibiotic treatment.

Plaintiffs acknowledge an expert's opinion cannot bebased on conjecture or speculation but must be given on factsassumed to be true, but they note the actual truth of the factsis later to be determined by the trier of fact. Murphy v.General Motors Corp., 285 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282, 672 N.E.2d 371,373 (1996). They argue Dr. Schurman's affidavit is virtuallyidentical to one in Brooks v. Illinois Masonic Hospital & MedicalCenter, 240 Ill. App. 3d 521, 523-25, 608 N.E.2d 483, 485-87(1992), which was found to be sufficient to withstand a motionfor summary judgment. In Brooks, the expert doctor's affidavitstated the defendant doctor concluded the plaintiff's hips werenormal at birth; another doctor later found congenital hipdysplasia. Brooks, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 522, 608 N.E.2d at 485. Based on his review of the record, the expert doctor concludedthe plaintiff suffered from the hip disorder at the time ofbirth; the condition should have been discovered by a qualifieddoctor; failure to discover was a deviation from the standard ofcare; and upon proper discovery, much surgical intervention couldhave been prevented. Brooks, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 524, 608 N.E.2dat 486.

Rather than being identical to the affidavit in Brooks,however, Dr. Schurman's affidavit does not state any facts toindicate infection was either present or discernable to Dr. Husson and after March 27. Instead, the affidavit states Dr. Hussdeviated from the standard of care by failing to timely diagnoseand treat infection, which may not have shown any signs of beingpresent on March 27, 1995.

The problem is Dr. Schurman relies on a fact not inevidence: a CT report communicating radiological suspicions ofosteomyelitis. Dr. Schurman contends Dr. Huss should have takencertain steps to verify the existence of osteomyelitis and treatit but the fact is he did not receive such a report. Further,Dr. Schurman is not qualified to and does not make assertionsthat the CT plates showed osteomyelitis and that Dr. Huss shouldhave seen this, too; nor does he state any other symptoms inevidence in the record should have made Dr. Huss test for andtreat osteomyelitis.

While an expert witness at trial may give opiniontestimony without disclosing the facts underlying his opinion(Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326(1981)), the same is not true of affidavits submitted in summaryjudgment proceedings. Kosten v. St. Anne's Hospital, 132 Ill.App. 3d 1073, 1079-80, 478 N.E.2d 464, 468 (1985). Rule 191(a)is specific in mandating affidavits not consist of conclusionsbut set forth facts admissible in evidence. 145 Ill. 2d R.191(a). Affidavits in opposition to motions for summary judgmentmust consist of facts admissible in evidence as opposed toconclusions and conclusory matters may not be considered inopposition to motions for summary judgment. O'Rourke v. Oehler,187 Ill. App. 3d 572, 585, 543 N.E.2d 546, 555 (1989).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion instriking Dr. Schurman's affidavit in light of its conclusorynature. Dr. Schurman's affidavit was also stricken in regard toDr. Cross as it purported to state Dr. Schurman was familiar withthe appropriate standard of care for radiologists when Dr.Schurman is not a radiologist.

Plaintiffs next contend the trial court erred ingranting the motions for summary judgment of defendants Dr. Hussand Dr. Cross. Dr. Huss argues there is no case against himwhere there is no competent affidavit establishing his breach ofthe applicable standard of care. Dr. Cross argues there is nocausation shown between any actions he took in reading the CTscan and communicating his findings to Dr. Huss and the injuriesallegedly incurred by Adam.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,depositions, and admissions, together with any affidavits, showthat there is no genuine issue of material fact and that themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). When ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment, a trial court must view all evidence in the light mostfavorable to the nonmovant. Williams v. Covenant Medical Center,316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 687-88, 737 N.E.2d 662, 667 (2000), citingRotzoll v. Overhead Door Corp., 289 Ill. App. 3d 410, 413, 681N.E.2d 156, 158 (1997).

In medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs have anaffirmative duty to come up with expert testimony supportingtheir case and failure to do so will justify entry of summaryjudgment against them. Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1,8, 610 N.E.2d 806, 812 (1993). Summary judgment is proper in amedical malpractice case only where the plaintiff has failed todemonstrate a present ability to offer competent expert testimonyon the applicable standard of medical care. Smock v. Hale, 197Ill. App. 3d 732, 741, 555 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1990). Grants ofsummary judgment are reviewed de novo. Williams, 316 Ill. App.3d at 688, 737 N.E.2d at 667.

Evidence that shows to a reasonable degree of certaintythat negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment lessened theeffectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish proximatecause. Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 115, 679N.E.2d 1202, 1211 (1997).

Plaintiffs contend Dr. Cross deviated from the requiredstandard of care of a radiologist by failing to alert Dr. Huss tothe likely presence of osteomyelitis when he read the CT scan. Dr. Huss testified in his deposition if he were informed of sucha possibility of infection, he would perform certain tests andundertake certain procedures to check for osteomyelitis and thenwould treat the patient accordingly. Thus, they contend Dr. Husswas not informed of a condition that may have effected the courseof treatment he provided Adam.

Dr. Cross argues the questions put to Dr. Huss at hisdeposition were entirely hypothetical as to what he would do ifhe suspects osteomyelitis in a patient either from his ownclinical observations or if a radiologist reports it as adiagnostic differential. In addition, Dr. Huss was also askedspecifically what he would have done if Adam's CT scaninterpretation had also included cortical destruction, low bonedensity, deep soft-tissue swelling and bone destruction, and Dr.Huss stated each case would have to be looked at individuallybut, in this case, there was sufficient evidence on the scan withfracture lines that his diagnosis was supported and he did notneed to look for "every other possible thing that there couldever be" and he would not have changed his course of treatment. Thus, Dr. Cross argues plaintiffs have failed to show causationfrom his actions in interpreting the CT scan and Dr. Huss'treatment of Adam.

Plaintiffs argue Dr. Cross cannot rely on Dr. Huss'testimony that he would not have changed his course of treatmentof Adam, even if he had been informed of the existence ofinfection, to show a lack of proximate cause for summary judgmentpurposes. Whether Dr. Huss' treatment would have remained thesame had he been informed of an infection is a question of factfor a jury to determine. See Suttle v. Lake Forest Hospital, 315Ill. App. 3d 96, 104-05, 733 N.E.2d 726, 733 (2000).

Plaintiffs contend the decision in Suttle isdispositive of this issue. The Suttle case did not involvesummary judgment but was an appeal from a judgment n.o.v. infavor of the defendant. In Suttle, at the time of delivery ofthe infant plaintiff, the doctor suspected a problem with theplacenta and sent it to the defendant's pathology lab foranalysis. Suttle, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 99, 733 N.E.2d at 728-29. The pathology report, indicating the infant had incurred bloodloss due to the problem with the placenta, did not get to theinfant's medical file until two days later. Suttle, 315 Ill.App. 3d at 99, 733 N.E.2d at 729.

The infant's pediatrician was unaware of the problem. When the infant had breathing difficulties, she was diagnosedwith respiratory distress syndrome. Her blood pressure was nevertaken before she was transferred to another facility, where hisblood pressure was taken upon arrival and she was immediatelygiven a transfusion. The infant had to be treated forcirculatory, liver, and kidney problems due to her substantialblood loss. Suttle, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 733 N.E.2d at 729.

The defendant argued proximate cause was not provedbecause the pediatrician testified he would not have treated theinfant differently had he been aware of the problem with theplacenta. However, there was also testimony the doctor diagnosedrespiratory distress because he was unaware of the placentalproblem. Thus, there was an actual factual dispute as to what thedoctor would have done had he known of the condition of theplacenta. Suttle, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 733 N.E.2d at 732. The court in Suttle then determined the question of whether thedoctor's treatment would have remained the same was a question offact for the jury. Suttle, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 104-05, 733 N.E.2dat 733.

Suttle differs from the instant case, however, in thatin Suttle there existed a specific condition that went undiagnosedor uncommunicated. In this case, no evidence of a specificcondition, osteomyelitis, has been shown to have existed at thetime Dr. Cross took the CT scan. If the condition did not existat that time, there was nothing to diagnose and communicate ormisdiagnose and fail to communicate. In her affidavit, Dr.Steinbach stated Dr. Cross failed to comply with the applicablestandard of care in failing to include the infection as adifferential diagnosis after reading the April 7, 1995, CT scan. However, Dr. Huss ordered a fine needle aspiration on April 21,which indicated no infection then existed and it is undisputedsuch an infection would not have gone away on its own.

In addition, there is a gap in the causation plaintiffsattempt to show as Dr. Steinbach's affidavit was submitted toestablish the applicable standard of care and Dr. Schurman'saffidavit was used to show how a breach of that standard causedAdam's injuries. However, Dr. Schurman's affidavit was strickenand, without it, no causation could be established against Dr.Cross.

As to Dr. Huss, once Dr. Schurman's affidavit wasstricken, no evidence suggested he had breached the applicablestandard of care and plaintiff could not establish a prima facieagainst him. Dr. Huss testified he had clinical evidence as wellas the CT scan report to support his diagnosis of first sprain andthen calcaneus fracture. There was no reason for him to rule outevery other possibility known to medical science when he hadsupport for his diagnosis.

Plaintiffs have failed to offer competent testimony onthe applicable standard of care regarding Dr. Huss and have failedto offer proof of causation as to Dr. Cross and, therefore,summary judgment for both defendants is proper.

Finally, plaintiffs contend the trial court abused itsdiscretion in failing to allow them to amend or correct Dr.Schurman's affidavit and erred in denying their motion toreconsider the orders granting summary judgment to defendants. Atrial court's decision on a motion to reconsider will not bedisturbed absent abuse of discretion. Williams, 316 Ill. App. 3dat 693, 737 N.E.2d at 671. Petitions to vacate summary judgmentare addressed to the equitable powers of the court and should begranted or denied in the interest of justice and fairness. Kirkv. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 275 Ill. App. 3d 170,173, 655 N.E.2d 933, 935 (1995).

The intended purpose of a petition to reconsider is tobring to the court's attention newly discovered evidence that wasnot available at the time of the first hearing, changes in thelaw, or errors in the court's previous application of existinglaw. Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213Ill. App. 3d 242, 248, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1991). Submissionof new matter on a motion to reconsider summary judgment lies inthe discretion of the trial court and should not be allowed absenta reasonable explanation of why it was not available at the timeof the original hearing. Delgatto, 131 Ill. 2d at 195, 545 N.E.2dat 695.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court's denial of theirmotion to reconsider is unfair. The motions for summary judgmentwere filed on April 10 and 11, 2000. Plaintiffs thereafter fileda motion to reset the case-management schedule on April 19, whichwas never set for hearing. Plaintiffs filed written responses tothe motions for summary judgment on May 1 and 3, including Dr.Schurman's first affidavit and Dr. Steinbach's affidavit. At thehearing on the motions on May 8, plaintiffs requested additionaltime for the specific purpose of "fil[ing] additional authorityregarding causation to the court." The court granted this requestbut gave plaintiffs no authority to produce new affidavits.

On May 12, plaintiffs filed a written response to themotion to strike Dr. Schurman's affidavit and requested thesummary judgment motions be continued or denied and, alterna-tively, that leave be granted to file an amended affidavit by Dr.Schurman. No hearing was scheduled on these requests and thetrial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on May 31. Plaintiffs then filed their motion to reconsider andattached a third affidavit by Dr. Schurman, which was verydetailed, and a very detailed affidavit by Dr. Lang, aradiologist. Plaintiffs contend these affidavits not onlywithstand defendants' motions for summary judgment butaffirmatively prove their case.

Plaintiffs have ignored the standard for motions toreconsider. The purpose of a motion to reconsider is not toreiterate arguments already made, nor to add new evidence thatcould have been produced earlier. There is no indication fromplaintiffs why they could not have produced the detailedaffidavits of Dr. Schurman or Dr. Lang earlier.

Plaintiffs rely on the Kirk case in support of thiscourt equitably deciding to allow them to file new affidavits. InKirk, no affidavits or expert opinions were offered in oppositionto a motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted and theplaintiff quickly changed attorneys. The new attorney found anexpert and presented an affidavit from this witness. Kirk, 275Ill. App. 3d at 171-72, 655 N.E.2d at 935. The court vacatedsummary judgment and remanded to reconsider the summary judgmentmotion taking into account the affidavit of the plaintiff's newexpert witness. Kirk, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 174, 655 N.E.2d at 936. The court based its decision on equitable grounds to saveplaintiff from his apparently inept first attorney.

In this case, however, plaintiffs have proceeded withthe same attorney, who has given no reason why he could not haveproduced the proffered affidavits earlier; nor did he request timeto do so. As the trial court noted:

"To indicate that you were denied theopportunity to supplement or correct existingdeficiencies in your affidavits, *** at theoutset [of the May 8 hearing,] I did ask youif you had filed any affidavits or motionsunder Rule 191. You responded by saying that,uh, you responded to the motion for summaryjudgment with affidavits that you didn't needany further information from any other party. And now it is only after the motions forsummary judgment have been granted that youare claiming, 1, a denial of the opportunityto supplement, and 2, that the [c]ourt shouldconsider new affidavits and that is just notpermissible under the rule. Why you chose toproceed I don't know. It is your choice, yourtactic, and that's fine. But the fact of thematter is you were given that opportunity anddecided *** to stand on the affidavit."

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyingplaintiffs' motion to reconsider.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, P.J., specially concurs.