Webb v. Lustig
Case Date: 09/04/1998
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-97-0625
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IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT JAMELLE WEBB, ) Administrative Review Petitioner, ) of the Human Rights v. ) Commission JACQUELINE LUSTIG, Chief Legal ) No. 1996SF0536 Counsel of the Department of Human ) Rights, THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT ) OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and MASON COUNTY ) SERVICE COMPANY, ) Respondents. ) _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: Petitioner Jamelle Webb brings this direct review of an order of Jacqueline Lustig, chief legal counsel (Chief Counsel) of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department), sustaining the Department's dismissal of petitioner's charges against Mason County Service Company (respondent) of unlawful discharge from employment based on her sex and as retaliation. 775 ILCS 5/8- 111(A)(1) (West 1996); 155 Ill. 2d R. 335. The issues are whether (1) the Department and the Chief Counsel used the correct legal standard for determining whether petitioner offered sufficient substantial evidence to justify the issuance of the complaint; (2) the Department and the Chief Counsel erred in failing to consider the definition of sexual harassment contained in the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/2- 101(E) (West 1996)) in evaluating petitioner's discharge for retaliation claim; and (3) the dismissal of the claims relating to discharge from employment violated petitioner's right to due process under the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 2). We affirm. Petitioner's charge of discrimination (Illinois Depart- ment of Human Rights No. 1996SF0536) alleged she was hired on June 20, 1995, and discharged from her bookkeeper/secretary position on January 18, 1996; from August 1995 to January 1996, she was sexually harassed by plant manager Kenny Brown and Mike Hudgins, in and away from the workplace; and the general manager told her she was being discharged because it was just not working out and Brown did not believe their relationship could ever be restored. In support of her claims for having been sexually harassed, discrimi- nated against because of her sex, and retaliated against for opposing unlawful discrimination, petitioner further alleged there were no complaints about her job performance; the sexual harassment included disgusting remarks asking her about her breasts and tan legs; she objected to these comments and refused offers to drink beer with Hudgins; after Hudgins made sexually derogatory remarks to her and her boyfriend at the Havana Octoberfest, his behavior worsened and she reported him; although she complained to her supervisor, Darrell Batley, by mid-November 1995 her work environ- ment became extremely hostile; on December 26, 1995, Hudgins and three other employees threw the shop phone at her; a dead mouse was placed in her desk drawer; Brown ignored her and refused to answer questions; she contacted Batley again, and he said he would talk to Brown, but he did not; and upon discharging her, Batley said he was sorry it had to end that way. In its verified response, respondent employer admitted the dates of hire and discharge, stated petitioner was discharged for poor performance and for improperly performing her job duties, and denied the rest of petitioner's allegations. On February 21, 1997, Rose Mary Bombela, Department Director, issued a notice of substantial evidence and a notice of dismissal. There was a finding of substantial evidence to support the allegations of sexual harassment and harassment based on petitioner's sex. The charges of discharge based on sex and discharge based on retaliation were dismissed. Petitioner was advised she could appeal to the Chief Counsel and, if an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) number had been assigned to the case, she could request EEOC to perform a substantial weight review of the dismissal. Petitioner's claim had been assigned EEOC No. 21B961513. The record does not indicate whether a substantial weight review was initiated by petitioner. The investigative report found the followiong as uncon- tested facts: petitioner (a) was hired on June 20, 1995, as a bookkeeper/secretary; (b) worked with Brown and Hudgins on a daily basis; (c) met with Batley in November 1995 to discuss her job performance; (d) received a 75 |