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JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2001, plaintiff, Richard Thomas, filed anamended complaint alleging malicious prosecution against defendants, Dick Hileman and Edward Masters. The malicious prosecution action arose from a defamation action brought by Hileman,through Hileman's attorney, Masters, against Thomas. See Hilemanv. Thomas, No. 4-00-0514 (December 5, 2000) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23). In July 2001, defendants filed amotion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615(e)of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West2000)), which the trial court treated as a motion to dismiss. InOctober 2001, the trial court dismissed Thomas's amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action in maliciousprosecution.

On appeal, Thomas argues that the trial court erred indismissing his complaint, claiming that the complaint allegedsufficient facts to support a claim of malicious prosecutionagainst defendants. We affirm.

In 1999, defendant Dick Hileman ran for commissioner ofthe Village of Gardner. In April 1999, Richard Thomas wrote aletter to the editor of the Gardner Chronicle newspaper, whereinhe criticized Hileman's work as the business representative ofthe International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) and urged Gardner residents not to vote for Hileman in hisupcoming election.

In May 1999, after winning his election, Hileman fileda defamation action against Thomas (No. 99-L-35 (Cir. Ct.Livingston Co.)), alleging that the following statements inThomas's letter to the editor were defamatory per se:

"'However, in 1991, Hileman wholeheartedly endorsed a Pearl Harbor-like attack onthe American Dream. He aggressively supported an insidious ["]supplemental agreement["] in early 1991 way prior to the expiration of 1989-1992 contract. That supplemental agreement effectively sold-out A to Zthe recalled workers and the next generationof Caterpillar workers. Hileman unabashedlysupported contractualizing the followingunprecedented arrangement without a fight.

Hileman even had the unconscionableaudacity to support cutting bereavement tonew hires (contrast page 100 against page233). Is nothing sacred? And the above fourexamples are but a few terms of a total A toZ sell-out!

Many times, I have seriously asked Mr.Hileman why he repeatedly supported suchagreements? Mr. Hileman, with a comical lackof sophistication, has always given a long-winded non-answer. Sadly, I have never heardHileman express any remorse for hismisleadership. If my words smack of beingunforgiving, let me state that I have nothingpersonal against Hileman. But any rhetoricalblack-eye given to Hileman is nothing compared to the economic bludgeoning my generation has been receiving since Dick pioneeredlow wages in 1991.

Every generation is charged with theduty of passing the torch burning at least asbright as they received it. Hileman supported passing a wet match. Consequently,cigar[-]chomping Dick Hileman's leadershiplegacy would most likely afford him a candidacy not for commissioner, but for economicpariah of Will County. Indeed, Hileman supported the biggest bag over the head - kickin the economic crotch ever perpetrated fromone generation to the next.'"

In March 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing onThomas's motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with leaveto amend, finding, in relevant part, that (1) the statementsexpressed in the letter to the editor are opinions, not statements of fact, and were, therefore, constitutionally protected;(2) the letter is nonactionable when read as a whole, applyingthe innocent construction rule and giving the words their naturaland obvious meaning; and (3) plaintiff is a public figure and hisfitness for the office of commissioner is thereby a matter ofpublic or general interest and, accordingly, a conditionalprivilege attaches to the comments made. In June 2000, Hilemanappealed the trial court's dismissal to this court. In December2000, this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. Hilemanv. Thomas, No. 4-00-0514 (December 5, 2000) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23).

In March 2001 at a hearing on his posttrial motion incase No. 99-L-35 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.), Thomas struck hisrequest for Rule 137 sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). The recorddoes not indicate that any further action was taken on theoriginal case.

In May 2001, Thomas filed a complaint in the instantcase, No. 01-LM-50 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.), alleging maliciousprosecution against Hileman and defendant Edward Masters stemmingfrom the defamation action. Thomas contended that Hileman's suitagainst him was brought maliciously and with the intent tosilence Thomas's criticism of Hileman and that Masters, asHileman's attorney, should have known that Hileman had no claimagainst Thomas and Hileman's motivation was malicious in nature. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuantto section 2-615(e) of the Code. At the June 2001 hearing ondefendants' motion, the trial court granted Thomas's request tofile an amended complaint.

In June 2001, Thomas filed his first-amended complaintagainst Hileman and Masters for malicious prosecution, which madeessentially the same allegations as the prior complaint. In July2001, defendants again filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing ondefendants' motion. The court granted defendants' motion anddismissed Thomas's complaint with leave to amend within 14 days. In October 2001, the court dismissed Thomas's cause of action forfailure to state a cause of action in malicious prosecution afterhe failed to file an amended complaint. Specifically, the trialjudge found that the facts alleged failed to show a specialinjury as required in Illinois for a malicious prosecution claim. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Thomas argues that the trial court erred indismissing his complaint. Specifically, he contends that hisamended complaint pleaded facts sufficient to show a specialinjury as an element of malicious prosecution, and, in thealternative, he advocates for this court's adoption of theposition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

In deciding upon a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, thetrial court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which reliefcan be granted (Hampton v. Village of Washburn, 317 Ill. App. 3d439, 442, 739 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (2000)), and the factuallysufficient allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaintmust be taken as true (Cult Awareness Network v. Church ofScientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 269, 685 N.E.2d 1347,1349 (1997)). A court reviewing a section 2-615 motion todismiss must apply the de novo standard of review. Hampton, 317Ill. App. 3d at 442, 739 N.E.2d at 1021.

A. Malicious Prosecution

An action for malicious prosecution is disfavored inIllinois. Cult Awareness, 177 Ill. 2d at 286, 685 N.E.2d at1357. To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, aplaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant brought the underlying suit maliciously and without probable cause, (2) the formeraction was terminated in his or her favor, and (3) some "specialinjury" or special damage beyond the usual expense, time, orannoyance in defending a lawsuit has been pleaded. Cult Awareness, 177 Ill. 2d at 272, 685 N.E.2d at 1350. In the presentcase, the trial judge ruled that Thomas failed to plead sufficient facts to show a "special injury" as a result of the formeraction.

Illinois jurisprudence has long required a "specialinjury" element to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution. In one of the earliest discussions on this issue, thesupreme court, in 1898, examined whether malicious prosecution"will lie in such case in the absence of any interference withpersonal liberty and in the absence of any seizure of property." Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 624, 51 N.E. 569, 570(1898). The court held that without the arrest of the person,seizure of property, or some "other special injury," a cause ofaction in malicious prosecution will not lie. Smith, 175 Ill. at627, 51 N.E. at 571. The court's decision was partly based onits belief that the courts are "open to every citizen; and everyman has a right to come into a court of justice and claim what hedeems to be his right without fear of being prosecuted for heavydamages." Smith, 175 Ill. at 628, 51 N.E. at 571. The ordinarytrouble and expense that arise from ordinary forms of legalcontroversy should be endured as an inevitable burden. Smith,175 Ill. at 629, 51 N.E. at 572.

Two decades later, the supreme court again addressedthis issue in Norin v. Scheldt Manufacturing Co., 297 Ill. 521,525, 130 N.E. 791, 792 (1921), wherein the supreme court concluded that a bankruptcy action could not be considered anordinary civil suit based on its "far-reaching and drastic"effects. A year later, in Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134N.E. 705 (1922), the court further discussed this issue. InShedd, the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution actionagainst the defendant after the defendant filed nine lawsuitsagainst the plaintiff, all relating to the same subject matter. Shedd, 302 Ill. at 356, 134 N.E. at 705. The appellate courtfound, based on its interpretation of Smith and Norin, that asuit for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained when theformer action is an ordinary civil suit. Shedd, 302 Ill. at 358-59, 134 N.E. at 706. However, the supreme court reversed andheld that while courts are open to the public, it "affords noreason for requiring them to employ their time to the prejudiceof other litigants and the public business, to enable a partywhose rights have been finally and conclusively determined toharass the same party about the same thing." Shedd, 302 Ill. at360, 134 N.E. at 707.

The supreme court relied on Shedd when it faced theissue of special injury in Cult Awareness. In Cult Awareness,the court found a common theme throughout its opinions, maintaining a proper balance between the societal interest in preventingharassing suits and in permitting the honest assertion of rightsin court. Cult Awareness, 177 Ill. 2d at 284, 685 N.E.2d at1356. The court there found the special-injury requirementsatisfied where the defendant sued the plaintiff 21 times inmultiple jurisdictions over a 17-month period of time because"[s]uch a sustained onslaught of litigation can hardly be deemed'ordinary' if plaintiff can prove that the actions were broughtwithout probable cause and with malice." Cult Awareness, 177Ill. 2d at 285, 685 N.E.2d at 1356.

In nearly all cases where Illinois courts have found aspecial injury to support a malicious prosecution suit, thenature of the underlying suit visited upon the plaintiff somequantifiable damage-causing characteristic. Levin v. King, 271Ill. App. 3d 728, 732, 648 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (1995). Thomasasserts that Hileman's suit caused a special injury in that itdeprived him of his first amendment right of free speech. In considering whether litigation is rendered "ordinary" or injuries are "special," the court's focus must properlyrest upon the peculiar effect of the suit together with theremedy sought and not upon the subjective effect that the suitmay have on the plaintiff. Levin, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 733, 648N.E.2d at 1112.

In Levin, the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecutionaction after the defendant sued him for tortious interferencewith an advantageous business relationship. The plaintiff arguedthat the defendant's lawsuit "'substantially chilled [his]exercise of his rights of free expression.'" Levin, 271 Ill.App. 3d at 730, 648 N.E.2d at 1110. He claimed special damagesin the nature of the loss of his free speech rights. Levin, 271Ill. App. 3d at 730, 648 N.E.2d at 1110. The First Districtfound that although the plaintiff alleged his first amendmentrights were chilled, the defendant had not sought any provisionalremedy (as in the cases of injunction, attachment, or bankruptcyproceedings) such that the plaintiff's right to protest wasdenied. The court found that apart from the defendant's allegedbad motive in filing the underlying suit, "there is absolutelynothing unusual about the characteristics of that suit whichsuggest it is anything but an ordinary civil suit." Levin, 271Ill. App. 3d at 733-34, 648 N.E.2d at 1112. The court said thatto find otherwise would mean "every unsuccessful civil action, nomatter how pedestrian, could be the basis of a malicious prosecution suit by the mere assertion that a defendant's idiosyncraticinjuries constituted special damages." Levin, 271 Ill. App. 3dat 734, 648 N.E.2d at 1112.

Thomas has alleged that Hileman's defamation suitchilled his first amendment right to free speech, and he specifically asserts that "the fundamental spirit of the [f]irst[a]mendment is being violated by a governmental official himself." Thomas claims that such action by a public official issufficient to cause special damages. Concededly, Hileman'sdefamation action could have been brought with malice. However, like Levin, the underlying suit is like any civil matter and doesnot seek anything out of the ordinary as to remedy.

We find the court's discussion in Levin persuasive.Hileman, in his complaint, solely sought money damages. He didnot seek any sort of remedy designed to prevent Thomas's right toprotest. Moreover, the action itself did not chill Thomas'sright to protest since Hileman did not file the defamation suituntil after his election. Thomas was free to criticize Hileman'scandidacy through the election. Even after the election, Thomasremained free to criticize Hileman.

Thomas argues that the ruling in Levin contemplated afinding of special injury under these circumstances. Althoughthe court in Levin did remark that its ruling was not meant toimply that no circumstances could exist under which the interference with a citizen's right of free expression could become thebasis of malicious prosecution action (Levin, 271 Ill. App. 3d at737, 648 N.E.2d at 1114), we conclude this is not the case. Thomas has shown no injury or damage apart from the ordinarycosts associated with defending a lawsuit. To satisfy thespecial injury requirement, one must allege more than a voluntarydecision not to protest as a result of the alleged wrongfullybrought civil suit. Levin, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 737, 648 N.E.2dat 1114. Thomas has failed to allege any facts that indicateHileman's action interfered with his exercise of his firstamendment rights. Therefore, the special-injury element has notbeen satisfied.

Alternatively, Thomas urges this court to abrogate thespecial-injury rule and adopt the position in sections 674 and681 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second) ofTorts