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JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 2003, plaintiff, the State Board of Elections(Elections Board), filed a complaint for mandamus against MarkSheldon, in his official capacity as the county clerk of Champaign County, seeking an order requiring Shelden to furnish andrelease the telephone numbers of voters registered in ChampaignCounty to the Elections Board. After a bench trial, the trialcourt denied in part and granted in part the Elections Board'srequest for mandamus.

The Elections Board appeals, contending the trial courterred by not requiring Shelden to also submit voters' telephonenumbers that were submitted to Shelden by the voters on papervoter-registration cards and change-of-address forms after May29, 2002, but not entered into the voter's computer-based registration file. We note Shelden has not cross-appealed the court'spartial grant of the mandamus complaint. We affirm in part andreverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2002, Shelden stopped including a voter'stelephone number in the voter-registration information that hefurnished to the Elections Board. On June 4, 2002, Sheldenissued a press release stating he would no longer keep track ofphone numbers in his voter files and would delete all numbersalready in the system. This way political parties and candidatescould not obtain voters' phone numbers through his office or fromthe Elections Board. Shelden explained he had received complaints from voters about their telephone numbers being availableand felt political parties and candidates have been harassingvoters. In a letter dated June 17, 2002, William D. McGrathinformed the Elections Board of Shelden's press release andquestioned the legality of his actions. In July 2002, theElections Board held a meeting to discuss McGrath's letter, atwhich both McGrath and Shelden spoke about the issue.

In September 2002, the Elections Board determined thevoter-registration information submitted by Shelden wasnoncompliant because it lacked the voters' telephone numbers. InDecember 2002, A.L. Zimmer, the Elections Board's generalcounsel, sent Shelden a letter, informing him that his last datasubmission was noncompliant since it lacked telephone numbers andrequesting compliance by December 26, 2002. In February 2003,the Illinois Attorney General's office and Shelden exchangedletters regarding Shelden's noncompliance.

In March 2003, the Elections Board filed its compliantfor mandamus, requesting the trial court to enter an orderdirecting Shelden to furnish and release to it the telephonenumbers of voters registered after May 1, 1990, and for allregistered voters irrespective of registration date, if suchinformation is available on the voter-registration card submittedby the voter. In April 2003, Shelden filed a motion to dismiss,contending the Elections Board had already deemed his datasubmissions compliant and reimbursed him for his submissions. After holding a hearing, the court denied Shelden's motion todismiss. Shelden then filed an answer, asserting the followingaffirmative defenses: (1) the Elections Board could not contestthe adequacy of his data submissions because it had alreadydeemed them compliant; (2) the Elections Board was also barredfrom contesting compliancy because of a statement made by one ofits employees indicating Shelden did not have to furnishtelephone numbers outside of a computerized registration file;and (3) if granted, the relief sought by the Elections Boardwould create public disorder and confusion because the ElectionsBoard accepts data submissions from other counties that do notinclude voters' telephone numbers.

In December 2003, the trial court held a bench trial onthe Elections Board's complaint. In January 2004, the courtentered a written order, granting the complaint in part anddenying it part. Specifically, the court concluded the voterrecords at issue could be divided into the following threecategories: (1) computer records of telephone numbers that weredeleted from the May 2002 submission; (2) telephone numbers notincluded in computerized voter-registration files subsequent tothe May 2002 submission, whether on paper records or in separatecomputer files that are not the voter-registration files; and (3)telephone numbers not submitted in May 2002 because they weredeleted based on a voter's request. The court then granted awrit of mandamus as to the first category of records because therecords were "available" within the meaning of the law. However,the court denied a writ as to the other two categories becausethe Elections Board had not sought relief as to the thirdcategory and the law does not impose a clear duty on Shelden tosubmit the records in the second category. Specifically, thecourt found the law does not impose a clear duty on Shelden tocollect telephone numbers, to include them in the computerizedrecord, and then to submit them to the Elections Board in thevoter-registration file. The court also denied all of Shelden'saffirmative defenses.

This appeal followed.

The Elections Board asserts the trial court erred bynot granting a writ of mandamus for the second category ofrecords, which is those paper or computer records containingvoter telephone numbers that are not part of the computerizedvoter-registration file.

A court may only grant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief to direct a public official to perform aministerial duty that does not involve the official's exercise ofjudgment or discretion. Thus, to obtain mandamus relief, apetitioner must demonstrate (1) a clear right to the requestedrelief, (2) the respondent's clear duty to act, and (3) therespondent's clear authority to comply with the terms of thewrit. Hadley v. Ryan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 297, 301, 803 N.E.2d 48,52 (2003). Generally, a reviewing court will only reverse atrial court's decision to grant or deny mandamus when it isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence or where the courtabused its discretion. Durbin v. Gilmore, 307 Ill. App. 3d 337,339, 718 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1999). However, where the court'sjudgment turns solely on a statute's construction, which is aquestion of law, our review is de novo. Villarreal v. Village ofSchaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 1161, 759 N.E.2d 76, 80(2001). The issue that this case presents involves theconstruction of several sections of the Election Code (10 ILCS5/1 through 30 (West 2002)), and thus our review is de novo.

As the trial court astutely noted, the statutespertaining to the issue at hand "are not a model of clarity." Thus, we will begin by setting forth the applicable statutes andregulations.

Section 4-8 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/4-8 (WestSupp. 2001)) is a lengthy provision that addresses many aspectsof voter registration and the county clerk's duty to furnishinformation to the Elections Board. The blank forms for theregistration of electors are known as registration-record cards. 10 ILCS 5/4-8 (West Supp. 2001). Section 4-8 requires a voter-registration card to contain the following information and anyother information the county clerk may think is proper to requirefor the applicant's identification: name, sex, residence, theterm of residence in Illinois and the precinct, nativity,citizenship, the date of application, age, any physicaldisability of the applicant that would require assistance invoting, the county and state in which the applicant was lastregistered, the voter's signature, and the deputy registrar's orregistration officer's signature. 10 ILCS 5/4-8 (West Supp.2001).

Sections 4-8.03 and 4-33(a) of the Election Code givethe Elections Board the authority to design the registration-record card for both counties that have adopted a computer-basedregistration file and those that have not. 10 ILCS 5/4-8.03(West 2000); 10 ILCS 5/4-33(a) (West 2002). The legislature hasamended section 4-33 since the controversy in this case arose,but the new statute still gives the Elections Board the authorityto design the registration record. See 10 ILCS 5/4-33(a) (WestSupp. 2003). Section 4-8.03 and the former section 4-33(a)mandated that the registration-record card contain "a box for theapplicant's telephone number, if available," and required theelection authorities with a computerized system and those withoutto use the card. 10 ILCS 5/4-8.03 (West 2000); 10 ILCS 5/4-33(a)(West 2002). The current version of section 4-33(a) stillrequires the election authorities to use the Election Board'sregistration-record cards but no longer mandates a box beprovided for the applicant's telephone number. See 10 ILCS 5/4-33(a) (West Supp. 2003).

Section 216, exhibit A, of Title 26 of the IllinoisAdministrative Code (26 Ill. Adm. Code