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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

This action is brought under the Consumer Fraud andDeceptive Business Practices Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.121 1/2, pars. 261 through 272 (now see 815 ILCS 505/1 through 12(West 2000))). The complaint seeks a determination that theaction be maintained as a class action. 735 ILCS 5/2-802(a)(West 2000). The circuit court entered summary judgment in favorof defendant, Boise Cascade. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs, Lisa M. Shannon, Timothy J. Shannon, BrianK. Connelly, Susan West, Shapour Arami, Bruce Fischer, and JamesTorongo, own homes in Du Page County, which were built in 1983 or1984. Plaintiffs Fischer and Torongo are the original owners oftheir homes, purchasing them in 1984. Most of the other plaintiffs purchased their homes in 1997, one in 1991. Boise Cascademanufactured an exterior composite wood siding product that wasinstalled on the homes when they were built. Boise Cascade beganmanufacturing its composite siding about 1960 but has not manufactured, sold, or marketed the siding since 1984. Plaintiffs' second-amended complaint, with amendedcount I, alleges a violation of section 2 of the Act (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262 (now see 815 ILCS 505/2 (West2000))). The complaint alleges that Boise Cascade's compositesiding was subject to rotting, buckling, warping, wick moisture,and general failure. The complaint alleges that Boise Cascadedeceptively advertised the composite siding, falsely representingthat the siding was "of inherent good quality," "durable," "lowmaintenance," and "looked and performed comparably to naturalwood siding." The complaint also alleges that Boise Cascadefraudulently and deceptively failed to disclose that its siding"performed poorly in the field," with a "high rate of failure,"was sensitive to moisture, and required "highly particularizedmaintenance."

The circuit court entered summary judgment for BoiseCascade, noting that while further discovery may be necessary todetermine whether Boise Cascade's marketing activity was false,misleading, or otherwise deceptive, the court could address thefactual premise of the motion that "seven of the eight plaintiffsneither saw, heard, or otherwise were aware of the defendant'sadvertising," which was strictly a legal issue. Although plaintiff Fischer bought his home new, he did not know that his sidingwas manufactured by Boise Cascade. Plaintiff Torongo knew thatthe siding had been manufactured by Boise Cascade, but there wasno evidence he was aware of any representations by Boise Cascade. The court held that Torongo and Fischer could not rely on therepresentations of the builder-seller of their homes, as therewas no evidence the builder-seller was an agent of Boise Cascade. The circuit court did refuse to enter summary judgment againstplaintiff Jack B. Babel, who bought his home new in 1984, knewthe siding was manufactured by Boise Cascade, and had read someof Boise Cascade's publications prior to making his purchase. The circuit court rejected Boise Cascade's argument that itsrepresentations were only nonactionable "puffing."

The circuit court made a finding under Supreme CourtRule 304(a) that there is no just reason to delay enforcement orappeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Plaintiffs appeal, arguing thatthe circuit court improperly analyzed the elements of a cause ofaction under the Act, in particular the concepts of "materiality"and "proximate causation." For purposes of this appeal weassume, as did the circuit court, that Boise Cascade's compositesiding was defective, that Boise Cascade's representations weredeceptive, and that Boise Cascade concealed facts with the intentthat others rely thereon.

Although the use of summary judgment aids in theexpeditious disposition of a lawsuit, "[s]ummary judgment is adrastic measure and should only be granted if the movant's rightto judgment is clear and free from doubt." Outboard Marine Corp.v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d1204, 1209 (1992). A motion for summary judgment is properlygranted, therefore, only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuineissue as to any material fact and that the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)(West 2000). In considering a summary judgment motion, the courthas a duty to construe the evidence strictly against the movantand liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292, 757N.E.2d 481, 491 (2001). In appeals from orders granting summaryjudgment, our review is de novo. Travelers, 197 Ill. 2d at 292,757 N.E.2d at 491.

Section 2 of the Act declares "[u]nfair methods ofcompetition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to be"unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived[,]or damaged thereby." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262(now see 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)). Among those methods andpractices, two are specifically described: (1) "the use oremployment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation," and (2) "the concealment, suppression[,] or omission of any material fact, with intent that othersrely upon the concealment, suppression[,] or omission of suchmaterial fact." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262 (nowsee 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)).

"Any person who suffers actual damage as a result of aviolation of *** this Act committed by any other person may bringan action against such person." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1211/2, par. 270a(a) (now see 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 2000)). Although the Act does not use the words "proximate cause," a tortconcept, the language of section 10a(a) has been held to giverise to a requirement that plaintiff show that the consumer fraudproximately caused plaintiff's injury. Connick v. Suzuki MotorCo., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 501, 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (1996).

The circuit court construed the Act to require privity,some sort of direct contact between the plaintiffs and therepresentations made by Boise Cascade. The circuit court construed the Act too narrowly. The Act created a new cause ofaction that affords consumers broad protection by prohibiting anydeception or false promise. Miller v. William Chevrolet/Geo,Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 642, 654, 762 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2001). TheAct eliminated many of the elements of common-law fraud in thisnew cause of action. Miller, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 762 N.E.2dat 11. For example, the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant'sdeception is not an element of a consumer fraud claim. Miller,326 Ill. App. 3d at 655, 762 N.E.2d at 12. Nor need the defendant have intended to deceive the plaintiff; innocent misrepresentations or material omissions intended to induce the plaintiff's reliance are actionable. Miller, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 655,762 N.E.2d at 12. There is a two-step process under the Act. Inthe first step it is determined whether the conduct of thedefendant is unlawful, without any consideration given to suchmatters as whether the plaintiff relied thereon, whether theplaintiff could have discovered the truth through reasonableinquiry, or whether the reliance was justified. In the secondstep it is determined whether plaintiff suffered actual damage asa result of a violation of the Act. The focus of the Act is uponthe deceptive conduct of the defendant, not upon the conduct ofthe plaintiff. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262 (nowsee 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)) ("unlawful whether any person hasin fact been misled, deceived[,] or damaged thereby").

Even common-law fraud did not require privity betweenthe plaintiff and defendant, only that the statement by thedefendant be made with the intention that it reach the plaintiffand influence his action and that it does reach him and that hedoes rely upon it, to his damage. St. Joseph Hospital v.Corbetta Construction Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 954, 316 N.E.2d51, 72 (1974). Nor does the Act impose any privity requirement. Where a material fact is concealed, it is sufficient that therebe an "intent that others rely upon the concealment." (Emphasisadded.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262 (now see 815ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)). It is not required that any particularperson rely, or be intended to rely, on the concealment. Some ofthe cases do list as an element "defendant's intent that plaintiff rely on the deception." (Emphasis added.) See, e.g.,Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 501, 675 N.E.2d at 593. The cases whichmake that statement, however, all seem to be cases in which thedeception was made directly to plaintiff. Certainly BoiseCascade did not need to know plaintiffs' identities when it madeits deceptive statements. A more accurate statement of theelement in the present case would appear to be: "defendant'sintent that someone rely on the deception."

The circuit court entered summary judgment againstplaintiffs Fischer and Torongo, who bought their homes new,concluding that they were not aware of any representations byBoise Cascade. The builder-seller of the homes was probablyaware of the representations, but according to the circuit courtthat did not help plaintiffs because there was no evidence thebuilder-seller was an agent of Boise Cascade. That analysis ismistaken. Whether or not the builder-seller was plaintiffs'agent, Boise Cascade's representations reached plaintiffs throughthe builder-seller, and plaintiffs Fischer and Torongo reliedupon those representations, to their damage. In the St. JosephHospital case, General Electric made representations in a letterto the contractor that its Textolite plastic laminate wallpaneling did not carry a flame spread rating of any kind. St.Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 951, 316 N.E.2d at 70. Thepaneling had been tested by Underwriters Laboratories, whichdetermined that the rating would be 255 (applicable codes required a rating no higher than 15). Underwriters Laboratoriesrefused to rate the paneling because it believed no producttesting out over 200 should be given a rating. St. JosephHospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 949-51, 316 N.E.2d at 68-70. Thecourt concluded that General Electric was guilty of fraud, andeven though its representations were made to the contractor, andnot directly to the hospital, the verdict in favor of the Hospital was affirmed. St. Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 954-57, 316 N.E.2d at 72-74.

The circuit court's insistence on privity is apparentin its analysis of what constitutes a "material fact." The Actprovides that the "concealment *** of any material fact, withintent that others rely upon the concealment," is unlawful. Ill.Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262 (now see 815 ILCS 505/2(West 2000)). Not every concealment of a fact is unlawful. Amanufacturer is generally under no obligation, for example, todisclose the day the product was made, the rate of pay of itsworkers, or what its product tastes like. The concealed factmust be "material." "A material fact exists where a buyer wouldhave acted differently knowing the information, or if it concerned the type of information upon which a buyer would beexpected to rely in making a decision whether to purchase." Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 505, 675 N.E.2d at 595. The circuitcourt, however, did not focus on a hypothetical buyer in determining materiality. Rather, it focused on the plaintiffs in thiscase, six of whom were unaware the homes had Boise Cascade sidingat the time they purchased them: "It follows logically that noneof those six plaintiffs would have acted differently had theybeen aware of the alleged undesirable characteristics, falserepresentations[,] and non[]disclosures." The circuit court'smistaken focus on the particular plaintiffs in this case misreadsthe Act. The Act and the cases refer to "a buyer," to "anybuyer," and to "others." In determining whether a practice isunlawful there are no specific references to the person harmed.

The circuit court determined that plaintiffs wererelying on a marketing theory of proximate cause and that toprevail plaintiffs must establish that "without the allegedlydeceptive advertising, the defendant would not have been in thesiding business, because there would have been no market for itssiding." Cf. Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d172, 180-81, 485 N.E.2d 855, 863 (1985) (misrepresentation was anattempt to induce the purchaser to buy the house for a value thatdid not reflect the existence of the defect). The court concluded that plaintiffs could not prove such a case withoutplunging "the trier of fact into the murky depths of speculation." The court stated that while plaintiffs need not provereliance to recover under the Act, "they must prove that someonesaw the specific advertising in question with the result that theplaintiffs were directly impacted, i.e., made a decision to theirdetriment." The court concluded that its observations concerningmateriality were applicable on the issue of proximate cause, thatmost of the plaintiffs were unaware that Boise Cascade hadmanufactured the siding on their homes when they made theirpurchase:

"Thus, it seems that no representation or non[]disclosure concerning Boise Cascade siding could have affected theirpurchasing decision. The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that nothing the defendant said, wrote, advertised[,] or refrained fromdis-closing could proximately cause the damages six of the plaintiffs claim they have suffered."

The circuit court's conclusion as a matter of law thatcausation was too remote, that there was no proximate causation,is erroneous. Where reasonable minds could differ whether thedefendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing aboutthe injury, the matter is for the jury to decide. Lee v. ChicagoTransit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 605 N.E.2d 493, 502-03(1992). Proximate cause must be proved by a reasonable certainty, but that is true of every element found by a jury. Ifthere is some evidence indicating proximate cause, the juryverdict cannot be overturned. See LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185Ill. 2d 380, 405-06, 706 N.E.2d 441, 454-55 (1998) (reversingruling there was no reasonably certain evidence to support futurelost earnings instruction; some evidence all that is required);McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 516, 736 N.E.2d 1074,1082 (2000) (some evidence of sole proximate cause sufficient tosupport instruction). The fact that Boise Cascade is separatedfrom some plaintiffs by the builder-seller or by interveningpurchasers does not necessarily destroy proximate cause. Proximate cause means any cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. It need not be "'theonly cause, nor the last or nearest cause.'" Holton v. MemorialHospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 110-11, 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (1997),quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 15.01 (3ded. 1995).

The term "proximate cause" describes two distinctrequirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee, 152 Ill. 2dat 455, 605 N.E.2d at 502. Generally it is not enough to showcause in fact, or "but for" causation. A plaintiff may notrecover against his mother, although but for his birth he wouldnot have suffered all the problems he encountered in life. Theremust also be "legal cause," a policy decision that limits how fara defendant's legal responsibility can be extended for conductthat did, in fact, cause plaintiff's harm. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at455, 605 N.E.2d at 502 (question of duty also a policy decision). Legal cause is essentially a question of foreseeability; adefendant should not be found liable for a highly extraordinaryresult. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456, 605 N.E.2d at 503. In casesarising under the Act, it appears that these policy decisionshave been made by the Act, and damages are proximately caused ifthey are in fact caused by a method or practice which is unlawfulunder the Act, that is, if the damages would not have occurredbut for the violation of the Act.

When a manufacturer is able to incorporate its defective product into a building by deception and the concealment ofmaterial facts, it is foreseeable that the purchaser or somesubsequent purchaser will suffer damages when the defect isdiscovered. The proposition that use of defective materials, asa result of misrepresentation, will cause damages when thedefects are discovered is not a highly extraordinary one. Usingthe circuit court's terms, was it possible or foreseeable thatBoise Cascade's representations, of which plaintiffs were unaware, "could have affected their purchasing decision"? Deceptive advertising can affect a home buyer who is unaware of it, ifit is relied upon by those with whom he deals, such as architectsor builders. See St. Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 950-57,316 N.E.2d at 69-74. If such a buyer has a cause of action whenhe discovers the misrepresentation, why should a subsequentbuyer, who is the one to discover the misrepresentation, not havea cause of action?

Boise Cascade knew there would be subsequent buyers. Boise Cascade disseminated its allegedly deceptive advertisingfor the purpose that it would be relied upon. It makes nodifference whether the deceptive advertising was read by architects, builders, or new home buyers, or whether they saw andliked homes built by others who had read the advertising. Proximate cause need not be the only cause, nor the last ornearest cause. The trial court's view of proximate cause isoverly restrictive. See Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Gay,288 Ill. App. 3d 32, 44, 680 N.E.2d 407, 415 (1997) (possibilitythat colliding with a building will disrupt a gas line or createa fire hazard is not so inherently farfetched as to merit thelabel "freakish" or "fantastic").

The argument is made that plaintiffs' "marketingtheory" would result in infinite liability for the manufacturerfor any injury associated with the product. It is not correctthat every purchaser of these homes from this time forward willhave a cause of action against Boise Cascade. Only a purchaserwho paid full price for the home, unaware of the defect, and thenwas unable to resell the home for its full price would have acause of action. A purchaser who buys the home at a discountbecause of known problems with the siding has not been damaged. In some marketing transaction cases, plaintiffs may befar removed from the deception or concealment. For example, instock transactions, private representations may be made to only afew individuals, causing them to purchase the stock and drivingup the price. Other individuals with no access to the representations may also purchase the stock at the inflated price (notnecessarily from the individuals to whom the representations weremade) and attempt to recover for the representations. SeeOliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 311 Ill. App. 3d 886, 893-94, 726N.E.2d 51, 58 (2000), appeal pending, Nos. 89497, 89511 cons. The present case involves a much tighter transaction: allegations of a physical defect in a product which has been transferred to plaintiffs. Even where privity of contract was required, privity was held to accompany a valid assignment of thecontract. Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 511,532 N.E.2d 834, 839 (1988). Boise Cascade's representationsapparently were widely distributed, and a jury could reasonablyconclude that plaintiffs would not have suffered damages if therepresentations had not been made.

We further reject the circuit court's contention thatplaintiff's cause of action is inconsistent with the UniformCommercial Code (810 ILCS 5/2-316(2), (3) (West 2000)), whichallows the disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability. There is nothing wrong with a manufacturer marketing Grade Dsiding. A problem only arises where the manufacturer marketsthat siding as Grade A siding. The existence of defects unaccompanied by misrepresentations does not amount to fraud. Naiditchv. Shaf Home Builders, Inc., 160 Ill. App. 3d 245, 261, 512N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (1987); Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts,Inc., 245 Ill. App. 3d 258, 270-71, 613 N.E.2d 805, 815 (1993)(misrepresentations lacking in Naiditch; evidence merely established house was defective).

The focus of the Act is upon the conduct of the defendants, not upon the conduct of the plaintiffs. Whether defendants are guilty of unlawful practices under the Act must bedetermined without considering whether any person has in factbeen misled, deceived, or damaged thereby. If defendants areguilty of unlawful practices, the question becomes whetherplaintiffs have suffered actual damage as a result, normally aquestion for the jury. We cannot say that a reasonable jurycould never conclude that plaintiffs sustained damages or thatthose damages were a natural and probable consequence of BoiseCascade's unlawful conduct.

We reverse the trial court's order entering summaryjudgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

KNECHT, J., concurs.

TURNER, J., dissents.

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority fails to addressthe actual proximate-cause theory advanced by plaintiffs in thiscase. The majority appears to set forth how it would havealleged proximate cause and finds that theory sufficient.

Here, in the amended count I based on the Act, plaintiffs asserted the following:

"Defendant's conduct as set forth abovecaused damage to the plaintiffs and classmembers in that absent said promotion andmarketing activities a market would not havebeen developed for composite wood siding andthus the siding would not have been sold inthe State of Illinois and therefore it wouldnot have been installed on the residences ofplaintiffs and the other members of theclass."

The trial court concluded the relationship between Boise Cascade's initial advertising of its products to create a market andthe siding damage experienced by plaintiffs almost 40 years laterwas anything but proximate. I agree.

Plaintiffs' theory essentially eviscerates theproximate-cause requirement. Under plaintiffs' theory, if falseadvertising effectively created a market for a product, then theadvertising is the proximate cause of any injuries associatedwith the product at any point in time because the product shouldnever have existed. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge in theirbrief they need only prove Boise Cascade's advertising created amarket for the product. Such a theory results in infiniteliability of the manufacturer for any injury associated with theproduct's use. Here, Boise Cascade has not manufactured sidingproducts for 17 years, yet faces a lawsuit relating to advertising that allegedly created a market for its siding productsalmost four decades earlier.

Further, while proximate cause is usually a matter forthe jury (slip op. at 10), it can only be established as a matterof law where a reasonable certainty exists that the defendant'sacts caused the plaintiff's injury (see Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455,605 N.E.2d at 502). I fail to see how plaintiffs can establishBoise Cascade's product would not have existed but for thedeceptive materials without resorting to speculation and conjecture. Liability cannot be premised merely upon surmise orconjecture as to the cause of the injury. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at455, 605 N.E.2d at 503.

Accordingly, the causation theory set forth by plaintiffs is too remote to establish proximate causation.

Even under the majority's proximate-cause theory,plaintiffs have not alleged proximate cause. While the focus ofthe Act is on the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's conduct isclearly relevant to the determination of proximate cause. InZekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 372,695 N.E.2d 853, 860 (1998), the plaintiff alleged the defendantviolated the Act by billing him in an allegedly misleadingmanner. In his deposition, the plaintiff stated he did not reador pay the bills himself. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 375, 695 N.E.2dat 861. The Supreme Court of Illinois held the defendant'salleged violations of the Act were not the proximate cause of theplaintiff's injuries because he was not deceived by the defendant's actions. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 376, 695 N.E.2d at 862.

While in a case such as this plaintiffs themselves maynot have needed to read the deceptive materials to establishproximate cause, someone who built or owned plaintiffs' propertymust have read the materials. Plaintiffs do not even assert intheir complaint that anyone who participated in the building oftheir homes or any previous owners of their homes read thedeceptive materials. In fact, the complaint alleges no factsdirectly connecting the deceptive material with plaintiffs'homes.

For example, consider the situation of plaintiffConnelly. In 1997, he purchased a 13-year-old house that had twoprevious owners. At the time of purchase, Connelly had neverseen or heard any marketing statements for the siding, had neverbeen told anything about the siding, and did not know who manufactured the siding. A few days after purchasing his home, henoticed that some of the siding was damaged (he did not discoverthe damage prior to the real estate closing because he chose notto employ a home inspector). A year later, he learned that hissiding was manufactured by defendant Boise Cascade. He thenjoined in bringing a lawsuit against Boise Cascade, alleging thatdecades earlier, Boise Cascade advertised the product in a wayinconsistent with how Connelly's siding is now performing.

Like Zekman, plaintiffs have not shown proximate causebecause they failed to allege they or anyone else connected totheir homes read the allegedly deceptive materials.

Additionally, the majority in reversing the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment notes "[a] purchaser who buysthe home at a discount because of known problems with the sidinghas not been damaged." Slip op. at 13. Here, the depositiontestimony shows plaintiffs Lisa Shannon, Timothy Shannon, West,and Arami all purchased homes they knew had siding damage at thetime of purchase. Thus, the summary judgment as to those fourplaintiffs should be affirmed on that basis alone.

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment. Because I would affirm thejudgment based on the failure to demonstrate proximate cause, Ido not address the materiality element.