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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: 

Plaintiff, Duttala Obula Reddy, M.D., a doctor specializing in psychiatry, contests the sanctions imposed upon hismedical license by defendant, Illinois Department of ProfessionalRegulation (Department), arising from plaintiff's romanticrelationship with a patient. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The problems began in 1991 when plaintiff fell in lovewith a female patient whom he was treating for various mentalhealth issues. Plaintiff pronounced his love for his patientduring a session, at which moment she "fired" him as her therapist, and the relationship took off from there. Plaintiff movedhis new lover into his home with his wife and kids, eventuallydivorced his wife, and then married his patient. The marriagelasted about a year.

In 1996, the Department instituted a disciplinarycomplaint against plaintiff seeking to sanction him for misconduct relating to the aforementioned romantic relationship withhis patient. After a series of hearings, the administrative lawjudge (ALJ) made extensive findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and recommended plaintiff's professional license be placed ontwo years' probation with certain restrictions on plaintiff'spractice of medicine. The ALJ forwarded his report to theIllinois Medical Disciplinary Board (Board). The Board acceptedand incorporated the ALJ's findings of fact and most of theconclusions of law in its own report, but the Board recommended amore severe sanction, including a six-month suspension of plaintiff's medical license and more onerous restrictions prohibitingplaintiff from supervising other doctors. The Board stated thatit believed plaintiff's actions were egregious, warranting astiffer penalty than that recommended by the ALJ, and that thestiffer penalty was more in line with precedent in similar cases. The Board forwarded its report to the Director of the Department,who made the final decision. The Director adopted the Board'sfindings and recommendations and issued an order suspendingplaintiff's medical license for six months and restricting himfrom supervising other doctors.

Plaintiff filed a timely complaint in the circuit courtfor review of the Department's administrative order pursuant tothe Illinois Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through3-113 (West 1998)). The circuit court remanded the case to theDepartment three times because of various technical and substantive shortcomings. On the fourth try, the Department issued anorder that adopted all of the Board's findings of fact andconclusions of law (which were now exactly the same as theALJ's), and the Board's recommendation of a six-month suspensionwith a restriction on supervising other doctors (which wasdifferent from the ALJ's). The circuit court affirmed thisorder. Plaintiff appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the formof the Department's order does not satisfy statutory requirements, and (2) the sanction imposed by the order was too harshand therefore an abuse of the Department's discretion. Weaddress each issue in turn.

A. Sufficiency of Form

Plaintiff initially argues that the Department's orderdoes not satisfy the requirements of form found in section 10-50of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (AdministrativeProcedure Act) (5 ILCS 100/10-50 (West 2000)) and section 40 ofthe Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Medical Practice Act)(225 ILCS 60/40 (West 2000)). This presents a question of law,which we review de novo. John v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 305 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967, 713 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1999)("Questions of law are reviewed de novo"). Plaintiff does notchallenge any of the Department's substantive factual findings orlegal conclusions.

Section 10-50 of the Administrative Procedure Actprovides in pertinent part:

"(a) A final decision or order adverse to a party (other than the agency) in acontested case shall be in writing or stated in the record. A final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall beaccompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings." 5 ILCS 100/10-50(a) (West 2000).

Section 40 of the Medical Practice Act provides in pertinentpart:

"Each certificate of order of revocation, suspension, or other disciplinary action shall contain a brief, concise statement of the ground or grounds upon which theDepartment's action is based, as well as the specific terms and conditions of such action." 225 ILCS 60/40 (West 2000).

In this case, the ultimate order issued by the Department adopted the factual findings and legal conclusions of theALJ (via the Board's recommendation). These findings and conclusions were separately stated. The order also stated the groundsfor the Department's action. Stated succinctly, plaintiff'sromantic relationship with a patient was a very serious breach ofjudgment and his professional responsibilities. In all respects,the Department's order satisfies the requirements of form foundin the cited statutes.

Plaintiff argues, however, that the Department's orderis deficient because it does not explain why it disregardedmitigating evidence found by the ALJ and why it imposed a harshersanction than that recommended by the ALJ. In response toplaintiff's argument, we first note that there is no indicationthat the Department disregarded the mitigating evidence. To thecontrary, the Department accepted and incorporated all of theALJ's findings of fact, which would necessarily conclude findingsregarding mitigating facts. Second, the Department (by acceptingthe recommendation of the Board) did explain why it imposed aharsher discipline than that recommended by the ALJ. Specifically, the grievous nature of plaintiff's behavior and the pastprecedent of sanctions in similar cases. See, e.g., Siddiqui v.Department of Professional Regulation, 307 Ill. App. 3d 753, 764,718 N.E.2d 217, 228 (1999) (because of need for uniformity ofsanctions in disciplinary proceedings, sanctions imposed insimilar cases may be considered).

In short, the Department relied on the exact samefactual findings and legal conclusions as the ALJ, but simplydecided that those same facts and conclusions warranted a different sanction than that recommended by the ALJ. Just because theALJ thought the circumstances warranted a certain sanction doesnot mean that that was the only possible conclusion that could bedrawn. It is axiomatic that different persons can look at thesame facts and come to different conclusions. While the ALJcould make recommendations, the authority to make the ultimatedecision rested with the Department. The form of the Department's order satisfied the statutory requirements. There was noerror here.

B. Severity of the Sanctions

The standard of review is whether the Department abusedits discretion in imposing the sanction that it did. Siddiqui,307 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 718 N.E.2d at 228. The Departmentabuses its discretion when it imposes a sanction that is "(1)overly harsh in view of the mitigating circumstances or (2)unrelated to the purpose of the statute." Siddiqui, 307 Ill.App. 3d at 763, 718 N.E.2d at 228. "The purpose of the MedicalPractice Act is to protect the public health and welfare fromthose not qualified to practice medicine." Siddiqui, 307 Ill.App. 3d at 764, 718 N.E.2d at 228. We must defer to the administrative agency's expertise and experience in determining whatsanction is appropriate to protect the public interest. Siddiqui, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 764, 718 N.E.2d at 228-29.

Plaintiff argues that the sanction of a six-monthsuspension was unduly harsh considering the mitigating circumstances (agreeing with the ALJ), and that it will not serve thepurpose of the statute. Plaintiff also argues that prohibitinghim from supervising other doctors has no reasonable relationshipto the purpose of the statute.

In this case, the Department determined that plaintiff's behavior warranted discipline under three statutorygrounds: (1) plaintiff's behavior was unethical and unprofessional (225 ILCS 60/22(A)(5) (West 2000)); (2) plaintiff'sbehavior was immoral (225 ILCS 60/22(A)(20) (West 2000)); and (3)plaintiff suffered from a mental illness that resulted in hisinability to practice with a reasonable degree of judgment (225ILCS 60/22(A)(27) (West 2000)). As cited above, the purpose ofthe sanctions authorized by the Medical Practice Act is toprotect the public health and welfare from those not qualified topractice medicine. The Department, even with the mitigatingcircumstances, determined that for a doctor guilty of theseshortcomings, a six-month suspension and a prohibition fromsupervising other doctors would serve to protect the publichealth and welfare. This decision is not so arbitrary, unreasonable, or harsh that this court can say the Department abused itsdiscretion. See, e.g., Pundy v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 211 Ill. App. 3d 475, 488, 570 N.E.2d 458, 467 (1991)(six-month suspension of psychiatrist's license as sanction foraffair with patient is not an abuse of discretion, even withmitigating facts). We therefore defer to the experience andexpertise of the Department in these matters and affirm itsorder.

For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Department.

Affirmed.

KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.