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JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 2001, the Illinois Department of HumanRights filed an amended complaint with respondent Illinois HumanRights Commission on behalf of respondent Jesse Mansker. Theamended complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that (1) a malecoworker had sexually harassed Mansker while both men wereemployed by petitioner, Pinnacle Limited Partnership, and (2)Pinnacle was liable for the coworker's conduct because it failedto take reasonable corrective measures after Mansker's supervisors became aware of the sexual harassment. Following a February2002 hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) entered an orderrecommending that the amended complaint against Pinnacle bedismissed with prejudice. In April 2004, the Commission rejectedthe ALJ's recommendation and determined that Mansker had provedhis sexual-harassment claim against Pinnacle.

Pinnacle appeals, arguing that (1) the Commission'sdecision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2)the Commission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Wedisagree and affirm.

In March 1999, Mansker, who is homosexual, filed adiscrimination charge with the Department, alleging, in pertinentpart, that (1) a coworker, Michael Montgomery, who is alsohomosexual, had sexually harassed him while both men worked atthe Springfield Hilton Hotel, which was operated by Pinnacle; and(2) Mansker had reported the sexual harassment to his supervisorsat the Hilton. Following an investigation by the Department, theDirector of Human Rights determined that substantial evidenceexisted that a civil-rights violation had occurred. In February2000, after the parties' settlement and mediation efforts failed,the Department filed a complaint on Mansker's behalf with theCommission, alleging that (1) Mansker had been subjected tosexual harassment by Montgomery and (2) neither Mansker's immediate supervisor, Abbas Zolghadr, nor Pinnacle properly respondedto Montgomery's conduct. (The ALJ later dismissed Zolghadr as aparty, and the Commission entered an uncontested finding againstMontgomery, who refused to participate in the proceedings. Neither Zolghadr nor Montgomery is a party to this appeal.)

In January 2001, the Department filed an amendedcomplaint on Mansker's behalf with the Commission, alleging, inpertinent part, that (1) from June 1998 through mid-November1998, Montgomery sexually harassed Mansker while both men wereemployed by Pinnacle and (2) Pinnacle was liable for Montgomery'sconduct because it failed to take reasonable corrective measuresafter Zolghadr and Lori Smothers, Mansker's assistant manager,became aware of the sexual harassment.

At the February 2002 hearing on the amended complaintbefore the ALJ, Mansker testified that in May 1998, he beganworking as a server at the Hilton's restaurant. In June 1998,Montgomery, who Mansker had previously met at a local bar, firstsexually harassed Mansker. On that occasion, Mansker was takinga break with two female restaurant workers when Montgomery walkedup and began talking to them. Montgomery described in detail asexual encounter he had while on vacation. According to Mansker,Montgomery's description "disgusted" Mansker and the two women. Mansker told Montgomery that they did not want to hear about theencounter, and Montgomery said, "[Y]ou know you want a littlestrange." Mansker then told Montgomery that he did not wantanyone at the Hilton to know that he was homosexual. Montgomeryresponded by asking Mansker if he would have "a threesome" withMontgomery and someone else. At that point, Mansker and the twowomen walked away from Montgomery.

After that first incident and until September 1998,every time Mansker saw Montgomery, Montgomery made inappropriatecomments. Montgomery "constantly" harassed Mansker by askingMansker when he was going to go to Montgomery's house for ahaircut and a "blow job." On one occasion, Montgomery toldMansker about a sexual encounter he had in a park before comingto work. Montgomery also made comments accusing Mansker'spartner of cheating on Mansker. During that time period, Manskerreported Montgomery's conduct to Vicky Boes, the restaurantmanager.

Mansker further testified that from September 1998through mid-December 1998, he worked as a server in Hilton'sbanquet department. Mansker was supervised by Zolghadr andSmothers. During that time, Montgomery made numerous sexualcomments to Mansker. Montgomery continued to make comments aboutgiving Mansker a haircut and a blow job. He also asked Manskerto come to his house "to fuck." In addition, Montgomery toldMansker that he had had sex with Mansker's partner and askedMansker to join them in a threesome. On several occasions,Mansker discussed Montgomery's conduct with both Zolghadr andSmothers.

Specifically, about one week after Mansker beganworking as a banquet server, he spoke with Zolghadr and Smothersabout Montgomery and "told them what was going on." Mansker toldthem that he could not handle the things Montgomery was saying tohim and he was too upset, sad, and angry to properly servebanquet guests. Zolghadr said that he would talk with Montgomery, and after Mansker left the office, Zolghadr and Smotherstalked with Montgomery. Mansker did not know what Zolghadr andSmothers said to Montgomery, but whatever they said to him didnot help the situation. On another occasion, Mansker spoke withZolghadr separately and told him that "it had started again" andMansker did not want to work with Montgomery.

Mansker also testified that after he told Zolghadr thathe did not want to be scheduled to work banquets with Montgomery,Zolghadr "would always come up to [Mansker] and say, 'have youkissed and made up yet, can I put you back together?'" On oneoccasion, Zolghadr told Mansker that he thought Mansker andMontgomery "need[ed] to fuck so it's out of [Mansker's] system."

One day in mid-October 1998, Mansker left work earlybecause he was sick. He returned to work two days later with adoctor's note excusing his absence for one of the days. WhenMansker handed Zolghadr the note, Zolghadr wadded it up and threwit at Mansker. Zolghadr then told him he was fired. Manskerwent to see Anita Perkins, who was the Hilton's personnel coordinator, and told her what had happened. He also told her that hebelieved that his firing was due to his reporting Montgomery'sconduct to Zolghadr. Perkins told Mansker that she would set upa meeting with Zolghadr. On October 20, 1998, Mansker met withZolghadr and Perkins, and Perkins reinstated Mansker as a banquetserver.

On December 13, 1998, Mansker and Montgomery were bothworking as servers at a banquet. Montgomery once again beganmaking inappropriate comments to Mansker. Mansker reportedMontgomery's conduct to Zolghadr and asked if he could go home. Zolghadr told him he could leave early, but Smothers refused tolet him leave until around 2 a.m. on December 14. Mansker statedthat he was angry that he was not allowed to leave earlier. WhenMansker returned to work on December 16, 1998, Zolghadr escortedhim to Perkins' office, where Mansker was fired. Later that day,Mansker had a meeting with Perkins and the Hilton's generalmanager, during which Mansker told the general manager aboutMontgomery's conduct. Mansker also gave Perkins the names of 10Hilton employees to interview, but she only interviewed 3 employees.

Mansker acknowledged that he never filed a writtencomplaint with the Hilton's management, as required by theHilton's harassment policy. Mansker denied telling Zolghadr thatMontgomery had called Mansker's probation officer.

Cheryl Davis, Mansker's sister, testified that duringthe late 1990s, she was a banquet manager at the SpringfieldRenaissance Hotel. During that time, Montgomery, who worked as aRenaissance banquet server, spoke openly and regularly about hissexual orientation and experiences as a gay man. Montgomery alsowas very flirtatious with coworkers.

Margaret Allen, a Renaissance banquet captain, testified that Montgomery was "very blatant" about his sexual orientation. He regularly discussed his sexual encounters with othermen.

Perkins testified on Pinnacle's behalf that in August1998, Boes told Perkins that she wanted Perkins to fire Manskerbecause of his attitude. Instead, Perkins transferred Mansker tothe banquet department. Between September 1998 and December 13,1998, Perkins met with Mansker about 10 times. Those meetingsinvolved discussions about Mansker's needing time off from workand Zolghadr's refusing to let him leave early. Perkins deniedthat Mansker ever complained to her about Montgomery's conduct. After Perkins told Mansker that he was fired during the December16, 1998, meeting, Mansker told her and Zolghadr that Montgomeryhad harassed him. Following Mansker's meeting with Perkins andthe general manager, Perkins investigated Mansker's allegationsagainst Montgomery. Perkins interviewed all of the Hiltonemployees that Mansker suggested she interview, but she did notfind any evidence to support Mansker's allegations. Perkinsacknowledged that two male employees, Warren Anderson and LarryHemingway, reported that Montgomery had made sexually relatedcomments to them. She also acknowledged that another employeetold her that he had heard Zolghadr tell Mansker that "you twoshould be married," referring to Mansker and Montgomery.

Perkins acknowledged that Mansker's absenteeism, anger,and requests to not work with Montgomery could have been signsthat Mansker was being sexually harassed.

Zolghadr testified that in late October or earlyNovember 1998, Mansker complained to him about Montgomery. Mansker said that he was unhappy because Montgomery had telephoned Mansker's probation officer and told the officer thatMansker was drinking and using drugs. Zolghadr agreed to foregoscheduling Mansker and Montgomery to work banquets together. Onone occasion, Zolghadr had to schedule Mansker and Montgomery towork the same banquet, but he assigned them to different workstations. Zolghadr talked with Montgomery about Mansker'sallegation, and Montgomery denied telephoning Mansker's probationofficer. Zolghadr acknowledged that he did not report Mansker'sallegation to anyone else.

On the evening of December 13, 1998, Mansker askedZolghadr if he could leave work early, and Zolghadr told him hecould not. Around 9 p.m., Zolghadr went home, and shortlythereafter, Smothers telephoned him and informed him that Manskerwas "out of control" and yelling at other managers. Zolghadrtold Smothers that Mansker had to stay and work. Around 11:30p.m., Smothers telephoned Zolghadr again, and Zolghadr informedher that Mansker had to finish his work shift. Based onMansker's conduct that night and his work history, Zolghadrrecommended that he be fired.

Zolghadr also testified that when Perkins firedMansker, Mansker told them that he had been sexually harassed andaccused Zolghadr of "certain things." Later that day, Zolghadrmet with the general manager, who informed Zolghadr that Manskerhad accused Zolghadr of telling Mansker to "kiss and make up"with Montgomery. Zolghadr told the general manager that he didnot "know anything about that issue."

Smothers testified that between mid-September and lateOctober 1998, Mansker had several unexcused absences from work. Around 9 p.m. on December 13, 1998, Mansker told Smothers that hewanted to leave work early because he had a scheduled appointmentthe next day. When Smothers told him that he had to stay,Mansker became upset and told her that he "would get even" withher. Mansker continued to complain to Smothers for the rest ofhis work shift. On December 14, 1998, Smothers prepared adisciplinary report as to the December 13, 1998, incident andgave it to Zolghadr. Smothers stated that (1) Mansker never toldher that Montgomery had sexually harassed him and (2) she neversaw Montgomery sexually harass Mansker.

In January 2003, the ALJ entered an order recommendingthat the Department's amended complaint against Pinnacle bedismissed with prejudice. The ALJ found that Montgomery hadsexually harassed Mansker, but the evidence did not show thatMansker's supervisors were aware of the harassment or had areason to be aware of it.

In April 2003, Mansker filed exceptions to the ALJ'srecommended order, and Pinnacle later filed a response. In April2004, the Commission entered an order rejecting the ALJ'srecommendation and determining that Mansker had proved hissexual-harassment claim against Pinnacle. The Commission thusentered a finding of liability against Pinnacle. In so doing,the Commission stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

"[Pinnacle] did not take actions tocorrect the working environment. Thequestion is whether [Pinnacle] failed to actdespite notice, or failed to act because itdid not have notice.

We find that [Pinnacle] had notice of asexual harassment and a hostile workenvironment.

The record indicates that [Montgomery]engaged in extensive inappropriate behaviorwhile at work. [The ALJ] found that[Montgomery] made many sexual remarks to[Mansker] while at work, over a sustainedperiod of time.

[Zolghadr] was supervisory andmanagement personnel. [Pinnacle] isvicariously liable to the extent ofZolghadr's knowledge of the work environment,([Montgomery's] actions). [Pinnacle] isdirectly liable for 'hostile environment'sexual harassment to the extent to whichZolghadr was a participant in thatenvironment ***.

Clearly[,] Zolghadr knew there was aproblem between [Montgomery] and [Mansker]well before [Mansker] was discharged. Zolghadr testified that he believed theproblem to stem from something other thansexual harassment. As [Pinnacle's] manager,he chose to address the problem throughmildly sexual terms: marriage and kissing.

[The ALJ] found that on one occasion[,]Zolghadr told [Mansker] that he and[Montgomery] should 'kiss and make up.' Onanother[,] he suggested that they should getmarried. [Pinnacle's] management was aware oftension in the working environment and choseto address the situation in mildly sexual orromantic terms.

Based on those findings, we believeZolghadr was aware of the hostileenvironment. We believe he was also activein the perpetuation of a hostile environment.

[The ALJ] did not believe [Mansker's]testimony that[] Zolghadr said [Mansker andMontgomery] [']should go home and havesex.['] We believe [Mansker's] testimony isconsistent with Zolghadr's other descriptionsof how the dispute between these twosubordinate employees should be addressed: kissing and marriage.

The finding that this remark was notmade is against the manifest weight of theevidence. On review of the record[,] we findthat Zolghadr did make this remark.

The record indicates that [Montgomery]made sexual remarks to other employees. [Perkins] testified and discussed her reporton Montgomery's conduct. Her reportindicated that [Montgomery] made sexualcomments to [Anderson and Hemingway].

Perkins reported that [Anderson,Hemingway, and Mansker] each told her that[Montgomery] had made sexual comments tothem. From this[,] she concluded that therewas no evidence of sexual harassment.

This report indicates that Montgomery'sconduct was pervasive and littleinvestigation was required to find severalemployees who were aware of [Montgomery's]behavior. It makes Zolghadr's claim ofignorance all the more difficult to believe."

This appeal followed.

A. Pinnacle's Claim That the Commission's Decision
Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

1. Standard of Review

Section 8A-103(E)(2) of the Human Rights Act providesthat the "Commission shall adopt the hearing officer's findingsof fact if they are not contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence." 775 ILCS 5/8A-103(E)(2) (West 2002). Prior to July18, 1996, section 8-111(A)(2) of the Act provided that "[i]n anyproceeding brought for judicial review [by the appellate court],the Commission's findings of fact shall be sustained unless thecourt determines that such findings are contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence." (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(2) (West 1994). As those sections were written, thiscourt did not address section 8A-103(E)(2) and focused only onsection 8-111(A)(2). For example, in Sherman v. Human RightsComm'n, 206 Ill. App. 3d 374, 385, 564 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1990), weheld that "the reviewing court examines the actual determinationof the Commission as if the Commission were the original factfinder." In so holding, we stated, in pertinent part, asfollows: "Where, as here, the Commission rejects some of theALJ's findings because they are contrary to the manifest weightof the evidence, the function of the court on administrativereview is limited to ascertaining whether the Commission'sdecision, not that of the ALJ, is contrary to the manifest weightof the evidence." (Emphasis added.) Sherman, 206 Ill. App. 3dat 385, 564 N.E.2d at 212. In addition, in Davis v. Human RightsComm'n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 420, 423, 615 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 (1993),we discussed section 8A-103(E)(2), which we referred to as an"unusual provision." We then held that section 8A-103(E)(2) wasof no great significance to us because of section 8-111(A)(2),which provided that this court must give deference to theCommission's findings. We further held that when the ALJ'sfindings and the Commission's findings differ, we would givedeference to the Commission's findings. Davis, 246 Ill. App. 3dat 423, 615 N.E.2d at 1378-79.

Effective July 18, 1996, the legislature amendedsection 8-111(A)(2) of the Act by changing the phrase "theCommission's findings of fact" to "findings of fact made at theadministrative level." Pub. Act 89-520,