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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 2001, defendant, Christopher D. Swank, pleadedguilty to burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 2000)). In exchangefor his plea, the State agreed to dismiss other charges but madeno agreement with defendant regarding what sentence the trialcourt would impose. At the September 2001 sentencing hearing,the State recommended probation, but the court sentenced defendant to 4 1/2 years in prison. The court also ordered thatdefendant pay a $20 penalty under the Violent Crime VictimsAssistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2000)), $425.75 in restitution, and $326 in costs. That same day, the McLean Countycircuit clerk notified defendant that he also must pay a $375fine. Later in September 2001, defendant filed a motion toreconsider his sentence, which the court denied.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial courtabused its discretion in sentencing him and (2) the circuit clerkimproperly imposed the $375 fine. We reverse and remand for anew sentencing hearing before a different judge; we vacate the$375 fine; and we otherwise affirm.

At the March 2001 guilty plea proceedings, the trialcourt admonished defendant that (1) no agreement existed regarding what sentence the court would impose; and (2) if the courtaccepted his "open" guilty plea, it could sentence him to betweenthree and seven years in prison. Defendant indicated that heunderstood the court's admonitions and without any reservationswished to plead guilty.

According to the factual basis the State provided fordefendant's guilty plea, around 12:30 a.m. on July 23, 2000,Denise Stark and her eight-year-old son returned to theirBloomington residence to find defendant walking out of theunattached garage. Defendant, who had dated Stark for about twoyears but did not live with her, told Stark that he needed totalk with her. When defendant, Stark, and her son went insidethe residence, Stark and her son noticed that a videocassetterecorder (VCR) and a television were missing. Stark confronteddefendant regarding the missing items, and he ran from theresidence. Stark then contacted defendant at his grandparents'residence and told him to come back to her residence. Defendantreturned and admitted that he (1) crawled through an unlockedkitchen window in Stark's residence, (2) stole her VCR andtelevision, and (3) pawned the items.

The trial court accepted the State's factual basis,found that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily entered hisguilty plea, and accepted the plea. The court then ordered thatdefendant submit to a drug test that day, and defendant informedthe court that he had used marijuana while out on bond in thiscase.

Defendant failed to appear at his April 2001 sentencinghearing, and the trial court issued a warrant. Defendant was later arrested in Indiana, where he pleaded guilty to a retailtheft charge. He was then returned to Illinois for sentencing inthis case.

At the September 2001 sentencing hearing, the trialcourt took judicial notice of defendant's (1) Indiana convictionand (2) recent retail theft guilty plea (McLean County case No.00-CM-551). The court also considered the presentence investigation report (PSI), which indicated, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) defendant admitted using marijuana on a weekly basiswhile awaiting sentencing in this case; (2) defendant's March2001 drug screen was positive for marijuana; (3) defendant hadunsuccessfully participated in drug-treatment programs; (4)defendant graduated from high school; (5) defendant had difficulty maintaining a steady job; and (6) defendant's criminalhistory included (a) a July 1993 retail theft conviction (McLeanCounty case No. 93-CM-1124), (b) a September 2001 retail theftconviction (McLean County case No. 00-CM-551), and (c) severaltraffic convictions. The State recommended that the courtsentence defendant to at least 30 months' probation, and defensecounsel concurred with the State's recommendation and suggestedthat defendant receive credit for time served. Defense counselfurther recommended that defendant receive drug treatment because"the problem here is marijuana addiction." The court stated thatit was inclined to agree with the probation recommendation butalso noted that it could sentence defendant to up to seven yearsin prison.

In pertinent part, the following discussion then tookplace between the trial court and defendant:

"THE COURT: To be honest with you, whenI looked at [the fact that you tested positive for cannabis in March 2001 and havetwice sought treatment for drug addiction,]and now that I know there are two additionalretail thefts while awaiting sentencing onthis, I think a reasonable question might bewhy should I put you on probation? In thelast 150 days, I couldn't trust you on bond. *** [Y]ou can't be trusted to be honest, notcommit crimes, and not use illegal drugs, sohow could I possibly put you on probation isa question I might ask. You stand up andtell me.

THE DEFENDANT: I think that--I meanpart of my problem when I committed the crimewas my drug use, you know, and I have been injail for four months now. I have had achance to clean out and my head to clear up. I haven't had the problem with drugs.

THE COURT: The problem, [defendant],since [your guilty plea], you went out andcommitted two more crimes of theft and youfailed to appear, and we had to go clear toIndiana to get you. You left the State ofIllinois in violation of bond. That is theproblem. I mean you have had lots of chancesto get your life cleaned up. You have beenin residential [drug] treatment twice, in '96and again in '97, right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Why were you in Indiana?

THE DEFENDANT: I went over there tolook for work.

THE COURT: Did you call your attorneyand tell her you would be back on what day?

THE DEFENDANT: I never told her.

THE COURT: So if they hadn't arrestedyou on that theft, you would still be inIndiana or someplace else?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Given that history, howcould I possibly trust you on probation?

THE DEFENDANT: I completed probationsuccessfully before.

THE COURT: That is before you committedall these additional crimes and continued touse illegal drugs.

THE DEFENDANT: That structure in mylife helped me in my life. It helped me livea productive life in society. That structureof probation, showing up once a month, twicea month.

THE COURT: Do you have a valid driver'slicense?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: How did you get to Indiana?

THE DEFENDANT: A friend.

THE COURT: Who?

THE DEFENDANT: A guy named Mike.

THE COURT: Mike what?

THE DEFENDANT: Wilson.

THE COURT: Is he your drug suppliertoo?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Who is?

THE DEFENDANT: They got arrested--

THE COURT: Don't play games. The guywho has been supplying you marijuana?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't know who theywere. They got arrested. The house gotraided.

THE COURT: [Defendant], you have beenusing drugs repeatedly for the last severalmonths. Who is your supplier?

THE DEFENDANT: I didn't even know theguy's name.

THE COURT: I am not talking about thepeople in Indiana. I am talking about thepeople you used drugs with here.

THE DEFENDANT: Right. I used by myself.

THE COURT: Who provided the drug foryou?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't even know theperson's name.

THE COURT: [Defendant], you have beenbuying too much marijuana to tell me youdon't know who the person is. If you don'ttell me, then I am going to look at a prisonsentence, a significant number of years.

About 10 years ago or 12 years ago, Isentenced a man named Anderson in LoganCounty. He got caught bringing a kilo ofcocaine from Chicago to St. Louis. *** [A]tthe time of the sentencing hearing[,] I askedhim the same question and he declined to tellme, and I warned him. I will consider a 15-year sentence, but if you are going to lie tome and not tell me who the person is, I amgoing to consider a 30-year sentence. Hepersisted in refusing to tell me. I gave hima 30-year sentence in the state prison.

The [a]ppellate [c]ourt said those areexactly the questions a trial judge ought toask a defendant in a drug case or a drug usecase, and those are exactly the responses thejudge ought to get, because to the extent youare going to protect a drug dealer out there,the [c]ourt must remove you from society. You are trying to protect your drug dealer soyou can get out there and use drugs again.

THE DEFENDANT: That wasn't my intent.

THE COURT: To the extent you don't tellme who your drug dealers are, I am going toconsider it against you. I have asked thisquestion literally thousands of times eachyear for at least a decade, and [in] almostevery case[,] the defendant finally stands upand says, 'okay, here is my drug dealer.'

Now you can choose not to, that is yourchoice, but you need to understand there willbe a consequence.

THE DEFENDANT: My drug dealer got arrested.

THE COURT: I don't care if he got arrested. I didn't ask you if he got arrested. What is his name?

THE DEFENDANT: Troy.

THE COURT: Troy what?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't know his lastname. I honestly don't know these people'slast names.

THE COURT: Certainly convenient, isn'tit?

THE DEFENDANT: Even if that is their[sic] real name.

THE COURT: How many times did you buyit from Troy?

THE DEFENDANT: More than a handful.

THE COURT: How many times did you buyfrom Troy?

THE DEFENDANT: Probably 30 times.

THE COURT: How much did you pay himeach time on the average?

THE DEFENDANT: Twenty dollars.

THE COURT: Where did he live?

THE DEFENDANT: Over--

THE COURT: What is the address?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't know the address. It was off of Washington Street.

THE COURT: A lot of places are off ofWashington Street. It runs clear throughtown.

THE DEFENDANT: By the old BloomingtonJunior High School.

THE COURT: Where did you arrange tomeet with him at those 30 times?

THE DEFENDANT: I just met him at hishouse. I think it was his mom's house. Idon't remember the house number.

THE COURT: [Defendant], that doesn'tsound like someone who is trying to be candidwith the [c]ourt. Any other comments youwant to make?

THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor."

The trial court then gave defendant an opportunity tospeak with defense counsel. The court again asked defendant ifhe had any comments, and defendant replied that he did not. Thecourt then sentenced defendant to 4-1/2 years in prison, stating,in pertinent part, as follows:

"[Defendant], this is your first knownfelony offense, obviously a very seriousoffense, and the State has reduced a residential burglary charge to burglary. You havegot a very long history of drug use andfailed efforts at treatment and I believe youhave not been candid with the [c]ourt heretoday. I think you have made every effort toavoid being honest regarding your drug suppliers."

That same day, the circuit clerk notified defendantthat he must pay a $375 "McLean County" fine, pursuant to section5-9-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1 (West2000)).

Later in September 2001, defendant filed a motion toreconsider his sentence, arguing that (1) the 4-1/2-year sentence"was arbitrary and a result of the [trial c]ourt's anger at thedefendant for lack of responses that the [c]ourt would consideradequate"; and (2) the sentence was excessive and failed to takeinto account defendant's rehabilitative potential and lack ofcriminal history. At an October 2001 hearing on defendant'smotion to reconsider, defense counsel informed the court thatdefendant "was afraid to answer" the court's questions at sentencing regarding his drug source, but was now able to do so. After considering counsels' arguments, the court denied defendant's motion, and this appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by sentencing him to 4 1/2 years in prison. Specifically, defendant objects to the dialogue between himself and thetrial court regarding his drug source.

In a series of cases, many of which involved this sametrial judge, this court has addressed the application of thefifth amendment privilege to sentencing hearings. Most recently,in People v. Anderson, 284 Ill. App. 3d 708, 716, 672 N.E.2d1314, 1320 (1996), we held that "a defendant has no right torefuse to answer the trial court's questions at the sentencinghearing except--perhaps--when fifth amendment concerns arelegitimately implicated." (Emphasis in original.) See alsoPeople v. Iseminger, 202 Ill. App. 3d 581, 605, 560 N.E.2d 445,460 (1990) (Knecht, J., specially concurring) (when a defendantproperly exercises his fifth amendment rights, his refusal toanswer should not be considered in any way); People v. Olson, 241Ill. App. 3d 488, 492, 608 N.E.2d 913, 916 (1993) (a defendant ata sentencing hearing still enjoys a privilege against self-incrimination); People v. Wacker, 257 Ill. App. 3d 728, 733, 629N.E.2d 764, 768 (1994) (trial court repeatedly told defendant hewould not hold it against him if he did not identify his cocainesuppliers). A recent decision of the United States Supreme Courtmakes it clear that the defendant does have a right to refuse toanswer the trial court's questions at the sentencing hearing. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424, 119S. Ct. 1307 (1999).

In Mitchell, the defendant, without any plea agreement,pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing cocaine. She puton no evidence at sentencing, nor did she testify to rebut thegovernment's evidence about drug quantity. Testimony ofcodefendants put the defendant over the 5-kilogram threshold,thus mandating a minimum sentence of 10 years. One of the thingspersuading the court to rely on the testimony of the codefendantswas the defendant's not testifying to the contrary. The districtjudge told defendant "'"I held it against you that you didn'tcome forward today and tell me that you really only did this acouple of times."'[Citation.]" Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 319, 143 L.Ed. 2d at 432, 119 S. Ct. at 1311. The Supreme Court reversedand remanded.

"Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege atsentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants." Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 435, 119 S.Ct. at 1313. "We reject the position that either petitioner'sguilty plea or her statements at the plea colloquy functioned asa waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing." Mitchell,526 U.S. at 325, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 435, 119 S. Ct. at 1313. Anyeffort by the State to compel the defendant to testify againsthis will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene thefifth amendment. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 326, 143 L. Ed. 2d at436, 119 S. Ct. at 1314; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463, 68L. Ed. 2d 359, 369, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1873 (1981). "The essenceof this basic constitutional principle is 'the requirement thatthe State which proposes to convict and punish an individualproduce the evidence against him by the independent labor of itsofficers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it fromhis own lips.'" (Emphasis in original.) Estelle, 451 U.S. at462, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 101 S. Ct. at 1872, quoting Culombe v.Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037, 1046, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1867 (1961).

The Supreme Court, in Mitchell, applied to the sentencing phase the normal rule in criminal cases that no negativeinference from the defendant's failure to testify is permitted. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 327-28, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 437, 119 S. Ct. at1314-15. The Court expressed no view, however, on the separatequestion whether silence bears upon the determination of a lackof remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility, factors considered under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Mitchell,526 U.S. at 330, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 438-39, 119 S. Ct. at 1316.

The dissent reads Mitchell narrowly, to prevent thesentencing court from drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's silence only in determining "'the facts of the offense'"(slip op. at 24, quoting Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 330, 143 L. Ed. 2dat 439, 119 S. Ct. at 1316) for which he is being sentenced. That was certainly the situation in Mitchell, but Mitchell makesit clear its rule is broader than that:

"The concerns which mandate the rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial apply with equal force at sentencing. Without question, the stakes are high: Here, the inference drawn by the District Court from petitioner's silence may have resulted in decades of added imprisonment. The [g]overnment often has a motive to demand a severe sentence so the central purpose of the privilege--to protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own condemnation--remains of vital importance." Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 437-38, 119 S. Ct. at 1315.

Even the Court of Appeals recognized that a defendantmay plead guilty and retain the privilege not to testify at thesentencing hearing with respect to implication in other crimes. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 320, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 432, 119 S. Ct. at1311. Even in revocation proceedings, which are not criminalproceedings, a defendant is not required to answer questions thatmight incriminate him in future proceedings. Minnesota v.Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 418, 104 S. Ct.1136, 1141 (1984); People v. Martin, 226 Ill. App. 3d 753, 757,589 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1992). A sentencing court cannot force adefendant, who has pleaded guilty to theft, to answer the question whether he ever murdered anyone. Nor can a sentencing courtforce a defendant, who has pleaded guilty to burglary, to identify the person who has supplied him with marijuana. Thattestimony would implicate defendant in other crimes.

It is true there may be an exception to the ruleagainst drawing negative inferences from a defendant's failure totestify when silence may bear upon the determination of a lack ofremorse or upon acceptance of responsibility. Mitchell, 526 U.S.at 330, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 438-39, 119 S. Ct. at 1316. Thosepossible exceptions, however, cannot be read so broadly as toswallow up the privilege. Again, a sentencing court cannot forcea defendant, who has pleaded guilty to theft, to answer thequestion whether he ever murdered anyone. Defendant's failure toidentify his drug supplier here had no bearing on his remorse orhis acceptance of responsibility for the offense of burglary.

The dissent argues that defendant waived his privilegeagainst self-incrimination in this case. That is not correct. The trial court had no right to call defendant as a witnessagainst his will ("You stand up and tell me").

"A defendant in a criminal case or proceeding shall only at his or her own request be deemed a competent witness, and the person's neglect to testify shall not create a presumption against the person, nor shall the court permit a reference or comment to be made to or upon that neglect." 725 ILCS 5/115-16 (West 2002).

When a defendant takes the witness stand and testifies on his ownbehalf, he waives his privilege not to testify and subjectshimself to legitimate cross-examination. People v. Parchman, 302Ill. App. 3d 627, 635, 707 N.E.2d 88, 94-95 (1998) (First District). Defendant did not take the stand here and did not waivethe privilege. The same was true in Mitchell. Defendant did notexpressly assert the privilege there, she simply did not take thestand.

It is true that the fifth amendment privilege againstself-incrimination is not self-executing. Roberts v. UnitedStates, 445 U.S. 552, 559, 63 L. Ed. 2d 622, 630, 100 S. Ct.1358, 1364 (1980). That rule, however, is subject to exceptionwhen some coercive factor prevents an individual from claimingthe privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent. Roberts,445 U.S. at 560 n.6, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 630 n.6, 100 S. Ct. at 1364n.6. The trial judge here first forced the defendant to speakabout whether he should be granted probation by stating, "Youstand up and tell me." Then, after switching topics to questionsabout defendant's drug supplier, the trial judge stated "If youdon't tell me, then I am going to look at a prison sentence, asignificant number of years." The judge continued, "To theextent you don't tell me who your drug dealers are, I am going tohold it against you," and "Now you can choose not to, that isyour choice, but you need to understand there will be a consequence." There was coercion here, which impaired defendant'sright to remain silent. The judge's coercive actions weresufficient "to deny the individual a 'free choice to admit, todeny, or to refuse to answer.'" Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.648, 657, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 379, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1976),quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241, 86 L. Ed. 166,182, 62 S. Ct. 280, 292 (1941).

Because we reverse defendant's sentence and remand forsentencing before a new judge, we need not address defendant'ssecond issue, that the trial court accorded too little weight tomitigating factors.

Last, defendant argues that this court should vacatethe $375 "McLean County" fine imposed by the McLean Countycircuit clerk because circuit clerks cannot impose fines. TheState concedes that we should vacate the fine, and we accept theState's concession.

The imposition of a fine is a judicial act. "The clerkof a court is a nonjudicial member of the court and, as such, hasno power to impose sentences or levy fines." People v. Scott,152 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873, 505 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1987) (FifthDistrict). Instead, the circuit clerk has authority only tocollect judicially imposed fines. See 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West2000).

Because the circuit clerk lacked authority to imposethe $375 fine, we vacate that fine. Having so concluded, we neednot address defendant's alternative argument that he is entitledto a $675 credit against the $375 fine.

For the reasons stated, we reverse defendant's sentenceand remand for sentencing before a new judge and vacate the $375fine imposed by the McLean County circuit clerk. We otherwiseaffirm.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated inpart; cause remanded with directions.

MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., dissents.

When imposing a sentence, a trial court needs--anddeserves--the most complete information possible about thedefendant. Certainly, that information includes all evidenceregarding a defendant's rehabilitative potential. And when, asin this case, the defendant cites his drug usage as a contributing factor to his criminality, the court cannot accurately assesshis rehabilitative potential without gauging the likelihood thatthe defendant will refrain from drug use in the future. Becausethe majority decision deprives the trial court of this criticalinformation, and does so without any compelling reasons, Irespectfully dissent.

This court has long held that a trial court may question a defendant at sentencing regarding the source of his drugsand consider as a sentencing factor the defendant's refusal togive details regarding that source. In People v. Jones, 142 Ill.App. 3d 51, 491 N.E.2d 515 (1986), the defendant was before thetrial court for sentencing on multiple burglary and theft convictions. The defendant's PSI indicated that he was addicted tococaine and heroin. Defense counsel asked the court to sentencethe defendant to intensive probation supervision so that he couldget counseling. Jones, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 491 N.E.2d at517. In response to a question from the court, the defendantsaid that he had been using drugs two or three times each dayduring the last year. The court then asked the defendant fromwhom he obtained the drugs. The defendant tried to evade thequestion but ultimately said, "'if I was to tell who I got,bought [my] drugs from and they found out about it, they wouldmore likely try to kill me, and I am pretty sure of it.'" Jones,142 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 491 N.E.2d at 517. The court thensentenced the defendant to four years in prison. Jones, 142 Ill.App. 3d at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 518. On these facts, this courtwrote, in pertinent part, as follows:

"The defendant requested intensive probationsupervision, and the court had a duty todetermine the likelihood of success of suchprogram in deciding whether such a programshould be used for the defendant. The availability and source of defendant's drugs is ofparamount importance in considering the probability of success of this program with defendant. If drugs were readily available,the likelihood of success would be remote. The court's inquiry was, therefore, quitelegitimate." Jones, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 55,491 N.E.2d at 518.

In Iseminger, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 560 N.E.2d at454-55, this court noted that a trial court at sentencing maysearch everywhere within reasonable bounds for facts that tend toaggravate or mitigate the offense. We thus reaffirmed that thetrial court may appropriately question the defendant at sentencing regarding the source of his drugs. Iseminger, 202 Ill. App.3d at 599-600, 560 N.E.2d at 456. In so doing, we stated, inpertinent part, as follows:

"A sentencing judge faced with a defendantwho blames his criminal behavior on drugabuse, but who does not reveal the sources ofthose drugs, may properly view the defendant's rehabilitative potential with skepticism. Under these circumstances, the sentencing judge might well have considerabledifficulty finding either of the followingmitigating factors to be present: the defendant's criminal conduct was the result ofcircumstances unlikely to recur, or the character and attitudes of the defendant indicatethat he is unlikely to commit another crime." Iseminger, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 601, 560N.E.2d at 457.

In Anderson, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 716, 672 N.E.2d at1320, we held that trial courts should

"require defendants who plead guilty (or whohave admittedly pursued the equivalent of aguilty plea, as here) and are seeking a reduced sentence because of 'acceptance ofresponsibility' to fully accept that responsibility by revealing everything regardingtheir use of--or trafficking in--narcotics." (Emphases in original.)

We further held that "a defendant has no right to refuse toanswer the trial court's questions at the sentencing hearingexcept--perhaps--when fifth amendment concerns are legitimatelyimplicated." (Emphases in original.) Anderson, 284 Ill. App. 3dat 716, 672 N.E.2d at 1320; see also Olson, 241 Ill. App. 3d at491, 608 N.E.2d at 916 ("We reject defendant's argument that thecourt's questioning [about his drug use] was an abuse of discretion. In the absence of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial judge may properly make inquiries of adefendant at a sentencing hearing, irrespective of whetherdefendant testifies or exercises his right of allocution").

At the sentencing hearing in this case, defendant toldthe trial court that one of the reasons he committed the burglarywas because of his drug problem. Defense counsel specificallyasked the court to sentence defendant to probation and order drugtreatment because "the problem here is marijuana addiction." Thus, the court was faced with a defendant who blamed his criminal behavior on his drug use and asked the court to imposeprobation rather than sentence him to prison. The court thenproperly questioned defendant, who neither objected nor assertedhis fifth amendment right, regarding the source of his drugs. When defendant refused to reveal his dealer's identity, the courtappropriately considered defendant's refusal to reveal his drugsource as it reflected upon his rehabilitative potential.

The majority concludes that the United States SupremeCourt's decision in Mitchell requires us to abandon this court'slong-standing position. I disagree. In that case, the SupremeCourt held that a defendant retains the privilege against compelled self-incrimination through the sentencing phase of acriminal trial. The Mitchell Court also held, in pertinent part,as follows:

"The Government retains the burden of provingfacts relevant to the crime at the sentencingphase and cannot enlist the defendant in thisprocess at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears uponthe determination of a lack of remorse, orupon acceptance of responsibility[, factorsconsidered under the United States SentencingGuidelines,] is a separate question. It isnot before us, and we express no view on it." (Emphases added.) Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 330,143 L. Ed. 2d at 438-39, 119 S. Ct. at 1316.

The Mitchell Court thus expressly (1) limited its holding byprohibiting the sentencing court's use of a defendant's silenceagainst him "in determining the facts of the offense at thesentencing hearing"; and (2) refused to decide whether a defendant's silence at sentencing "bears upon the determination of alack of remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for thepurposes of the downward adjustment" to the defendant's sentence. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 330, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 438, 119 S. Ct. at1316. Thus, the Supreme Court simply did not determine theextent to which a court may consider a defendant's silence as itpertains to sentencing factors, such as lack of remorse, rehabilitative potential, acceptance of responsibility, or willingnessto comply with probation conditions.

As a final matter, it is important to note what thiscase does not involve. This case does not present the followingissues:

(1) If a trial court questions a defendant at sentencing on the source of his drugs, is the defendant's privilegeagainst self-incrimination self-executing? Defendant does notargue that the trial court's questioning of him at sentencingcomes within an exception to the general rule that a witness musttimely invoke the fifth amendment privilege to enjoy itsprotections, and we thus do not have the benefit of the parties'briefs and arguments on this issue.

(2) If a defendant asserts his fifth amendmentprivilege during sentencing, is it then appropriate for the trialcourt to consider the defendant's silence as a factor indetermining whether the defendant is a suitable candidate forprobation? As earlier noted, defendant did not assert his fifthamendment privilege at sentencing.

Simply put, this case is no different from Jones or thecases cited by the majority, in which this court upheld the trialcourt's authority to question a defendant at sentencing regardinghis drug source. Issues arising under the fifth amendmentrequire a nuanced assessment. See, for example, McKune v. Lile,536 U.S. 24, 41, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 62, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2028(2002) (adverse consequences faced by a state inmate forexercising his fifth amendment privilege and refusing to makeadmissions required for participation in a sexual abuse treatmentprogram were not so severe as to amount to compelled self-incrimination); People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d399 (2002) (probationer's testimony at his probation revocationhearing was not a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination under the state constitution where he did not facea realistic threat that his answers would incriminate him in anyfurther proceeding); People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 104, 481N.E.2d 690, 696 (1985) (in a sexually-dangerous-personproceeding, the defendant was not entitled to refuse to answer apsychiatrist's questions that might incriminate him). Accordingly, because these issues are not now before us (and,indeed, have not arisen over the last 17 years since this court'sdecision in Jones), we should leave their resolution for anotherday.