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(b) Transcript. The proceedings required by this rule to be in open court shall be taken verbatim, and upon order ofthe trial court transcribed, filed[,] and made a part of the common[-]law record." 134 Ill. 2d R. 401.

Here, no verbatim record was made, as required by Rule 401(b), to show defendant was given the admonishments requiredby Rule 401(a). No court reporter was present at the August pretrial conference nor does the record or argument by the Stateindicate any of the Rule 401(a) admonishments were given to defendant. He proceeded pro se at his bench trial on August21.

The right to counsel is fundamental and will not be lightly deemed waived. People v. Robertson, 181 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763,537 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (1989). Rule 401(a) governs a trial court's acceptance of a defendant's counsel waiver. Strictcompliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required. Substantial compliance will suffice if the waiver was knowingly andvoluntarily made and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d204, 236, 673 N.E.2d 318, 333 (1996). Whatever admonishments are given to a defendant, however, must be included inthe record since Rule 401(b) requires that when a defendant waives the right to counsel, the proceedings must be recordedverbatim and strict compliance with Rule 401(b) is required. People v. Montgomery, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1099, 700N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (1998).

The record does not show defendant wanted to proceed pro se. He indicated he wanted to obtain private counsel and thepublic defender was discharged. Later, after he obtained multiple continuances, when he found he could not afford to retainprivate counsel, the trial court informed defendant he made too much money to have counsel appointed for him. The trialcourt told defendant to "consult" with the public defender for advice but he might have to proceed on his own.Correspondence in the record indicates defendant thought he obtained a plea bargain with the State and would have the pleaentered prior to trial and would not need counsel. Instead, no plea agreement was entered and the case went to trial withdefendant having no choice but to represent himself.

The trial court was required to consider competing interests. Defendant was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel inpresenting his defense and ordinarily would be entitled to counsel of his choice. People v. Myles, 86 Ill. 2d 260, 268, 427N.E.2d 59, 62 (1981); People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 185, 387 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1979). However, "the right to counselof a defendant's own choosing may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the administration of justice."Myles, 86 Ill. 2d at 268, 427 N.E.2d at 62-63. A defendant cannot use his right to counsel to thwart the timelyadministration of justice by insisting on appointed counsel of his choice. People v. West, 137 Ill. 2d 558, 588, 560 N.E.2d594, 608 (1990).

This case differs from the situation where a defendant seeks to represent himself and the question is whether he knowinglyand voluntarily gave up his right to representation in favor of his right to represent himself. Defendant made no request torepresent himself. We need not reevaluate whether a defendant can be found to have waived counsel--even if he does notask to represent himself--if the proper admonishments required in Rule 401(a) are given, because in this case noadmonishments were given. People v. Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d 65, 74, 662 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (1996). To proceed to trialwithout counsel, whether or not it was at the request of defendant, the trial court must give the admonishments required byRule 401(a). Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 74, 662 N.E.2d at 166-67.

The State argues the record indicates defendant was aware of the information required to be conveyed to him by Rule401(a). The admonishments necessary under Rule 401(a) must be provided when the court learns the defendant has chosento waive counsel so the defendant can consider the ramifications of his decision. Prior admonitions or the request todischarge counsel do not serve to fully inform a defendant of the ramifications of acting on his own behalf. He cannot beexpected to rely on admonishments given several months earlier, at a point when he was not requesting to waive counsel.Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 749-50, 589 N.E.2d at 830. Defendant was forced to proceed to trial after failing to obtaincounsel following several months of continuances. The record does not show a valid waiver of counsel, and defendant isentitled to a new trial.

In the circumstances present here, the trial court should have given the proper admonishments and inquired whetherdefendant was willing to waive counsel. If the defendant still wanted counsel, but had not obtained his own after the trialcourt had permitted time to do so, then counsel could have been appointed. The court could have later conducted a hearingpursuant to section 113-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-3.1 (West 1996)) forpayment for appointed counsel.

Defendant also contends the trial court overstepped its bounds while attempting to assist him at trial, and he is entitled tocredit against his fine for the time served in pretrial detention. Because we have concluded defendant is entitled to a newtrial, we need not address these issues but note the statutory right to per diem credit is mandatory unless the statute underwhich the fine is imposed prohibits such crediting.

The trial court's judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

GARMAN, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:

I agree with the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize that the primary error the trial court committed in thiscase was its apparent belief that defendant had only two choices: hire a lawyer or represent himself. Reversible error willalmost always occur when a trial court forces a defendant (whom the court has found to be nonindigent and who has askedto be represented by counsel) to proceed pro se because the court will not appoint counsel to represent him and defendanthas failed, willfully or not, to hire counsel of his own choice. Under these circumstances, no legitimate waiver of Rule 401can occur because the rule requires a defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be represented bycounsel. When a defendant insists on being represented by counsel but claims to be unable to afford an attorney of his ownchoice, Rule 401 simply does not apply.

Rule 401 lacks the explicit provision concerning voluntariness found in Rule 402, which addresses guilty pleas. See 177 Ill.2d R. 402(b). Nonetheless, because Rule 401 deals with a fundamental constitutional right, it implicitly requires that anywaiver of that right must be voluntary.

In addressing waivers by defendants of their right to counsel, many courts have recognized that voluntariness is required. InPeople v. Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d 92, 104, 687 N.E.2d 945, 952 (1997), the court wrote that "[w]hen a defendant seeks to waivecounsel, the trial court must not only determine that he is competent to stand trial but also satisfy itself that his waiver ofthis constitutional right is both knowing and voluntary," citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321,333, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1993) ("trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of [a defendant's constitutional right tocounsel] is knowing and voluntary"). See also Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 235, 673 N.E.2d at 332 (waiver of constitutional rightto counsel must be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent"); United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 1998)(defendant's waiver of counsel must be "knowing and voluntary"). Because Rule 401 implicitly requires that a waiver of adefendant's right to counsel be voluntary, I must disagree with a decision of this court that suggests a valid Rule 401 waivercould be obtained involuntarily from a defendant. In Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d 65, 662 N.E.2d 161, this court addressed asituation in which the defendant at the trial level was "playing games" with court procedures, insisting that he berepresented by counsel, while also insisting that the two different assistant public defenders who had been appointed torepresent him were incompetent and he needed other counsel. This court stated its disapproval of such game playing andwrote the following: