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JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 23, 2002, a jury convicted defendant, DennisE. Probst, of unlawful delivery of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(d)(West 2002)). On May 20, 2002, the trial court sentenced him tofive years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) a perse conflict violated his right to counsel in that his attorneyhad previously represented the State's confidential informant ina criminal matter; (2) the trial court committed reversible errorby refusing to properly instruct the jury on his theory of thecase; and (3) defense counsel failed to object to admission of alab report and accompanying affidavit despite lack of foundation,in violation of his constitutional right to confront hisaccusers, and thus constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Lieutenant Frank Scoggins, police officer for the Cityof Jerseyville police department (department), testified that hehad participated in an ongoing investigation of the house at 711South Arch Street in Jerseyville, home to defendant and DebbieWhite. Neighbors had complained about the amount of traffic inand out of the residence. The investigation did not produce anyreliable informants until the local drug task force providedDanny Moore.

Moore wanted help getting a couple of traffic ticketsremoved from his record. Moore contacted Investigator KennyKallal of the Illinois Drug Task Force. Moore informed Kallalthat he knew someone who had cannabis and was willing to sell it. Moore had worked with Kallal previously as an informant on drugbuys.

On January 15, 2002, Moore called White and asked herif she had any cannabis for sale. She indicated that she wouldhave some the next day and that he should meet her in the parkinglot of the local Wal-Mart because of police surveillance of thehouse shared by her and defendant.

On January 16, the department conducted an undercoveroperation to attempt a purchase of cannabis. Officers stripsearched Moore and placed an audio surveillance device on hisperson. No money or drugs were found in the search. Officersthen gave Moore $280 in marked money with which to make thepurchase. Officers anticipated that the transaction would occurin the Wal-Mart parking lot. However, once Moore arrived at Wal-Mart, he called White, who indicated that the house was safe andthat the transaction should instead occur there.

The audiotape of the transaction reflects thefollowing. When White met Moore in the parking lot, sheindicated to Moore that he should "come to the house." AfterMoore arrived at the house, he engaged in conversation with Whiteand then proceeded to the bedroom, where he met defendant. Moorecounted out the $280 for defendant and then inquired whether hecould get another ounce for a friend. Defendant indicated thathe was not sure and had to get to work.

Moore testified that after he gave the money todefendant, defendant gave him the bag of cannabis. Moorereturned from the residence and produced 53.6 grams of plantmaterial later identified as cannabis. Officers identified thesubstance as cannabis by smell and verified this finding by labreport and accompanying affidavit from the state crime lab.

Officers stopped White for a traffic violation aftershe left the residence and found the marked money in her purse. Officers later got a search warrant for the residence andarrested defendant. The search yielded a scale and a jarsmelling of cannabis in a bedroom.

Moore had previously dated Angel White, White'sdaughter and defendant's stepdaughter. During that time, anincident occurred where defendant accused Moore of stealing $300. Moore acknowledged that he had been accused of the theft butstated that such accusations were never proved.

At the jury instruction conference, defendant offered ajury instruction on mistake of fact. That instruction providedthat "[a] defendant's mistake as to a matter of fact is a defenseif the mistake shows that the defendant did not have theknowledge necessary for the offense charged." His theory attrial was that he believed that the $280 in buy money was in factan attempt at satisfaction for the $300 that Moore had allegedlystolen. Defendant denied delivering any cannabis. He testifiedthat he was not paying attention to what Moore was saying to him. The trial court refused defendant's proffered instruction.

Before the State rested its case, it asked foradmission of the lab report and accompanying affidavitidentifying the substance seized as cannabis. Defense counseldid not object, and the court admitted the evidence.

On the day of trial, defense counsel notified the courtthat a potential conflict of interest existed in that he hadpreviously represented the State's key witness and undercoverinformant, Danny Moore, at a sentencing hearing on a burglaryconviction. The record states as follows:

"MR. PISTORIUS: *** During the lunchhour I checked with my office, *** the nameDanny Moore wasn't something that stuck in myhead. I'm usually good at remembering names,but when I looked further at it I noticed itwas Danny Lee Moore and that name did kinda[sic] hit me so I checked with my secretariesand indeed I had handled a sentencing caseonly. It was a Calhoun County case that wasa 98 case that Scott Schultz was handling andthen when Scott became State's Attorney herethen I took over Scott's files and in Januaryof last year, *** I handled a resentencing toa Motion to Revoke and he was ultimately sentto the Department of Corrections. It justliterally came to me during the lunch hourand then coincidentally Kevin from theState's Attorney's Office talked to Mr. Mooreand he likewise brought it up today about12:30 p.m. so we both came to that conclusionat the same time. I discussed this with myclient about the prior representation, Ihaven't done anything for him since Januaryof 2001 and had no contact with him andliterally the only contact I had with him wasthat one sentencing hearing. And I talked toDennis and he has agreed to waive anypotential conflict that may arise from thatprior relationship. And priorrepresentation.

THE COURT: Alright. Any comments Ms.Kirbach?

MS. KIRBACH: No Your Honor. I justwould like Mr. Probst to waive that on therecord is all.

THE COURT: Mr. Probst, do you waive anyconflict on the record here?

DEFENDANT: Yes I do.

THE COURT: Okay. You willing to haveMr. Pistorius continue to represent you isthat right?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you."

The State called Moore as its chief witness. On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached Moore with the burglaryconviction referenced above.

A jury convicted defendant, and the trial courtsentenced him as stated. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that because his court-appointedcounsel previously represented the State's key witness in a priorcriminal case, a per se conflict existed that violated Probst'sright to counsel. Because the issue is one of law, we review theissue de novo. People v. Miller, 199 Ill. 2d 541, 544, 771N.E.2d 386, 387 (2002).

The sixth amendment right to effective assistance ofcounsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI) includes the correlative rightto conflict-free representation. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d465, 472, 795 N.E.2d 231, 236 (2003). In other words, a criminaldefendant is entitled to the undivided loyalty of his counsel. People v. Enoch, 146 Ill. 2d 44, 51-52, 585 N.E.2d 115, 119(1991). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counselclaim, the accused must generally satisfy the test set forth inStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), and demonstrate that he suffered actualprejudice. However, a defendant need not show prejudice if a perse conflict exists. Miller, 199 Ill. 2d at 545, 771 N.E.2d at388.

Defendant argues that People v. Daly, 341 Ill. App. 3d372, 792 N.E.2d 446 (2003), requires a finding of a per seconflict in this case. We disagree.

In Daly, in August 1999, the State charged BrianJockisch with multiple counts related to drugs. Attorney JohnEndres was appointed to represent Jockisch on those charges. Those charges were dismissed on December 6, 1999, and theinformant signed a written employment agreement with SchuylerCounty officials to make undercover drug buys four days later. Under that agreement, Jockisch made buys at least betweenDecember 28, 1999, and August 4, 2000. In February 2000, theState filed domestic battery charges against Jockisch in BrownCounty. Endres represented Jockisch on those charges as well,which were eventually dismissed. On June 14, 2000, Jockisch'svan was stopped in Brown County and officers discovered cannabis. However, they did not arrest Jockisch after learning he was apaid informant for Schuyler County. Jockisch testified that hehad purchased cocaine from defendant Daly in a controlled sale onJuly 24, 2000. Endres represented Daly on the drug charges thatarose from that transaction.

The prosecutor conceded in the hearing on the motion inlimine that the work Jockisch had done in other counties may havebeen a consideration in the December 9, 1999, dismissal. Thetrial court concluded that, with the closeness in time, thedismissal of the cases on December 6 and Jockisch's beginning towork for Schuyler County on December 28 were "'highly probativethat, at least in Mr. Jockisch's mind, there was some kind ofquid pro quo.'" Daly, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 792 N.E.2d at449. The court concluded that Jockisch could be cross-examinedabout the connection between the cannabis dismissal on December6, 1999, and the drug purchases but not the dismissal of thedomestic battery charges.

While Endres elicited testimony as to the cannabischarge that had been dismissed, he introduced no evidence thatthe dismissal was the result of an informant deal betweenJockisch and law enforcement. Nor did he impeach Jockisch withthe financial arrangement made in Schuyler County, whereby policepaid Jockisch for successfully buying drugs from local residentsand for his "'time to testify,'" but reimbursed him only forexpenses if he failed to make a buy. Daly, 341 Ill. App. 3d at375, 792 N.E.2d at 449. Under the agreement Jockisch had beenpaid $5,650 plus $3,050 in living expenses.

A jury convicted defendant Daly on all charges. Onappeal, we reversed, concluding that a per se conflict ofinterest existed where the matter in which defense counselrepresented the witness both concerned and was significantlyrelevant to the defendant's trial, and where the informant's caseterminated only weeks before the defendant's felony trial. Daly,341 Ill. App. 3d at 377, 792 N.E.2d at 451.

We find that Daly is distinguishable from the facts inthe instant case. We recognized in Daly that to determinewhether a per se conflict of interest exists, we must base ourdetermination on a realistic appraisal of defense counsel'sprofessional relationship to the witness under the circumstancesof the case. Daly, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 376, 792 N.E.2d at 450. Further, a per se conflict exists only in the class of caseswhere defense counsel "had a tie to a person or entity--eithercounsel's client, employer, or own previous commitments--whichwould benefit from an unfavorable verdict for the defendant." People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 525 N.E.2d 30, 35 (1988). We find that, unlike Daly, defense counsel's representation ofMoore neither concerned nor was relevant to defendant's trial. In this case, defense counsel had represented DannyMoore at a sentencing hearing on an unrelated case 15 monthsearlier. Moore had completed his sentence and was allegedlyreleased on parole. Moore testified that he agreed to become adrug informant to get rid of several traffic tickets.

The record does not suggest under the standard setforth under Spreitzer that counsel's former representation ofMoore would be benefitted by an unfavorable verdict fordefendant. Defendant points to Moore's testimony that Mooremight go back to prison because he was still on parole at thetime of trial. Moore suggested that if he did not get rid of thetraffic tickets, he would then be unable to drive, which mightprevent him from keeping a steady job, a condition of parole. However, Moore acknowledged that he could have simply paid offthe fines on the tickets to retain his license. Further, even iftaken as true, the relationship between representation at asentencing hearing on the underlying conviction and testimonysuggesting a possible but speculative chain of events that wouldresult in a parole violation on that sentence is so distant andattenuated in relation to the sentencing on the former convictionas to be virtually unrelated.

Nor did Moore suggest that his arrangement with countyofficials was contingent on a guilty verdict in the instant case. Unlike the link between the defense counsel and State witness inDaly, the previous representation of Moore by defense counselhere would not be furthered by an unfavorable verdict fordefendant.

Equally important is the fact that the matters on whichdefense counsel had represented Moore would not have been withinthe scope of cross-examination. Cf. Daly, 341 Ill. App. 3d at377, 792 N.E.2d at 451. Defendant could not, either in his briefor at oral argument, suggest any set of facts under which thesubject matter of the representation would conceivably fallwithin the scope of cross-examination. Nor does the recordsuggest any such possibility. We conclude that a per se conflictof interest did not exist in this case. See Graham, 206 Ill. 2dat 472, 795 N.E.2d at 236 (No per se conflict of interest existsunless defense counsel has actual or potential conflict stemmingfrom previous or current commitment to person with interestsadverse to defendant).

Where defendant fails to show a per se conflict ofinterest, he has the burden to prove an actual conflict ofinterest and to demonstrate prejudice. People v. Flores, 128Ill. 2d 66, 84, 538 N.E.2d 481, 487 (1989). Defendant has notalleged an actual conflict of interest in this case. Nor doesthe record indicate that defendant was prejudiced by defensecounsel's previous representation of Moore. Therefore, weconclude that defendant was not denied his constitutional rightto counsel.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred byrefusing to instruct the jury on his affirmative defense ofmistake of fact. We disagree.

We first address the issue of forfeiture. Generally, aparty that does not object at trial to an error in juryinstructions forfeits the issue on appeal. People v. Anderson,325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 636, 759 N.E.2d 83, 93 (2001). Because therecord on appeal presents no evidence that (1) defendant objectedat the jury instruction conference or (2) defendant sought reliefby a posttrial motion, we conclude that, absent plain error,defendant has forfeited the issue on appeal.

Defendant argues that even if he did not preserve theissue for appeal, we should consider the issue under the plain-error doctrine. "'Plain errors or defects affecting substantialrights may be noticed although they were not brought to theattention of the trial court.' 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)." Graham,206 Ill. 2d at 475, 795 N.E.2d at 238. The plain-error ruleallows a reviewing court to consider an error that wouldotherwise be forfeited if either "(1) the evidence is closelybalanced or (2) the error is 'so substantial that it affected thefundamental fairness of the proceeding, and remedying the erroris necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.'" Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 475, 795 N.E.2d at 238, quoting People v.Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335, 743 N.E.2d 521, 539 (2000).

However, even if we were to consider the issue, wewould find that any error did not constitute reversible error. We first note the insufficiency of the record on this issue. "Anappellant has the burden to present a sufficiently completerecord of the proceedings below to support a claim of error." People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264, 738 N.E.2d 500, 504 (2000). Absent a complete record on appeal, we presume that the trialcourt's order was in conformity with the law and had a sufficientfactual basis. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264, 738 N.E.2d at 504. Therefore, any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness ofthe record regarding an error in refusing a jury instruction willbe resolved against the defendant. See Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264,738 N.E.2d at 504.

On appeal, defendant has failed to provide in therecord a transcript of the jury instruction conference, either byofficial transcript or bystander's report (see 166 Ill. 2d R.323(c)). We are thus unable to scrutinize the reasoning of thetrial court in failing to give such instruction. Therefore, wepresume that the trial court's decision in refusing theinstruction was in conformity with the law and had a sufficientfactual basis.

Even in reviewing the record before us, we cannot saythat the refusal to admit the instruction amounted to plainerror. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theoryof the case if some foundation exists for the instruction in theevidence. People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 131-32, 676 N.E.2d646, 649 (1997).

In asserting error by the trial court, defendant relieson People v. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d 520, 585 N.E.2d 99 (1991), andJones. In Crane, a jury convicted the defendant of the beatingand burning murder of the victim. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d at 523, 585N.E.2d at 100. At trial, the circuit court refused thedefendant's mistake-of-fact jury instruction. Crane, 145 Ill. 2dat 526, 585 N.E.2d at 102. The Supreme Court of Illinoisconcluded the trial court should have given a mistake-of-factinstruction at trial where (1) two detectives testified that thedefendant stated during his interview that he believed the victimwas dead prior to burning the body; (2) the State's experts wereunable to conclusively determine that the victim was alive at thetime of burning; and (3) a doctor testified that an unconsciousbody with injuries like the victim might lead a person toreasonably conclude the victim was dead. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d at526-27, 585 N.E.2d at 102.

In Jones, a jury convicted the defendant of attempt(aggravated criminal sexual abuse). Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 128-29, 676 N.E.2d at 647. At trial, the defendant pleaded theaffirmative defense of mistake of fact in that he did not knowthat the victim was under age 17. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132, 676N.E.2d at 649. The supreme court concluded that he was entitledto a jury instruction on mistake of fact where the State'sevidence sufficiently raised the issue of defendant's reasonablebelief the victim was 17 years of age or older, in that (1) thevictim was 16 years and 10 months old at the time of the offenseand defendant did not know the victim prior to the incident; (2)the victim was consuming alcohol, an adult activity; and (3) thevictim was apparently free to stay overnight at his friend'sapartment. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132-33, 676 N.E.2d at 649. Thecourt additionally considered that the jury was able to see thedefendant testify and observe his appearance and demeanor to testhis belief that the victim was 17 years of age or older. Jones,175 Ill. 2d at 133, 676 N.E.2d at 649.

However, here, defendant's evidence is comprised almostexclusively of his own testimony. While the evidence need onlybe slight (Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132, 676 N.E.2d at 649), it mustbe more than a scintilla. Further, the trial court had noobjective basis, unlike the trials in Crane and Jones, todetermine that mistake of fact was a legitimate defense. Inaddition, in this case, defendant merely contests a mistake offact as to receipt of consideration, not delivery of thecannabis. The record shows that the trial court also rejectedthe State's instruction relating to consideration and delivery ofcannabis. While receipt of consideration may or may not bepresent in a given transaction, the presence or absence ofconsideration is not an element of the crime of unlawful deliveryof cannabis. See 720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2002). We find thatdefendant did not meet his burden to warrant a mistake-of-factinstruction.

Under the above reasoning, we conclude that the trialcourt did not err in refusing defendant's proposed instruction.

Defendant also argues that because introducing evidenceof identification of a controlled substance by only a lab reportand accompanying affidavit violates an accused's constitutionalright to confront his accusers, defense counsel's failure toobject to admission of a lab report and affidavit at trialconstituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

Whether to object to matters such as foundation forevidence is, by and large, a matter of trial strategy. People v.Sparks, 335 Ill. App. 3d 249, 254, 780 N.E.2d 781, 785 (2002). As a matter of strategy, failure to object does not necessarilyestablish substandard performance. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 478-79, 795 N.E.2d at 240.

Defendant asserts that People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill.2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000), supports the assertion thatfailing to object to admission of a lab report and accompanyingaffidavit without foundation constitutes ineffective assistanceof counsel in that the admission violates his right to confrontwitnesses against him. We disagree with defendant's argument andconclude that the authority he cites is inapposite to thequestion of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Failing to object to certain State evidence has asimilar effect to stipulating to the evidence. In this case, therecord does not indicate whether defense counsel and the Statemade an actual stipulation to admission or whether defensecounsel merely chose not to object. Either way, the effect wasthat the evidence was admitted.

In People v. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d 808, 814, 773N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002), we held that "because a decision tostipulate to certain State evidence remains one of trial strategywithin defense counsel's sound judgment ***, defense counsel'sagreement to stipulate does not implicate the defendant's rightunder either the federal or state constitution to confront andcross-examine the witnesses against him." Similarly, as statedabove, failure to object is a matter of trial strategy. Sparks,335 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 780 N.E.2d at 785. Therefore, we findthat the failure to object does not implicate defendant's rightto confront his accusers, and his argument that he receivedineffective assistance of counsel fails.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.