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The factual basis for defendant's guilty plea is asfollows. Defendant confessed to investigators, in WoodfordCounty case No. 99-CF-116, that on approximately June 1, 1999, heplaced his penis in the mouth of H.H., he touched H.H.'s vaginawith his hand, and he touched H.H.'s vagina with his tongue. Defendant admitted to investigators, in Woodford County case No.99-CF-117, that between September and October 1998, he touchedH.H.'s vagina with his hand. Defendant admitted to investigators, in Woodford County case No. 99-CF-118, that in November1998, defendant placed his penis in H.H.'s mouth and rubbedH.H.'s vagina with his hand. H.H. was 11 years old at the timeof the three incidents and is defendant's stepdaughter; defendantwas 39 years old.

In July 1999, the State charged defendant with fourcounts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in No. 99-CF-116, one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a childin No. 99-CF-117, and two counts of predatory criminal sexualassault of a child in No. 99-CF-118. In October 1999, the Statedismissed one count in No. 99-CF-116, and defendant pleadedguilty to the remaining six counts of predatory criminal sexualassault of a child.

In November 1999, the State filed a presentence investigation report with the trial court. It revealed that defendantwas employed as a well-driller's assistant and had briefly servedin the United States Army. In 1998, he married Glenda Pippen,H.H.'s mother. Defendant had 1979 convictions for burglary andtheft and 1985 convictions for possession of a hypodermic syringeand possession of cannabis. Defendant also had a number ofconvictions for traffic violations.

In November 1999, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. Glenda testified for the State that H.H. was herdaughter, she was married to defendant, and they had all residedtogether since February 1998. She stated H.H. was currentlydoing well in pastoral counseling. She further testified thatshe still loves defendant, wants to be with him, and wants all ofthem to be a family again. Defendant testified of his regretover what happened and the hardship that would be placed on hisfamily if the trial court sentenced him to prison.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor stressed theaggravating factors including the serious harm to H.H., defendant's prior criminal history, deterrence, and the position oftrust defendant held over H.H. He recommended consecutivesentences of seven years on each of the six counts. Counsel fordefendant stressed the nonviolent nature of defendant's priorcriminal history, the fact that defendant pleaded guilty, and hisremorse. The trial court sentenced defendant as stated.

In December 1999, defendant filed a timely motion toreconsider sentence in each case, which the trial court denied.

This appeal followed.

Defendant contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in sentencing him to three consecutive 12-year termsin No. 99-CF-116 in light of the consecutive nature of theoffenses and the factors in mitigation. The trial court hasbroad discretion in sentencing (People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1977)), and a sentence within thestatutory limits will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 258, 652 N.E.2d 322,327 (1995)). A court has abused its discretion when the recordshows the sentence is excessive and not justified under anyreasonable view of the record. People v. Smith, 214 Ill. App. 3d327, 338, 574 N.E.2d 784, 791-92 (1991).

A defendant's rehabilitative potential and othermitigating factors are not entitled to greater weight than theseriousness of the offense. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d at 261, 652N.E.2d at 329. When mitigating factors are presented to thetrial court, there is a presumption it considered them. Peoplev. Payne, 294 Ill. App. 3d 254, 260, 689 N.E.2d 631, 635 (1998). The existence of mitigating factors does not require the trialcourt to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed. Payne, 294Ill. App. 3d at 260, 689 N.E.2d at 635.

Defendant contends that the trial court did not afforda number of the factors in mitigation enough weight. This courtnotes that defendant's motion to reconsider sentence mentionsonly the nature of his prior convictions and his plea of guilty. Any issue not raised in the motion to reconsider sentence isforfeited on appeal. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d); People v. Feltes,258 Ill. App. 3d 314, 317, 629 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1994). However, even if we were to consider defendant's other arguments,they would still fail.

Defendant contends that the trial court did not consider his age sufficiently as a factor in mitigation. Defendantwas 39 years old when he committed the offenses. Defendant failsto cite, nor is this court aware of, any authority that wouldweigh such a factor in defendant's favor. Defendant points outthat an abuse of discretion may be found even if the sentence iswithin the statutory range, particularly where the defendant isyoung and has rehabilitative potential. People v. Margentina,261 Ill. App. 3d 247, 249, 634 N.E.2d 29, 31 (1994). However, asthe State points out, defendant is not an errant youth, but a 39-year-old stepfather who had the responsibility and duty to helpcare for a young girl. Instead, he took advantage of his father-figure role to commit criminal conduct against her. The trialcourt properly considered defendant's age.

Defendant also contends that the trial court did notproperly consider defendant's criminal history in his favor. In1979, a trial court convicted defendant of felony theft andburglary. In 1985, a trial court convicted defendant of drugpossession. Defendant also received a number of traffic violations since 1985, and in 1997 a trial court convicted defendantof driving under the influence. The State contends that althoughthe prior offenses were not recent, the trial court properlyconsidered them. Defendant's criminal record does not evidence alack of criminal history. It should not serve to mitigatedefendant's current convictions. Defendant presented all thisinformation to the trial court and we presume that it consideredthis information. Payne, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 689 N.E.2d at635. The existence of mitigating factors does not obligate thetrial court to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed. Payne, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 689 N.E.2d at 635.

Defendant argues that his plea of guilty and remorseover the incidents should have been given greater considerationby the trial court as factors in mitigation "in that it demonstrates his acceptance of the responsibility for his actions." Admission of fault has been recognized as a first step towardrehabilitation and should be treated as a factor in mitigation. See People v. Bergman, 121 Ill. App. 3d 100, 105-06, 458 N.E.2d1370, 1375 (1984). The State contends that although factors inmitigation may be present, they do not require a trial court toimpose the minimum sentence possible. We agree with defendantthat remorse and guilty pleas can be factors in mitigation. However, again, the existence of mitigating factors does notobligate the trial court to reduce a sentence from the maximumallowed. Payne, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 689 N.E.2d at 635. Thetrial court specifically stated it considered defendant's cooperation in determining the sentences. A reviewing court does notreweigh the factors involved in a trial court's sentencingdecision. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d at 262, 652 N.E.2d at 329.

Defendant also contends that the trial court did notgive proper weight to the testimony and evidence that showeddefendant's wife and other family members wished for the court touse leniency in sentencing defendant. H.H.'s mother wished forthem to be a family again. H.H.'s maternal grandmother, DaisyCarmen, stated in a letter that both H.H. and defendant werevictims and that H.H. wished to forgive defendant. Again, as theState points out, the trial court noted the support that variousfamily members had for defendant. The trial court properlyweighed the factors in mitigation and aggravation in this case.

Last, the State contends that the trial court entered avoid sentence. A sentence that does not conform to a statutoryrequirement is void and may be corrected at any time. People v.Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995). TheState argues that the sentences entered by the trial court wereall required to run consecutively whether or not they were partof a single course of conduct. Section 5-8-4(a) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 through 8-6-1 (West 1998)) provides as follows:

"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed aspart of a single course of conduct duringwhich there was no substantial change in thenature of the criminal objective, unless, oneof the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony andthe defendant inflicted severe bodily injury,or where the defendant was convicted of aviolation of [s]ection 12-13, 12-14, or12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, inwhich event the court shall enter sentencesto run consecutively. Sentences shall runconcurrently unless otherwise specified bythe court." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998).

The trial court imposed consecutive sentences fordefendant for those offenses that were committed in a singlecourse of conduct as required. However, the State argues thestatute also requires consecutive sentences for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998))when they are not part of a single course of conduct. Section 5-8-4(b) further provides:

"(b) The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence except as provided for insubsection (a) unless, having regard to thenature and circumstances of the offense andthe history and character of the defendant,it is of the opinion that such a term isrequired to protect the public from furthercriminal conduct by the defendant, the basisfor which the court shall set forth in therecord; except that no such finding or opinion is required when multiple sentences ofimprisonment are imposed on a defendant foroffenses that were not committed as part of asingle course of conduct during which therewas no substantial change in the nature ofthe criminal objective, and one of the offenses for which the defendant was convictedwas a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, orwhen the defendant was convicted of a violation of [s]ection 12-13, 12-14, or 12-14.1 ofthe Criminal Code of 1961, in which event theCourt shall enter sentences to run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998).

The State contends this requires consecutive sentenceseven if defendant's conduct was not part of a single course ofconduct. The State points to People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188,613 N.E.2d 740 (1993), for support that consecutive sentences arerequired. In Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198, 613 N.E.2d at 745, thesupreme court held that section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38. par. 1005-8-4(a)) "plainly requires the imposition of consecutive sentences only when thesubject offenses are committed in a single course of conduct." The supreme court explained as follows:

"Effective July 1, 1988, the provisionassumed its current form. An amendment thattook effect on that date added the languageregarding violations of sections 12-13 and12-14 of the Criminal Code. In addition, thephrase 'in which event the court may entersentences to run consecutively' (emphasisadded) was changed to read, 'in which eventthe court shall enter sentences to run consecutively' (emphasis added). The legislature thus made consecutive sentences mandatory, and not merely discretionary, in thecircumstances in which the provisionapplies." Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 196, 613N.E.2d at 744.

The court then explained its reasoning further asfollows:

"We have determined that the statute plainlyrequires the imposition of consecutive sentences only when the subject offenses arecommitted in a single course of conduct, andwe find no warrant here for disregarding thisclear expression of legislative intent. Ifthe legislature had meant to make this provision generally applicable, we have no doubtthat the legislature would have placed theprovision in a different part of section5-8-4. *** Although this might simply havebeen an oversight by the legislature, it isnot one that we are able to correct under theguise of statutory interpretation." Bole,155 Ill. 2d at 198-99, 613 N.E.2d at 745.

Thus, the supreme court determined that it could not read furtherinto the statute to find consecutive sentences applicable exceptas provided for in section 5-8-4(a). It left it to the legislature to provide otherwise.

The statute has since been amended to require consecutive sentences regardless of whether the offenses were committedin a single course of conduct. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998); see People v. Brials, 315 Ill. App. 3d 162, 170, 732 N.E.2d 1109,1116 (2000). The effective date of the amendment was July 22,1997, before the offenses in this case were committed and thus itis applicable to defendant's crimes.

As previously noted, in Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 196, 613N.E.2d at 744, the supreme court construed the phrase "'in whichevent the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively'[(emphasis in original)]" in section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)) to mandate consecutive sentences. "Under basic rules of statutory construction, where thesame words appear in different parts of the same statute, theyshould be given the same meaning unless something in the contextindicates that the legislature intended otherwise." McMahan v.Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 513, 702 N.E.2d 545, 552(1998). Both sections 5-8-4(a) and 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Codenow contain the phrase "in which event the court shall entersentences to run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a), (b) (West1998). Thus, defendant's sentences were required to be consecutive regardless whether they were committed as a single course ofconduct.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's conviction but vacate defendant's sentences and remand forresentencing.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remandedwith directions.

STEIGMANN, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.