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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Susan Olsson was charged by information forviolation of a protective order. 720 ILCS 5/12-30 (West 1998). The information alleged defendant violated an order that prohibited defendant from telephoning her sister, Lisa Olsson, and aminor child. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge. Defendantargued section 12-30 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code)(720 ILCS 5/12-30 (West 1998)) cannot be violated by a singletelephone call even if a protective order prohibits that telephone call. The Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit,Champaign County, agreed and dismissed the charge. The Stateappealed. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2000, the trial court granted Lisa Olsson'spetition for an emergency protective order against defendant. Using a preprinted form, the trial court ordered defendant "tostay away from" Lisa Olsson and a minor child and "not communicate directly or indirectly with persons protected under this[o]rder, whether in person, by telephone, written notes, mail[,]or through third parties" through December 1, 2000.

In January 2001, the State charged defendant withviolating the order of protection. The information allegeddefendant knowingly committed an act prohibited by the order ofprotection in that she called Lisa Olsson on July 19, 2000, inviolation of section 12-30 of the Criminal Code. Section 12-30provides:

"A person commits violation of an orderof protection if:

(1) He or she commits an act which was prohibited by a court *** in violation of:

(i) a remedy in a valid order of protection authorized under paragraph[] (1), (2),(3), (14), or (14.5) of subsection (b) of[s]ection 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986." 720 ILCS 5/12-30 (West1998).

In March 2001, defendant moved to dismiss the charge,alleging the charge failed to state an offense. Defendant arguedviolation of a protective order under section 12-30 may be statedonly if there is an alleged violation of a prohibition or orderauthorized by subparagraph (1), (2), (3), (14), or (14.5) ofsection 214(b) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS60/214(b) (West 1998)). Defendant maintained none of thesesubparagraphs authorized the trial court to prohibit communications by defendant to Lisa Olsson or the minor child and thussection 12-30 could not be violated by one nonharassing telephonecall.

The State argued the charge stated an offense becausesection 214(b)(3) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act authorized the trial court's no-contact-by-telephone order. Section214(b)(3) authorizes courts to order a "respondent to stay awayfrom petitioner." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (West1998). The State contended "stay away" means courts may prohibitnonphysical, as well as physical, contact with an abused. Thisinterpretation, according to the State, is clear from the plainmeaning of the term "stay away" and is consistent with thepurposes of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act.

Defendant insisted, however, section 214(b)(3) of theIllinois Domestic Violence Act authorizes prohibitions of onlypersonal, physical contact and not nonphysical communications. Defendant contended this interpretation is clear from the plainlanguage of "stay away," as well as from the context of thelanguage of section 214(b)(3).

After hearing in April 2001, the trial court agreedwith defendant, holding "[i]t is clear that that subsection talksabout physical presence, not other communications. It wouldappear that we are not then talking about any violations forcrime for violation of [o]rder of [p]rotection." The trial courtdismissed the charge. The State appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

This dispute involves one issue: the interpretation ofthe "stay[-]away" language in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. Our review is de novo. People v. Bowden, 313 Ill. App. 3d 666,668, 730 N.E.2d 138, 140 (2000).

The rules of statutory interpretation and constructionare well settled and not in dispute. Like all endeavors toconstrue statutes, we must ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. We begin with the language of the statuteitself, which is the best indication of legislative intent. Bowden, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 730 N.E.2d at 140. We give thelanguage its plain and ordinary meaning (Staske v. City ofChampaign, 183 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4, 539 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1989)),and we read the statute as a whole and consider all relevantprovisions together. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189,561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990).

If the statute is ambiguous and legislative intentcannot be determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of itslanguage, we are guided by rules of statutory construction. Bowden, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 730 N.E.2d at 140. These rulesrequire us to consider "the reason and necessity for the statute,the evils to be remedied, and the object to be obtained by thestatute" and "to avoid a construction of the statute that woulddefeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust result." In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 195, 688 N.E.2d 642, 648(1997).

In addition, and important here, the legislature in thetext of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act tells us to construeits provisions liberally to "promote its underlying purposes." Wood v. Wood, 284 Ill. App. 3d 718, 724, 672 N.E.2d 385, 389(1996), citing 750 ILCS 60/102(4) (West 1994). These purposesinclude "[r]ecogniz[ing] domestic violence as a serious crimeagainst the individual and society which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families, promotes a pattern ofescalating violence which frequently culminates in intra-familyhomicide, and creates an emotional atmosphere that is not conducive to healthy childhood development." 750 ILCS 60/102(1) (West1998).

With these guidelines in mind, we interpret and construe section 214(b)(3). Section 214(b)(3) authorizes courts todo the following:

"Order respondent to stay away frompetitioner or any other person protected bythe order of protection, or prohibit respondent from entering or remaining present atpetitioner's school, place of employment, orother specified places at times when petitioner is present, or both, if reasonable,given the balance of hardships. Hardshipsneed not be balanced for the court to enter astay[-]away order or prohibit entry if respondent has no right to enter the premises." 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (West 1998).

Interpreting the Illinois Domestic Violence Act andsection 214(b)(3) as the legislature tells us to do, we determinea "stay[-]away" order can encompass both physical presence andnonphysical contact. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act wouldfail in its purpose of protecting family harmony and creating anemotional atmosphere "conducive to healthy childhood development"if it cannot protect an abused person, particularly a minor, fromreceiving even a single or occasional telephone call from his orher abuser. If a protective order forbids telephone contact,then the defendant cannot use the telephone to contact theprotected party.

We find defendant's arguments unpersuasive. Defendantfirst argues because the other provisions of section 214(b)(3)prohibit only physical contact, the "stay[-]away" language ismeant to do the same. Defendant further contends the IllinoisDomestic Violence Act addresses communications in section214(b)(1) and only prohibits communications to the extent theyare harassing. Defendant's argument may have carried some weightif the legislature addressed communications in one section andphysical contact in another. This, however, is not what thelegislature did. In section 214(b)(1), for example, the legislature addressed not only nonphysical communications, but alsophysical contact in that it authorized prohibitions of bothharassment and stalking. We find the legislature did the same insection 214(b)(3), authorizing "stay[-]away" orders that mayprohibit all types of contact.

Defendant next contends People v. Spencer, 314 Ill.App. 3d 206, 731 N.E.2d 1250 (2000), supports the interpretationa single telephone call does not violate section 12-13 of theCriminal Code. In Spencer, the Second District considered aconviction under section 12-13 for harassing the petitioner withone telephone call. Spencer, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 731 N.E.2dat 1252. The Spencer court did not consider whether the defendant could have been convicted under section 214(b)(3) for simplycontacting the petitioner. See Spencer, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 209,731 N.E.2d at 1252 ("The State *** does not appear to argue thatdefendant could be convicted under the complaint for merelycontacting [the alleged victim]"). Spencer simply does notapply.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in dismissing the charge against defendant. We reverse and remand forproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

STEIGMANN and TURNER, JJ., concur.