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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Joseph Ivy, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault under section 12-14(b) of the CriminalCode of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b) (West 1992)) in No. 92-CF-33 and escape under section 31-6 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/31-6(West 1992)) in No. 92-CF-56. The trial court later sentencedhim to 2 consecutive 13-year prison terms for the aggravatedcriminal sexual assault convictions and a consecutive 4-year termfor escape. After his sentence was affirmed on appeal (People v.Ivy, No. 4-95-0224 (October 28, 1996) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23)), defendant filed a petition forpostconviction relief. The trial court dismissed this petition. Defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in finding (1)the petition time-barred and (2) it failed to state a claim forwhich relief could be granted. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The State charged defendant on August 7, 1992, with one count ofaggravated criminal sexual assault on "John Doe No. 1," a boyunder the age of 13. Defendant waived his right to a preliminaryhearing on count I. On October 28, 1992, the State filed asecond charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault againstdefendant, alleging a similar act against "John Doe No. 2,"another boy under the age of 13. No preliminary hearing was setor waived regarding count II.

On December 28, the State filed counts III and IV, allegingdifferent acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against bothJohn Doe No. 1 and John Doe No. 2. On that same date, defendantentered into a negotiated guilty plea to counts III and IV inexchange for the State's dismissal of counts I and II. OnFebruary 10, 1993, defendant also pleaded guilty to escape. Asentencing hearing followed.

John Trefz, chief of police for the City of Marshall, testifiedfor the State on the interviews he conducted with three boyvictims of defendant. John Doe No. 1, approximately 12 years oldat the time of the interview, told Trefz defendant performed oralsex and other sexual acts on him by force. These acts occurredduring fishing trips with defendant over the previous four orfive years. John Doe No. 2, approximately eight years old at thetime of the interview, said defendant performed oral and anal sexon him and the sexual acts occurred for about two years. He toldTrefz other young boys were present at the time of these acts.

Finally, Trefz stated he had an interview with "John Doe No. 3,"who was approximately 12 years old at the time of the interview. He told Trefz defendant performed oral sex on him and drank hisurine. He stated oral sex occurred with defendant on a "regularbasis." None of the boys mentioned defendant was intoxicatedduring these acts. The mother of one of the boys testifieddefendant was sober both when her son would leave in his companyand when he returned her son to her.

Search warrants had been executed on defendant's vehicles. Trefzidentified the items seized. One box of items from defendant'sOldsmobile contained newspaper and magazine clippings of youngboys. The return from the warrant indicated "four magazine cut-outs of young boys; one was nude and three partially clothed" and"one photograph of two young boys." No objection was made bytrial counsel as to the relevance of the inventory or whether ithad been illegally seized.

Trefz then identified items from another box seized fromdefendant's Buick. Trefz identified nude photos of boys; a bookentitled "Sexual Exploitation of Children"; and a videotape ofnude "indian-type" people, also described as a "NationalGeographic type of tape of the Third World country," portraying"Indians laying [sic] around with little or no clothing." Trefzalso identified two pair of boy's underwear; photographs of youngpeople, mostly boys, some nude and some clothed; and two morebooks entitled "Violence in Our Time" and "Children's PlayPlaces." Trefz also stated many of the photographs seized werejust pictures of scenery and of people normally found inmagazines.

Clark County jail employee Paul Hoggat also testified to detailsof defendant's escape from jail. Defendant's statement inallocution included an admission of guilt to the charges ofaggravated criminal sexual assault and for his participation inan escape from jail while in custody on those charges.

The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive 13-year termsfor each of the 2 aggravated criminal sexual assault convictionsand a 4-year consecutive term for escape. On February 22, 1993,the trial court signed and filed a written sentencing order.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence on March 8,claiming the sentence was excessive. Defendant later filed anamended motion arguing consecutive sentences were not mandated. On August 10, defense counsel filed a certificate pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), stating heconsulted with defendant concerning allegations of error in themotion to reduce sentence. In October, the trial court denieddefendant's motion to reconsider sentence, and defendant filed anotice of appeal from the denial of his motion to reconsider.

On December 8, 1994, this court vacated the judgment of the trialcourt and remanded the case by summary order because defensecounsel had failed to review transcripts from the guilty pleahearing pursuant to Rule 604(d). People v. Ivy, Nos. 4-93-0927,4-93-0928 cons. (November 30, 1994) (unpublished summary orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2)).

On February 14, 1995, defendant filed an amended motion toreconsider sentence or to have a new sentencing hearing. Thecourt denied this motion on March 6. The trial court issued anew judgment of sentence on March 8 with the sentences unchanged. Defendant appealed. This court affirmed defendant's sentence inNo. 92-CF-33 (People v. Ivy, No. 4-95-0224 (October 28, 1996)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and the trialcourt's judgment in No. 92-CF-56 (People v. Ivy, No. 4-95-0225(October 28, 1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23)).

On April 21, 1997, defendant filed his petition forpostconviction relief. On March 3, 1999, the trial court held ahearing on the State's motion to dismiss defendant's postcon-viction petition. On March 8, the trial court found defendant'spetition was filed more than three years from the date ofconviction contrary to section 122-1(c) of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1996) (effective January 1, 1997)). The trial courtalso found the allegations of the petition insufficient towarrant a hearing. The trial court then dismissed the petitionin its entirety without an evidentiary hearing.

On March 30, the trial court gave defendant notice of thedismissal of the petition and his appeal rights. He filed anotice of appeal on April 28. Appointed counsel on appeal fileda motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal on July 7 andthis court allowed the late notice on July 8, 1999.

II. ANALYSIS

Review of the dismissal of a postconviction petition without anevidentiary hearing is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d366, 388-89, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998). In making adetermination whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the postconviction petition and accompanyingaffidavits must be taken as true. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d239, 249, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1997).

A. Operation of the Statute of Limitations Provision

Section 122-1(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides inrelevant part:

"No proceedings under this Article shall

be commenced more than 6 months after the

denial of a petition for leave to appeal

or the date for filing such a petition if

none is filed or more than 45 days after

the defendant files his or her brief in the

appeal of the sentence before the Illinois

Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after

the deadline for the filing of the defen-

dant's brief with the Illinois Supreme Court

if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the

date of conviction, whichever is sooner, un-

less the petitioner alleges facts showing

that the delay was not due to his or her

culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)

(West 1996) (effective January 1, 1997).

Defendant argues he filed his petition on April 21, 1997, withinsix months of the date this court rendered its decision affirminghis sentence (October 28, 1996) and he was in a position to filea petition for leave to appeal that decision. He further arguesafter this court initially vacated the trial court's judgment in1994, the trial court entered a new sentence, albeit identical tothe original one, on March 8, 1995. Therefore, he argues hispetition filed on April 21, 1997, was also within three years ofthe entry of the "new sentence" and section 122-1(c) does not barhis petition for postconviction relief.

The State contends the trial court did not enter a "new sentence"on March 8, 1995, but simply denied defendant's motion toreconsider sentence. The State notes the imposition of sentencein a criminal case causes the judgment to be final (People v.Hanson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1005, 481 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1985))and argues the sentence in this case was imposed on February 22,1993, four years prior to the filing of defendant's April 1997postconviction petition. Therefore, the three-year-from-the-date-of-conviction bar found in section 122-1(c) operates to makedefendant's petition untimely despite his having filed it withinsix months of the ruling on his latest appeal, as the statutenotes the operative date is "whichever is sooner." 725 ILCS5/122-1(c) (West 1996) (effective January 1, 1997)).

This a case of first impression. It has been noted, however,although under different factual circumstances, the provisionspertaining to postconviction relief should not be construed sostrictly as to deny a defendant a fair hearing or defeat theremedial purposes of the Act. People v. Hudson, 65 Ill. App. 3d422, 426, 382 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1978). Adopting the State'sposition would defeat the remedial purposes of postcon-victionrelief because it would defeat defendant's claim before hisdirect appeal rights had been exhausted.

The three separate limitations periods found in section 122-1(c)were discussed in People v. Reed, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1009,706 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (1999). First, the six-month limitationapplies where defendant appealed to the appellate court, whichtriggers "the denial of a petition for leave to appeal" to theSupreme Court of Illinois "or the date for filing such apetition." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1996) (effective January 1,1997). Second, the 45-day period applies to cases appealeddirectly to the supreme court (such as capital cases) or caseswhere the petition for leave to appeal is granted. Finally, thethree-year period from the date of conviction applies to allother cases. In Reed, defendant took no direct appeal and thecourt found the three-year period applied. Reed, 302 Ill. App.3d at 1009, 706 N.E.2d at 1061.

While we do not agree with defendant that the time commencedticking when the trial court most recently denied his amendedmotion to reconsider sentence on March 8, 1995, we do not findthe three-year limitations period found in section 122-1(c) barshis petition for postconviction relief. The trial courtsentenced defendant on February 10, 1993, and entered thejudgment of sentence on February 22. This sentence was not finaluntil the trial court denied defendant's amended motion toreconsider sentence and that denial was affirmed on appeal. Thisdid not occur until this court's decisions of October 28, 1996.

Dicta in Reed indicated the three-year period in section 122-1(c)might apply where a direct appeal and the time for a petition forleave to appeal extended more than three years beyond the date ofconviction, as in this case. Reed, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 1009, 706N.E.2d at 1061. We disagree with this dicta in the Reed court'sanalysis. Defendant here did exactly as the postconvictionhearing article anticipated. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8(West 1996). Defendant exhausted his appellate remedies prior tofiling a postconviction petition. He did not sit back and donothing after his conviction while three years went by, allowinghis case to grow stale before filing his post-convictionpetition. He obtained a final determination on his amendedmotion to reconsider sentence on October 28, 1996, and filed hispostconviction petition within six months of that date. We arenot prepared to require a defendant to file a postconvictionpetition while the decision of this court on direct appeal ispending in order to be within the three-year limitations periodfrom the original imposition of sentence. An otherwise diligentdefendant should not be penalized in the filing of apostconviction petition for the length of time it takes hisattorneys, the State, and this court to process a direct appeal. Therefore, we find defendant's petition for post-convictionrelief was not barred by section 122-1(c) but was timely filed.

B. Sufficiency of the Allegations of the Petition

We turn now to the factual allegations made in defendant'spetition. They were all properly dismissed for failure tosufficiently state a claim for postconviction relief. Defendantfirst argues that prior to entering his guilty plea to theaggravated criminal sexual assault charges his trial counsel wasineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidenceseized, failing to move to suppress his confession, and coercinghim into pleading guilty.

As previously noted, we are conducting a de novo review of thedismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and are notbound by the reasons given by the trial court in dismissing butmay sustain the judgment upon any ground warranted. People v.Shanklin, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059-60, 711 N.E.2d 796, 798(1999). The failure to raise a claim that could have beenaddressed on direct appeal is a procedural default that resultsin a bar to consideration of the claim's merits in a postcon-viction proceeding. People v. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 87, 641N.E.2d 455, 458 (1994). An exception exists where the matterssupporting the claim were not of record on direct appeal. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d at 87, 641 N.E.2d at 458. All ofdefendant's first three claims of ineffective assistance ofcounsel could have been raised on direct appeal. No affidavitsare attached to the petition providing any additional evidencenot previously of record supporting his allegations. These threeclaims are barred from consideration in his postconvictionpetition.

Further, after pleading guilty, a defendant may not generallyraise claims of deprivation of constitutional rights occurringprior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608(1973); People v. Wendt, 283 Ill. App. 3d 947, 957, 670 N.E.2d1230, 1237 (1996). Thus, these first three claims of allegedconstitutional deprivations may not be raised as they occurredprior to the entry of defendant's guilty plea.

The standard for determining the merits of a claim of ineffectiveassistance of trial counsel in a petition for post-convictionrelief is the two-pronged test announced in Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 698,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 2068 (1984). A defendant must prove that,despite the strong presumption of counsel's professionalcompetence, allegedly unprofessional acts or omissions werecommitted and a reasonable probability exists that, but forcounsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedingwould have been different. People v. Stewart, 141 Ill. 2d 107,118, 565 N.E.2d 968, 973 (1990). If a case can be decided onwhether defendant has been prejudiced by alleged deficientrepresentation, a court should do so rather than determine ifcounsel's actions were deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697,80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

In this case, the evidence of defendant's guilt came primarilyfrom the complaints of the two minor victims, John Doe No. 1 andJohn Doe No. 2. Even if the evidence seized from defendant'sautomobiles and his videotaped confession had been suppressed,nothing suggests another outcome to the case. Defendant was notprejudiced because of trial counsel's failure to move to suppressthe evidence or his confession.

Additionally, defendant's petition does not indicate how defensecounsel could successfully have argued a motion to suppress theevidence. Defendant argues some of the items seized were notincluded in the list of items enumerated in the search warrantitself. Some were irrelevant to the charges filed against him. The cases he cites in support of suppressing this evidence,however, all deal with first amendment issues regardingbookstores engaged in the sale of allegedly obscene material. Nosuch issues are involved here. An attorney is not required tomake futile motions to avoid charges of ineffective assistance ofcounsel. People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 629 N.E.2d724, 728 (1994).

As for defendant's assertions trial counsel should have moved tosuppress his confession, the affidavits he attached to hispetition in support of his argument did not support him. Defendant claimed to have requested an attorney before making hisstatement and claimed a specific police officer was aware of hisrequest. He requested the officer supply an affidavit verifyingthis fact, but the officer replied he did not remember theincident and was long since retired. A defendant is not entitledto an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition unlesshe makes a substantial showing of a violation of hisconstitutional rights supported either by the record or byaffidavits. People v. Almodovar, 235 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149, 601N.E.2d 853, 856 (1992). Here, no such showing was made either ofrecord or by affidavit.

The same holds true for defendant's assertions he was coercedinto pleading guilty. The record of the guilty plea indicatesthe trial court scrupulously inquired of defendant as to hisknowing, intelligent waiver of his right to a trial and of atrial's attendant rights. In addition, the trial court inquiredinto the voluntariness of defendant's plea and defendant assuredit he was not forced into making the plea. Defendant now assertshis trial counsel told him, "If you do not plead guilty, I do notknow how to defend you." Defendant requested trial counselsupply him with an affidavit verifying this statement and counseldeclined to do so, denying he ever said this or anything similarto defendant. No evidence of misrepresentations made todefendant to induce him to plead guilty exists either of recordor supported by affidavit.

Defendant next asserts his trial counsel failed to object tohearsay testimony used in aggravation at his sentencing hearingand that was ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant notestrial counsel made no objection when police chief Trefz testifiedto statements made by three John Does, all under the age of 13. He claims such hearsay testimony is only admissible in theprosecution of a sexual offense committed against a child underthe age of 13 when a hearing has been held to determine whetherthe "time, content, and circumstances of the statement providesufficient safeguards of reliability." 725 ILCS 5/115-10(b)(West 1998).

Defendant is correct in his assertions concerning the use ofhearsay statements of children under 13 when they are used in theprosecution of sexual offenses. However, in this case thestatements were used during the sentencing and not theprosecution of the crimes charged. Hearsay evidence isadmissible at sentencing. People v. Pickens, 274 Ill. App. 3d226, 233, 653 N.E.2d 778, 783 (1995).

Defendant also argues evidence of uncharged conduct presented inthe statement of John Doe No. 3 should not have been admitted andtrial counsel should have objected to its admission. Unchargedcriminal conduct is relevant in a sentencing determination. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 296, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1094(1992). The evidence of which defendant complains was properlyadmitted at the sentencing hearing. Where an objection wouldhave been overruled, trial counsel is not required to make alosing objection to provide effective representation. People v.Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 156, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1359 (1981). Thetrial court properly dismissed this portion of the postconvictionpetition.

Finally, defendant asserts he received ineffective assistance ofappellate counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise andargue on appeal the trial court's denial of his motion towithdraw his guilty plea. However, the postconviction petitionstated mere conclusory allegations without factual support thatappellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge thedenial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. An allegationin a postconviction petition must be based on factual allegationsand not mere conclusory statements. People v. Cihlar, 125 Ill.App. 3d 204, 208, 465 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1984). The record showsno meritorious issues to be raised concerning the denial ofdefendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea despitedefendant's assertions he should have been granted a preliminaryhearing on counts II, III, and IV, which were added after theinitial charge was filed. Defendant pleaded guilty to counts IIIand IV in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss counts Iand II. The fact no preliminary hearing was held on severalcounts is irrelevant. Defendant admitted his guilt. Where anissue has no merit and would not have changed the outcome ondirect appeal, a defendant suffers no prejudice from appellatecounsel's failure to contest the issue on appeal. People v.Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 347, 606 N.E.2d 1186, 1193 (1992). Thetrial court did not err in dismissing this portion of defendant'spostconviction petition.III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, although we find defendant's postconviction petitionwas timely filed, we find the trial court properly dismissed thepetition because he failed to raise issues for which relief couldbe granted by a postconviction petition. The judgment of thetrial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARMAN, J., concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring:

Defendant was resentenced following remand by this court on March8, 1995. He timely filed his postconviction petition on April21, 1997, well within the three-year limit under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

Nonetheless, I concur with the majority finding the trial courtproperly dismissed the petition because defendant failed to raiseissues for which relief could be granted by a postconvictionpetition, and I agree to affirm the trial court.