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JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

A Sangamon County jury found defendant, Donald Cookson,guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child andaggravated criminal sexual abuse. 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1), 12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25years' imprisonment for predatory criminal sexual assault andimposed no sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Theissues on appeal are whether (1) the trial court properly excludedevidence that the child victim had made allegations of sexual abuseagainst another person that the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) determined to be unfounded, (2) the trial courtcommitted an abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of thecomplainant's out-of-court statements pursuant to section 115-10 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure)(725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2000)), (3) the trial court erred infinding the child complainant competent to testify, and (4) thejury's finding of guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse mustbe vacated because it is a lesser included offense of predatorycriminal sexual assault. We affirm.

Although defendant challenges the admissibility of someevidence, he does not contest that, if the trial court properlyadmitted the evidence, the jury could reasonably find him guilty ofpredatory criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Ifadmissible, the evidence would establish that defendant, who was 17years of age or older, had anal sex with his 7-year-old stepdaughter A.C. (born October 6, 1992) on two occasions between March 1and August 31, 1999.

We initially consider whether the trial court erred infinding A.C. competent to testify. Irrespective of age, everyperson is qualified to be a witness (725 ILCS 5/115-14(a) (West2000)) unless she is incapable of (1) expressing herself concerningthe matter so as to be understood, either directly or throughinterpretation, or (2) understanding the duty of a witness to tellthe truth (725 ILCS 5/115-14(b) (West 2000)). The party requestinga determination of the competency of a witness to testify has theburden of proof. 725 ILCS 5/115-14(c) (West 2000). Thedetermination of witness competency rests in the discretion of thetrial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse ofdiscretion. People v. Sutherland, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 1125, 743N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (2000). This deference is given because thetrial court, unlike the reviewing court, has the opportunity toobserve the demeanor, appearance, and conduct of the witness. People v. Dempsey, 242 Ill. App. 3d 568, 584, 610 N.E.2d 208, 218(1993).

In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing withregard to A.C.'s competency to testify on May 21, 2001. At thattime, A.C. was eight years old. After listening to and observingA.C. testify, the trial court concluded that she had the ability toexpress herself so as to be understood and that she understood theduty to tell the truth. She testified that she did not know therules about being in court but stated that she would tell the truthwhen she testified at trial. She related that she had gotten introuble for lying in the past. As examples of lying, she statedthat she had gotten in trouble for lying when she had, in fact, hither brother, and that her brother had once lied about not having acookie.

In Sutherland, the court found no basis for disturbingthe finding that a six-year-old child was competent to testify whenshe knew the difference between lying and telling the truth andsaid she would tell the truth. Sutherland, 317 Ill. App. 3d at1125, 743 N.E.2d at 1013; see Dempsey, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 583-84,610 N.E.2d at 217-18 (a nine-year-old sexual abuse victim wascompetent to testify); People v. Hoke, 213 Ill. App. 3d 263, 271-72, 571 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (1991) (two six-year-old children werefound competent to testify).

Defendant's argument relies on the rules regardingcompetency of a child witness put forth in People v. Epps, 143 Ill.App. 3d 636, 639, 493 N.E.2d 378, 380 (1986) ("[a] child maytestify if he is sufficiently mature to receive correct impressionsby means of his senses, to recollect and narrate intelligently, andto appreciate the moral duty to articulate the truth"). The Eppsdecision, however, predates Public Act 85-1190, which added section115-14 to the Code of Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1989. 725 ILCS 5/115-14 (West 2000). In People v. Trail, 197 Ill. App.3d 742, 748, 555 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1990), this court interpreted thenew section as expressing a legislative intent to discard the priorbody of law dealing with witness competency, particularly the morerigid of the former rules. In Hoke, we reaffirmed that interpretation of section 115-14. Hoke, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 571 N.E.2dat 1148. Defendant presents no valid argument for reconsideringour prior interpretation. We have reviewed the testimony of A.C.at the competency hearing and conclude that the trial court did notcommit an abuse of discretion in finding her competent to testify.

Through several witnesses, the State was allowed tointroduce out-of-court statements made by A.C. to those witnessesconcerning defendant's anal sexual assaults on her. Thesestatements were made to DCFS caseworker Dorothy Rice on January 29,2000; A.C.'s foster parent Laverne Landers on January 30, 2000; andDCFS investigator Timothy Gonzalez and City of SpringfieldDetective Richard Wiese on January 31, 2000. Defendant challengesthe admissibility of this testimony introduced pursuant to section115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The standard of reviewis whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 344, 739 N.E.2d 455, 475(2000).

Section 115-10(a) authorizes the trial court to admithearsay testimony of out-of-court statements made by children underthe age of 13 who are victims of offenses defined in sections 12-13through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720ILCS 5/12-13 through 12-16 (West 2000)). 725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(West 2000). As previously noted, defendant was charged withviolating sections 12-14.1(a)(1) and 12-16(c)(1)(i) of the CriminalCode, and he does not challenge the application of section 115-10to this case. Section 115-10(b) provides that testimony about suchan out-of-court statement is admissible only if (1) the courtfinds, after conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury,that the time, context, and circumstances of the statement providesufficient safeguards of reliability, and (2) the child either (a)testifies at the proceeding or (b) is unavailable to testify as awitness and there is corroborative evidence of the act that is thesubject of the statement. 725 ILCS 5/115-10(b) (West 2000). Inthis case, A.C. testified, and defendant's challenge to theadmissibility of the evidence focuses on the trial court's findingsconcerning the sufficiency of the safeguards of reliability.

At the section 115-10 hearing conducted May 21, 2001, thetrial court heard the testimony of Landers, Wiese, and Gonzalez. Rice testified at a May 25, 2001, hearing.

Rice testified that, on January 29, 2000, after she tookA.C. into protective custody, she took the child for a requiredhealth screening. The screening did not involve a gynecologicalexamination. After the examination, Rice drove A.C. to theemergency foster home. Rice had a conversation with the childabout marijuana because there had been references to marijuana andcocaine when she picked up A.C. at the police station. A.C. saiddefendant gave her marijuana, ran bath water, put her in the tub,and "humped on her." She said he put his "thingy" in her butt. Rice had not asked A.C. any questions about sexual abuse. A.C.just blurted it out. Rice never met or talked to Landers.

Landers, a registered nurse, testified that in responseto a general question inquiring whether everything was going okay,A.C. said, "I am never going home. I am never going home. I'm notgoing back to Don and Judy. Don fucked me in the ass, and Judy atemy pussy." At the time of this statement, A.C. had been sittingand coloring at the kitchen table. A.C. was then seven years old.Landers did not make further inquiry of A.C. on this subject. Oncross-examination, Landers testified that A.C. had, on otheroccasions, indicated a preference to remain in the foster home.

Wiese testified that the interview of A.C. he andGonzalez conducted took place in a child-friendly room at the ChildAdvocacy Center. A.C. used slang terms such as "boobs," "dick,"and "butt" to express what occurred and stated that defendant puthis penis into her anus, pointing to the crack in the buttocks ofan anatomically correct drawing. A.C. described two incidents, oneoccurring in the bathroom and one in the bedroom.

When the interview began, Wiese asked A.C. if she knewwhy she was there, and she stated because of something that Don andJudy had done to her. A.C. said that one of these incidentsoccurred in a gray house and the other in a pink house. Wiese wasnot sure in which house the bathroom incident occurred. At onepoint, A.C. said that these kinds of things happened all the time,and then later she said these were the only two times. She did notindicate whether defendant had ejaculated.

Gonzalez testified that A.C. indicated she did not wantto reside with Don and Judy for what they did to her. At thatpoint, A.C. was asked what they did to her. Gonzalez's testimonyfollowed the same tenor as the testimony given by Wiese. Accordingto Gonzalez, the incidents occurred when A.C. was six, and herdescription of the instances of sexual abuse he deemed "remarkable"for a child of that age.

The State bears the burden of proving that the statementswere reliable and not the result of adult prompting or manipulation. People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 45, 600 N.E.2d 1169, 1172(1992). Among the factors to be considered in making a reliabilitydetermination are (1) the child's spontaneity and consistentrepetition of the incident, (2) the child's mental state, (3) useof terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age, and (4) thelack of motive to fabricate. People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 164,632 N.E.2d 1004, 1009 (1994); People v. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d668, 676, 697 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1998). In Simpkins, this court alsoindicated that the court should examine whether the statement wasthe product of suggestive interview techniques when there had beensuccessive interviews. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 677-78, 697N.E.2d at 308.

Defendant raises six points of contention with theadmission of A.C.'s out-of-court statements. We initially addressthe fact that, although a video recording system was available inthe room used to interview A.C., Wiese and Gonzalez did not recordthe interview. Taping an interview provides a better means forassuring that there was no adult prompting or manipulationinvolved, and the failure to do so may be considered a negativefactor when considering reliability. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at677-78, 697 N.E.2d at 308. However, in light of the other factors,we decline to overturn the trial court's reliability ruling on thisbasis alone.

A.C.'s statements to Landers and Rice were spontaneousand her descriptions of the incidents consistent in each of thesestatements. She also employed descriptive terminology unexpectedfrom a seven year old. Defendant argues that the reliability isdiminished because five months passed between the statements andthe occurrences. Delays in reporting sexual acts do not automatically render a child victim's statements inadmissible. Zwart, 151Ill. 2d at 46, 600 N.E.2d at 1173.

Defendant also argues that (1) the results of A.C.'sexamination by Dr. Victoria Nichols-Johnson on February 3, 2000,provided no support for the statements about frequent analintercourse, (2) during the medical examination A.C. denieddefendant had anal intercourse with her but claimed he subjectedher to vaginal intercourse, (3) her statement to Wiese and Gonzalezthat this type of behavior occurred all the time was contradictedby her statement that it happened only twice, and (4) A.C. had amotive to lie because she did not wish to return to the care ofdefendant and her mother.

The argument that the medical examination did not providesupport for A.C.'s assertions does not determine the admissibilityof her statements in light of the fact that A.C. testified. Theremaining points of contention raised by defendant are matters thatgo to the weight to be accorded the statements rather than to adetermination of the admissibility of the statements. Nichols-Johnson testified for the State at trial, and defendant had theopportunity to cross-examine her on the statements made by A.C. toher and the results of the examination. We find no abuse ofdiscretion in admitting testimony of A.C.'s out-of-court statements.

We next consider whether the trial court committed anabuse of discretion by refusing to admit evidence that A.C. made anallegation of sexual abuse against Richard Aston that DCFS haddetermined to be unfounded. A.C. and her mother had lived withAston for a time. Defendant argues that a false allegation isadmissible to prove that it is more likely than not that theaccusation against defendant is false.

The admissibility of evidence rests in the sounddiscretion of the trial court, and this court will not substituteits judgment on admissibility absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d 53, 59, 481 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1985). In Gorney, the failure to allow a defendant to present evidence ofa prior false allegation was deemed harmless error under the factsof that case. Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d at 61, 481 N.E.2d at 676. TheGorney decision did say that evidence of a prior false accusationof rape by the victim may be admitted if the trial judge deems theevidence relevant and probative. Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d at 61, 481N.E.2d at 676.

In People v. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1010-11, 569N.E.2d 604, 610-11 (1991), the court found reversible error wherea DCFS determination of unfounded, concerning an allegation ofabuse of a minor, was not admitted into evidence. The court inNicholl said the evidence was admissible to attack the victim'scredibility even though it would not absolutely prove that theallegation deemed unfounded was false.

In People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d 76, 81, 578 N.E.2d1351, 1355 (1991), this court rejected a similar argument,requiring a showing that the proferred testimony would prove morelikely than not that the accusation made on the other occasion wasfalse, to establish its probative value to the case at bar. Thiscourt specifically observed that a DCFS determination is arecommendation not to prosecute or continue proceedings and is nota judicial determination or a final determination of the falsity ofthe accusation. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 82, 578 N.E.2d at 1356.

We distinguish Gorney because, in that case, the evidence sought to be admitted indicated that on another occasion the victimhad indicated a willingness to intentionally lie about being raped(Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d at 58, 481 N.E.2d at 675), and we decline tofollow Nicholl. Following the reasoning in Mason, we find no abuseof discretion. DCFS determining an accusation unfounded does notdefinitely establish that the accusation determined to be unfoundedwas false and is not probative of whether the accusation againstdefendant is false.

Defendant's last issue is whether the finding of guiltyof aggravated criminal sexual abuse should be vacated. In thiscase, the judgment and sentence referred only to predatory criminalsexual assault and made no reference to aggravated criminal sexualabuse. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found, and theState conceded, that the abuse charge merged into the predatoryassault charge.

"When multiple convictions of greater and lesser offensesare obtained for offenses arising from a single act, a sentenceshould be imposed on the most serious offense and the convictionson the less serious offense should be vacated." People v. Garcia,179 Ill. 2d 55, 71, 688 N.E.2d 57, 64 (1997). However, in theabsence of a judgment formally entered or sentence imposed, thereis no "conviction." 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 2000). A jury verdict isnot the equivalent of a conviction. People v. Cruz, 196 Ill. App.3d 1047, 1052, 554 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1990). When there has beenfindings of guilty of multiple offenses arising out of the samephysical act, it is proper for the trial judge to enter judgmentand sentence on only the most serious of the offenses. People v.Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 170, 435 N.E.2d 477, 479-80 (1982);Cruz, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1052, 554 N.E.2d at 601. In this case,the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict forpredatory criminal sexual assault and expressly declined to enterjudgment on the jury verdict for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. This issue is without merit.

The judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The trial court erred inadmitting the hearsay statements of A.C., as related by DetectiveWiese and DCFS investigator Gonzalez. The trial court also erredin preventing the jury from knowing that A.C. had falsely accusedRichard Aston of the same conduct. I would reverse and remand fora new trial.

A.C. lived with her apparent parents, defendant and hiswife Judith Cookson, until August 1999, when Judith and herboyfriend, Richard Aston, took A.C. with them to Hammond, Indiana. In Hammond, Richard, Judith, and A.C. lived on the streets, withJudith engaging in prostitution and Richard acting as her pimp. Richard then took A.C. and disappeared, and Judith contacteddefendant, who came to Indiana and, along with Judith, filed areport of child abduction against Richard. Several days later, onJanuary 29, 2000, Richard returned to Illinois and turned A.C. overto authorities. At that time DCFS caseworker Rice spoke to A.C.,who told Rice that she had not been to school in a while, that sheunderstood she was going to be placed in a foster home, that shewanted to live in a clean place, and that she did not want to staywith Don (defendant?) and Judith because they fed her nasty food"like dogs or cats would eat." In response to Rice's questioningabout marijuana, A.C. told Rice that "daddy" Don had given hermarijuana, put her in the bathtub, took out his "thingy" andproceeded to "hump" on her.

The next day, in response to the question whether she wasdoing okay, A.C. told her foster mother, Landers, that "I am nevergoing home. I'm not going back to Don and Judy. Don fucked me inthe ass." Of course, A.C. had not lived with defendant during theprior six months. In a later conversation with Dr. Nichols-Johnson, A.C. made it clear that she had not been subjected to analpenetration although she then claimed she had been subjected tovaginal penetration. Dr. Nichols-Johnson found no sign of rectalinjury and determined that A.C.'s hymen was intact with noindication of sexual abuse. A.C. also stated that "Judy ate mypussy," and "they are going to jail," while she would stay with thefoster mother forever. At trial, A.C. acknowledged that shesometimes got Richard and defendant mixed up. She considered bothRichard and defendant to be her dad. In mid-2000, after deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing was done, it was established thatRichard was A.C.'s biological father.

A.C.'s testimony at trial consisted primarily of one- ortwo-word answers in response to leading questions. Often A.C.changed her answers in response to follow-up questions.

It is exceptional for hearsay evidence that is takenwithout the opportunity to cross-examine to be admitted understatutes such as section 115-10. Hearsay should be admitted, underthe confrontation clause, only where "truthfulness is so clear fromthe surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examinationwould be of marginal utility," and only where the evidence is "sotrustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to [its]reliability." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 111 L. Ed. 2d638, 655-56, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990). Absent "particularizedguarantees of trustworthiness" the evidence must be excluded. Evidence possessing "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmlyrooted hearsay exception. Idaho, 497 U.S. at 821, 111 L. Ed. 2d at656, 110 S. Ct. at 3149. Because of the importance of the right ofcross-examination, section 115-10, which places limits on thatright, should be strictly construed. People v. Bridgewater, 259Ill. App. 3d 344, 349, 631 N.E.2d 779, 782 (1994); People v. Bowen,183 Ill. 2d 103, 126-28, 699 N.E.2d 577, 589-90 (1998) (McMorrow,J., dissenting).

What was there about the child's hearsay statements herethat made them "particularly worthy of belief"? People v. Coleman,205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 583-84, 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1020-21 (1990); 725ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1) (West 2000) ("sufficient safeguards ofreliability"). The statements to Detective Wiese and DCFSinvestigator Gonzalez were clearly not spontaneous. Simpkins, 297Ill. App. 3d at 678, 697 N.E.2d at 308 (statements during questioning by DCFS investigator); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124,144 L. Ed. 2d 117, 126, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1894 (1999) (specificintent of confrontation clause was to prevent trial on ex parteaffidavits prepared by the prosecution). They were made inpreparation for trial, and the conscious decision not to videotapethe statements raises the inference that the prosecution saw anadvantage in the jury hearing an interpretation of the child'sstatements, rather than the statements themselves.

The fact that A.C. used terminology unexpected of a childof similar age does not support admission of the hearsay, but infact weighs against it. A.C. was clearly a streetwise child, butthere is no suggestion that knowledge was acquired from activitieswith defendant. The mistaken reference to anal penetrationsuggests that A.C. was familiar with the words, but not with whatthey meant. The logical inference is that A.C.'s knowledge wasacquired during the six months prior to the statements being made,the six months that A.C. spent with Richard and Judith in Indiana. The most troublesome aspect of this case is the possibility thatA.C.'s references to her "daddy" Don are in fact references to her"daddy" Richard. A.C. testified at trial that she had previouslybeen living in Indiana with her mother and a man named Donald. Thefact that Detective Wiese, at the time he interviewed A.C., was notaware that she had spent the last six months in the custody ofRichard is troublesome. Wiese's narration of A.C.'s statements,given his misunderstanding of the situation, is likely to bemisleading. The other witnesses relating A.C.'s statements mayhave suffered from the same misunderstanding.

There was clearly a motive to fabricate. A.C.'sstatements were prefaced with her remarks that she wanted to stayin a clean place and she did not want to stay with Don and Judithbecause they fed her nasty food. Of course A.C. was not "staying"with Don and Judith at the time her statements were made. It isalso troublesome that Richard had just returned the child toIllinois after a report of child abduction had been filed againsthim by defendant and Judith. A.C. testified at trial that Richardhad told her to say bad things about Don.  Richard, who mostrecently had control over A.C., clearly had a motive to fabricatetestimony against defendant.

A.C.'s testimony at trial was halting and inconsistent. Were her statements to the four witnesses who repeated her hearsayany better? The hearsay testimony related by Detective Wiese andDCFS investigator Gonzalez was not merely cumulative. It reinforced the testimony of the other witnesses and "lent considerablecredence to [the child's] testimony at trial, noteworthy for itscontradictions." People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d 344, 355, 614N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (1993). Inadmissible hearsay gives the State theadvantage of having the victim testify twice and serves to unfairlyadd heft to the State's case. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d at 126-30, 699N.E.2d at 589-91 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). A new trial iswarranted "if it appears that the delicate scales of justice havebeen unfairly tilted by the sheer weight of repetition." People v.Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 648, 587 N.E.2d 1050, 1059 (1992);People v. Moss, 275 Ill. App. 3d 748, 756, 656 N.E.2d 193, 199(1995).

The majority asserts that the contradictions in A.C.'sstatements and testimony "go to the weight to be accorded thestatements rather than to a determination of the admissibility ofthe statements." Slip op. at 8. That contradicts the majority'slisting of the factors to be considered in making a reliabilitydetermination under section 115-10(b). The first factor listed is"the child's spontaneity and consistent repetition of the incident." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 8. The child's repetitionof the incident here was not consistent.

The burden of proof is on the State, not just to showthat the statements were made, but that they were "particularlyworthy of belief." What was there about these statements that madethem "particularly worthy of belief"? The mere fact that defendanthas not proved the statements to be inaccurate does not make them"particularly worthy of belief." Section 115-10 is a new andcontroversial statute. It is not sufficient for us to recite thatwe cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Theappellate court should maintain some consistency of result at leastfor certain situations that are common and for which a clear resultfollows from the spirit as well as the letter of the applicablerules or statutes. In re Estate of Smith, 201 Ill. App. 3d 1005,1010, 559 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1990). Independent review is necessaryto maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principlesgoverning the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy theprotections of the Bill of Rights. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 136, 144 L.Ed. 2d at 134, 119 S. Ct. at 1900.

The trial court further erred by refusing to admitevidence that A.C. made an allegation against Richard Aston thatDCFS had determined to be unfounded. A complainant's prior orsubsequent unfounded allegations of sexual abuse against theaccused may be admissible, if they bear upon the complainant'scredibility. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 578 N.E.2d at 1355. Defendant must demonstrate only that it is more likely than notthat the prior accusations were false. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d at82, 578 N.E.2d at 1356. In Mason, we suggested that a DCFS findingthat the accusation was unfounded was not sufficient proof offalsity, where the DCFS file also indicated that defendant admittedimproper touching of the complainant. There is no such impeachmentof the DCFS finding in the present case. Similar considerationsapply to the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or actscommitted by the accused. Proof of such acts need not be beyond areasonable doubt, but such proof must be more than a mere suspicion. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 456, 584 N.E.2d 89, 95(1991). It is not required that evidence "definitely establishthat the accusation determined to be unfounded was false." Slipop. at 10. There was evidence in this case from which a reasonablejury could have concluded that A.C. made false accusations againstRichard.

Even beyond that, the fact that A.C. accused Richard ofabusing her was relevant to some very material elements of thecrime charged in this case and should have been admitted. Evidenceof other acts can be admissible if it is intertwined with theinstant offense or where it relates to earlier events. People v.Lewis, 243 Ill. App. 3d 618, 625-26, 611 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (1993). A.C. has stated that she has been sexually attacked by every adultin her life, by her mother, Judith, by her father, Richard, and byher stepfather, defendant. The jury was entitled to know that A.C.made these allegations against everyone, not just against defendant. Preventing the jury from knowing this essential evidencedeprived defendant of a fair trial.