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In February 1999, the State charged defendant, LarryFonneill Billups, with two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS5/12-4(b)(8) (West 1998)) and one count of domestic battery (720ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 1998)). A jury convicted defendant ofone count of aggravated battery but acquitted him of the othercharges. In September 1999, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a newtrial. The trial court denied defendant's motion and sentencedhim to a five-year prison term.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed toprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed aggravated battery, (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and (3) the prosecutor made improper comments duringclosing arguments, which denied defendant a fair trial. Weaffirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 1999, the State charged defendant, LarryFonneill Billups, with two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS5/12-4(b)(8)(West 1998)) and one count of domestic battery (720ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2)(West 1998)). The following evidence waspresented to the jury.

In early 1999, defendant had separated from his wife,Tameka Billups. In February 1999, Tameka observed defendant andhis girlfriend, Wanda Brooks, driving in defendant's car. Tamekaand her cousin pursued defendant's car, honking at defendant andWanda for approximately 10 minutes. Later that afternoon, Tamekaand her sister, Brandi Thornton, met defendant as he was waitingin his car outside Wanda's residence to drive Wanda to work. Tameka and Brandi began arguing with defendant about his relationship with Wanda. According to Wanda, when she came out fromher residence, Tameka, Brandi, and defendant were arguing andBrandi was brandishing an ice scraper. Brandi, however, testified that she never had an ice scraper at Wanda's residence. Tameka also testified that she did not remember Brandi's havingthe ice scraper at Wanda's residence.

Thereafter, defendant drove Wanda to her job; Tamekaand Brandi followed. In the parking lot at Wanda's job, Tamekaapproached defendant on the driver's side of his car, and Brandiapproached Wanda, who was sitting in the passenger's seat. Tameka opened defendant's car door and began to argue withdefendant. Defendant attempted to close his door, but Tamekaheld the door, preventing defendant from doing so. Defendantbegan to push and pull the car door, attempting to break Tameka'sgrip from the car door. According to Tameka's testimony, Tamekathen slapped defendant's face. Defendant responded by slappingTameka across the face.

Brandi, who had engaged Wanda in a verbal confrontationon the other side of the car, saw defendant slap Tameka. Inresponse, Brandi then walked around to the driver's side of thecar. The testimony regarding the next events is in conflict.

Brandi testified that, after she saw defendant slapTameka, Brandi went to the car that she was driving and retrievedan ice scraper. Brandi then approached defendant and hit him inthe neck and back with the ice scraper.

Wanda testified, however, that Brandi already had thescraper in hand at the time that defendant slapped Tameka. Wandaclaimed that as soon as defendant slapped Tameka, Brandi hitdefendant behind his left ear. Wanda never testified that Brandiretrieved the ice scraper from the car before approaching defendant.

Tameka testified that, after Brandi supposedly struckdefendant with the ice scraper, defendant slapped Brandi acrossthe face, causing Brandi to fall to the ground. Wanda then wentinto her workplace, and defendant left in his car.

The State called Gary Parrish as an eyewitness to theevent. Parrish testified that he pulled into the gas stationadjoining Wanda's workplace and noticed two cars parked intandem. Parrish noticed two women talking to the driver of oneof the cars. Parrish then saw the driver's side car door burstopen and defendant jump out of the car, and the two young womenbegan backpedaling away from defendant. Defendant shoved Tameka,causing her to fall off the curb onto the ground. Defendant wentafter Brandi as she attempted to retreat. As defendant pursuedBrandi, he "just hauled off and punched her with a closed fistright in the face." Defendant hit Brandi so hard that "the firstthing that hit the ground was the back of her shoulders." Defendant returned to his car and drove away. Parrish immediately pulled up to the scene and offered assistance. Parrish sawBrandi get up from the ground yet never saw an ice scraper orother such object in her hand or lying on the ground around her. In fact, Parrish never observed anything in Brandi's hand duringthe incident.

Brandi immediately telephoned the police, and Wandawent into work. After the police arrived, Tameka and Brandi eachgave the police a written statement, describing the incident. Although she spoke with the officers, Wanda refused to give awritten statement. Neither Tameka nor Brandi mentioned an icescraper in their accounts to the officer. In fact, until openingarguments at trial, no one had ever mentioned the presence or useof an ice scraper.

At trial, although the State had called Tameka andBrandi as witnesses for the prosecution, the State was forced toimpeach its own witnesses with evidence of their prior inconsistent written statements to police after Tameka and Brandi testified as to new facts that aligned with defendant's self-defensetheory. In response, the State produced Tameka's and Brandi'swritten police reports as prior inconsistent statements, highlighting the conspicuous absence of any reference to an icescraper.

Defendant claimed self-defense as to both Tameka andBrandi. A jury convicted defendant of aggravated battery againstBrandi but acquitted him of the other charges regarding Tameka. In September 1999, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. Thetrial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced defendant toa five-year prison term. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant argues that the jury's acquitting him of theaggravated battery against Tameka indicated that the jury foundthat his use of force against her was justified as self-defense. By extension, defendant argues that because his use of forceagainst Tameka was legally justified under his self-defensetheory, the jury should have found that Brandi's use of forceagainst him was unlawful. Because Brandi unjustifiably attackedhim, defendant claims that he properly used force to defendhimself against Brandi. From this, defendant concludes that theState did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theaggravated battery of Brandi. We disagree.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of theevidence supporting his conviction, the relevant inquiry iswhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have foundthe elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 132, 718 N.E.2d 88, 111 (1999). Thetrier of fact bears the responsibility of (1) determining thewitnesses' credibility, (2) determining the weight given to theirtestimony, (3) resolving conflicts in the evidence, and (4)drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. Brooks, 187Ill. 2d at 132, 718 N.E.2d at 111. A jury need not accept orreject all of a witness' testimony but may attribute differentweight to different portions of it. People v. Cobbins, 162 Ill.App. 3d 1010, 1025, 516 N.E.2d 382, 393 (1987). We will notsubstitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on thesematters. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d at 132, 718 N.E.2d at 111.

In the present case, although Tameka, Brandi, and Wandaall testified that Brandi struck defendant first, Parrish testified that he never saw Brandi strike defendant. Instead, Parrishtestified that (1) defendant burst out of the car door; (2)defendant pushed Tameka, causing her to fall to the ground; (3)Brandi attempted to retreat from defendant without striking him;(4) Brandi never held anything in her hand, including an icescraper; and (5) after defendant pursued Brandi, he punched herin the face with a closed fist, causing Brandi to fall to theground with her shoulders landing first. Because the trier offact--in this case the jury--may accept or reject any or all of aperson's testimony, the jury may have found Parrish's testimonymore credible than that of the other witnesses and sufficient todetermine defendant's action against Brandi was unlawful andunjustified.

To the extent that defendant implies that the verdictsare inconsistent, we disagree. Our courts have held that logically inconsistent verdicts may stand while legally inconsistentverdicts cannot. People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270, 274,665 N.E.2d 1370, 1373 (1996). When a jury has returned legallyinconsistent verdicts acquitting a defendant of one offense andconvicting him of another, the conviction must be reversed. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d at 275, 665 N.E.2d at 1373. As ageneral rule, verdicts that acquit and convict a defendant ofcrimes composed of different elements, but arising out of thesame set of facts, are not legally inconsistent. Klingenberg,172 Ill. 2d at 274, 665 N.E.2d at 1373. "Legally inconsistentverdicts are verdicts where the same essential element of eachcrime is found to exist and not to exist and both crimes ariseout of the same set of facts." People v. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d743, 746-47, 569 N.E.2d 228, 231 (1991).

Here, the State charged defendant with aggravatedbattery of both Tameka and Brandi. The jury convicted defendantof aggravated battery against Brandi and acquitted him of aggravated battery against Tameka. Defendant argues that an acquittalof the charge regarding Tameka required an acquittal of thecharge regarding Brandi because he was defending against theirinitial attacks. However, the jury may have concluded based uponParrish's testimony that defendant hit or pushed Tameka indefense against Tameka's initial attack, yet concluded thatdefendant pursued and struck Brandi in anger without provocation. Accordingly, the verdicts regarding each charge are neitherlegally nor logically inconsistent and are not subject to reversal.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant next argues that his defense counsel renderedineffective assistance by (1) failing to tender or modify certainjury instructions and (2) failing to object to the admission ofTameka's and Brandi's prior written statements. Initially, wenote that defendant failed to claim ineffective assistance ofcounsel in a posttrial motion. Ordinarily, such a failure wouldresult in forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch,122 Ill. 2d 176, 187, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988); People v.Shields, 143 Ill. 2d 435, 446, 575 N.E.2d 538, 543 (1991). Therefore, defendant has forfeited these issues on appeal, and weneed not address defendant's arguments. Nonetheless, we alsoreject the defendant's arguments on the merits.

1. Jury Instructions

Defendant claims that his defense counsel providedineffective assistance by failing to tender a jury instruction todefine "unlawful force." To claim ineffective assistance ofcounsel, defendant must show that his attorney's performance fellbelow an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists that defendant was prejudiced by theperformance. People v. Edwards, 305 Ill. App. 3d 853, 856, 713N.E.2d 235, 237 (1999), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Prejudice isassessed in light of the likelihood of success at trial, and ifprejudice has not been demonstrated, we need not consider whethercounsel's performance was deficient. People v. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d1, 14-15, 623 N.E.2d 255, 261-62 (1993).

In the present case, the trial court instructed thejury as to the elements of aggravated battery. The trial courtfurther instructed the jury that a person is justified in the useof force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes thatsuch conduct is necessary to defend himself or another againstthe imminent use of unlawful force. As a result, the trial courtinstructed the jury as to the law regarding both the State'scharges and the defense's strategy. Therefore, even absentforfeiture, defendant was not prejudiced, and his arguments tothe contrary are meritless.

2. Prior Inconsistent Statements

Defendant next claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of Tameka's andBrandi's written statements in the police report as prior inconsistent statements. We disagree.

Defendant claims that the trial court improperlyadmitted Tameka's and Brandi's prior statements as prior consistent statements, effectively allowing them to bolster theirtestimony at trial. The record does not support this assertion.

In a discussion regarding the admissibility of thesestatements, the prosecutor argued that the statements "would fallunder the prior consistent statement [section]." On appeal, theState claims that the prosecutor misspoke by referring to thesestatements as "prior consistent." Although we cannot determinefrom the record whether the prosecutor misspoke or the courtreporter made a typographical error, the record is clear that allparties understood the statements to be prior inconsistentstatements. The record reflects that defense counsel made noobjection regarding the supposed misstatement. In fact, defensecounsel proceeded to assist the court in finding the sectionconcerning prior inconsistent statements. Moreover, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the trial court all noted theapplicability of section 115-10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 1998)), whichpertains to inconsistent statements. Therefore, no legitimateargument exists that these statements were admitted as priorconsistent statements.

Section 115-10.1 provides for the substantive admissionof prior inconsistent statements. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West1998). Paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 115-10.1 require priorstatements to be inconsistent with the offered testimony and thewitness to be subject to cross-examination. The court must thendetermine if the statements were made either under oath at atrial, hearing, or other proceeding, such as a grand jury proceeding pursuant to paragraph (c)(1), or if they were writtenstatements that were signed or acknowledged by the witness underoath which narrate, describe, or explain an event or conditionwithin the personal knowledge of the witness pursuant to paragraph (c)(2). 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(a) through (c) (West 1998). The trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidencewill not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 96, 552 N.E.2d 743, 751(1990).

In their written statements, neither Tameka nor Brandiever mentioned an ice scraper. At trial, however, both Tamekaand Brandi testified that Brandi utilized an ice scraper toattack defendant. Defendant argues that Tameka's and Brandi'sin-court testimony regarding the ice scraper indicated an omission in their written statements to the officers but did notconstitute an inconsistency that permitted the trial court toadmit the statements under section 115-10.1. We disagree.

A determination of whether a witness' prior statementis inconsistent with his present testimony is left to the sounddiscretion of the trial court. People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66,87-88, 538 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989). "[A] prior statement of awitness does not have to directly contradict the testimony givenat trial to be considered 'inconsistent' within the meaning ofsection 115-10.1." People v. Zurita, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1072,1076, 693 N.E.2d 887, 891 (1998). In fact, a prior statement isinconsistent with a witness' trial testimony when it has even atendency to contradict the trial testimony. Zurita, 295 Ill.App. 3d at 1077, 693 N.E.2d at 891. "Inconsistencies may befound in evasive answers, silence, or changes in position." Zurita, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 1077, 693 N.E.2d at 891. Moreover,"a prior statement is deemed inconsistent when it omits a significant matter that would reasonably be expected to be mentioned iftrue." Zurita, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 1077, 693 N.E.2d at 891. "The inconsistency may consist of the failure to speak of amatter entirely when it is shown that the witness had an opportunity to make a statement and that a person would reasonably beexpected under the circumstances to do so." Zurita, 295 Ill.App. 3d at 1077, 693 N.E.2d at 891; see also People v. Batchelor,202 Ill. App. 3d 316, 327-28, 559 N.E.2d 948, 956 (1990) (statingthat an inconsistency can occur through a witness' omission of aparticular fact that, under the circumstances, rendered itincumbent upon him to, or likely that he would, state such fact,if true; such an omission may be used to discredit his testimonyas to such fact); People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 321, 265N.E.2d 876, 882 (1970).

As we have previously stated, although the Stateoffered Tameka's and Brandi's written statements as substantiveevidence, the State also attempted to impeach Tameka and Brandi--its own witnesses--because the State believed that they hadaltered their stories to align with defendant's self-defensetheory and facilitate an acquittal. Although they had sufficientopportunities and would have reasonably been expected to relatethis fact if true, neither Tameka nor Brandi ever acknowledgedthe ice scraper until trial. The State assumed that the late-breaking ice scraper story was fabricated, especially in light ofParrish's testimony that he never saw Brandi holding an icescraper.

Moreover, the State approached the court with evidencethat Tameka and Brandi were fabricating the recent remembrance ofthe ice scraper. The following discussion occurred outside thepresence of the jury before the second day of trial:

"MR. PRIOR [(Prosecutor)]: Your Honor, Ihave one more issue.

THE COURT: All right. Just a second. Go ahead.

MR. PRIOR: Linnette Moore, she'sTameka's mother, she came with--to me afterthe trial yesterday and she said that thedefendant called her the night that he wasarrested and said that he was sorry for hitting both of her daughters and, et cetera, soI believe that she could be a witness.

Also, your Honor, she then[,] today shegave me this letter written from the defendant to Tameka that the mother was able toget. It was written on July 17th of thisyear, and in the letter the defendant asksTameka and the sister, Brandi, to lie forhim. ***

* * *

The letter is from the defendant injail, and he's asking her and her sister tolie."

Ultimately, the trial court did not permit the State to admit theletter into evidence because defendant objected as to lack ofnotice. The letter, however, tended to substantiate the State'stheory that Tameka and Brandi had fabricated the ice scraperstory. Therefore, their prior written statements were inconsistent with their trial testimony. Even absent forfeiture, thetrial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements. Any objection by defense counsel regarding the admissibility of the written statements would have been properly overruled. Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to object does notconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant finally argues that the prosecutor madeimproper comments to the jury during his closing argument thatprejudiced the jury against him and denied him a fair trial. Wedisagree.

Every defendant is entitled to a fair trial free fromprejudicial comments by the prosecution. People v. Barker, 298Ill. App. 3d 751, 757, 699 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (1998). Prosecutors, however, are afforded wide latitude in closing argument,and improper remarks will not merit reversal unless they resultin substantial prejudice to defendant, in light of the context ofthe language used, its relationship to the evidence, and itseffect on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. People v. Bowen, 241 Ill. App. 3d 608, 621, 609 N.E.2d 346, 357(1993); see also People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 184-85, 604N.E.2d 294, 315 (1992); Barker, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 699N.E.2d at 1043. Reversible error results when comments by aprosecutor substantially prejudice a defendant, causing one toquestion whether the guilty verdict resulted from those comments. People v. Castaneda, 299 Ill. App. 3d 779, 784, 701 N.E.2d 1190,1192 (1998). "[S]tatements of counsel and argument based uponfacts and circumstances proved, or upon legitimate inferencedrawn from them, [however,] do not exceed the bounds of properdebate." Bowen, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 609 N.E.2d at 357. Theprosecutor is free to reflect unfavorably on the defendant andcomment on his action if based upon competent and pertinentevidence. Bowen, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 609 N.E.2d at 357.

Initially, defendant claims that, because Tameka's andBrandi's written statements were improperly admitted, the prosecutor improperly referred to the statements during closingargument. Because we have previously concluded that thesereports were properly admitted into evidence as prior inconsistent statements, the prosecutor's references to the reports wereproper.

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperlyargued that the testimony regarding the ice scraper was a totalfabrication, arguing that these comments were improper andprejudicial. A prosecutor's statements in closing arguments thatsuggest that defense counsel fabricated a defense theory, attempted to free his client through trickery or deception, orsuborned perjury are improper. People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430,491, 560 N.E.2d 849, 877 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 501U.S. 1202, 115 L. Ed. 2d 966, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991). Thecomments of which defendant complains were not attacks on defensecounsel, however. The State was commenting on the evidence as itrelated to the credibility of Brandi, Tameka, and Wanda. Therefore, the State's argument was not improper. Furthermore, to theextent that these comments could be considered an attack ondefense counsel, the trial court sustained defendant's objection,thereby neutralizing any prejudicial effect. People v. Landwer,166 Ill. 2d 475, 499, 655 N.E.2d 848, 860 (1995); People v.London, 256 Ill. App. 3d 661, 664, 628 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1993).

Defendant also complains that the State attempted toinflame and prejudice the jury against him by repeatedly commenting on his extramarital relationship with Wanda and the fact thatboth Tameka and Wanda were pregnant with defendant's children atthe time that the incident occurred. Again, the State was merelycommenting on properly admitted evidence as tending to demonstrate why Tameka and Wanda may fabricate testimony regarding theice scraper. Therefore, the prosecutor's comments relateddirectly to the credibility of the witnesses and were not improper.

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperlymisstated the law regarding self-defense and expressed hispersonal opinion as to the validity of certain witnesses' testimony in his closing argument. Parties in closing argument maynot go beyond the scope of the evidence presented and inferencestherefrom, misstate the law, or express their personal opinionson the evidence. People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 210, 687N.E.2d 979, 995 (1997). The prosecutor stated that a person "canuse reasonable force if it's necessary to defend [her]self oranother." Although perhaps somewhat of an oversimplification,the prosecutor's comment was not a misstatement. In fact, thejury was properly instructed that "[a] person is justified in theuse [of] force when and to the extent that he reasonably believesthat such conduct is necessary to defend himself or anotheragainst the imminent use of unlawful force." Therefore, theprosecutor's comment was a correct statement of the law in thisstate. Moreover, even if the prosecutor had misstated the law,the trial court's administering a proper jury instruction curedthe error. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d at 499, 655 N.E.2d at 860;London, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 664, 628 N.E.2d at 623.

With regard to the prosecutor's comment on his opinionof the evidence, the defendant failed to allege any prejudicialeffect. Furthermore, the trial court sustained the defendant'sobjection, thereby negating any potential prejudice. Landwer,166 Ill. 2d at 499, 655 N.E.2d at 860.

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperlyasked the members of the jury to place themselves in the positionof the victims and consider how they would react under similarcircumstances. Although the prosecutor's tactic was improper, itdoes not warrant reversal. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1,38, 525 N.E.2d 30, 45 (1988).

Therefore, having reviewed the record, including theclosing arguments, we cannot say that defendant was denied a fairtrial due to the prosecutor's comments. Although we believe thatsome of the prosecutor's comments bordered on being inappropriateand we do not condone such questionable tactics, we conclude thatthey did not materially affect the verdict against defendant.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT and COOK, JJ., concur.