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June 19, 2001

NO. 4-00-0958

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, PekinInsurance Company (Pekin), appeals from the order of the circuitcourt of Ford County granting summary judgment in favor ofdefendant, the estate of Clinton Ritter, deceased, and denyingPekin's cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court'sruling allowed defendant to "stack" available underinsured motorist(UIM) coverage for multiple vehicles under the same Pekin policy. The only issue is whether the UIM coverage limitation provision ofthe policy, read in conjunction with the remaining provisions ofthe policy, is ambiguous. We reverse and remand with directions toenter summary judgment in favor of Pekin.

The construction of an insurance policy is a question oflaw (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992)), and we construe itde novo (Mank v. West American Insurance Co., 249 Ill. App. 3d 827,830, 620 N.E.2d 6, 8 (1993)).

The Pekin policy involved in this case lists threevehicles in the declaration sheet and limits the liabilities forUIM coverage to $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. TheUIM coverage limitation provision provides in relevant part asfollows:

"D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

1. Regardless of the number of covered'autos,' 'insureds,' premiums paid, claimsmade or vehicles involved in the 'accident,'the most we will pay for all damages resultingfrom any one 'accident' is the Limit of Insurance for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE shownin this endorsement."

With the exception of the policy limits and the number ofvehicles insured, the policy in this case is identical to thepolicy found ambiguous in Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Goben,303 Ill. App. 3d 639, 646-49, 707 N.E.2d 1259, 1264-66 (1999). Here, too, the declaration sheet contained two columns per vehicle.It showed UIM coverage to be limited to "50/100" in the firstcolumn for each vehicle, with the second column showing UIMpremiums of $7 for vehicle 1, $7 for vehicle 2, and $11 for vehicle3. As does the disposition in Goben, the defense relies on theobiter dictum in Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill.2d 179, 192-93, 620 N.E.2d 355, 362 (1993), even though the Bruderdecision found unambiguous the limitation of UIM coverage clauseusing virtually identical language to that employed in this caseand in Goben (Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189-94, 620 N.E.2d at 360-63). The Goben court relied on the fact that the UIM limitation-of-coverage clause referred to the UIM coverage in the endorsementsand concluded that it could be read to imply that the partiesintended multiple coverage amounts, one for each vehicle, wereafforded by payment of the separate premiums. We disagree.

Although referred to as an "anti-stacking clause," theparties agree that the relevant clause in this case defines thelimits of UIM coverage. This case does not involve stacking ofcoverage under multiple insurance policies. The entries in thecolumns on the declaration page in this policy do nothing more thanindicate the amount of coverage provided for each vehicle and theamount of the total premium allotted to that coverage. To theextent that there could be some confusion arising out of whetherthe coverages could be "stacked," the UIM coverage limitationprovision clarifies that question. That provision is not ambiguous. The amount that would be paid for all damage is limited bythe UIM coverage, i.e., "50/100," for any covered vehicle. Thepolicy does not allow for UIM coverage for each vehicle to beaggregated.

When the language limiting UIM coverage is unambiguous,the fact that separate premiums are paid does not render the UIM-coverage-limitation clause ambiguous; it simply means that theinsured can recover under one of the coverages. See Menke v.Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425-26, 401 N.E.2d539, 542 (1980). A similar limitation on uninsured motoristcoverage was upheld in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190 Ill.App. 3d 240, 248-49, 546 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1989).

Although it involves interpretation of a differentinsurance policy, we are equally unpersuaded by the analysis inYates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797,799-800, 724 N.E.2d 1042, 1044-45 (2000). The Yates decision seemsto contradict Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 50,53-54, 60-65, 648 N.E.2d 180, 182-83, 186-90 (1995), wherein thecourt found unambiguous a UIM-limitation clause very similar to theclause interpreted in Yates.

The summary judgment entered in the circuit court of FordCounty in favor of defendant is reversed and the cause is remandedwith directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Pekin.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

MYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.