Newsome v. Illinois Prison Review Board

Case Date: 09/04/2002
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-00-1041 Rel

NO. 4-00-1041

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT


JACK NEWSOME,
                            Plaintiff-Appellant,
                            v.
THE ILLINOIS PRISON REVIEW BOARD;
DWAYNE A. CLARK, LEORA HARRY; DONALD N.
SNYDER; MARK NELSON; SERGEANT L.
GREGORY; D. KNIGHT; OFFICER T. RUFFINO;
and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
                            Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Livingston County
No. 00MR57


Honorable
Harold J. Frobish,
Judge Presiding.



PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Plaintiff, Jack Newsome, an inmate of StatevilleCorrectional Center (Stateville), appeals pro se from the order ofthe circuit court of Livingston County dismissing his unamended prose complaint for mandamus against defendants, "The Prisoner ReviewBoard; Dwayne A. Clark; Leora Harry; Donald N. Snyder; Mark Nelson;Sergeant L. Gregory; D. Knight; Officer T. Ruffino; and Does 1through 100." The only parties to this appeal are plaintiff anddefendants, the Prisoner Review Board and Snyder. The issues onappeal are whether (1) the complaint was properly dismissed forfailure to state a cause of action in mandamus and (2) plaintiffwas provided effective assistance by court-appointed counsel. Weaffirm.

We consider de novo the issue of whether the complaintstated a cause of action for mandamus. See Toombs v. City ofChampaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583, 615 N.E.2d 50, 51 (1993). Mandamus is a civil proceeding governed by sections 14-101 through14-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/14-101 through14-109 (West 2000)), and it lies to compel an action by an officerthat is purely ministerial and not discretionary (Dennis E. v.O'Malley, 256 Ill. App. 3d 334, 341, 628 N.E.2d 362, 368 (1993)). In determining whether the allegations of the complaint aresufficient to state a cause of action, we take all well-pleadedfacts as true and view them in the light most favorable toplaintiff. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490, 675N.E.2d 584, 588 (1996).

On May 23, 2000, plaintiff filed the pro se complaint formandamus requesting a new hearing by the administrative reviewboard or, in the alternative, reinstatement of his good-conductcredit and grade. This action arose out of an incident atStateville on July 27, 1998. Correctional officer Ruffino wrote adisciplinary report against plaintiff for failing to stay with thegroup Ruffino was escorting and for striking Ruffino. Plaintiffwas charged with disobeying a direct order, insolence, intimidationor threats, assault, and dangerous disturbance. The following day,plaintiff submitted a request to the adjustment committee for (1)polygraph examinations of himself and Ruffino, (2) review of therelevant inmate movement sheets, mugshot book, and surveillancetape to identify three other inmates being escorted by Ruffino atthe time of and who witnessed the incident, and (3) an interview ofthe food service supervisor with whom plaintiff claimed he stoppedto discuss his dietary requirements. The adjustment committee,comprised of defendants Nelson, Gregory, and Knight, conducted itshearing on August 3, 1998. At that hearing, plaintiff stated hehad no desire to make a comment and orally requested a continuance. Plaintiff informed the adjustment committee that he did not knowthe names of the three inmate witnesses. The request for acontinuance was denied. The adjustment committee found plaintiffguilty of the charges on the basis that plaintiff admitted beingpresent at the incident, assistant warden Springborn saw plaintiffstrike and assault Ruffino, and Ruffino's report of the incidentwas accurate. In its summary, the adjustment committee stated thatthe inmate witnesses were not called because doing so wouldundermine authority and jeopardize security, and Springbornwitnessed the assault. The adjustment committee then revoked oneyear of plaintiff's good-conduct credit, demoted him to C grade forone year, placed him in segregation for one year, and denied himcommissary and audiovisual privileges for three months. Statevillechief administrative officer Dwayne Clark approved the decision.

On August 9, 1998, plaintiff filed a grievance chargingthat the three inmate witnesses "may have" corroborated hisstatement that, prior to the incident, Ruffino put his hands onplaintiff with the deliberate intention of provoking a fight. Plaintiff argued that his request to review the relevant inmatemovement sheets and mugshot book to discover the identities of thethree inmate witnesses was not unreasonable. On December 17, 1998,the administrative review board, chaired by defendant Leora Harry,conducted a hearing on plaintiff's grievance. At the hearing,plaintiff described the incident as he felt it occurred and statedthat Springborn was not present during the entire incident andcould have no knowledge that Ruffino had shoved plaintiff prior tothe confrontation. Plaintiff told the administrative review boardthat he was justified in assaulting Ruffino. The administrativereview board concluded it was reasonably satisfied that plaintiffcommitted the infraction and recommended denying the grievance. Defendant Donald Snyder, the Director of the Department ofCorrections (DOC), concurred.

In his mandamus complaint, plaintiff alleged that Ruffinoviolated his rights to due process by omitting the names of thethree inmate witnesses from his report, the adjustment committeeviolated his right to due process by not correcting Ruffino'somissions or not interviewing the three inmate witnesses, and theadjustment committee and the administrative review board knew thatthe request to interview the three inmate witnesses was within thepurview of DOC rules.

A mandamus action is not an appropriate means for seekingjudicial review of an administrative proceeding. To withstand achallenge to the legal sufficiency of a complaint seeking mandamus,the complaint must allege facts establishing a clear right of theplaintiff to the desired relief, a clear duty of defendant to act,a clear authority in defendant to comply with the terms of thewrit, and the activity sought to be compelled is ministerial andnot discretionary. Dennis E., 256 Ill. App. 3d at 340-41, 628N.E.2d at 367-68.

In Durbin v. Gilmore, 307 Ill. App. 3d 337, 343, 718N.E.2d 292, 297 (1999), this court stated:

"Due process requires only that the inmatereceive (1) advance written notice of thedisciplinary charges at least 24 hours priorto hearing; (2) when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, anopportunity to call witnesses and presentdocumentary evidence in his defense; and (3) awritten statement by the fact finder of theevidence relied on and the reasons for thedisciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418U.S. 539, 564-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 956, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979 (1974)."

DOC rules provide that a committed person, upon written request andfor good cause shown, may be granted additional time to prepare adefense (20 Ill. Adm. Code