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JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On June 2, 1998, the circuit court of McLean County entered a permanency review order pursuant to section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1996 & Supp. 1997)), changing the permanency goal for minors J.H. and K.H. from "return home" to "substitute care pending court determination." Respondent father, Dale Mellinger, appeals, arguing the evidence did not support a finding the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided services to him as required by the Act. Therefore, he asserts, the circuit court abused its discretion by finding such services had been provided and changing the permanency goal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Respondent is the father of two children by respondent mother, Linda H. They are a son, J.H. (born August 14, 1991), and a daughter, K.H. (born August 27, 1992). Respondent and Linda never married. Linda had another child, C.W., by Grady W. Linda and Grady are not parties to this appeal.

On August 8, 1996, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging the three children were abused and neglected. The alleged abuse was an act of aggravated criminal sexual assault against K.H. committed by Grady. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(iii) (West 1996). The allegation of neglect was based on Linda's failure to protect the children. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1996). After a hearing, the children were placed in shelter care.

The goal stated in the initial return home. The plan was revised on February 2, 1997. The goal remained the return of the children to Linda's home, but Mellinger's progress was rated unsatisfactory overall. The basis for this rating was that he had not been able to maintain stable housing long enough for the caseworker to implement any services. The caseworker noted Mellinger had expressed a desire to visit the children on a regular basis, but he was prevented from doing so because of an order of protection prohibiting any contact between him and Linda, which also prohibited him from having contact with the children.

After a number of delays, an adjudicatory hearing was held on June 5, 1997. Linda stipulated to the allegation of neglect. The circuit court found the abuse by Grady proved by clear and convincing evidence, based on his having pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault to K.H.

An updated service plan was filed on August 29, 1997. Mellinger's progress was again rated unsatisfactory because his housing situation remained unstable and he had not completed a drug and alcohol evaluation or domestic violence counseling. The goal remained to return the children to Linda's custody. Mellinger indicated at that time he would seek custody if Linda were to lose custody of the two children.

At the dispositional hearing on September 16, 1997, the circuit court entered an order stating that the permanency goal was the return of the children to Linda's home. The circuit court noted that the petition for adjudication of wardship contained no allegations directed at Mellinger; thus, no finding of unfitness was made with regard to him. Nevertheless, the circuit court placed Mellinger under an order of protective supervision and ordered him to cooperate with DCFS, undergo a substance abuse evaluation, submit to drug screening tests, and obtain an assessment and counseling related to domestic violence.

On March 17, 1998, a newly revised service plan was filed with the court. Mellinger's progress was again rated unsatisfactory. He had not complied with any of the plan objectives except visitation with the children. It was also noted that he visited inconsistently and had arrived "high" on marijuana at several visits. On November 25, 1997, he was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia after the police responded to a domestic violence call to Linda's home. The plan noted that the Baby Fold, the private agency assigned by DCFS to provide services to the parties in this case, had referred Mellinger to substance abuse, domestic violence, and sexual abuse programs, but he had not utilized any of these services. The goal remained "return home," but the agency referred the matter for internal legal screening.

At the permanency review hearing on June 2, 1998, the parties were informed that on June 1, 1998, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mellinger, Linda, and Grady. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1996). The petition alleged, inter alia, that Mellinger failed to make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children and (2) reasonable progress toward their return. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996).

The sole witness at the permanency review hearing was Linda Polk, a child welfare specialist at the Baby Fold, who prepared the dispositional report filed on June 1, 1998. Polk was not questioned by the State about Mellinger. On cross-examination by counsel for Mellinger, she agreed that the statement in the dispositional report, in which she said Mellinger had not completed any service plan objective other than visitation, was inaccurate. Mellinger completed the recommended psychological evaluation in May 1997. Polk also acknowledged Mellinger completed parenting classes while in prison, but she stated these are not recognized by DCFS as acceptable classes. She explained this fact to Mellinger on several occasions. At the conclusion of cross-examination, the following exchange took place:

"Q. And did you ever inform Mr. Mellinger that it was no longer necessary for him to work on the Client Service Plan?

A. I told him that if he needed to continue working for himself on the plan because he needed to have the skills at the time of the legal screening, that we took the case for legal screening. But, yes.

Q. You told him to stop working on his Client Service Plan?

A. I told him it would not make a difference."

Following Polk's testimony, the circuit court asked for recommendations. The State replied:

"The goal of return home has not been achieved with any of these parents. All the services that were provided were appropriate. They were not successful. Reasonable efforts to achieve those goals were made; however, it doesn't appear that the agency adequately provided for the services, and, therefore, reasonable efforts were not made to facilitate the goal."

It is unclear which portion of the State's remarks referred to efforts by DCFS and the Baby Fold and which portion to efforts by any or all of the respondent parents. The State concluded with a recommendation that the goal be changed to "substitute care pending court determination."

Counsel for Linda made no argument. Counsel for Grady "concur[red]" with the State's comment that reasonable efforts had not been made to assist his client in attaining his assigned goals. Counsel for Mellinger did not object to continued guardianship in DCFS, but argued the permanency goal should not be changed and the agency abused its discretion by advising Mellinger to stop working on his client service plan.

The guardian ad litem (GAL) did not make a recommendation. He did, however, state:

"I can say that I'm not really happy with the progress of any parent, but if the agency has not provided services, I don't know if we can go to a change of goal to substitute care if they haven't been provided adequate services. Usually, we have a change of goal to substitute care when services have been provided but the people haven't taken full advantage of it."

The court initially declined to enter a permanency order, but was persuaded by counsel for Mellinger that it was necessary to do so. From the bench, the circuit court ruled:

"The court will reconsider and will enter a permanency order today with the recommendations as made by the State with the exception of the court will not make any fi[nd]ing as to the provision of services. I am not satisfied from what I've heard today that I've heard enough evidence on that, and we don't have time to delve into all the service plans and go into all the details. So, with the exception of that finding, I'll enter the permanency order."

Counsel for Mellinger again objected, arguing the court is required to make such a finding if a complete, valid, and appealable order is to be entered. The circuit court then called a recess to speak to counsel in chambers. Upon their return, the court stated:

"The court, after reviewing matters with counsel, will, in this case, enter a permanency order changing the goal to substitute care pending court decision with the other findings recommended[,] except that the court will find that services were provided, [and] were reasonably calculated to achieve the goal."

The court further explained its understanding that the agency is not required to continue to provide services after "there's a legal screening and the goal is internally changed within [DCFS]."

Ms. Webber (identified elsewhere in the record as a DCFS representative) commented that services to Grady and Mellinger "may have been shut off prior to that case review." She explained that legal screening was held, but the goal of "return home" was not changed at that time. According to Webber, services should continue to be provided to the respondent parents until the goal is changed by the court.

The court asked Polk to explain what had occurred in this case. She stated that a discussion took place within the agency as to whether, under the amended statute (705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West Supp. 1997), the agency had the authority to designate a new goal and discontinue services based on that new goal. "So we left the old goal so that [at] the permanency hearing, that's when we would change it to the new goal."

In light of the most recent plan dated February 26, 1998, and the legal screening on March 17, 1998, the circuit court observed, "And after you had the legal screening without changing the plan, you basically changed the internal goal to substitute care[,] but that's not formalized anywhere."

Webber explained this was not permissible. According to her, to change the goal from "return home" to substitute care, the agency is required "to write a new service plan reflecting what the new goal is and then setting forth objectives." Only after the goal is formally changed may the agency "omit any objectives for the parents except for visitation." Further:

"[W]hile Ms. Polk may have made a decision based on what happened at a legal screening, in order for the [] goal to technically [] have been changed, she would have had to develop a new Client Service Plan to document that. *** [T]he reason for that would be that, technically, the parents would have an opportunity internally, within DCFS, to appeal that change of the goal ***. Therefore, the service plan is part of [the agency's] announcement that something is changing."

In this case, the parties agreed, the original permanency goal of return home was set by the agency and the dispositional order of September 16, 1997, merely recognized that the goal set by DCFS was appropriate. The court commented that, under the law as it existed at that time, the court did not have the authority to set permanency goals, but could find DCFS abused its discretion in setting a goal. Given the confusion on this issue, the circuit court offered to continue the matter. The State responded:

"Your Honor, Ms. Webber is indicating that it's her understanding that had the private agency done this correctly, what could have been done is take the case to legal screening, made a decision the goal should now be substitute care, develop a new Client Service Plan and give[] it to all the parties[,] stating that was the goal. Under the old law, they still had the authority to do that without coming into court and asking the court to change [the goal]. It just didn't happen in this case."

The circuit court then made its final ruling:

"I will enter the order as previously indicated[,] finding that substitute care pending court determination is now the appropriate goal in this case. Under the confusing circumstances that I think are presented by the change in the law *** with the court now setting permanency goals ***, while it appears there may have been some misunderstanding or mix up here, the court is not going to enter a finding that the Baby Fold has not adequately provided for services. *** [T]he court, at any hearing on a Petition to Terminate, will hear that evidence in more detail. And certainly for any period of time that services may not have been provided or made available to any of the respondent parents, that, obviously, would not be held against them."

The written order was filed on June 4, 1998. It consists of a two-page checklist-type form. By filling in the blanks and checking certain spaces on the form, the circuit court indicated its findings that the permanency goal of "return home" had not been achieved; services were provided; the services were appropriate but were not successful; the parties did not make reasonable efforts to achieve their goal; DCFS and the private agency adequately provided for the services and did make reasonable efforts to facilitate the goal; and DCFS and the private agency did not abuse their discretion. The order then indicated by means of a check mark which of the 11 listed permanency goals it was selecting: "SUBSTITUTE CARE PENDING COURT DETERMINATION ON PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS."

ANALYSIS

Before undertaking analysis of the issues raised on appeal, we express our concern with the almost 28-month interval between the removal of the children from parental custody and these proceedings. Although we appreciate the delays were due largely to Grady's incarceration and his several changes of counsel, the best interests of children are served by prompt hearings. As this court has previously stated, "Trial courts should be reluctant to grant continuances in such cases, and when a continuance is necessary, it normally should be for the shortest time possible." In re S.H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 394, 672 N.E.2d 403, 404 (1996).

As noted by the circuit court, relevant sections of the Act have recently been amended. In fact, they have been amended more than once. Because the question is likely to arise in subsequent cases, we address which amendment should be applied in this case, although the parties have not raised the issue.

Section 6 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)) provides:

"Two or more Acts which relate to the same subject matter and which are enacted by the same General Assembly shall be construed together in such a manner as to give full effect to each Act except in case of an irreconcilable conflict. In case of an irreconcilable conflict the Act last acted upon by the General Assembly is controlling to the extent of such conflict." 5 ILCS 70/6 (West 1996).

On May 22, 1997, final legislative action was taken on Public Acts 90-27, 90-28, and 90-87, each of which contained language amending section 2-28 of the Act. Pub. Act 90-27,