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JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 2001, respondent, Zachariah Mc. (born in March1986), admitted that he committed the offense of aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (West 2000)), asalleged in a delinquency petition the State had filed againsthim. The trial court later committed him to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division (DOC). The court also deniedrespondent's motion for exemption from the requirements of theSex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1through 12 (West 2000)), because he was a juvenile sex offender.

Defendant appeals, arguing only that the trial courterred when it denied his motion for exemption from the Registration Act. We affirm.

Respondent's victim was a seven-year-old girl to whomhe had access. The State originally charged him in a delinquencypetition with (1) aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS5/12-14(b)(i) (West 2000)) (count I), and (2) aggravated criminalsexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (West 2000)) (count II). Pursuant to an agreement with the State, respondent admitted tocount II, and count I was dismissed. The parties had no agreement regarding a disposition.

In May 2001, the trial court conducted a dispositionalhearing and sentenced respondent to DOC. In August 2001, respondent filed a motion for exemption from the requirements of theRegistration Act. The court denied that motion, and this appealfollowed.

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by denyinghis motion for exemption from the Registration Act because itdoes not apply to juvenile sex offenders. We disagree.

The Second District Appellate Court (In re Nicholas K.,326 Ill. App. 3d 497, 761 N.E.2d 352 (2001), appeal pending, No.93908) and the Third District Appellate Court (In re Ben S., 331Ill. App 3d 471, 771 N.E.2d 1133 (2002), petition for leave toappeal pending, No. 94221) both recently addressed this sameissue and reached contradictory conclusions. We agree with theThird District's decision in Ben S., which held that juvenile sexoffenders are not exempted from the requirement to register underthe Registration Act. Ben S., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73, 771N.E.2d at 1134.

In Ben S., the court wrote the following:

"Before July 1, 1999, section 3 of theAct provided that '[a] sex offender *** shall*** register in person' with a prescribed lawenforcement official. 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(West 1998). The term 'sex offender' wasdefined in section 2 as, inter alia, 'anyperson' who is charged with, and convictedof, a sex offense. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a)(West 1998). Effective July 1, 1999, thelegislature amended section 2 by adding thefollowing definition:

'"Juvenile sex offender" meansany person who is adjudicated ajuvenile delinquent as the resultof the commission of or attempt tocommit a violation set forth initem (B), (C), or (C-5) of this[s]ection or a violation of anysubstantially similar federal,sister state, or foreign countrylaw. For purposes of this[s]ection "convicted" shall havethe same meaning as "adjudicated".' 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5) (West 2000).

The amendment did not change the definitionof a 'sex offender' or the requirement insection 3 that such offenders register underthe Act.

The Appellate Court, Second District,addressed the instant issue in [Nicholas K.],326 Ill. App. 3d 497[, 761 N.E.2d 352], andheld that juveniles are not required to register under the Act. The court's reasoningwas as follows:

'By creating a separate category of "juvenile sex offenders,"the legislature must have intendedthose in this category to betreated differently. Section 3 ofthe Act plainly proves that only"sex offenders" are required toregister. It says nothing about"juvenile sex offenders." If thelegislature wanted to provide thatjuveniles who were adjudicateddelinquent for having committed sexcrimes had to register as sex offenders on the same basis as adultsconvicted of sex crimes, it couldsimply have amended the definitionof "sex offender" to include juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent.' Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App.3d at 500[, 761 N.E.2d at 355].

We disagree with the Second District'sholding. Indeed section 3 of the Act onlyrequires 'sex offenders' to register. Butthe applicable definition of a 'sex offender'is 'any person' who is charged with, andconvicted of, a sex offense. (Emphasisadded.) 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a) (West 2000). The plain meaning of that language encompasses juveniles without any need for themissing amendment noted by the Second District. In light of such plainness, we refuseto add an adult limitation under the guise ofstatutory construction." Ben S., 331 Ill.App. 3d at 472-43, 771 N.E.2d at 1134-35.

We agree with the Third District's analysis in Ben S.and adopt its holding. We thus conclude that the trial court didnot err by denying respondent's motion for exemption from therequirements of the Registration Act.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I agree with Justice Slater'sdissent in Ben S., 331 Ill. App. 3d 471, 771 N.E.2d 1133, andwith the Second District's decision in Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App.3d 497, 761 N.E.352.