Find Legal Information

July 5, 2001

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 1999, the State filed a two-count petitionpursuant to sections 2-3(1)(a) and (1)(b) of the Juvenile CourtAct of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a), (1)(b)(West 1998)), alleging that respondent, Amber Woolsey, failed toprovide her minor children, S.P. and J.W., with adequate shelterand exposed the children to unsanitary living conditions. Although the court continued the matter under supervision (CUS)until May 2, 2000, the State filed a petition to revoke CUSpursuant to section 2-20(5) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS405/2-20(5) (West 1998)) on April 6, 2000. The trial court setthe petition to revoke CUS for hearing on May 31, 2000. On May30, 2000, however, respondent filed a motion to dismiss thepetition to revoke CUS because (1) section 2-20(5) requires sucha petition to be heard within 15 days of filing and (2) the Statefailed to call the matter for hearing within that 15-day period. The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss and proceeded with adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, resulting inthe children being made wards of the court and their guardianshipbeing transferred to the Illinois Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS).

On appeal, respondent only challenges the trial court'sdecision denying her motion to dismiss the State's petition torevoke CUS because the hearing was not held within the 15-dayperiod proscribed by statute. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Respondent is the biological mother of S.P. and J.W.,born October 26, 1982, and December 29, 1984, respectively. Theminors' father is deceased. DCFS received several indicatedreports of abuse prior to filing the neglect petition in thiscase.

In July 1998, DCFS received a report, alleging thatrespondent had caused S.P. to have abrasions, scratches, andredness on her cheek after a physical altercation. Respondentrefused services at the time of the investigation. In May 1999,DCFS received an additional report, alleging environmentalneglect.

A child protective investigator (investigator) attempted to contact respondent and her children regarding theallegations of environmental neglect. Despite the investigator'snumerous attempts, respondent failed to return the investigator'smessages. In June 1999, the investigator was finally able tocontact respondent at her residence and notify respondent thatshe had three days to show marked improvement in the cleanlinessof the home. Respondent refused services again.

On June 11, 1999, the investigator returned to respondent's home to again find filth and debris. On July 8, 1999, theState filed a petition to have S.P. and J.W. declared neglectedminors due to unsanitary living conditions under sections 2-3(1)(a) and (1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 1998)). In November 1999, the trial courtgranted the CUS for a period of six months during which time thechildren were to remain in respondent's custody until mid-May2000. The trial court set the matter for a May 2, 2000, statushearing regarding the CUS, more than two weeks before the six-month CUS period would have run.

On April 6, 2000, however, the State filed a petitionto revoke the CUS pursuant to section 2-20(5) of the JuvenileCourt Act (705 ILCS 405/2-20(5) (West 1998)), alleging thatrespondent violated the trial court's CUS order "in that therespondent's home is in an unsanitary condition and [DCFS] hasbeen denied access to the respondent's home." The trial courtacknowledged the State's petition to revoke the CUS at the May 2,2000, hearing, admonished respondent as to the petition, appointed new counsel to represent her, appointed a new attorneyand guardian ad litem for the children, set a hearing on therevocation petition on May 31, 2000, and continued the CUS untilthe revocation hearing.

On May 30, 2000, respondent filed a motion to dismissthe petition to revoke the CUS, arguing that (1) section 2-20requires such a petition to be heard within 15 days of filing and(2) the State failed to call the matter for hearing within that15-day period. At the May 31, 2000, hearing, the trial courtdenied respondent's motion to dismiss, heard evidence on theState's petition to revoke the CUS, recessed and continued thehearing on the revocation petition until June 2, 2000, andcontinued the CUS until the June 2, 2000, hearing.

At the June 2, 2000, hearing, the trial court reconvened the hearing on the State's petition to revoke the CUS. Thetrial court learned that Mary Palma (Palma) had been appointedS.P.'s guardian in October 1994. The trial court permitted theState to amend its petition for adjudication of wardship to addPalma as a party to the proceeding. As to J.W., the trial courtrevoked the CUS and found J.W. to be a neglected minor. Thetrial court also set an admonition hearing for Palma regardingthe petition for adjudication of wardship as to S.P. and set adispositional hearing regarding J.W. for June 29, 2000. Thetrial court entered its written adjudicatory order finding J.W.neglected on June 21, 2000.

On June 29, 2000, the trial court admonished Palma ofthe nature of the allegations found in the petition for adjudication of wardship and the possible consequences of the proceedings. The trial court continued the adjudicatory hearing as toS.P. until August 14, 2000.

Also at the June 29, 2000, hearing, the trial courtheld a dispositional hearing regarding J.W. The trial courtfound that J.W. was a neglected minor and made the minor a wardof the court. The trial court appointed DCFS as J.W.'s guardianbut permitted J.W.'s custody to remain with respondent.

On August 14, 2000, Palma waived her right to anadjudicatory hearing regarding S.P. Therefore, the trial courtfound S.P. neglected as alleged and set the cause fordispositional hearing on September 5, 2000. On August 24, 2000,the trial court entered its adjudicatory order memorializing itsfinding that S.P. was neglected.

On September 5, 2000, the trial court conducted adispositional hearing regarding S.P. The trial court found thatS.P. was a neglected minor and made S.P. a ward of the court. The trial court appointed DCFS as S.P.'s guardian and removedcustody from Palma and transferred custody to respondent. OnSeptember 18, 2000, the trial court filed its dispositional orderregarding both S.P. and J.W. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in denyingher motion to dismiss the State's petition to revoke the CUSbecause no hearing was held within the 15-day period containedwithin section 2-20(5) of the Juvenile Court Act. The Stateargues that the 15-day limitation found in section 2-20(5) isonly directory and not mandatory and, therefore, not jurisdictional in nature. Alternatively, the State argues that, even ifthe 15-day period is mandatory, respondent forfeited this argument by participating in a hearing after the 15-day periodelapsed and failing to object to the continuance of the revocation hearing for more than 50 days.

The issues of first impression before this court are(1) whether a trial court must dismiss a petition to revoke theCUS when a hearing on such petition is not held within 15 daysfrom the date of filing the petition, and (2) whether a respondent forfeits the benefit of that limitation period by participating in a hearing after the 15-day period elapsed.

Section 2-20(5) states:

"If a petition is filed charging a violation of a condition of the continuanceunder supervision, the court shall conduct ahearing. If the court finds that such condition of supervision has not been fulfilled[,]the court may proceed to findings and adjudication and disposition. The filing of apetition for violation of a condition of thecontinuance under supervision shall toll theperiod of continuance under supervision untilthe final determination of the charge, andthe term of the continuance under supervisionshall not run until the hearing and disposition of the petition for violation; providedwhere the petition alleges conduct that doesnot constitute a criminal offense, the hearing must be held within 15 days of the filingof the petition unless a delay in such hearing has been occasioned by the minor, inwhich case the delay shall continue the tolling of the period of continuance under supervision for the period of such delay." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-20(5) (West1998).

Interestingly, this or similar language appears in at least threeother statutes, none of which have been interpreted regarding the15-day period. See 705 ILCS 405/3-21, 4-18, 5-615 (West 1998).

The parties interpret the 15-day period as applyingwhenever a petition to revoke the CUS is filed. We disagree. The 15-day time period applies only where a petition to revokethe CUS has been filed, no criminal conduct is alleged, and thehearing on that petition is not held prior to the CUS lapsing,i.e., the hearing on the petition to revoke is only required tobe held within 15 days from the filing of the petition where anautomatic tolling of the CUS period applies.

The preeminent rule of statutory construction is togive effect to the language and intent of the legislature. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222, 647 N.E.2d 257, 259(1995). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is thelanguage of the statute. In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 480, 677N.E.2d 920, 924 (1997). To effectuate a proper construction of astatute, words used in the statutory provision should be giventheir plain and ordinary meaning. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222, 647N.E.2d at 259. A court must, therefore, consider every part ofthe statute together and give every word or phrase some reasonable meaning. In re E.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d 712, 717, 731 N.E.2d1270, 1274 (2000). Statutes are to be construed so that noclause is superfluous or void. E.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 717,731 N.E.2d at 1274.

Section 2-20(5) provides that the initial filing of apetition to revoke the CUS shall toll the CUS and the terms ofthe CUS shall not run until the disposition of the revocationpetition. 705 ILCS 405/2-20(5) (West 1998). This languagesuggests that, in certain circumstances, a fixed period of CUSmay lapse without action from the trial court.

In In re D.P., 165 Ill. App. 3d 346, 347-48, 519 N.E.2d32, 33-34 (1988), we interpreted nearly identical language from the Juvenile Court Act regarding juvenile probation revocation. At that time, the last sentence of section 5-3(3)(c) provided:

"The filing of a petition for violationof a condition of probation or of conditionaldischarge shall toll the period of probationor of conditional discharge until the finaldetermination of the charge, and the term ofprobation or conditional discharge shall notrun until the hearing and disposition of thepetition for violation." Ill. Rev. Stat.,1986 Supp., ch. 37, par. 705-3(3)(c) (asamended, see 705 ILCS 405/5-720(1) (West1998)).

We found this language to indicate that "[a] period of probationexpires at the end of its specific term." D.P., 165 Ill. App. 3dat 348, 519 N.E.2d at 34. When the legislature uses identicallanguage to prescribe identical provisions, absent evidence of acontrary intent, the only logical conclusion to be drawn is thatthe legislature intended that the two provisions have the samemeaning and be interpreted identically. City of Tuscola v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736,732 N.E.2d 784, 788 (2000). Therefore, under section 2-20(5), afixed period of CUS may lapse on its own terms without intervention from the trial court.

However, section 2-20(5) provides a mechanism toautomatically toll the CUS when it could potentially lapse aftera petition to revoke has been filed but before a hearing andresolution can occur. Specifically, section 2-20(5) states thatthe CUS shall be tolled, "provided where the petition allegesconduct that does not constitute a criminal offense, the hearingmust be held within 15 days of the filing of the petition." 705ILCS 405/2-20(5) (West 1998). We conclude that the within-15-dayhearing requirement on petitions to revoke CUS that allege nocriminal conduct is applicable only in situations where the CUSwould lapse by its own terms while the petition to revoke ispending, i.e, when the automatic tolling provision is needed tocontinue CUS.

For example, hypothetically, on January 1, 2001, atrial court continues the CUS until June 1, 2001, an interval ofsix months. On May 28, 2001, the State files a petition torevoke the CUS, alleging a noncriminal violation of the CUSterms. The trial court sets a hearing on the petition to revokefor June 6, 2001. This hearing date, however, falls outside thesix-month CUS period. In such a situation, the period of the CUSis tolled until the June 6, 2001, hearing and disposition of therevocation petition because the trial court held its hearing onthe revocation petition within 15 days after the respondent filedthe petition. In this hypothetical situation, the 15-day timeperiod within which a revocation hearing must be held is applicable only to toll the soon-to-be or recently expired CUS until thetrial court resolves the revocation petition. Under the plainlanguage of section 2-20, if the CUS was not in danger of lapsing, the 15-day period would have no relevance or application.

Further, had the legislature intended to require trialcourts to hold hearings on revocation petitions within 15 days inevery instance, it would have said so. Indeed, the legislaturedid just that in section 5-720(2), which provides:

"(2) [If a revocation petition is filed,t]he court shall conduct a hearing of thealleged violation of probation or of conditional discharge. The minor shall not beheld in detention longer than 15 days pendingthe determination of the alleged violation." 705 ILCS 405/5-720(2) (West 1998).

This language has been interpreted as requiring the trial courtto conduct a hearing on a probation revocation petition within 15days after the juvenile is detained. People v. Dean, 52 Ill.App. 3d 383, 385, 367 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1977) (interpretingsection 5-3(4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 705-3(4)), theprecursor to section 5-720(2) (705 ILCS 405/5-720(2) (West1998)), which used identical language for this section). Section2-20(5) does not contain similar language.

In the case at bar, at the November 19, 1999, hearing,the trial court granted a six-month period of the CUS until May19, 2000, and scheduled a May 2, 2000, status hearing to reviewthe respondent's progress and determine whether to extend theperiod of the CUS. On May 2, 2000, the trial court conducted ahearing and extended the period of the CUS until May 31, 2000,the date on which the trial court adjudicated the petition torevoke the CUS. Therefore, the trial court's original CUS orderwas formally continued by order of the trial court and wouldnever have automatically lapsed during the pendency of theState's petition to revoke. Consequently, the automatic tollingprovision of section 2-20(5) was inapplicable to respondent'ssituation. Because the 15-day hearing requirement is invokedonly when the automatic tolling provision applies, the trialcourt was not required under section 2-20(5) to conduct a hearingon the State's petition to revoke within 15 days of the filing ofthat petition. Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessaryto address any issues of forfeiture.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.