Find Legal Information

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Tonya Prince, is the mother of R.A.L. (bornDecember 16, 1991), M.A.L. (born May 5, 1994), and R.A.P. (bornMay 14, 1996). The children were removed from her care due to ahistory of domestic violence, inappropriate supervision, andother environmental factors. The children were found to beneglected and made wards of the court in 1995. All three children reside in foster care.

In 1999, the State filed a petition to terminateparental rights, alleging that Prince was unable to discharge herparental responsibilities due to her mental impairment, mentalillness, or mental retardation. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 1998). After a subsequent permanency review hearing, the goal waschanged from "substitute care pending return home within a periodnot to exceed one year" to "substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights." A review hearingwas held again on September 27, 2000, and the trial court retained the goal of substitute care pending court determination.

Prince contends that the trial court's findings at the September2000 hearing were inadequate.

The trial court is given broad discretion to select apermanency goal in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, the trial court's decision regarding a permanency goal isentitled to deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unlesscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 317Ill. App. 3d 467, 472, 740 N.E.2d 54, 58 (2000). Here, however,Prince is challenging the trial court's compliance with section2-28(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998)). Specifically, Prince directs us to theprovision that provides: "In selecting any permanency goal, thecourt shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selectedand why the preceding goals were ruled out." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998).

Prince cites our decision in In re K.H., 313 Ill. App.3d 675, 730 N.E.2d 131 (2000), to support her argument that thetrial court's order violated section 2-28(2) of the Act. InK.H., we affirmed the trial court's decision to change thepermanency goal but remanded for compliance with the requirementthat the court indicate in writing the reasons the particulargoal was selected and why other permanency goals were ruled out. K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 730 N.E.2d at 137. There, thetrial court used a form permanency order and simply checked thebox indicating that the goal had been changed to substitute carepending court determination on the petition to terminate parentalrights. No additional detail was provided, clearly violating therequirements of the Act. We remanded and recommended that "thetrial court reevaluate the standardized forms used in suchproceedings to ensure adherence to the current procedural mandates." K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 730 N.E.2d at 137.

The order at issue here differs from the order in K.H. The trial court filed a written order stating that the court hadconsidered the previously established permanency goal, the mostrecent service plans, all reports and evidence presented at priorhearings, the court's prior findings and orders, and the recommendations of the parties. The court found that the Departmentof Children and Family Services (DCFS) had made reasonableefforts to achieve the prior permanency goal of return home. Thecourt further indicated that Prince was unfit and unable to carefor, protect, train, and discipline the children and that appropriate services aimed at family preservation and reunificationhad been unsuccessful in rectifying the conditions leading to thefinding of unfitness. The court specifically noted that thechildren needed to remain in DCFS care because:

"The parents have still not resolved the problems existing at the outset of this case;[respondent father] still keeps the house so
cluttered, there is limited room for the children; neither parent implements the parenting techniques learned in counseling and parenting classes; they still show little ability to understand the children's needs."

In addition, the written order stated that the court had considered the factors listed in section 2-28(2) and all relevantcircumstances. The trial court's order establishes the reasonsfor its choice of permanency goal and indicates why other permanency goals were not feasible, fulfilling the requirements ofsection 2-28(2). 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998).

As a final matter, Prince argues that the court automatically assigned the permanency goal at issue because the Statehad filed its petition to terminate parental rights. Princeargues that the order violates the Act's requirement that anypermanency goal be in the best interests of the children. 705ILCS 405/2-28 (West 1998). However, the trial court's order andremarks issued at the hearing demonstrate that the State'spetition was not the sole basis for the choice of permanencygoal. The choice had been made out of a concern for the bestinterests of the children in view of the age of this case, thefact that many of the court's concerns had not been met evenafter almost six years, and the failure of services to rectifythe situation after a significant period of time. Based upon ourreview of the record, we find that the trial court's permanencygoal was appropriate, properly issued, and within its discretion.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.