In re Marriage of Shaddle

Case Date: 11/22/2000
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-00-0021 Rel

NO. 4-00-0021
22 November 2000
IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re:  the Marriage of
JAMES F. SHADDLE,
                    Petitioner-Appellee,
                    and
KRISTINE M. SHADDLE, n/k/a KRISTINE
M. SCHIFF,
                    Respondent-Appellant.
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Appeal from
Circuit Court of
McLean County
No.  95D473

Honorable
James E. Souk,
Judge Presiding.


PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of thecourt:

The marriage of petitioner, James F. Shaddle, andrespondent, Kristine M. Shaddle, n/k/a Kristine M. Schiff, wasdissolved in February 1996. The trial court awarded the partiesjoint legal custody of their daughter, Devon (born in April1990), with primary physical custody to Kristine. In June 1997,Kristine filed a petition for leave to remove Devon from theState of Illinois, alleging that she would soon marry SidneySchiff and move to Florida. Later that month, Kristine andSidney were married. In December 1997, the trial court deniedKristine's motion and she continued to live in Illinois whileSidney resided in Florida. In May 1998, a son, Michael, was bornto Kristine and Sidney. In December 1998, Kristine filed asecond removal petition, and in the early summer of 1999, whilethat motion was pending, Kristine moved to Florida, leaving Devonin James' care. In August 1999, following a hearing, the courtdenied Kristine's second removal petition. Kristine appeals. Wereverse.

The court found that "the mother is an excellentparent." The court found that Devon was neutral on the move, "aslong as she could continue to have substantial contact *** withboth parents and the contact with her little brother." The courtwas critical of the fact that after the initial motion was filed,"[t]he mother, Ms. Schiff, however did not wait for that matterto be resolved but rather made the choice to go ahead and marryMr. Schiff on June the 20th, 1997. And events have gone fromthat point." The court recognized the argument that "the bestthing for this child is to be in the full-time care of mom who isa stay-at-home mom and who has always been with the child." However, there was more to this case. "The court is really beingtold, if this is not done my way, then the court will be responsible for not acting in the best interest of the child by notkeeping the full-time mom situation. When, in fact, that wouldhave occurred by the unilateral decision of the mother." Thecourt saw "a somewhat disturbing pattern there of filing aremoval petition and without you waiting for court determinationsand then taking action, personal choices of her own which, ofcourse, she has a perfect right to make, that then presumably putthe court in a position where somehow its hands are tied." "Ms.Schiff knew before she got married that she was treading intodangerous, difficult waters that might create a problem." "Thatwhole process *** does not indicate a decision I believe thatplaced Devon first."

The court determined "that while there may have beensome efforts to seek out jobs in Illinois, that the effort wasreasonably superficial." The court noted, however, that it didnot "casually suggest that people take $50,000 pay cuts."

The court recognized that Devon had a good relationshipwith her father. "The move to Florida in my view would substantially alter the relationship between Devon and her father." "The relationship that this man has with his daughter is--and theinvolvement in her life[,] especially considering the workschedule that he has and travel[--]is exceptional." The courtalso noted that Devon had a very close relationship with hergrandmother and her aunt.

The court was troubled by allegations made againstSidney Schiff in a prior divorce, while recognizing "we are nothere today to determine the truth of what happened in Mr.Schiff's prior household or his prior divorce." The court wastroubled that Schiff agreed to an order "that there be no contactwith his child until progress is made or whatever." The courtdid note the "evidence presented by Devon that she likes Sid, andhe is a good guy, and never been any indication from her of anyproblems in the home in any way, shape[,] or form." Still, theallegation "leaves uncertainty in which there is almost no way toalleviate perhaps until at least the court in New Jersey hasremoved that restriction." In contrast, "in terms of the carereceived from her father and his side of the family, there are nounknowns, there are no risks. There are no uncertainties." Nevertheless, "I really haven't any conclusions about whathappened in New Jersey, and I have some recognition that it couldall be one of those types of situations where one parent doeseliminate the other."

The court concluded that "the choices that Mrs. Schiffhas made has, in fact, led to hoisting herself upon her ownpetard and putting herself in a situation where the bestinterests of this child are not being served, and court believesthat this second petition to remove should also be denied." Thecourt also found that "the relationship of the father with thisdaughter is of such remarkable depth, and I feel that's anoverriding factor in this case."

The trial court noted that the first removal petitionwas denied in December 1997, and "the court here has to determinewhether there has been any substantial change since that time." If the court considered, in isolation, only the events occurringafter the denial of the first petition, the court erred. At thesecond hearing, the court should have considered all factsbearing on the removal issue, whether or not those facts were inexistence and were considered when the first petition was denied. The question before the trial court was not whether the evidencepresented at the first hearing was insufficient to justifyremoval, and whether the evidence at the second hearing wasinsufficient to justify removal. The question before the trialcourt was whether all the evidence, considered in toto, wassufficient to justify removal. The party opposing removal shouldnot gain an advantage from the fact that the evidence is taken attwo hearings instead of one.

Where continuing relief is involved, such as in casesinvolving child support or custody, a modification may beappropriate where there is a later material change of conditions. A modification claim "may arise upon the later facts (to beconsidered sometimes in combination with the old), and that claimwill be held not barred by the previous judgment." Restatement(Second) of Judgments