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30 June 2000

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On March 18, 1998, the State filed a petition toterminate the parental rights of respondent mother, KathleenCrowder, to her minor daughter, K.B. Following a hearing, thetrial court denied the petition. The State filed a motion toreconsider, which the court denied on October 4, 1999. In July1999, the State filed a supplemental petition to terminate. Thatpetition was denied following a hearing. The State now appeals. We affirm.

In November 1993, the State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship, naming Kevin B. as K.B.'s father andrespondent as K.B.'s mother. It alleged that K.B. (born November21, 1993) was neglected due to an injurious environment, becauseshe was born with cocaine in her system. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)(West 1992). An adjudicatory order, entered on February 17,1994, found K.B. to be neglected as alleged in the petition andordered her placed in the custody and guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), with theright to place her with her parents. The trial court entered adispositional order on March 17, 1994, adjudging K.B. a ward ofthe court and continuing her custody and guardianship in DCFS. Respondent and Kevin were ordered to cooperate with DCFS andtheir service plans. The parents were ordered to obtain andsuccessfully complete drug and alcohol treatment as recommendedby DCFS.

On January 4, 1996, K.B.'s foster mother, Janice Neal,a DCFS employee, filed a petition for custody of K.B. in causeNo. 96-F-2. On Neal's motion, her custody case was consolidatedwith the instant case.

All proceedings in this appeal concern only the State'stwo petitions to terminate Kathleen's parental rights.

A. March 1998 Petition To Terminate

On March 18, 1998, the State filed its first petition toterminate the parental rights of both parents. As to Kathleen, thepetition alleged that she was an unfit parent in that she (1)failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to K.B.'s well-being (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West1996)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for removal of K.B. from her custodywithin 12 months after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)); and (3) failed to make reasonable progresstoward return of K.B. to her custody within 12 months of theadjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)).

At a hearing on this petition, DCFS caseworker Robin Reestestified that she was K.B.'s caseworker from December 1996 toApril 1997. K.B. was returned to Kathleen in December 1996 andremoved by DCFS on February 19, 1997. The reason for the removalinvolved a neighbor who was causing trouble for Kathleen. Due tothis problem, DCFS decided to move Kathleen to another location. During the moving process, Kathleen asked the neighbor to help movefurniture. An altercation occurred and "the placement was blown." Kathleen was arrested for endangering K.B.'s life, battery, andresisting a police officer. When K.B. was removed after thatincident, she was placed with Lisa Cameron, Kathleen's sister. Thepurpose of removing K.B. was to place her outside Kathleen's homeuntil an investigation of the incident between Kathleen and theneighbor was completed. A return of K.B. to Kathleen's custody wasanticipated. When asked whether K.B. was returned, Rees statedthat she was not, because Kathleen refused DCFS' request to go torelapse prevention counseling. Despite the fact that all criminalcharges against Kathleen were dropped the same week that she wasarrested, DCFS indicated Kathleen for risk of harm. For thisreason and because during the nine-day period from February 19,1997, to March 1, 1997, Kathleen had not followed through with herrelapse prevention counseling, DCFS decided to remove K.B. fromCameron's house and place her with Neal. Due to the fact that Nealis a DCFS employee, the case was transferred from DCFS to LutheranChild and Family Services (Lutheran Services). This is the normalprocedure in such a situation.

Rees stated that following removal of K.B. fromKathleen's home in February 1997, visitation was to be once perweek for three hours. Rees supervised some visitation betweenKathleen and K.B. in early 1997 while K.B. was living with Cameron. A February 19, 1997, visit was terminated early because Kathleenstarted making inappropriate statements about Neal. A visit thefollowing week was terminated early because Kathleen upset K.B. bytalking about giving K.B. up for adoption. Of the eight visitsscheduled from February 1997 until Rees transferred the case,Kathleen missed three visits. Only two visits took place that werenot terminated early.

Rees developed client service plans during her tenure asK.B.'s caseworker. Two service plans written in March 1997 and May1997 had a permanency goal of return home. They contained multipleobjectives, including requirements that Kathleen (1) continue toavoid exposing herself to potentially dangerous people, (2)continue to avoid resorting to violence to settle disputes, (3)refrain from violating any laws, (4) call the police if she isthreatened by another person, (5) agree to cooperate with visits bythe caseworker, (6) obtain a psychological evaluation and followany recommendations for treatment, and (7) complete a drug andalcohol assessment from the Triangle Center and comply with anyrecommendations. Most of the objectives were rated unsatisfactory. Kathleen obtained the drug and alcohol assessment but did notfollow through with recommendations. She met with a counselor onetime but refused to continue. When Rees discussed the objectiveswith Kathleen, she told Rees that she did not need counseling andwould not attend. She also said that she would not go back toTriangle Center, because alcohol was not her drug of choice.

Rees testified that Tim Gonzalez preceded her ascaseworker. When K.B. was placed with Kathleen in December 1996,the case went to Bridgeway Aftercare. Rees was assigned the caseeither at that point or in January 1997. When asked whether sheknew of any reason why caseworkers changed, Rees stated that it was"just policy and procedures" that once a child returns home fromfoster care, DCFS' contracts are with Bridgeway Aftercare. Gonzalez had been the caseworker for the four preceding years, whenK.B. was initially taken into foster care. At the time K.B. wasreturned to Kathleen in December 1996, Gonzalez had rated Kathleensatisfactory on her service plan objectives. Rees agreed that theremoval of K.B. from Kathleen's home in February 1997 marked thepoint at which Kathleen ceased to cooperate and achieve herobjectives. Kathleen and Rees worked well together until thattime.

Roberta Gaines, former Lutheran Services caseworker,testified that she was K.B.'s caseworker from the end of April 1997until June 1997. Visits were to take place once a week at LutheranServices. Kathleen attended most of those visits. Her clientservice plan objectives during that period were to (1) complete adrug and alcohol assessment through Triangle Center, (2) completea psychological evaluation, and (3) receive counseling services. Kathleen's position with regard to these tasks was that she hadaccomplished these same tasks prior to K.B.'s return home and thatshe would not do them all over again. These tasks had beenestablished to deal with anger-management issues that arose fromKathleen's prior outbursts with previous caseworkers and also to becertain that alcohol was no longer an issue for Kathleen. Gaineswas not aware that, under Rees' tenure, Kathleen did obtain a drugand alcohol assessment.

Joseph Anderson, former Lutheran Services caseworker,testified that the client service plans while he was the caseworkerall remained the same. Anderson evaluated the service plan inOctober 1997, more than 30 days prior to the normal evaluationdate, because he was leaving Lutheran Services. Kathleen hadparticipated well in visits with K.B. and participated in somecounseling. To Anderson's knowledge, Kathleen did not complete anydrug or alcohol assessment or any type of treatment. Andersontestified that while he had the case, Kathleen was arrested outsidea convenience store and police had to use pepper spray to restrainher. She was charged with resisting a police officer, but thecharges were dropped.

Vanessa Taylor, Lutheran Services caseworker, testifiedthat she was assigned K.B.'s case on October 27, 1997, and hadcontinued to the present. Initially, visits with K.B. were on aweekly basis. At an administrative case review (ACR) held onNovember 21, 1997, which Kathleen did not attend, the permanencygoal was changed from return home to substitute care pending courtdecision. This resulted from a legal screening held on August 5,1997, at which termination of parental rights was recommended. After the November 21, 1997, ACR, Kathleen's weekly visits werechanged to once per month for one hour. Kathleen had theresponsibility to call and arrange for a visit. No visits tookplace between January 1998 and July 1998. Kathleen made no contactat all with Taylor during that time period. On July 1, 1998,Kathleen called and requested a visit with K.B. Because K.B. wason vacation during July, she was asked to call again near thebeginning of August. She did so and a visit was held on August 7,1998. Another visit was held in September 1998. At that time,Kathleen told Taylor that she was living at McFarland Zone Center. She refused to tell Taylor why she was there. At no time didKathleen provide any information indicating that she had beenworking on any of her tasks.

Taylor testified that she did not make any referrals onKathleen's behalf for services during her tenure as caseworker. Taylor was aware that Kathleen had obtained a drug and alcoholassessment and a psychological evaluation prior to K.B.'s returnhome in December 1996. When asked why it was necessary forKathleen to do these tasks again after K.B. was removed in February1997, Taylor stated that DCFS procedure requires it. Taylor hadnot visited Kathleen at her home. Taylor sent Kathleen a certifiedletter in March 1998, asking her to contact Taylor. Kathleen didnot respond.

Pam Rouse of Lutheran Services testified that shesupervised visits in 1998 between Kathleen and K.B. At first, K.B.did not recognize Kathleen and Rouse had to tell her that Kathleenwas her mother. During the visit, Kathleen told K.B. that she hadnot visited with her because Lutheran Services would not allow it. Gonzalez, K.B.'s initial caseworker, testified that hewas assigned the case at the end of November 1993. He was removedas caseworker at the beginning of February 1997. During his sixyears as a DCFS caseworker, Gonzalez was involved in hundreds ofcases. He thought it unusual that he was removed as caseworker,since there normally would have to be some compelling reason for acaseworker's removal. Neither he nor Kathleen requested hisremoval. In fact, he objected to it. During his tenure ascaseworker, Gonzalez had contact with Neal as K.B.'s foster parent. They spoke or met at least once per month. They discussed serviceplans, visitation, and the permanency goals. Neal made statementsabout wanting K.B. to live with her permanently. Gonzalezsometimes had to refocus the discussion on the permanency goal,which was to reunite Kathleen and K.B. Neal later hired anattorney to combat this permanency goal.

Gonzalez testified that for five to six months prior tothe time that K.B. was officially returned to Kathleen in December1996, K.B. was with Kathleen on an unsupervised basis the vastmajority of the time. Gonzalez made the recommendation that K.B.be returned home. Kathleen had accomplished the tasks required ofher to regain custody of her child. New tasks were established toallow K.B. to remain home. Between the time K.B. returned home andthe time Gonzalez was removed from the case, Kathleen continued tocooperate with him as caseworker. Some of her tasks includedremaining drug-free, abiding by the law, maintaining stablehousing, and protecting K.B. from individuals who would pose a riskof harm to her.

Kathleen testified that after K.B. was returned to her inDecember 1996, she did not feel that she needed to complete anyfurther tasks, as she had already done everything required of herto regain custody of her daughter. The neighbor with whom she hadtrouble lived across the hall from Kathleen. She was hostile toKathleen and was an alcoholic who had prior dealings with Neal. The neighbor would often get drunk, knock on Kathleen's door lateat night, and call Kathleen a "nigger lovin' ho" in front of K.B. After Kathleen moved to her new apartment, the neighbor calledpolice and made a complaint. Police came to her door and took herto jail. No charges were filed against her. After K.B. wasreturned to foster care, Kathleen stopped her mental healthcounseling and her attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous/NarcoticsAnonymous meetings. She did not attempt to do any of the thingsrequested by her caseworkers.

Kathleen testified that she attended her visits with K.B.until November 1997. At that time, DCFS decided that, because Nealhad put in another request for termination of parental rights,Kathleen's visits would be cut to once a month for one hour. Shecould not deal with this and so did not attend the November 1997visit. She did attend the December 1997 visit, but did not attendfurther visits until August 1998, because she felt that "it was alost cause." No matter what she did, the result would be the same. Kathleen expressed a willingness to now follow the case plan,despite her feelings that she has completed the tasks before.

Kathleen testified that she had weekly contact withGonzalez when he was her caseworker. She saw Rees only twice afterK.B. was removed from her custody. She saw Anderson once a week,and Gaines and Taylor only one time each. DCFS did not provideKathleen with any assistance to help her resolve the reason thatK.B. was removed from her in February 1997. She continued tofollow the case plan until November 1997, when her visitation withK.B. was cut to once a month. She received counseling andmaintained her visits with K.B.

At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court foundKevin B. to be an unfit parent. The court took the matter underadvisement as to Kathleen. On December 1, 1998, the court entereda written order denying the petition to terminate Kathleen'sparental rights. The court found that Kathleen had made reasonableprogress toward the return of K.B. while Gonzalez was hercaseworker and the child was in fact returned to her. Severaloccurrences interrupted that reasonable progress, including thechange in caseworkers, Kathleen's arrest, and the November 21,1997, ACR and corresponding permanency goal change. The courtdiscussed these factors as follows:

"It is abundantly clear that under[Gonzalez'] tutelage, [Kathleen] was makingsubstantial progress toward reunification withher daughter. [Gonzalez] was removed as thecaseworker by [DCFS] for reasons unknown and asuccession of new caseworkers were assigned. Those new workers demanded that [Kathleen]

in effect start over again on her by then [31/2-]year effort to regain custody of herchild. Many of the tasks set forth by themhad already been accomplished and no one couldsuccessfully explain to [Kathleen] why theyhad to be done again. When faced with thisbureaucratic imperative, [Kathleen] refused,viewing this demand as a stumbling blockintentionally placed in her path towardregaining custody. Without comment on whether[Kathleen] was right or wrong, the Court doesfind that under these circumstances herrefusal was not unreasonable.

In February of 1997, [Kathleen] wasarrested for battery and aggravated battery. She was also charged with child endangerment. Even though all of those charges weresubsequently dismissed and the limitedevidence heard by the [c]ourt would indicatethat [Kathleen] was in no way an aggressor inthis circumstance, DCFS indicated a reportagainst her. The mother had a difficult timeconvincing either DCFS or [Lutheran Services]she was blameless in these events.

As [DCFS] continued to believe otherwise,in November of 1997 it changed the goal ofthis case to one of termination. This caused[Kathleen] to despair and she failed to makeseveral visits. That emotionally [DCFS] mayhave at this time beaten [Kathleen], this doesnot result in the [c]ourt finding that herfailure to exercise all of her visitsconstitutes a failure to make reasonableefforts, reasonable progress, or showreasonable interest. Rather, the [c]ourtfinds that [Kathleen's] actions or inactionwas reasonable under the circumstances.

In sum, [Kathleen] was experiencing morethan reasonable progress toward reunion withher child until February of 1997. Thereafter[DCFS'] actions caused an interruption in saidprogress. Progress has now been restored tothe extent that the [c]ourt cannot find thatany of the bases for termination of rights asalleged in [p]aragraph 8 of the [p]etitionhave been proven."

In December 1998, the State filed a motion to reconsiderthe trial court's denial of its petition. This motion apparentlywas not set for hearing until after proceedings resulted in denialof the State's July 1999 petition to terminate. The court heardand denied this motion on October 4, 1999.

B. July 1999 Petition To Terminate

On July 20, 1999, the State filed a supplemental petitionto terminate Kathleen's parental rights. That petition allegedthat Kathleen had failed to maintain a reasonable degree ofinterest, concern, or responsibility as to K.B.'s welfare and thatshe had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return ofK.B. to her custody within 12 months of K.B.'s adjudication as aneglected minor.

At a hearing on this petition, Neal testified that fromSeptember 1998 to September 1999, Kathleen had no contact with K.B.outside of that arranged by Lutheran Services. K.B. received astuffed animal from Lutheran Services that Neal was told came fromKathleen. K.B. received no birthday gifts in November 1998 andthere had been no cards or letters. Neal had a birthday party forK.B. in November 1998, to which Kathleen was not invited. Kathleencalled twice approximately three months earlier to inquire aboutK.B. Those two calls are the only times Neal and Kathleen havespoken in two years. Neal acknowledged that she would not haveexpected Kathleen to initiate contact with K.B. through her. Herrelationship with Kathleen has been adversarial during the lastthree years.

Vanessa White, formerly known as Vanessa Taylor,testified that Kathleen had attended three visits with K.B. sinceSeptember 1998. They occurred in September 1998, October 1998, andNovember 1998. A visit was scheduled for August 1999, but Kathleencalled and canceled it, saying that she had some errands to run andwould not be able to finish in time. She did not call toreschedule the August visit. White sent Kathleen several lettersfrom December 1998 to July 1999, telling her that her parentalrights had not been terminated and that Lutheran Services waswilling to work with her to get K.B. back. Kathleen advised Whitethat she had received the letters and understood that her rightshad not been terminated. Other than the one call in late July 1999about setting up an August 1999 visit, Kathleen did not respond toWhite's letters. White talked with Kathleen on the telephone aboutupcoming court hearings. During those conversations, Kathleenwould ask about K.B. Kathleen has not, in the last 12 months,given any correspondence or gifts to Lutheran Services to passalong to K.B. During the last 12 months, Kathleen has notcompleted any of her service plan tasks, although she did go toTriangle Center in September 1999. Since the goal was termination,DCFS had no duty to provide services for Kathleen after November1997.

White testified that following the trial court's orderdenying the petition to terminate parental rights in December 1998,DCFS did not change the permanency goal to return home. The clientservice plan implemented in November 1998 required Kathleen to (1)obtain a psychological evaluation, (2) complete drug and alcoholtreatment at Triangle Center, (3) abide by laws, (4) refrain fromexposing herself to dangerous people, and (5) attend visitationwith K.B. once per month. From November 1998 to the present, Whitehad not made any referrals for Kathleen for a psychologicalevaluation or drug and alcohol treatment. White does not knowwhether Kathleen maintained a safe environment for herself sinceSeptember 1998, because Kathleen did not contact her. White hadnot had a current telephone number for Kathleen until three monthsago. White also made visits to Kathleen's house in an attempt tocontact her, but Kathleen was not present at these times.

White testified that at a permanency review hearing heldthree months before the hearing on the supplemental petition,Lutheran Services decided to maintain the permanency goal assubstitute care pending court decision. This meant the visitationarrangements stayed the same, with Kathleen having to schedule thevisits once per month.

Kathleen testified that she had lived in her currentresidence for the last 1 1/2 years. She also had a post office boxand a telephone number. She first learned in July 1999 that thetrial court had denied the State's first petition to terminate herparental rights. She received White's letters but lacked thecourage to open them. They are still unopened. Kathleen did openone of the letters hand-delivered to her house in July 1999; thatis when she learned that her parental rights had not beenterminated.

Kathleen called Triangle Center in August 1999 andrequested an evaluation. She attended some classes but relapsed byhaving a drink. She went to detox and stayed for 14 days. She hadbeen on outpatient status since that time. When she called Whitein July 1999 to schedule a visit, White told her that she wouldhave to wait 30 days because she had not seen K.B. for a while. During that month, she was "shoved" off her front porch andsustained a foot injury. On the day of the scheduled visit inAugust 1999, she overslept. She called White to see if the visitcould be held later in the day, because she had to take the bus tothe bank, which is on the other side of town. White declined tochange the time and suggested that the visit be rescheduled for thenext Friday. By that time, however, Kathleen was on a drinking"binge." She later sought help.

Kathleen testified that she did not attend a scheduledvisit on K.B.'s birthday in November 1998. She also did not attendan ACR scheduled for that same day, although she was aware of it. At the close of evidence, the trial court took the matterunder advisement. In a written order entered on September 29,1999, the court denied the State's supplemental petition. In doingso, the court noted that Kathleen had visited with K.B. inSeptember, October, and November 1998 and sent a Christmas gift toK.B. in December 1998.

C. Appeals

In October 1999, the State obtained denial of itsDecember 1998 motion to reconsider the court's denial of the March1998 petition to terminate and filed its notice of appeal on denialof both petitions to terminate parental rights.

Our courts have recognized that parental rights andresponsibilities are of deep human importance and thus will notterminate those rights lightly. In re A.T., 197 Ill. App. 3d 821,825, 555 N.E.2d 402, 405 (1990). Parental rights of anonconsenting parent may be terminated only after a finding ofunfitness that is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Inre J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 627, 699 N.E.2d 167, 174 (1998). Incases involving the termination of parental rights, great deferenceis given to the trial court, since it had the opportunity to seethe witnesses and evaluate their testimony, and that court'sdecision will not be reversed unless contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence. In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 458,577 N.E.2d 1375, 1385 (1991). The reviewing court does not reweighthe evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In reC.P., 191 Ill. App. 3d 237, 244, 547 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1989).

A question arises in this case as to whether the trialcourt could consider the evidence presented by the State on bothpetitions as to Kathleen's alleged lack of reasonable efforts andlack of reasonable progress. In In re Davonte L., 298 Ill. App. 3d905, 699 N.E.2d 1062 (1998), the State filed a petition toterminate the respondent mother's parental rights. Among thegrounds alleged in the petition were allegations that therespondent mother had failed to make reasonable efforts orreasonable progress toward a return of the child to her within 12months of the adjudication of neglect. The evidence showed thatthe respondent mother failed to make any efforts or progress duringthe initial 12-month period. Her conduct improved after two yearshad elapsed from the date of adjudication. The trial court foundthat the State had failed to establish any of the grounds ofunfitness alleged. In doing so, the trial court considered therespondent mother's conduct during the entire postadjudicationperiod. The appellate court found the trial court's decision wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, where the recordestablished that the respondent mother had failed to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility towardthe child's welfare, failed to make reasonable progress within 12months of the adjudicatory order and was addicted to drugs for atleast one year preceding the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding. In re Davonte L., 298 Ill. App. 3d 905, 919-20, 699N.E.2d 1062, 1072 (1998). The appellate court held that, as to thereasonable progress ground of unfitness under section 1(D)(m) ofthe Adoption Act, a court may only consider a parent's conduct thatoccurs within the initial 12-month period following adjudication. Any evidence subsequent to that time period is irrelevant inestablishing parental unfitness. Davonte L., 298 Ill. App. 3d at921, 699 N.E.2d at 1072.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois agreedwith the appellate court regarding the time limitation set forth insection 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1,10, 727 N.E.2d 990, 994 (2000). In construing section 1(D)(m) ofthe Adoption Act, the supreme court determined that the plainlanguage of that section mandates a finding that the relevant timeperiod during which a parent's efforts or progress must be assessedand measured is the 12-month period following adjudication. Thecourt also noted that the legislature amended section 20a of theAdoption Act (750 ILCS 50/20a (West 1994)) by adding languagestating that it is in the best interests of persons to be adoptedthat the Adoption Act be construed and interpreted so as not toresult in extending time limits beyond those set forth therein. Aconstruction that permits the entire course of a parent's conductunder section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act to be considered would beinconsistent with the legislature's expressed intent that thestatute not be interpreted in a manner that would extend the timelimits established therein. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 11, 727 N.E.2d at995.

Although the respondent mother in D.L. raised only thereasonable progress ground of unfitness in her appeal, the supremecourt made references to a parent's efforts, as well as progress,in determining that section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act limits acourt's consideration of a parent's conduct. The court clearlysignaled that no distinction is to be made between the two groundsin that section by stating the following:

"We agree with the guardian and theappellate court below and conclude thatsection 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act limits theevidence that may be considered under theprovision to matters concerning the parent'sconduct in the 12 months following theapplicable adjudication of neglect, abuse, ordependency. The statute plainly states that aparent is unfit if the parent fails to makeeither reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that led to the child's removal orreasonable progress toward return of the childwithin 12 months after an adjudication ofneglect, abuse, or dependency. Giving effectto the plain language of section 1(D)(m), weconclude that the relevant period of timeunder this provision, in which the parent'sefforts or progress must be assessed andmeasured, is the 12-month period following theadjudication." D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10, 727N.E.2d at 994.

These statements, insofar as they relate to reasonableefforts, are contrary to the decision of this court in In reK.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d 917, 713 N.E.2d 253 (1999), where theState alleged both grounds of unfitness under section 1(D)(m) ofthe Adoption Act. The trial court found the respondent motherunfit under both grounds. On appeal, respondent mother argued thatthe trial court could not have considered her progress during theentire 12-month period set forth in that section, because the Statefiled its petition to terminate parental rights prior to theexpiration of the 12-month period. She did not argue that the timelimitation applied to the reasonable efforts ground or that theevidence concerning her efforts was inadequate to establish herunfitness. K.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 713 N.E.2d at 256. This court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that thereasonable efforts ground was not subject to the 12-monthlimitation in section 1(D)(m). In so holding, we determined thatthe legislature's use of the word "or" in the disjunctive signaleda legislative intent that the two grounds be viewed in thealternative. Relying on the doctrine of the last antecedent, westated that placement of a comma after the word "parent" andimmediately prior to the word "or" showed a legislative intent thatonly the reasonable progress ground was subject to the timelimitation. K.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23, 713 N.E.2d at 257. We also noted that because the reasonableness of a parent's effortsis gauged subjectively, it is not unreasonable to place the burdento make reasonable efforts on the parent at some reasonable timeless than 12 months following the adjudication of neglect, abuse,or dependency. K.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 923, 713 N.E.2d at 258.

Although the statements in D.L. regarding the reasonableefforts ground were dicta, the supreme court drew no distinctionbetween that ground and the reasonable progress ground, nor did itgive any indication that it would not apply the same reasoning toan argument regarding reasonable efforts and the time limitationcontained in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. In fact, thereasoning employed by D.L. applies with equal force to bothgrounds. K.B.J. is inconsistent with this reasoning. See In reE.B., No. 4-99-0805, slip op. at 4 (June 1, 2000), ___ Ill. App. 3d___, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___.

B. The State's Initial Petition To Terminate Parental Rights

The State argues that the trial court's decision denyingits first petition of March 1998 was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. The first petition alleged that Kathleen had (1)failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility toward K.B.'s welfare, and (2) failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that resulted inK.B.'s removal from her custody or make reasonable progress towardK.B.'s return to her custody within 12 months of the adjudicationof neglected minor.

We note that, as this court stated in In re D.S., No. 4-99-0683, slip op. at 11 (June 1, 2000), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___,___ N.E.2d ___, ___, the statutory period of section 1(D)(m) of theAdoption Act starts on the date that the trial court files itsdispositional order completing the adjudication of the minor asneglected, abused, or dependent. Accordingly, that time period,for purposes of both petitions to terminate herein, commencedrunning on March 17, 1994, and concluded on March 17, 1995. 750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1994) (at time of adjudication in this case,section referred to reasonable progress within 12 months).

The State presented no evidence as to Kathleen's progressor efforts during the initial 12-month period following the March1994 dispositional order that completed the adjudication of K.B. asa neglected minor. The State's evidence commenced with a timeperiod more than three years after K.B.'s adjudication. Accordingly, the State did not prove that Kathleen failed to makereasonable efforts to correct conditions or reasonable progresstoward K.B.'s return to her within 12 months of the order ofadjudication. Although the trial court erred in consideringevidence outside the 12-month period following adjudication, itsdecision denying the State's petition on these two grounds wascorrect. We note that we may affirm the trial court's decision onany basis established by the record. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill.2d 501, 511, 713 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1999).

The State also alleged that Kathleen failed to maintaina reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as toK.B.'s well-being. It relied on Kathleen's failure to comply withDCFS mandates after K.B. was removed from her in February 1997regarding client service plan objectives that it asked Kathleen tomeet. Evidence at the unfitness hearing showed that DCFS sought torequire Kathleen to start all over again on the same service plantasks that she had previously accomplished prior to K.B.'s returnto her in December 1996. When asked why this was necessary, White,Kathleen's most recent caseworker, could only say that this wasDCFS' policy when a child is removed after a return home.

Rees testified that, when K.B. was removed fromKathleen's custody in February 1997, K.B. was placed with Cameronand a return to Kathleen was anticipated. However, when Kathleenfailed to follow through with relapse prevention counseling, DCFSdecided to place K.B. with Neal nine days after K.B.'s removal. Noexplanation was given as to how relapse prevention counselingrelated to remedying the problem that caused K.B.'s removal inFebruary 1997. Kathleen became discouraged and refused to complywith her service plan objectives. She did, however, maintain hervisits with K.B., which were scheduled once a week for three hours. Rees testified that Kathleen attended five of the eight visitsscheduled between February 1997 and April 1997.

Gaines testified that during her tenure as caseworkerfrom the end of April 1997 to June 1997, Kathleen attended most ofher visits with K.B. Anderson testified that, between June 1997and October 1997, Kathleen participated well in visits with K.B. The most recent caseworker, White, testified that, because of theNovember 1997 change in permanency goal from return home tosubstitute care pending court decision, Kathleen's visits werechanged from once a week for three hours to once a month for onehour. In addition to the drastic change in visitation, Kathleenwas required to call to schedule visits. No visits took placebetween January 1998 and July 1998. Visits were scheduled andattended in August 1998 and September 1998.

In arguing that it proved Kathleen an unfit parent underthe lack of reasonable interest ground, the State relies on thelack of visits between January 1998 and July 1998. The trial courtcriticized DCFS for requiring Kathleen essentially to start overagain and complete the same tasks that she had previously completedprior to December 1996. It noted the unexplained removal ofGonzalez, Kathleen's initial caseworker, under whose tutelageKathleen was progressing toward the return of K.B. The court foundthat these circumstances caused Kathleen to despair and to abandonher efforts to secure custody of her child. Under thesecircumstances, we do not find that the trial court's decision onthe reasonable interest ground was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

C. Supplemental Petition To Terminate Parental Rights

A similar analysis applies to the State's July 1999supplemental petition. In that petition, the State alleged a lackof reasonable interest and a lack of reasonable progress. Clearly,under D.L., the trial court was limited to considering Kathleen'sprogress or lack thereof only during the initial 12-month periodfollowing the trial court's March 1994 dispositional order. TheState presented no evidence as to Kathleen's conduct during thistime.

As to the lack of reasonable interest ground, the Staterelied on Kathleen's lack of contact and lack of visitation withK.B. from September 1998 to September 1999, the date of the hearingon the supplemental petition. The trial court denied thesupplemental petition on this ground, noting that Kathleen hadattended visits during September 1998, October 1998, and November1998. The court also found that Kathleen had sent K.B. a stuffedanimal in December 1998. We note that Kathleen acknowledged in hertestimony that she received letters from White, but stated that shelacked the courage to open them. She testified that when sheopened a letter left at her house in July 1999, she learned for thefirst time that the trial court did not find her to be an unfitparent. Thereafter, she called to schedule a visit for August1999, but when that was canceled, she did not call again toreschedule the visit.

In In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 562 N.E.2d174 (1990), the supreme court set forth factors to be considered indetermining whether a parent has demonstrated a reasonable degreeof interest, concern, or responsibility toward the welfare of herchild. Those factors must be examined in the context of thecircumstances in which the parent's conduct occurred. Whenconsidering whether a parent's failure to visit her childestablishes a lack of reasonable interest, concern, orresponsibility toward the child's welfare, a court should consider(1) the parent's difficulty in obtaining transportation to thechild's residence, (2) the parent's poverty, (3) the actions andstatements of others that hinder or discourage visitation, and (4)whether the parent's failure to visit was motivated by a need tocope with other aspects of her life or by true indifference to thechild. If personal visits with the child are impractical, letters,telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for thechild may demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, andresponsibility. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 278-79, 562 N.E.2d at 185.

In accordance with Syck, we evaluate Kathleen's conductin the context of the circumstances in which the conduct occurred. There can be no doubt that Kathleen should have opened thecorrespondence that White sent to her after the trial court'sDecember 1998 denial of the State's initial petition to terminateparental rights. However, had Kathleen opened the letters, shewould have learned that nothing had changed as far as DCFS wasconcerned. We find it disturbing that DCFS essentially chose toignore the trial court's December 1998 denial of the State's firstpetition to terminate Kathleen's parental rights. White testifiedthat, after the court's decision, DCFS decided not to change thepermanency goal from substitute care to return home. It also didnot change Kathleen's visitation with K.B. Rather than resume theweekly visits that Kathleen had prior to the November 1997 changein the permanency goal, DCFS simply continued the same monthly one-hour visitation.

In addition, White testified that she made no referralsfor services for Kathleen and that she was not required to do so,since the permanency goal was substitute care pending courtdecision. The trial court had criticized the service plans put inplace after February 1997 as not being related to remedying theproblem that had caused K.B. to be removed from Kathleen inFebruary 1997. Yet, after the December 1998 order, DCFS made nochanges in the service plan tasks to address the trial court'sconcerns. DCFS' actions since Gonzalez' removal as caseworkersuggest a preference that K.B. not be reunited with Kathleen. Compounding the situation is the fact that Neal was apparentlyworking against reunification and had an adversarial relationshipwith Kathleen. Under these circumstances, it is not surprisingthat Kathleen did not try to contact K.B. at Neal's home. Nealherself testified that she would not have expected Kathleen to doso. We conclude that the trial court's judgment denying theState's supplemental petition was not contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence.

The legislature has revised procedures under the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.(West 1998)) and increased the role of trial courts in followingthe case after adjudicating a minor neglected, abused, or dependentand entering the dispositional order. In 1993, the legislatureamended the Juvenile Court Act to provide for "permanency review hearing[s]" and "permanency goal[s]." Pub. Act 88-487,