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Filed:  January 16, 2002

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent minor, Jesus R. (born August 8, 1984)(hereinafter J.R.), was adjudicated a delinquent and committed tothe Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOC), for anindeterminate period, not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. J.R. appeals from the trial court's dispositional order committing him to the DOC, contending (1) the trial court erred when itcommitted him to the DOC until age 21; and (2) he is entitled tosentencing credit for 163 days served prior to his commitment tothe DOC. We reverse the trial court's dispositional order andremand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

Respondent minor, J.R., was adjudicated delinquent (705ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 1998)) after the trial court found himguilty of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(8) (West 1998)) andillegal consumption of alcohol by a minor (235 ILCS 5/6-20 (West1992)). After an October 5, 1999, dispositional hearing, thetrial court entered a dispositional order committing J.R. to DOCfor an indeterminate period. The dispositional order statedJ.R.'s term of commitment could not exceed his twenty-firstbirthday. This appeal followed.

Recitation of the facts of the incidents leading toJ.R.'s commitment is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Term of Commitment

J.R. first contends the trial court erred when itcommitted him to DOC until age 21 for the Class 3 felony ofaggravated battery. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)states: "[i]n no event shall a guilty minor be committed to [DOC]for a period of time in excess of that period for which an adultcould be committed for the same act." 705 ILCS 405/5-710(7)(West 2000). The maximum nonextended sentence available to anadult who is convicted of the Class 3 felony of aggravatedbattery is five years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 2000).

J.R. was adjudicated a delinquent on October 5, 1999,made a ward of the court, and committed to DOC until his twenty-first birthday. Because J.R. will not attain the age of 21 untilAugust 8, 2005, if he remains in DOC until age 21, he will haveserved a term of 5 years, 10 months, and 3 days. This clearlyexceeds the five-year maximum sentence an adult offender couldreceive for the same offense.

The State concedes J.R.'s commitment to DOC until histwenty-first birthday would exceed the five-year maximumnonextended term for Class 3 felony aggravated battery. Therefore, the dispositional order committing J.R. to DOC until histwenty-first birthday violates section 5-710 of the Act. 705ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2000). Accordingly, we remand the causeso a corrected dispositional order may be entered.

B. Credit for Time Served

Respondent next argues he is entitled to 163 days'credit for time served prior to his commitment to DOC. Respondent was taken into custody for the charged offenses on April 26,1999. He remained in custody until his dispositional hearing onOctober 5, 1999, when he was committed to DOC. Respondent urgesthis court to remand the cause and order the trial court to applythe proper credit of 163 days to his commitment in DOC. Weagree.

Criminal defendants are entitled to sentencing creditfor each day spent in custody. People v. Hutchcraft, 215 Ill.App. 3d 533, 535, 574 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1991). In In re E.C.,297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 180, 696 N.E.2d 846, 848 (1998), we examined the plain meaning of the Act to ascertain and give effect tothe legislative intent, and concluded juveniles are also entitledto sentencing credit for time served prior to their commitment toDOC. Specifically, we looked to section 5-710(1)(a)(v) of theAct, which expressly provides juveniles are entitled to sentencing credit when their dispositions involve a sentencing order ofdetention. 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v) (West 2000). We thenexamined section 5-710(1)(b), which states the time juvenilesspend in DOC as part of their disposition "shall be considered astime spent in detention." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2000). When these provisions are consideredalong with the provision providing "[i]n no event shall a guiltyminor be committed to [DOC] for a period of time in excess ofthat period for which an adult could be committed for the sameact" (705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2000)), we find no support fordenying a minor credit for time served prior to his commitment toDOC. To deny a juvenile credit for time served could lead to atotal commitment that exceeds the maximum time an adult couldserve for the same offense. This is a result contrary to theexpress provisions of the Act itself.

The State concedes under the rationale of E.C., J.R. isentitled to receive credit against his sentence for the 163 daysserved prior to his commitment. However, the State invites us toapply the reasoning of a Second District case which held thatsection 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (UnifiedCode) does not allow a juvenile delinquent who has been committedfor an indeterminate term in DOC to receive credit for timeserved prior to his commitment. In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d327, 332, 701 N.E.2d 1170, 1173-74 (1998); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b)(West 1996) (offender entitled to credit for time served spent incustody as a result of the offense for which the sentence wasimposed). The gist of the court's reasoning in J.M.M. for notextending credit for time served was juveniles are not "similarlysituated" to the adult criminal defendant, and it is not thepurpose of the Unified Code and the Act to treat them similarly. J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 330-32, 701 N.E.2d at 1173-74. However, as discussed above, the Act itself refers to provisionsof the Unified Code to determine proper terms of juvenile commitment to DOC and affords the juvenile the same proceduralprotections as the adult criminal.

Further, recent amendments to the Act have resulted injuvenile proceedings that are strikingly similar to adult criminal proceedings. Our supreme court recently stated the Act "hasbeen reconfigured and now contains a purpose and policy sectionwhich represents a fundamental shift from the singular goal ofrehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protectingthe public and holding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law." In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317, 746 N.E.2d732, 735 (2001). While proceedings under the Act are still not"criminal" in nature and the primary purpose of the Act is therehabilitation of the juvenile offender (In re Beasley, 66 Ill.2d 385, 389, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (1977)), the Act has clearlyevolved to include facets that resemble adult criminal proceedings. Therefore, we decline to follow the Second District'sreasoning in J.J.M., which rests primarily on the "distinct"differences between the juvenile and adult criminal court systems.

We note our reasoning and holding in E.C. was recentlycited with approval and applied by the Third District when thecourt determined a juvenile was entitled to credit for hispredispositional confinement when the juvenile was committed to DOC under section 5-815(f) of the Act; this section provides forthe commitment of the habitual juvenile offender. In re B.L.S.,325 Ill. App. 3d 96, 100, 757 N.E.2d 637, 641 (2001); 705 ILCS405/5-815(f) (West 2000).

Accordingly, we stand by our reasoning in E.C. and findJ.R. is entitled to receive 163 days' credit against the term ofhis commitment to DOC for time he spent in custody prior to theentry of his dispositional order.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court's dispositional order andremand the cause for the entry of a new dispositional orderconsistent with this decision.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.