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PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In January 2002, the trial court found respondent,Sandra Muellner, to be a disabled adult and appointed petitioner,the Office of State Guardian (State Guardian), as limited guardian of her person. Respondent appeals, arguing the trial courterred in authorizing the State Guardian to place her in a nursinghome's behavioral unit without proceeding for her involuntarycommitment under chapter III of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-100through 3-1003 (West 2000)).

In September 2001, respondent was 55 years old andresided in Hotel Quincy Apartments. The manager noticed respondent holding a towel in her arms and acting like she had a baby. A maid convinced respondent to go to Blessing Hospital (Blessing), where she was voluntarily admitted as an inpatient to anadult psychiatric unit. In October 2001, Melissa Penn, a socialworker at Blessing, filed a guardianship petition and a petitionfor temporary guardianship. Penn alleged respondent was adisabled person because she was unable to care for herself andshe suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia with delusions. The petitions sought to appoint the State Guardian as guardian ofrespondent's person with authority to make residential placement. The trial court appointed the State Guardian as respondent'stemporary guardian for up to 60 days. The trial court authorizedthe State Guardian to make residential placement.

In November 2001, the State Guardian, as respondent'stemporary guardian, placed respondent with New Horizons inSycamore Health Care (Sycamore), a 24-hour skilled nursingfacility. New Horizons is a behavioral unit that works tostabilize psychiatric patients. It has an in-house psychiatristand offers group therapy classes. The facility is not locked,but access to other areas of Sycamore or the outside community isrestricted until the resident gains levels of trust.

In January 2002, the trial court held a hearing onPenn's guardianship petition. Dr. Lee Johnson, a psychiatrist,treated respondent for schizophrenia. Dr. Johnson noted thatrespondent rarely took prescribed medication. Julie Irvine ofthe West Central Illinois Center for Independent Living testifiedfor respondent. Irvine stated respondent was capable of livingindependently in the community with visits by personal assistantsto her home. Respondent filed a motion to limit the proposedguardian's power to place her in a nursing home. After takingthe matter under advisement, the trial court denied respondent'smotion as moot and appointed the State Guardian as limitedguardian of respondent's person. The trial court granted theState Guardian authority to place respondent in a group home,shelter-care facility, or in the community. The trial courtconditioned the State Guardian's authority to residentially placerespondent in a skilled-care nursing facility; the State Guardianhad to determine that respondent's placement in a less restrictive environment would cause substantial harm to her.

This appeal followed.

Respondent argues the trial court erred in authorizingthe State Guardian to place her in a nursing home's behavioralunit without proceeding for her involuntary commitment underchapter III of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-100 through3-1003 (West 2000)).

The State Guardian concedes error under the facts ofthis case but contends we should dismiss the present appeal asmoot. In its brief, the State Guardian informed this court thatit allowed respondent to return to her residence, and the StateGuardian has also given this court its assurance that respondentwill not be returned to New Horizons except to the extent allowedunder the Mental Health Code.

Respondent asserts this appeal is not moot for thefollowing reasons. Respondent suggests the trial court couldappoint a substitute guardian or compel the State Guardian toplace respondent in New Horizons or another mental health facility. Citing In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273(1977), respondent also contends the "mental health exception" tomootness applies. Finally, respondent claims the "substantialpublic interest exception" to mootness applies.

Although the appellate court has recognized a generalexception to mootness for mental health cases (see, e.g., In reSlaughter, 253 Ill. App. 3d 718, 721-22, 625 N.E.2d 832, 834(1993)), our supreme court has not embraced that exception. SeeIn re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559(1998). Instead, we determine that the public interest exceptionto mootness applies.

Three factors determine whether the public interestexception applies: "(1) the public nature of the question, (2)the desirability of an authoritative determination for thepurpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood thatthe question will generally recur." In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d247, 257, 537 N.E.2d 292, 296 (1989). Whether the State Guardianmay admit a ward to a nursing home's behavioral unit for treatment of mental illness is a question of a public nature. Anauthoritative determination is very important because involuntaryadmission to a mental health facility implicates a ward's libertyinterest. Finally, the question is likely to generally recur,given that other mentally ill wards reside in this state and theState Guardian has limited its concession to the particular factsof this case.

Accordingly, we address the merits.

Section 11a-3(a) of the Probate Act of 1975 (ProbateAct) (755 ILCS 5/11a-3(a) (West 2000)) authorizes a trial courtto appoint a guardian for a disabled person. A guardian of theperson has custody of the ward. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West2000). The guardianship order may specify the conditions onwhich the guardian may admit the ward to a residential facilitywithout further court order. 755 ILCS 5/11a-14.1 (West 2000). However, a trial court may not grant a guardian the power toadmit a nonconsenting ward to a mental health facility fortreatment as a voluntary patient. In re Gardner, 121 Ill. App.3d 7, 12, 459 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1984). Section 3-200(a) of theMental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-200(a) (West 2000)) providesthat "[a] person may be admitted as an inpatient to a mentalhealth facility for treatment of mental illness only as providedin" chapter III of the Mental Health Code.

In the present case, the trial court authorized theState Guardian to admit respondent to a skilled-care nursingfacility, and the State Guardian placed respondent in New Horizons, which is a behavioral unit of a skilled-care nursingfacility. Although the State Guardian has confessed error, thiscourt is not bound by a confession of error. People v.Lavallier, 298 Ill. App. 3d 648, 649, 698 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1998). Therefore, we decide whether a nursing home's behavioral unitqualifies as a "mental health facility" under the Mental HealthCode.

Section 1-114 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/1-114 (West 2000)) defines "mental health facility" as:

"any licensed private hospital, institution,or facility or section thereof, and any facility, or section thereof, operated by theState or a political subdivision thereof forthe treatment of persons with mental illnessand includes all hospitals, institutions,clinics, evaluation facilities, and mentalhealth centers which provide treatment forsuch persons."

Section 1-113 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/1-113 (West2000)) defines "licensed private hospital" as:

"any privately owned home, hospital, or institution, or any section thereof which islicensed by the Department of Public Healthand which provides treatment for persons withmental illness."

The State Guardian claims that the definition of"mental health facility" is limited to those facilities with a"primary purpose" of treating mental illness. Amicus curiaesuggests that any nursing home may become a "mental healthfacility" if a single mentally ill person is admitted for mentalhealth treatment. We reject these interpretations because theydepart from the plain language of section 1-114. See People v.Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39, 765 N.E.2d 991, 997 (2002).

Instead, we determine that New Horizons qualifies underthe "licensed private hospital" portion of the definition of a"mental health facility" in section 1-114 of the Mental HealthCode. As this court noted in In re Moore, 301 Ill. App. 3d 759,766, 704 N.E.2d 442, 446 (1998), sections 1-113 and 1-114 of theMental Health Code recognize that a facility may have sectionsfor the treatment of mentally ill persons. The record shows thatSycamore is licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Healthand New Horizons, a section of Sycamore, provides treatment forpersons with mental illness.

Therefore, the trial court erred in permitting theState Guardian to place respondent in a mental health facilitywithout requiring the State Guardian to proceed under the MentalHealth Code.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the portion of thetrial court's limited guardianship order that authorizes theState Guardian to place respondent in a skilled-care nursingfacility to the extent it allows the State Guardian to admitrespondent to a mental health facility without complying with theMental Health Code. We affirm the trial court in all otherrespects and direct the trial court on remand to enter an orderrestricting the State Guardian's authority to admit respondent toa mental health facility without complying with the Mental HealthCode.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remandedwith directions.

KNECHT and APPLETON, JJ., concur.