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JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

The United States of America appeals the entry of anorder by the trial court, which was entered by the mandate ofthis court on a prior appeal. We affirm the trial court'sinterpretation of that mandate.

When Floyd Funk died in January 1983, he left a validwill naming his surviving spouse, defendant Patsy Printy, as theexecutrix of his estate. At the time of his death, Floyd owned a62-acre farm in Scott County, Illinois, and a three-quarterinterest in another farm. (Floyd's then 12-year-old son, Michael, owned the other one-quarter interest in that farm.) InFebruary 1983, the trial court appointed Patsy as executrix ofFloyd's estate.

In July 1983, the Farmers Home Administration of theUnited States Department of Agriculture (FmHA) filed an amendedproof of debt in the probate proceeding, asserting that at thetime of Floyd's death, he owed $234,106.86 to plaintiff, theUnited States of America, which was a secured creditor of Floyd'sestate. (Between May 1980 and April 1982, Floyd had borrowed atotal of $319,290 from the United States through FmHA. Floyd'sFmHA loans were secured by mortgages on the 62-acre farm andFloyd's three-quarter interest in the other farm.)

In March 1998, Patsy, acting as executrix, filed anamended account of her actions as executrix, encompassing theentire period of January 7, 1983 (the date of Floyd's death), toMarch 2, 1998. Interim current reports had been filed withnotice to all parties and approved in 1983, 1984, and 1989. InJune 1998, the United States filed an objection to the amendedaccount, in which it alleged that Patsy had violated fiduciaryduties she owed to the United States by selling collateralpledged to the United States and distributing the sale proceedsand the interest that had accrued on those proceeds to thirdparties in violation of state and federal law. At a July 1998hearing, the trial court determined that the United States'objection presented questions of law only, and the court laterentered a written order approving the amended account.

The United States appealed to this court, and wereversed and remanded, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded the trial court from enteringjudgment on the pleadings. We directed the trial court on remandto conduct a hearing to determine whether the United States hadagreed to discharge or subordinate its liens, thereby authorizingPatsy to use the proceeds from the sale of its secured collateralfor estate administration expenses. In re Estate of Funk, No. 4-98-0640, slip order at 27 (April 14, 1999) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23) (Funk I).

In November 1999, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on that issue, as well as other United States'objections to the amended account, and took the matter underadvisement. In February 2000, the court approved the amendedaccount, specifically finding that (1) the United States allowedPatsy to keep the estate open and manage the farm operationsfollowing Floyd's January 1983 death; and (2) under the ProbateAct of 1975 (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110 1/2, par. 18-10;755 ILCS 5/18-10 (West 2000)), executrix and attorney fees takepriority over claims of the United States.

The United States appealed to this court, and wereversed and remanded for further proceedings, upon concludingthat the trial court's order approving the amended account waserroneous as a matter of law. Estate of Funk v. Printy, No. 4-00-0178, slip order at 13 (October 19, 2000) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23) (Funk II). In so concluding, westated, in pertinent part, as follows:

"First, the [trial] court appears to equatethe United States' agreement to allow Patsyto keep the estate open and operate the farms(from 1983 through 1988) with an agreement todischarge or subordinate its liens on itssecured collateral. However, in [In re Estate of] Yealick, 69 Ill. App. 3d [353,] 356,387 N.E.2d [399,] 401 [1979], this court heldthat a creditor's authorization for or acquiescence in a sale of secured property doesnot affect the creditor's rights to the saleproceeds as against the debtor. *** Thefact that the United States agreed to allowPatsy to operate the farms for a period oftime simply does not affect the UnitedStates' rights to the sale proceeds in thiscase. (As earlier discussed, a secured creditor has a right to gross sale proceeds,subject to customary incidental costs appropriate to the sale of the collateral. See 7C.F.R.