In re Adoption of C.D.
Case Date: 05/15/2000
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-99-0641
In re Adoption of C.D., No. 4-99-06414th District, 15 May 2000
PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: Bonnie G. and Dean G. appeal an order denying their petition to adopt their granddaughter, C.D. They allege numerouserrors committed by the circuit court in an attempt to overturn an order finding that it was in C.D.'s best interests to beadopted by her foster parents, Phillip P. and Melissa P. We affirm the circuit court's judgment. I. BACKGROUND Tina D. gave birth to C.D. on January 29, 1993, in McLean County, Illinois. Tina D. subjected C.D. to physical abuse andallegations were made that Scott D., Tina D.'s brother, sexually abused C.D. In October 1996, the McLean County juvenilecourt found C.D. to be an abused child and placed her in the care of the Illinois Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS). On April 10, 1997, the trial judge made C.D. a ward of the court. C.D. was placed in foster care with Marie Y. DCFS developed a service plan to assist and counsel Tina D. so that she andC.D. could ultimately be reunited. A DCFS caseworker contacted Bonnie G., Tina D.'s mother, to determine if she would bewilling to provide a temporary home for C.D. Bonnie agreed to take C.D. into her home. C.D. was accustomed to spendingtime with Bonnie, having lived with her during the summer of 1994, and enjoying other extended visits in 1995 and 1996.Bonnie participated in a home study that concluded she was a suitable placement for C.D. However, DCFS chose not toplace C.D. with her grandmother because Bonnie and Dean lived in the State of Virginia. Moving C.D. to Virginia wouldprevent visitation with Tina D. and impair DCFS' goal of reuniting C.D. and her mother. C.D. remained in foster care with Marie Y. for approximately eight months. Marie Y. was experiencing personal problemsunrelated to C.D., so on June 8, 1997, C.D. was moved to Melissa and Phillip P.'s foster home (foster parents). Through counseling and other assistance, Tina D. made progress toward achieving custody of C.D. However, withoutdiscussion or notification to DCFS, Tina D. executed a final and irrevocable consent to adoption on January 15, 1998,purporting to consent to Bonnie's adoption of C.D. Robin Cashen, DCFS court monitor, testified that at the time Tina D.signed the consent she "had basically completed her client service plan, and it was a matter of working [C.D.] back into the[Tina D.'s] home." On January 22, 1998, Bonnie filed her petition to adopt a related child. Later, the petition was amended to join Bonnie'shusband, Dean, as a party to the petition (Bonnie and Dean collectively referred to as "grandparents"). When DCFS wasnotified of the consent and grandparents' petition in late February 1998, it requested an adoptive home study of thegrandparents through the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children Act (Act) (45 ILCS 15/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). InMarch 1998, caseworkers from Catholic Social Services (CSS) and the Children's Advocacy Center of McLean County(court-appointed special advocate (CASA) program) recommended placing C.D. with the grandparents. At a hearing onApril 14, 1998, the foster parents attended and informed the circuit court that they would adopt C.D. if the grandparents'petition for adoption did not go through for some reason. By the end of August 1998, the adoptive home study had not yet been completed by the State of Virginia because Bonnieand Dean were living together and were unmarried. Dean had not yet divorced his third wife, and the State of Virginiawould not complete the home study because of the living arrangement. As the months passed, the foster parents became more assertive with their interest in adopting C.D. On August 31, 1998, thefoster parents filed their petition to intervene and petition for adoption in the grandparents' adoption proceeding. The fosterparents alleged that their petition was entitled to the "foster-parent preference" and should be given first considerationpursuant to sections 15.1(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/15.1(a), (b) (West 1998)). The sections give fosterparents who have had custody for more than one year a preference in the adoption proceeding. At a hearing in September 1998, the circuit court found that both petitions to adopt were premature because the parentalrights of C.D.'s parents had not yet been terminated. The court allowed the petitions to remain on file and continued themgenerally. The parental rights of C.D.'s birth father were terminated on September 29, 1998. On October 20, 1998, the Statemoved to terminate Tina D.'s parental rights because she "failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of [C.D.]."The motion also requested that the court appoint DCFS guardian "with the power to consent to [C.D.'s] adoption." The Statefiled a supplemental petition for adjudication of wardship on December 22, 1998, stating that Tina D. wished to be relievedof her parental duties. Tina D. agreed to the appointment of DCFS as guardian, but did not agree to DCFS being givenpower to consent to adoption until the court heard evidence from the grandparents and foster parents relating to theircompeting petitions to adopt C.D. At the hearing on December 22, 1998, the court admonished Tina D. that she was relinquishing her parental rights and thatthe court alone would determine C.D.'s best interests based on the competing petitions to adopt. The court specificallyinformed Tina D. that it may not find that placement with the grandparents was in C.D.'s best interests. After extensiveexplanation and discussion with Tina D., the circuit court accepted her waiver of parental rights. Tina D.'s parental rightswere terminated by court order. The court also ordered an investigation report of the grandparents and the foster parentspursuant to section 6 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/6 (West 1998)) and set the matter for hearing. The circuit court held four days of hearings to determine which family would provide the best adoptive home for C.D. Thecourt heard testimony from each of the prospective adoptive parents. Additionally, numerous caseworkers and counselorstestified at trial. The caseworkers and counselors overwhelmingly agreed that while the grandparents were an acceptableplacement for C.D., it would be in C.D.'s best interest to be adopted by the foster parents. DCFS caseworker Susan Allison suggested placement with the foster parents because of her concern that any exposure toScott D., who was accused of sexually abusing C.D., would be harmful. Robin Cashen initially testified that she believed Bonnie would be a "good placement" for C.D. Cashen went on to state,however, that she believed it would be in C.D.'s best interest to be adopted by the foster parents because: "She has been there since June of 1997. From the reports that I have read, she is very bonded to [the foster parents] asmom and dad. She is bonded to the other children in the home. She has been in the home consistently and knowsthese people as her family, and [their] extended family as her family." Chris Newman, a CSS caseworker, testified that when she first became aware of the direct consent signed by Tina D., shebelieved that C.D.'s placement with Bonnie would be in her best interest. By August 1998, however, her opinion hadchanged and she favored C.D. staying with the foster parents. She changed her mind because of the delay in obtaining ahome study from Virginia, C.D.'s limited contact with Bonnie and Dean, and the fact that C.D. had developed a strongerbond with the foster parents. Jennifer Aranda, a clinical professional counselor, testified that it was in C.D.'s best interest to stay with the foster parents.However, she had no opinion regarding the grandparents' ability to care for C.D. because she had never spoken to them orobserved them with C.D. Aranda expressed concern that any move would create a risk to C.D. because C.D. needed securityand structure. She feared that further moves would increase the risk of C.D. "acting out." Carolyn Walker, a CASA caseworker, understood that C.D. was not placed with her grandparents originally because of thedelays related to the home studies. Despite the delays, Walker believed that adoption by the grandparents was in C.D.'s bestinterests. Steve Bryan, a DCFS adoption specialist, reviewed the interstate home studies of the grandparents, met with the fosterparents, met with C.D. six or seven times, and consulted C.D.'s teacher and counselor. His opinion was based on hisobservations, his opinions, the Adoption Act, and DCFS' rules and procedures. Bryan stated that he felt that both coupleswere appropriate to adopt C.D. and that both had a positive relationship with C.D. Bryan testified that C.D. recognizes thefoster parents as mom and dad and the foster parents' daughter as her sister. He felt it was important to preserve these familyties for C.D.'s stability and best interest. He recommended that C.D. maintain her current ties with her school, hercounselor, and her friends. He ultimately recommended that C.D. stay with the foster parents. II. ANALYSIS The grandparents' first argument on appeal is that the circuit court's order granting the foster parents' adoption petition wasnot in C.D.'s best interests. A. The Trial Court's Decision Granting the Foster Parents' Petition for Adoption was Within Its Discretion and Not Againstthe Manifest Weight of the Evidence The Adoption Act specifies that the "best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramountconsideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act." 750 ILCS 50/20a (West 1998). After hearing extensiveevidence from the grandparents and the foster parents in support of their respective adoption petitions, the court determinedthat it was in C.D.'s best interests to grant the foster parents' petition. On appeal, we will not overturn an adoption judgmentinvolving the best interest of a child unless the circuit court clearly abused its discretion and the judgment was against themanifest weight of the evidence. In re Adoption of Scheidt, 89 Ill. App. 3d 92, 99, 411 N.E.2d 554, 560 (1980). The grandparents make numerous factual arguments as to why the circuit court's decision was in error. These arguments canessentially be reduced to two: (1) they are C.D.'s blood relatives and currently have custody of A.D., C.D.'s younger half-brother, and (2) they are financially more stable than the foster parents. The grandparents argue that these factors establishthat it is in C.D.'s best interests to be placed with them and not the foster parents. The circuit court was required to considerseveral statutory factors in reaching its decision in this case. Section 15.1(c) of the Adoption Act states that "the court shallconsider all relevant factors including[,] but not limited to[,] the factors in subsection (b)" (750 ILCS 50/15.1(c) (West1998)), which include: "(1) the wishes of the child; (2) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the applicant to adopt the child; (3) the child's need for stability and continuity of relationship with parent figures; (4) the wishes of the child's parent as expressed in writing prior to that parent's execution of a consent or surrender foradoption; (5) the child's adjustment to his present home, school[,] and community; (6) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (7) the family ties between the child and the applicant to adopt the child and the value of preserving family tiesbetween the child and the child's relatives, including siblings; (8) the background, age[,] and living arrangements of the applicant to adopt the child; (9) the criminal background check report presented to the court as part of the investigation required under [s]ection 6of this Act." 750 ILCS 50/15.1(b) (West 1998). Upon review of the record, it is clear that the circuit court considered the statutory factors, evidence presented, and thewitness testimony in reaching its ruling in favor of the foster parents. The court heard four days of testimony from theparties, counselors, and various caseworkers. The circuit court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnessesand the evidence. See People ex rel. Bukovic v. Smith, 98 Ill. App. 3d 144, 153, 423 N.E.2d 1302, 1309 (1981). The circuit court noted that it was a difficult decision to make since both families would provide a good home for C.D. Thecourt acknowledged the importance of C.D. maintaining relations with blood relatives and her siblings. However, the courtalso recognized that Melissa P. was a "stay-at-home mom" and had done an excellent job nurturing C.D. for the previoustwo years. In reaching its decision in favor of the foster parents, the court noted that even though the foster parents may notpossess material things comparable to the grandparents, their home provided things that "money can't buy." After ourreview of the record, we find that the circuit court's decision to give custody to the foster parents was within its discretionand not against the manifest weight of the evidence. B. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error by its Application of Section 15.1(b) of the Adoption Act The grandparents next argue that the circuit court's application of Adoption Act section 15.1(b) circumvents Illinois publicpolicy favoring relatives in adoption proceedings. They assert that the circuit court's interpretation of section 15.1(b)negates this court's decision in In re Adoption of Smith, 38 Ill. App. 3d 217, 347 N.E.2d 292 (1976). In Smith, we reversed acircuit court order denying the grandparents' petition to adopt. In Smith, we stated: "The legislature, in the provisions of the Adoption Act, while defining the child's best interests as the paramountconcern[,] recognized it to be an important interest of a child that his relationships to the persons, places[,] and courseof inheritance where Providence has placed him be preserved where possible, and that this interest should besubordinated only when, considering other important interests, a different placement is clearly indicated." Smith, 38Ill. App. 3d at 227, 347 N.E.2d at 300-01. Then, as now, we encourage the preservation of family ties in adoption cases. However, preservation of family ties is notthe only consideration. Almost six years after Smith, our legislature added section 15.1 to the Adoption Act, recognizingadditional factors and considerations that should be taken into account when reviewing petitions to adopt. Pub. Act 82-437, |
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