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25 August 2000

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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Mark Arnold, appeals from an order enteredat a permanency review hearing suspending his visitation with hischildren until such time as he engages in the counseling thecourt previously ordered. He contends the suspension order wasimpermissible because it did not set a specified period of timefor the suspension and, further, made no finding continuedvisitation would endanger the physical and emotional well-beingof his children. We affirm.

On April 24, 1997, the State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship as to respondent's children, M.A.(hereinafter referred to as Ma. A.), born April 3, 1985, M.A.,born August 5, 1987, and A.A., born January 5, 1990, in the circuit court of Champaign County alleging the children wereneglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a)(West 1996)) because theirmother, Tina Shankles, was not providing the education for themas required by law. On June 12, an amended petition was filedalso naming respondent as not providing the minors' requirededucation.

At the adjudicatory hearing on July 31, Shanklesstipulated to the petition and respondent waived his adjudicatoryhearing. The court held a dispositional hearing on September 2. The court adjudged the minors neglected and made them wards ofthe court under the guardianship of the Illinois Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS), with custody to remain withtheir mother. Both parents, divorced and no longer livingtogether, were ordered to cooperate with DCFS. The court entereda written dispositional order to this effect on September 22. The court ordered respondent to establish and maintain regularvisitation with the minors, obtain psychological and alcohol/drugevaluations, and successfully complete any course of counselingand treatment recommended as the result of these evaluations.

The court directed its orders remain in full force andeffect after a permanency review hearing on December 2, 1997. Nofurther review was held until January 7, 1999, when custody ofthe minors was removed from Shankles and placed with DCFS. Atthat time, the court ordered respondent to attend and successfully complete a course of individual counseling and jointcounseling with any or all of the minors as recommended; undertake and complete a course of parenting education and instruction; refrain from criticizing Shankles and any teachers, principals, or school administrators in the presence of the minors;cooperate fully in securing the regular attendance of Ma. A. atschool and counseling; immediately advise DCFS of any difficulties in transportation that prevented his attendance at counseling or parenting classes or for the children at school; andtruthfully complete a psychological evaluation for which DCFSreferred him and successfully complete any course of counseling,education, or treatment recommended by the evaluation.

At the permanency review hearings held March 1, April26, June 28, and December 20, 1999, the court found respondenthad made little or no progress toward the goals set out in thedispositional order and continued all prior orders. At thepermanency review hearing on September 2, the trial court toldrespondent he was always making excuses for failing to comply andthis was to the detriment of his children.

Reports by caseworkers prepared for the permanencyreview hearing of December 20 indicated respondent was notactively addressing family issues and was only concerned withbeing a parent when it was convenient for him. He did notconverse with the social services caseworker assigned to thecase, did not attend services provided for him, and did notinteract with all three children at their visits but usually onlyinteracted with the oldest, Ma. A. The trial court continued allprior orders.

At the permanency review hearing held on March 2, 2000,the reports showed respondent was not attending counseling andnot maintaining contact with DCFS. The caseworker was unable toprovide a current residence and place of employment for respondent due to his failure to communicate with her. He continued toattend supervised visitation, although he previously balked atspending the first 20 minutes of his two-hour visitation doinghomework with the children. At one point, respondent told thecaseworker he saw no need for counseling and did not wish toparticipate in it or maintain contact with her.

Respondent testified he previously attended counselingand would do so again if he had transportation. He complainedabout having six different caseworkers during the course of thiscase and said he did not contact the current workers because theyalways ended up in a debate. Under questioning by the trialcourt, respondent admitted he last attended counseling in June orJuly 1999 and could not give a reason for failing to attendsince.

The court stated the minors needed stability and itwould tolerate no further delays in parental assumption ofresponsibility. The court found respondent refused to participate in any services and ordered all prior orders as to himremain in full force and effect subject to one modification: thecourt ordered respondent's visitation "suspended until he engagesregularly in a course of counseling." This appeal followed.

Respondent first argues section 2-25 of the Act (705ILCS 405/2-25 (West 1998)), providing for orders of protection,is the only vehicle by which the trial court could have suspendedhis visitation until he obtained the previously ordered counseling. Section 2-25(1) provides:

"The court may make an order of protection in assistance of or as a condition ofany other order authorized by this Act. Theorder of protection shall be based on thehealth, safety[,] and best interests of theminor and may set forth reasonable conditionsof behavior to be observed for a specifiedperiod." 705 ILCS 405/2-25(1) (West 1998).

Respondent notes the trial court did not order hisvisitation suspended for a specified period of time, nor did thetrial court find respondent's behavior endangered the physicaland emotional well-being of the minors. Respondent contends theorder should be reversed based on noncompliance with section 2-25.

The State suggests permanency review hearings aresimply further dispositional hearings and dispositional ordersexpressly include "visiting orders." 705 ILCS 405/2-23(3)(iii)(West 1998). In support of its argument, the State cites In reS.M., 223 Ill. App. 3d 543, 585 N.E.2d 641 (1992), as statingpermanency review hearings are merely further dispositionalhearings. S.M. dealt with a petition filed under section 2-28(3)of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802-28(3), now 705ILCS 405/2-28(4) (West 1998)) seeking a change in custody of achild subject to the Act as to whom a dispositional hearing hadalready been held. A proceeding pursuant to a section 2-28(3)petition was found to be a further dispositional hearing. Weconclude permanency review hearings are meant to do as the nameimplies, review the status of the previously entereddispositional orders and set a permanency goal. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). At a permanency review hearing, the court isessentially asking how well the previous disposition worked. Ifit is not working, the court has the power to make a change.

The State argues the trial court was merely modifyingan order of visitation and cites several cases in which courtsmodified or curtailed visitation due to changed circumstancessince the original visitation order was entered, which orderswere reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard rather thanfor whether the orders complied with section 2-25. In re D.S.,307 Ill. App. 3d 362, 366, 717 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1999); In reBeatriz S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 496, 500, 641 N.E.2d 953, 956(1994); In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 890, 571 N.E.2d905, 930 (1991).

Visitation modifications may be made wherecircumstances warrant without resorting to the requirements ofsection 2-25. D.S., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 717 N.E.2d at 500. The loss of visitation rights is essentially "the stick" thecourt is holding over respondent's head to get compliance withanother of its orders: counseling.

Ample evidence supports the trial court's position. Respondent's failure to get the counseling he has been ordered toobtain while continuing to maintain a close relationship with theminors through his regular visits has contributed to thechildren's false hopes that their family will be reunited in thenear future. Such false hopes are certainly not in the bestinterests of the children. The father's recalcitrance may makeit impossible for him to be reunited with the children.

Respondent's reported attitude of disinterest inobtaining the needed counseling, and his obvious failure to doso, is a justifiable basis for the suspension of visitation. The order of the trial court suspending respondent'svisitation rights until he has obtained counseling is affirmed.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.