Illinois Department of Transportation v. Callender Construction Co.

Case Date: 05/28/1999
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-98-0184

IDOT v. Callender Construction Co., No. 4-98-0184

4th District, 28 May 1999



THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, for and in behalf of the People of the State of Illinois,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CALLENDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from Circuit Court of Pike County

No. 91ED4

Honorable Michael R. Roseberry, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 1991, plaintiff, the Department of Transportation of the State of Illinois (Department or IDOT), by virtue of its power of eminent domain, filed a complaint for condemnation seeking to condemn property of defendant landowner, Callender Construction Company. In May 1991, defendant filed a motion to dismiss and traverse, alleging lack of necessity and statutory authority for the taking. In November 1993, the circuit judge denied the motion, holding the Department established a prima facie case of necessity but defendant failed to carry its burden of proof to rebut it. In February 1998, the trial court entered judgment per the stipulation of the parties, which stipulated the amount of compensation to be paid but preserved defendant's right to appeal the ruling on the condemnation. Defendant now appeals. We affirm.

This dispute arises from the condemnation of defendant's property by the Department in connection with the construction of Interstate 72 from Springfield, Illinois, to Quincy, Illinois, also known as the Central Illinois Expressway (Expressway). The defendant's land was to be subject to a restrictive easement. The State of Illinois (State), through legislation passed by the General Assembly, concluded that a highway connecting Springfield and Quincy was necessary for the public good. See Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 381, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1984) (hereinafter Kramer).

To carry out the mandate of the General Assembly, the State found it necessary to procure federal funding, as the State alone did not have the resources to finance the construction of the Expressway. Thus, the Department was required to comply with the mandates of the Department of Transportation Act (see 49 U.S.C.