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May 4, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In October 1997, plaintiff, Kenneth L. Hesson, sueddefendants, William D. Leichsenring and John L. Livingston, d/b/aChatham Disposal (collectively Chatham), for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. In September 1999, a juryreturned a verdict in Hesson's favor and awarded him $45,809.12. In October 1999, Hesson filed a motion to tax costs, pursuant tosection 5-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS5/5-108 (West 1998)), which the trial court later granted inpart.

Chatham appeals, arguing only that the trial courterred by awarding certain deposition costs to Hesson. We affirmin part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

In October 1999, Hesson filed a motion requesting thetrial court to tax certain litigation costs, totaling $3,634.29,to Chatham. 735 ILCS 5/5-108 (West 1998). Chatham later filedan objection to some of the requested costs, including (1) courtreporter attendance and transcription fees for the discoverydeposition of Chatham's medical expert, Dr. Walter Lemann, whichwas taken by Hesson (totaling $416.75), and (2) the cost ofcopying Lemann's videotaped evidence deposition, which was takenby Chatham (totaling $153.75). Following a hearing, the courtgranted Hesson's motion to tax costs of $2,921.15, which includedthe aforementioned contested amounts. In November 1999, Chathamfiled a motion to reconsider, which the court later denied. Thisappeal followed.

Although Hesson did not file a brief with this court,the record is simple and the claimed error is such that we candecide this appeal on the merits without the aid of an appelleebrief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis ConstructionCorp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).

Chatham argues that the trial court erred by awarding(1) court reporter attendance and transcription fees for Lemann'sdiscovery deposition; and (2) the cost of copying Lemann'svideotaped evidence deposition because no Illinois authorityallows Hesson to recover for such items. We agree.

Generally, a successful litigant is not entitled torecover the ordinary expenses of litigation. Galowich v. BeechAircraft Corp., 92 Ill. 2d 157, 162, 441 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1982)(Galowich I); Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc.,308 Ill. App. 3d 789, 804, 721 N.E.2d 614, 627 (1999). "Theallowance and recovery of costs is therefore entirely dependenton statutory authorization." Galowich I, 92 Ill. 2d at 162, 441N.E.2d at 320.

Section 5-108 of the Code provides that a prevailingplaintiff in any action for damages personal to the plaintiff mayrecover his "costs." 735 ILCS 5/5-108 (West 1998). In addition,Supreme Court Rule 208(d) provides that certain expenses relatingto depositions may be taxed as costs. 134 Ill. 2d R. 208(d). InGalowich I, 92 Ill. 2d at 166, 441 N.E.2d at 322, the supremecourt held that Rule 208(d) authorizes the trial court "to tax ascosts, in its discretion, the expenses only of those depositionsnecessarily used at trial." The Galowich I court explained asfollows:

"This interpretation of the rule accordswith this court's frequent statements that asuccessful litigant is not entitled to recover the ordinary expenses of litigation. [Citations.] The deposition as used in modern litigation is almost entirely a techniqueof trial preparation, serving primarily theconvenience of counsel. Though there may beinstances in which a discovery depositionwould become a necessity--as when a crucialwitness died or disappeared before trial--itis difficult to say that all or even most ofthe depositions routinely taken in preparation for trial are necessary. Litigants inIllinois must bear their own litigation andtrial-preparation expenses, and in our viewthese include the expenses of discovery depositions." Galowich I, 92 Ill. 2d at 166, 441N.E.2d at 322.

Under the Galowich I test, use of a deposition at trialis not a sufficient basis for taxing deposition costs to thelosing litigant. In order for deposition costs to be taxed, thedeposition must have been necessary. Galowich v. Beech AircraftCorp., 209 Ill. App. 3d 128, 142, 568 N.E.2d 46, 55 (1991)(Galowich II). Courts have interpreted the phrase "necessarilyused at trial" to mean "indispensable" to the trial. Wiegman,308 Ill. App. 3d at 804, 721 N.E.2d at 627; Boyle v. Manley, 263Ill. App. 3d 200, 206, 635 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (1994); see GalowichII, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 568 N.E.2d at 55 (holding thatdepositions used at trial to impeach witnesses or refresh theirrecollection were not "indispensable").

In this case, the discovery deposition of Lemann,Chatham's medical expert, was not used at trial. Thus, itclearly was not "necessarily used" at, or "indispensable" to, thetrial. Further, although Lemann's videotaped evidence depositionwas used at trial (by Chatham over Hesson's objection), Hesson'sobtaining a copy of that deposition cannot be fairly characterized as "indispensable" to the trial. Instead, Hesson's copyingand use of the evidence deposition of his opponent's medicalexpert constituted a "technique of trial preparation, servingprimarily the convenience of counsel" (Galowich I, 92 Ill. 2d at166, 441 N.E.2d at 322). We therefore conclude that the trialcourt erred by awarding Hesson (1) court reporter attendance andtranscription fees for Lemann's discovery deposition, and (2) thecost of obtaining a copy of Lemann's videotaped evidence deposition, totaling $570.50. Accordingly, we reverse that portion ofthe order awarding costs for Lemann's discovery deposition andcopying Lemann's evidence deposition and remand for entry of anamended order awarding costs.

For the reasons stated, we reverse that portion of theorder awarding costs for the depositions of Lemann and remand forentry of an amended order awarding costs. We affirm the trialcourt's judgment in all other respects.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remandedwith directions.

McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.