Find Legal Information

January 26, 1999

NO. 4-98-0269

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 1996, plaintiffs, Francis Patrick Harris and Linda N. Harris (the Harrises), sued defendants, Cropmate Company, d/b/a the Richter Company (Cropmate), and Robert Schone, one of Cropmate's employees, alleging that Cropmate and Schone had negligently sprayed a herbicide on farmland adjacent to a 50-acre tract of land rented and farmed by the Harrises, causing damage to the Harrises' watermelon, cantaloupe, and pumpkin crops. In October 1997, the trial court conducted a bench trial, granted a motion for directed verdict in Schone's favor, and ultimately entered judgment against Cropmate and in favor of the Harrises, awarding them damages.

Cropmate appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by (a) refusing to admit a letter written by a bureau chief of the Illinois Department of Agriculture, (b) admitting the testimony of three of the Harrises' opinion witnesses, and (c) limiting the testimony of one of Cropmate's opinion witnesses; (2) the court's finding that the Harrises' crop yield loss resulted from Cropmate's negligent spraying of the herbicide 2,4-D was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the damages award was clearly excessive and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.

(Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Trial Court's Decision To Admit the Testimony of

the Harrises' Opinion Witnesses

1. The Daubert Standard

Initially, we address Cropmate's suggestion that this court should adopt the "admissibility standard for expert opinion" articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). We decline to do so.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Illinois has adhered to the "general acceptance" standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 277, 687 N.E.2d 910, 920 (1997); People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (1996); People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 96, 662 N.E.2d 1215, 1225 (1996). In Miller, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Daubert held that the Frye "general acceptance" standard no longer applies in federal cases and, instead, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (see 28 U.S.C. app. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1994)) applies in those cases. Nonetheless, the Miller court declined to address sua sponte the issue of whether it should abandon the Frye standard and adopt the reasoning of Daubert. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 187 n.3, 670 N.E.2d at 731 n.3.

The decision whether to change long-standing, fundamental rules of Illinois evidence law lies within the discretion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, not this court. Further, even if we did possess that discretion, we are not at all sure Daubert should be adopted in this State--at least, not at the present. We note that legal scholars do not share Cropmate's enthusiasm regarding Daubert. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence