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JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Joseph K. and Carolyn K. Gerwin, sued theLivingston County board and its chairman, John T. Jacobson, forholding a public meeting in an "inconvenient" place, in violationof section 2.01 of the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/2.01(West 2002)). In that meeting, the board voted to amend thecounty solid-waste disposal plan (plan) so that American DisposalServices of Illinois (American Disposal) could expand a landfillin Pontiac. The trial court allowed American Disposal to intervene as a defendant, and American Disposal and the other defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' first-amended complaint, withprejudice, pursuant to sections 2-615(e) and 2-619(a)(9) of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e), 2-619(a)(9)(West 2002)). The court granted the motions to dismiss, andplaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs argue that because the board knew ahead oftime that the meeting would attract more people than would fitinto the county boardroom and because alternative venues wereavailable, the boardroom was not "convenient *** to the public"within the meaning of section 2.01 of the Act. We hold that theissue of public convenience was one of fact that the trial courtshould not have resolved on the pleadings. Plaintiffs havestated a cause of action, and we reverse the trial court'sjudgment.

Because the trial court dismissed the first-amendedcomplaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619, we accept allwell-pleaded facts in the first-amended complaint as true anddraw all reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiff'sfavor. See Storm & Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App.3d 1040, 1047, 700 N.E.2d 202, 207 (1998). We review the dismissal de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221,720 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (1999); Thomas v. Hileman, 333 Ill. App. 3d132, 136, 775 N.E.2d 231, 234 (2002).

Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their first-amended complaint. Allied Waste Disposal, through its subsidiary, American Disposal (we will refer to the two collectively asAllied Waste), operates a landfill in Pontiac. Sometime prior toMay 16, 2002, Allied Waste informed the board that it wished toexpand the landfill. Such an expansion would have been impermissible under the plan in effect at the time. Therefore, AlliedWaste requested the board to amend the plan to allow the expansion. The board published an announcement in a local newspaperthat it would hold a public hearing on the proposed amendment onMay 16, 2002.

Approximately 20 members of the public, includingCarolyn Gerwin, attended the May 16 meeting. "The room wascrowded ***." Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, thatJacobson supported the expansion of the landfill. He announcedthat members of the public would be allowed only three minutesapiece to address the board on the proposed amendment of theplan. "In contrast to the limits put on citizens' comments,representatives of Allied Waste were permitted to address the[b]oard in an interactive format for an extended period of time,"and "Jacobson and the [b]oard allowed representatives of AlliedWaste to have greater access to [b]oard members during the publicmeeting than was provided to members of the general public,including [p]laintiffs." The board decided to delay voting onthe proposed amendment of the plan until its meeting scheduledfor June 13, 2002.

In the meantime, opponents of the landfill collectedsignatures on petitions and took out "large ads" in local andregional newspapers, urging citizens to attend a meeting of theagricultural committee scheduled for June 4, 2002, as well as ameeting of the board scheduled for June 13, 2002. (The agricultural committee was a standing committee of the board and hadjurisdiction over landfills.)

"[A]n overflow crowd of citizens" attended the June 4committee meeting. "Many people," including Joseph Gerwin, "wereforced to stand in the hallway." Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that the room where the board met had "a maximumcapacity of 49 persons under the fire code. This number wouldhave to include the 28 [b]oard members and their advisors." Carolyn Gerwin managed to get into the boardroom on that occasionand gave the board a petition bearing the signatures of 500Livingston County residents opposed to the expansion of thelandfill.

The "[a]dministrative [c]ommittee of the [b]oard" had ameeting on June 6, 2002, and according to the minutes of thatmeeting, Frank Livingston of the agricultural committee reportedthat 97 people had attended the June 4 meeting. Another boardmember, Dee Woodburn, "expressed concern about the lack of spacefor spectators in the [b]oard room and asked if there was anypossibility of changing the location for the June [b]oard meeting. According to the minutes, 'Jacobson suggested it would bedifficult to change at this point in time.'"

Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, thatJacobson and the board knew, at least seven days in advance, thatthe June 13 meeting would attract large numbers of the public. Nevertheless, the board made no effort to move the meeting to alarger room. Plaintiffs allege:

"Despite inquiries from news organizationsand members of the public regarding changingthe venue of the meeting to accommodate anticipated crowds, Mr. Jacobson stated to thepress and to individuals that the [b]oardwould meet in its regular chambers [in thecounty courthouse,] despite the very limitedcapacity of the room."

Plaintiffs further allege, on information and belief, thatJacobson actually "attempted to discourage public participationin the June 13 board meeting by telling members of the public andthe press that the June 13 meeting would not be moved to a largerroom."

Plaintiffs further allege:

"In the past, when large numbers of citizenswere known to be interested in matters beforethe [b]oard, the [b]oard arranged to hold itsmeeting in a larger space. For example, ameeting concerning property tax caps was heldat the Pontiac Township High School."

After voting to amend the plan, the board held hearings for anentire week on Allied Waste's application to expand the landfill,and the location of those hearings was the more expansive Pontiaccity council chambers rather than the boardroom.

Plaintiffs further allege, on information and belief,that members of the public began arriving an hour ahead of timefor the June 13 board meeting, lining up outside the courthouse,but Allied Waste had "encouraged its employees, union members[,]and their families to arrive at the courthouse extremely early sothat they could fill the [b]oard[]room with pro-landfill employees." When Carolyn Gerwin arrived 15 minutes before the meeting,"the crowd outside the courthouse had grown to at least 75people. More than 150 people attempted to attend the June 13meeting." Although Jacobson and the board knew that most ofthose people would not fit into the boardroom, they made noarrangements to accommodate them. "Several alternatives wereavailable *** that could have provided the public access to themeeting."

Five minutes before the meeting, the courthouse doorsswung open, and the crowd entered the courthouse, but "[o]nly afew members of the public were able to enter the meeting room." Plaintiffs allege that "[m]ost of the citizens who were permittedto enter the [b]oard[]room were in favor of the landfill. Only afew landfill protesters gained admittance," although (plaintiffsallege on information and belief) more people in the crowd wereopposed to the landfill than in favor of it. "Agents of AlliedWaste were permitted to enter the meeting room despite havingarrived after citizens who were made to stand in the hall." By"[e]xcluding members of the public from the meeting room," theboard "prevented most opponents of the landfill from observingand visually confronting [b]oard members during the meeting." Had the board admitted plaintiffs and other protesters into theroom, it "may have decided to allow additional public commentfrom interested citizens."

At first, Carolyn Gerwin had to stand in a stairwellbetween the first and second floors of the courthouse. Later,she was able to reach the second-floor hallway and stand about 10feet from the door of the boardroom, along with 100 other people. Joseph Gerwin, who had arrived just before the meeting began,also was forced to stand in the second-floor hallway, about 20feet from the door. Neither plaintiff could hear or see any ofthe proceedings of the board meeting. The air in the packedhallway was "close, hot, airless, and uncomfortable. No seatingwas made available at any time." Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that many members of the public left, eitherbecause they could not hear or see the meeting or because conditions in the courthouse were intolerable.

The board voted 16 to 11 in favor of amending the plan,with one member abstaining.

In their first-amended complaint, plaintiffs requestedthe trial court to (1) nullify the vote of June 13, 2002; (2)issue an injunction against future violations of the Act; (3)require that "all future meetings concerning the *** [l]andfillbe held at such locations as are sufficient to accommodate allinterested members of the public, such that they may see and hearall proceedings in reasonable comfort and safety"; (4) awardplaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs; and (5) appoint a"special prosecutor" to investigate possible violations of theAct.

In granting the motions to dismiss, the trial courtchiefly relied on the Second District's decision in People exrel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 321 Ill. App. 3d 897, 748N.E.2d 801 (2001), rev'd, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 795 N.E.2d 281 (2002). Some four months after the dismissal of plaintiffs' first-amendedcomplaint, the supreme court reversed the appellate court'sjudgment in Graf for reasons having nothing to do with the Act. People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541,558, 795 N.E.2d 281, 290 (2002) ("quo warranto will not liebecause the validity of the annexation process has already beengiven final judicial approval"). In the present case, the trialcourt interpreted the appellate court's decision in Graf asholding that "people do not have an absolute right to be presentin the meeting room or to participate in the public meeting; andthat the purpose of the Act is satisfied as long as the meetingis not conducted in secrecy." The trial court stated: "[T]hiswas a publicly noticed meeting open to the public[,] and ***members of the public were in fact there; *** that some peoplewere not able to get into the room[ ] [was] not a violation."

The trial court acknowledged that "some size of room"--a "broom closet," for example--could "violate[ ] the spirit ofthe law," but the county board room was "regularly used for openmeetings," and "there were lots of people there."

This appeal followed.

A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)) challenges the legal sufficiencyof the complaint, whereas a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2002)) admits thelegal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts additional mattersoutside the complaint that defeat the plaintiff's claim. Wallacev. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 447, 786 N.E.2d 980, 984 (2002).

According to the board's and Jacobson's motion todismiss, those additional matters were the minutes of the June13, 2002, meeting, which showed that the board had deliberatedand voted "in open session[] and not in closed session." Theboard and Jacobson argue that those minutes defeat plaintiffs'claim for two reasons: (1) a court may not nullify the vote ofJune 13, 2002, because it occurred in an open rather than aclosed meeting (5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2002)); and (2) the Actrequires only that the meeting be open or "not conducted insecrecy" (Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811).

If the June 13, 2002, meeting had been an open meeting,we agree that fact would partly defeat plaintiffs' claim in thatit would narrow their remedies. In their first-amended complaint, plaintiffs request a nullification of the board's vote ofJune 13, 2002. A court may "declar[e] null and void any finalaction taken at a closed meeting in violation of this Act." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2002). "The statutepermitting the court to declare the action void refers by itsterms only to a 'closed session.'" Williamson v. Doyle, 112 Ill.App. 3d 293, 300, 445 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1983).

Keeping in mind that dismissal is a drastic way to enda case (Friedman, Alschuler, & Sincere v. Arlington StructuralSteel Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 556, 489 N.E.2d 308 (1985)) and acourt should not dismiss a complaint unless it clearly appearsthat no set of facts could be proved under the complaint thatwould entitle the plaintiff to relief (City of North Chicago v.North Chicago News, Inc., 106 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594, 435 N.E.2d887, 892 (1982)), we hold that plaintiffs have pleaded a meetingthat was not entirely open. According to the first-amendedcomplaint, the board gave one segment of the public, agents ofAllied Waste, preferential access to the June 13, 2002, meetingand, to that extent, excluded opponents of the landfill. Plaintiffs allege: "Agents of Allied Waste were permitted to enterthe meeting room despite having arrived after citizens who weremade to stand in the hall."

"Open" means "not restricted to a particular group orcategory of participants." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 811 (10th ed. 2000). That the board was officially "in opensession" does not refute plaintiff's allegation that the boardgave preferential admission to agents of Allied Waste and, tothat extent, restricted the audience to a particular group. Cf.Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 398, 400, 631 P.2d 304,306 (1981) (statutory right to "attend and listen" means that "noone will be systematically excluded or arbitrarily refusedadmittance" and "[e]veryone desiring to attend" will be "affordedan opportunity to do so"); Wyse v. Rupp, No. F-94-19, 1995 WL547784, at *5 (Ohio App. September 15, 1995) (finding a meetingwas open because the public agency "dealt with the large crowd ina reasonable and impartial manner," without "intentionallybarr[ing] certain members of the public from having access to themeeting"). Taking the factual allegations in the first-amendedcomplaint as true, we hold that nullification of the vote is apotential remedy, discretionary with the trial court (Graf, 321Ill. App. 3d at 908, 748 N.E.2d at 811).

We also disagree with defendants' contention that theAct requires only "open" meetings in the technical sense, i.e.,meetings in open rather than closed session. On its face,section 2.01 of the Act requires more than mere "openness." Itprovides: "All meetings required by this Act to be public shallbe held at specified times and places which are convenient andopen to the public." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West2002). We strive to interpret a statute in such a way that noword is superfluous. Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v.Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 91, 750 N.E.2d 202, 214(2001). By its plain terms, section 2.01 requires a venue thatis not only "open," but "convenient," to the public.

From the legislative history of section 2.01, "open"and "convenient" are clearly not synonymous. Section 2.01formerly read: "All meetings required by this Act to be publicshall be held at specified times and places which are convenientto the public." 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 1992). Section 5 ofPublic Act 88-621 added the words "and open" after "convenient." Pub. Act 88-621,