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August 28, 2001

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: 

In April 2000, plaintiff, Ada F. Elder, filed a complaint against defendants, Thomas G. Bryant and Schnucks Markets,Inc., a Missouri corporation licensed to do business in Illinois(Schnucks) (collectively defendants), alleging that Bryant, anemployee of Schnucks, drove a semi truck into her vehicle whileshe was driving and caused her personal injuries. Plaintiffserved defendants with the summons and complaint and entered intonegotiations with defendants' insurer, St. Paul Fire & MarineInsurance Company (St. Paul), through its claims representative,Carol Reindl. Defendants did not retain an attorney or enter anappearance in the case.

In June 2000, plaintiff's attorney served Reindl with asettlement demand letter, stating that, if no settlement had beenreached, he requested Reindl to retain counsel and file responsive pleadings on or before July 28, 2000. Defendants failed tocontact plaintiff, retain counsel, or file responsive pleadings.

In August 2000, plaintiff filed a motion for defaultjudgment. In September 2000, the trial court granted plaintiff'smotion in chambers without notice to any party and set the casefor a hearing on damages. At the October 11, 2000, hearing, thetrial court awarded plaintiff $43,754.44, plus costs of suit,followed by a written judgment filed October 17, 2000. OnNovember 3, 2000, defendants filed a timely motion to vacate theOctober 2000 damages award under section 2-1401 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). Thetrial court denied defendants' motion.

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erredin (1) entering the default judgment against them, (2) denyingtheir section 2-1401 motion, and (3) denying them due process byentering judgment against them without notice. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint againstdefendants, alleging that Bryant, an employee of Schnucks, drovea semi truck into her vehicle while she was driving and causedher personal injuries. Plaintiff served defendants with summonsand complaint on April 20, 2000. Plaintiff's attorney alsoentered into negotiations with St. Paul's through Reindl. Duringthese negotiations, the parties agreed that St. Paul's would notobtain counsel in anticipation of settling the dispute withoutlitigation. At the request of Reindl, plaintiff delayed prosecution of the case until Reindl had an opportunity to respond tothe settlement demand.

In June 2000, plaintiff submitted a settlement demandto Reindl. Reindl never responded. Plaintiff's attorney sentReindl a letter dated July 12, 2000, stating that, because Reindlnever responded to his previous letter, he requested her toretain counsel and to file responsive pleadings on or before July28, 2000, if no settlement had been reached by that time. Reindlfailed to arrange for counsel and never contacted plaintiff'sattorney during this time period. In addition to his writtencorrespondence, plaintiff's counsel left telephone and voice-mailmessages for Reindl reminding her that she had failed to eitherrespond to the settlement offer or obtain counsel. Reindl didnot respond.

In August 2000, without further notice to defendants,plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. In September2000, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion and set the casefor a prove-up hearing regarding damages. Although the trialcourt ordered plaintiff's attorney to provide notice to defendants of the prove-up hearing, plaintiff's counsel failed toprovide defendants such notice. However, plaintiff's attorneyfailed to give notice pursuant to the trial court's order becauseplaintiff's attorney never received a copy of the docket entryrequiring him to give notice. The record contains no indicationthat the clerk sent the trial court's docket entry to plaintiff'sattorney.

On October 11, 2000, the trial court conducted thehearing. On October 17, 2000, the trial court entered a writtenjudgment against defendants in the amount of $43,753.55 pluscosts of suit.

Later in October 2000, Reindl referred this case tooutside counsel. Immediately upon taking the case, defendants'counsel learned of the default judgment and damages award enteredagainst defendants. On November 3, 2000, defendants' counselfiled a timely section 2-1401 motion to vacate the October 17,2000, damages award. On November 28, 2000, the trial courtdenied defendants' motion. This appeal followed.

We note that, on appeal, defendants attempt to supplement the record by appending to their brief various letters fromplaintiff's attorney to Reindl not otherwise submitted to thetrial court. We cannot and have not considered this information. See Cottrill v. Russell, 253 Ill. App. 3d 934, 939, 625 N.E.2d888, 891 (1993) ("Attachments to briefs not otherwise of recordare not properly before a reviewing court and cannot be used tosupplement the record").

I. ANALYSIS

Section 2-1401 provides a comprehensive method forpetitioning for relief from judgments, orders, and decrees morethan 30 days after their entry. Kaput v. Hoey, 124 Ill. 2d 370,377-78, 530 N.E.2d 230, 233 (1988). To obtain relief undersection 2-1401, a party must show the existence of a meritoriousdefense to the judgment and the exercise of due diligence inpresenting the defense, both in the underlying action and in thesection 2-1401 proceeding. Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 378, 530 N.E.2dat 233. Accordingly, a section 2-1401 petitioner is not entitledto relief unless he establishes that through no fault or negligence of his own, the error of fact or the existence of a validdefense was not presented to the trial court. Kaput, 124 Ill. 2dat 378, 530 N.E.2d at 233. The decision whether to grant or denya section 2-1401 petition is reserved to the discretion of thetrial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 378, 530 N.E.2d at 234.

A. Motion To Vacate Default Judgment

1. Forfeiture

Defendants first argue that the trial court erred indenying their section 2-1401 motion to vacate the default judgment because plaintiff failed to give defendants notice that thetrial court had entered a default judgment. Plaintiff arguesthat defendants forfeited this issue by failing to contest thedefault judgment before the trial court. We agree with plaintiff.

"It is well established that matters not presented toor ruled upon by the trial court may not be raised for the firsttime on appeal." Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 229,499 N.E.2d 1381, 1390 (1986); Shell Oil Co. v. Department ofRevenue, 95 Ill. 2d 541, 550, 449 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1983).

In the present case, defendants neither filed a motionto vacate the default judgment nor included that issue or requestin their motion to vacate damages. Specifically, defendants'motion to vacate damages stated:

"Now come [defendants], by [their attorneys] and hereby [move] to vacate the prove-up of damages and entry of judgment on October 11, 2000[,] with written [j]udgment[o]rder being entered October 17, 2000 ***.

* * *

2. It is not the intention of the[d]efendants to contest the issue of liability but they do wish to contest the issue ofdamages.

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7. These [d]efendants do wish to contest the issue of damages and [ask] the[c]ourt, under all of the circumstances, tovacate the written [j]udgment [o]rder enteredOctober 17, 2000[,] and allow these[d]efendants to contest the issue of damages.

* * *

WHEREFORE, the [d]efendants move tovacate the written [j]udgment [o]rder enteredand filed on October 17, 2000, and have thismatter allocated for proceedings on the damages issues alone."

Defendants never raised the propriety of the default judgmentand, in fact, admitted liability.

Moreover, defendants admit that Reindl failed to obtaincounsel, enter an appearance, or file responsive pleadings inthis case even after Reindl received a letter from plaintiff'scounsel requesting Reindl to do so. Plaintiff's attorney repeatedly demanded by letter and through telephone and voice-mailmessages that Reindl retain counsel and have counsel enter anappearance on or before July 28, 2000. Reindl claims that shefailed to obtain counsel through mere inadvertence. However,section 2-1401 does not afford a remedy whereby a litigant may berelieved of the consequence of his own mistakes or his counsel'snegligence. Airoom, 114 Ill. 2d at 222, 499 N.E.2d at 1387;Genesis & Sons, Ltd. v. Theodosopoulos, 223 Ill. App. 3d 276,279-80, 585 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1991). Accordingly, defendant'snegligence substantially contributed to the entry of the defaultjudgment. Therefore, we find that defendants forfeited thisissue first raised on appeal.

2. Merits of Attack on Default Judgment

Even if there were no forfeiture, we would concludethat failure to provide notice did not affect the validity of theorder. Section 2-1302(a) of the Code provides that "[u]pon theentry of an order of default, the attorney for the moving partyshall immediately give notice thereof to each party who hasappeared, against whom the order was entered, or such party'sattorney of record." 735 ILCS 5/2-1302(a) (West 1998). Additionally, in this case, the trial court ordered plaintiff'sattorney to notify defendant of the default judgment. However,the circuit clerk failed to send a copy of the trial court'sorder to plaintiff's attorney so plaintiff's attorney did notsend a notice of default to defendants. The "failure to providethe defendant with notice of entry of the default order [does]not render it or the subsequent proceedings void." Kaput, 124Ill. 2d at 379, 530 N.E.2d at 234 ("'[T]he failure of the attorney to give the notice does not impair the force, validity[,] oreffect of the order' [quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par.2-1302(a) (now 735 ILCS 5/2-1302(a) (West 1998))]"). Therefore,the failure to provide notice did not nullify the default judgment.

Additionally, as stated earlier, to obtain section 2-1401 relief, defendants must establish a meritorious defense tothe underlying action. Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 378, 530 N.E.2d at233. Defendants make no claim of a defense, much less a meritorious defense. In fact, defendants admitted liability in theirsection 2-1401 petition. Therefore, even on the merits, defendants could not have established the valid defense requirementfor section 2-1401 relief once they conceded the issue of liability.

Further, this is not a situation where principles ofequity and fairness require a different outcome. There is noindication that the plaintiff attempted to conceal the existenceof the default judgment or that she purposefully delayed mattersso that defendants would be prejudiced. The record does notsuggest that the plaintiff or her attorney attempted to lull thedefendants into complacency or mislead them about the status ofthis case. See Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 384, 530 N.E.2d at 236-37. Plaintiff's attorney repeatedly contacted Reindl by mail, telephone, and voice mail asking for defendants to retain counsel,enter their appearance of record, and file responsive pleadings,all to no avail. Defendants readily admit that Reindl's negligence caused the delay in referring the case to outside counseland responding to plaintiff's complaint.

Accordingly, we find that defendants forfeited anyissue regarding the propriety of the default judgment, andotherwise failed to demonstrate any basis for relief from thatjudgment. Therefore, we find that the trial court neither erredin granting the default judgment nor abused its discretion byfailing to vacate that judgment.

B. Motion To Vacate Damages

Defendants next argue that the trial court erred indenying their motion to vacate damages because the plaintifffailed to give defendants proper notice of the hearing on damages. We disagree.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has directly addressedthe issue of whether a plaintiff is required to provide notice ofthe hearing on damages to a defaulted defendant. Kaput, 124 Ill.2d at 380, 530 N.E.2d at 234-35. In Kaput, the supreme courtstated:

"Supreme Court Rule 104(b) [(134 Ill. 2dR. 104(b)], pertaining to the filing of papers and proof of service, provides, 'Pleadings subsequent to the complaint, writtenmotions, and other papers required to befiled shall be filed with the clerk with acertificate of counsel or other proof thatcopies have been served on all parties whohave appeared and have not theretofore beenfound by the court to be in default for failure to plead.' [Citation.] Thus, the defendant, having been found in default for hisfailure to plead, was not entitled to separate notice of the hearing on damages." Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 380, 530 N.E.2d at 234-35.

We have a similar situation in the case at bar. Plaintiffobtained a valid default judgment against defendants. Therefore,defendants were not entitled to notice of the hearing on damages.

Defendants need not always file a motion to vacatedefault judgment whenever they choose to attack only a damageaward following entry of a default judgment. However, wheredefendants attack only the damages award based upon failure tosend notice of the entry of the default judgment or of thehearing on damages, defendants must first move to vacate theunderlying default judgment to challenge the damages award. Defendants would not have to move to vacate a default judgment tochallenge only the damages award if, for instance, they wereclaiming merely that the damages award was excessive.

Defendants here make no claim that the trial courtawarded excessive damages. Plaintiff's complaint notifieddefendants that she sought damages in excess of $50,000, pluscosts of suit. Therefore, plaintiff's request for damages inexcess of $50,000, plus costs, provided notice that at least$50,000 was being sought. The trial court awarded plaintiff$43,754.44, plus costs of suit, an amount well under the $50,000requested. Therefore, we determine that the judgment for damagesin this case was not excessive, in light of the nature of theaction pleaded, the notice in the complaint of the amount ofdamages sought, and the size of the final award, which did notexceed the base amount. See Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 382, 530N.E.2d at 235-36. We find no abuse of discretion in the trialcourt's denial of defendants' section 2-1401 petition.

C. Defendants' Constitutional Claims

Last, defendants argue that they were deprived of dueprocess of law as required under the Illinois and United StatesConstitutions. We disagree.

Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7))provides that an appellant's brief must contain his contentionsand the reasons therefor, accompanied by citation of authoritiesand pages of the record. People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 414,655 N.E.2d 873, 888 (1995); People v. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 743,746, 569 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1991). Mere contentions, withoutargument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration onappeal. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 569 N.E.2d at 230. Allegations of trial court error summarily raised without supporting authority are deficient and warrant a finding of waiver. People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 261, 712 N.E.2d 314, 323(1999). Contentions that are supported by some argument, yetlack citations of authority, do not meet the requirements of Rule341(e)(7). Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 569 N.E.2d at 230. "Areviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly definedwith pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depositoryinto which the appealing party may dump the burden of argumentand research. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 569 N.E.2d at 230. Arguments that do not satisfy Rule 341(e)(7) may be rejected forthat reason alone. Maun v. Department of Professional Regulation, 299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 399, 701 N.E.2d 791, 799 (1998).

Defendants' argument on this issue consists of severalparagraphs reiterating how unfairly they have been treated. Thissection appears as an afterthought, making a fleeting referenceto the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution andwithout any citation to case law. By failing to provide properargument and citations of authority, defendants forfeited thesearguments. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 246, 718 N.E.2d 1,56 (1999); Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 414, 655 N.E.2d at 888.

Moreover, defendants themselves did not comply with the process provided for under Illinois law. Although they wereserved with summons and complaint, defendants failed to obtaincounsel, enter an appearance, respond to plaintiff's settlementdemand, or comply with plaintiff's request to file responsive pleadings.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

STEIGMANN, P.J. and KNECHT, J., concur.