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Petitioner, John P. Duffy, appeals the decision of theIllinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) adopting itsadministrative law judge's December 1, 2003, recommended orderand decision to grant the motion to dismiss of respondents,Christie Clinic, P.C., and Dr. Ellen E. Roney (collectively, theClinic). On appeal, petitioner argues that the Commission erredin dismissing his complaint where he alleged facts sufficient toshow the Clinic operated a "place of public accommodation," asdefined by article five of the Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS5/5-101 through 5-103 (West 2000)). We affirm.

On December 4, 2001, petitioner filed a charge ofdiscrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights(Department), alleging that the Clinic discriminated against himbecause of his handicap, in violation of the Act. The Directorof the Department did not act on the charge within the statutorily mandated 365-day period. See 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(1) (West2000).

On December 11, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint withthe Commission pursuant to section 7A-102(G)(2) of the Act (775ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(2) (West 2002)), alleging one count of handicapdiscrimination by the Clinic. The complaint alleged that on orabout June 11, 2001, he received a letter from Dr. Roney advisinghim that the Clinic's department of internal medicine would nolonger offer him treatment beginning 30 days following receipt ofthe letter. Petitioner claimed that the Clinic's stated reasonsfor termination of treatment, that it was based upon his behaviorat the Clinic and his failure to follow prescribed medicaltreatment, were pretextual and asserted only for the purpose ofconcealing its discriminatory motives. Petitioner furtheralleged that the Clinic operated a medical facility open to thepublic and was a "place of public accommodation," as defined bysection 5-101(A)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) (West2002)).

On March 8, 2003, the Clinic filed a motion to dismiss,arguing that the Commission was without jurisdiction where theClinic's internal medicine department was not a "place of publicaccommodation," as defined by the Act and as interpreted by caselaw. The administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that thematter be dismissed, finding that a medical clinic dispensingmedical services to the public is not a "business" as contemplated under section 5-101(A)(1) of the Act and thus does notqualify as a "place of public accommodation" as that term isdefined under the Act (775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) (West 2000)). TheCommission declined review and adopted the ALJ's decision as itsown, pursuant to section 8A-103(E)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/8A-103(E)(1) (West 2002)). This appeal followed.

Petitioner argues that the Clinic's department ofinternal medicine is a "place of public accommodation," asdefined by the Act. Statutory construction is a question of law,and the standard of review is de novo. Ferrari v. Department ofHuman Rights, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1103, 815 N.E.2d 417, 422(2004).

Section 5-101(A) of the Act provides as follows:

"(A) Place of Public Accommodation. (1)'Place of public accommodation' means a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facilityof any kind, whether licensed or not, whosegoods, services, facilities, privileges,advantages or accommodations are extended,offered, sold, or otherwise made available tothe public.

(2) By way of example, but not of limitation, 'place of public accommodation' includes facilities of the following types:inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels,soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns,roadhouses, barber shops, department stores,clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores,bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skatingrinks, public golf courses, public golfdriving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicyclerinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms,railroads, omnibuses, busses, stages,airplanes, street cars, boats, funeralhearses, crematories, cemeteries, and publicconveyances on land, water, or air, publicswimming pools and other places of publicaccommodation and amusement." 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A) (West 2000).

Statutes should be construed as to render no word orphrase superfluous or meaningless. Langendorf v. City of Urbana,197 Ill. 2d 100, 109, 754 N.E.2d 320, 325 (2001). Adoptingpetitioner's broad interpretation of "business *** facility ofany kind" would render the Act's definition of "place of publicaccommodation" and the accompanying examples in section 5-101(A)(2) mere surplusage. See Baksh v. Human Rights Comm'n, 304Ill. App. 3d 995, 1003, 711 N.E.2d 416, 422 (1999). "Had thelegislature intended such an all-encompassing definition of a'place of public accommodation' the definition would simply read'a "place of public accommodation" is a business facility of anykind.'" Baksh, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 1003, 711 N.E.2d at 422.

Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where a statutelists several classes of persons or things but provides that thelist is not exhaustive, we interpret the class of unarticulatedpersons or things as those "others such like" the named personsor things. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v.Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211, 636 N.E.2d 528,531 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as SIU).

Section 5-101(A) does not contain the terms "medicalfacility," "medical clinic," "doctor's office," "health-carefacility," or other like terms. The examples listed in section5-101(A)(2) are also fundamentally different from medicalclinics, which dispense medical care. "The cited establishmentsare examples of facilities for overnight accommodations,entertainment, recreation or transportation." SIU, 159 Ill. 2dat 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531. "Thus, what was anticipated by theGeneral Assembly is a restaurant, or a pub, or a bookstore." SIU, 159 Ill. 2d at 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531. What was notanticipated is a private medical clinic. Because the Clinic'sinternal medicine department is not a "place of publicaccommodation" under the Act, we hold that the conduct alleged bypetitioner does not fall within section 5-102(A); consequently,no jurisdiction is conferred by that section over this cause ofaction. See SIU, 159 Ill. 2d at 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531 (academicprogram at a state-operated university); Baksh, 304 Ill. App. 3dat 1006, 711 N.E.2d at 424 (private dental practice); Cut 'NDried Salon v. Department of Human Rights, 306 Ill. App. 3d 142,147, 713 N.E.2d 592, 595-96 (1999) (insurance company); Gilbertv. Department of Human Rights, 343 Ill. App. 3d 904, 910, 799N.E.2d 465, 469 (2003) (scuba-diving school). The Commissionproperly dismissed petitioner's complaint.

Petitioner also argues that the Clinic's participationin Medicare and Medicaid programs brings it under the definitionof "place of public accommodation." However, he cites no on-point authority for this proposition, nor does the Act createsuch an inference from the mere receipt of federal funds (see 775ILCS 5/1-101 through 10-103 (West 2002)). Whether the Clinicwould qualify as a "place of public accommodation" under adifferent definition under federal statutes, rules, orregulations is irrelevant to our analysis under the Act.

Because we find that the Clinic's internal medicinedepartment is not a "place of public accommodation" under section5-101(A) of the Act, we need not address whether petitionerfailed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the Commission'sdecision dismissing petitioner's complaint.

Affirmed.

TURNER, J., concurs.

APPLETON, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring:

I concur with the result reached by the majority butwrite separately to state my belief that the provisions of theAct have no application to this situation.

Plaintiff had been a patient of the Christie Clinicdepartment of internal medicine. Plaintiff did not attend thephysical facility of the clinic as a destination but rather to betreated by medical personnel. For whatever reason, clinicpersonnel decided to terminate their professional relationshipwith plaintiff and had the right to do so. See Olaf v. ChristieClinic Ass'n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 191, 195, 558 N.E.2d 610, 613-14(1990) (the right to engage in a physician-patient relationshipis not absolute but is instead terminable at will).

I am aware of no law that requires a regulatedprofessional--doctor, lawyer, dentist, accountant--to treat orserve every applicant. In fact, the service at issue here isrecognized by the law above to be discretionary with the provider(after taking all abandonment and malpractice issues intoconsideration). Christie Clinic, as a place, may be forced to beopen to all persons regardless of disability, but the medicalpersonnel who work within the clinic's walls cannot be made totreat patients against their will.