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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Joseph O. Daugherty, Sr., is the tenant farmerunder oral crop-share leases on three tracts of land in Piatt andDouglas Counties. He is also a joint owner of all three tracts,owning less than a majority interest in each. Defendants MaryBurns and James Daugherty, plaintiff's sister and brother, arejoint owners with plaintiff of all three tracts. Their mother'ssister, defendant Helen Short, is a joint owner with them of onetract. Their father's sister, Grace Dye, who is not a party tothis action, is a joint owner with them of another tract. OnOctober 22, 1999, defendants served plaintiff with notice toterminate all three leases. They also filed an action seeking topartition the three farms. In March 2000, with defendants'partition action pending, plaintiff brought an action seeking adeclaratory judgment he was entitled to remain in possession of thethree farms under the oral leases until partition. In July 2001,the trial court ruled in defendants' favor. Plaintiff appeals,arguing (1) defendants lacked the power to terminate his tenancyabsent the consent of all joint owners, and (2) their notice toterminate was ineffective because it was not served more than fourmonths prior to the end of the lease as required by statute. See735 ILCS 5/9-206 (West 1998). We affirm.

Plaintiff, defendants, and Grace Dye are joint owners ofthree tracts of farmland in Piatt and Douglas Counties. Theyacquired their interests through inheritance or grants from familymembers.

Plaintiff began farming the first of the three tracts,known as Farm No. 1167, in 1977. Farm No. 1167 includes 400 acresin Piatt County (where plaintiff resides) and 151 acres in DouglasCounty. At that time, plaintiff's mother, Ruth Daugherty, and hersister, defendant Helen Short, each owned an undivided one-halfinterest in the land and plaintiff was merely a tenant farmer. After Ruth Daugherty died, plaintiff and his brother and sisteracquired her interest in the farm. Helen Short deeded portions ofher interest to her husband, William V. Short, who died in 1999,and both purported to transfer their interests into living trusts. Currently, Helen Short, individually or through the William andHelen Short Trusts, owns an undivided one-half interest in Farm No.1167, while plaintiff and his two siblings each own undivided one-sixth interests.

Plaintiff began farming Farm No. 1738, consisting of 53.3acres in Piatt County, in 1988. He and defendants Mary Burns andJames Daugherty each own an undivided one-third interest in thisland. He began farming Farm No. 1001, consisting of 320 acres inPiatt County, in 1990. Although plaintiff farms Farm No. 1001 asa single unit, it is divided into 40-acre and 80-acre tracts, eachof which is owned by plaintiff, Mary Burns, James Daugherty, andGrace Dye (their father's sister) in varying proportions. GraceDye owns a 100% interest in one 40-acre tract. Mary Burns andJames Daugherty together own a majority interest in Farm No. 1001.

Plaintiff does not have written leases for any of thethree farms. The terms of the three oral crop-share leases areessentially identical. Plaintiff, as tenant farmer, provides allfarming equipment and labor. The landowners, including plaintiff,pay the property tax on the land and supply the limestone and halfthe cost of seed, herbicide, and fertilizer in proportion to theirinterest in the land. Plaintiff, as tenant farmer, receives halfthe proceeds from sale of the crops; the parties divide the otherhalf among the landowners, including plaintiff, in proportion totheir ownership interests. The parties have always settled theirfinancial accounts involving the three farms around January 1 eachyear.

Plaintiff could not testify to the exact dates he tookpossession of Farm No. 1167 or began farming it. He testified hebegan purchasing farming equipment and storing it on the land sometime in the autumn of 1976, began farming "in crop year 1977," andtook possession of the buildings "in crop year 1978." He movedinto the house in July 1979.

On October 22, 1999, defendants served plaintiff with anotice to terminate his tenancy effective March 1, 2000. They alsofiled an action seeking partition of the three farms. On March 13,2000, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuitcourt of Piatt County. In August 2000, defendants served plaintiffwith a second notice to terminate his tenancy effective January 1,2001. They did so because plaintiff challenged the efficacy oftheir original notice partly on grounds of untimeliness, claimingthe lease term coincided with the calendar year.

On May 25, 2001, the trial court issued a memorandum ofopinion in which the trial judge determined defendants had theauthority to terminate the lease absent the consent of minorityinterest-holders plaintiff and Grace Dye. He found the parties'oral agreement did not specify a start date and took judicialnotice of the fact custom and usage in East-Central Illinois is tobegin crop-share leases on March 1. Thus, he found the October1999 notice effective to terminate the leases as of March 1, 2000. On July 25, 2001, the trial court entered a judgment denyingplaintiff the relief he sought. This appeal followed.

A. Defendants' Authority To Terminate Plaintiff's Leases

Plaintiff argues defendants lacked the power to terminatethe leases without the unanimous consent of all the joint owners ofthe farmland in question. No case law in Illinois directly answersthe question and the rule varies in other jurisdictions. Plaintiffurges us to follow those authorities holding the rights andobligations between lessors and lessees are indivisible, thusrequiring the unanimous consent of all joint owners to terminate atenancy. Defendants urge us to follow authorities allowing jointowners to terminate a lease, at least as to their interest in theproperty.

Plaintiff urges us to adopt the rule espoused by thedissent in Ahrens v. Dye, 208 Neb. 129, 302 N.W.2d 682 (1981). InAhrens, 208 Neb. at 130, 302 N.W.2d at 683, four family membersjointly owned a tract of farmland which they leased to the husbandof one of the joint owners to farm. Two of the joint owners, whotogether owned an undivided one-third interest in the land, servedthe tenant farmer with notice to terminate his tenancy and thenfiled a partition action. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 130, 302 N.W.2d at683. The tenant farmer continued to farm the land "pursuant to thelease remaining in effect with the other co-owners." Ahrens, 208Neb. at 130, 302 N.W.2d at 683. The Supreme Court of Nebraska heldthe notice to terminate tenancy was effective to terminate thelease between the tenant farmer and those joint owners who hadjoined in it, but not between the tenant farmer and the other jointowners. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 132, 302 N.W.2d at 684.

The dissent criticized this rule, stating, it "will leadto confusion and uncertainty in an area of the law where certaintyis of utmost importance." Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 134, 302 N.W.2d at685 (Boslaugh, J., dissenting in part, joined by McCown, J.). Instead, dissenting Justice Boslaugh recommended applying thegeneral rule relating to termination for forfeiture to terminationof year-to-year leases. That rule states rights and obligationsunder a lease are indivisible and, therefore, unanimous consent ofjoint owners is needed to terminate a lease under a forfeitureprovision. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 134-35, 302 N.W.2d at 685(Boslaugh, J., dissenting in part, joined by McCown, J.), citingFredeking v. Grimmett, 140 W. Va. 745, 762, 86 S.E.2d 554, 564(1955).

Plaintiff argues the rule relating to forfeiture shouldapply with equal force to this case because "the net result is thesame, removal of the tenant." Defendants contend termination of alease at the end of a yearly term is different in character fromtermination for forfeiture. The forfeiture cases cited by theAhrens dissent and plaintiff illustrate the difference betweenforfeiture during a tenancy for a term of years and termination ofa year-to-year tenancy. In Howard v. Manning, 79 Okla. 165, 169,192 P. 358, 362 (1920), for instance, the Supreme Court of Oklahomaexplained:

"If the right to enforce a forfeiture accruesand a part of the tenants in common are allowed to elect to enforce the forfeiture, thenthe lessee is placed in the inequitable position of being bound by the lease as to part ofthe tenants [in common] and discharged by apart, which means that the lessee is stillliable as a lessee to some of the tenants incommon, although he cannot enjoy any of thebenefits of his lease without becoming atrespasser and liable for damages to the otherowners of the land."

Accord Fredeking, 140 W. Va. at 762, 86 S.E.2d at 564.

By contrast, a lease for an indefinite term, such asthose of the parties here, is a year-to-year tenancy. It isessentially a lease contract that is completely fulfilled withineach year and allowed to be renewed by failure to give thestatutorily required notice to terminate. Winn v. Turner, 55 Ill.App. 3d 291, 293, 371 N.E.2d 170, 172 (1977). Thus, allowing somejoint owners to terminate a year-to-year tenancy (that is, allowingthem to opt not to renew it) does not leave the lessee obligated tothe other joint owners.

Other policy considerations weigh against the enforcementof forfeiture provisions. Some of these considerations support therule advocated by plaintiff; others support the rule advocated bydefendants. In Clark-Devon Building Corp. v. Hinrichs, 308 Ill.App. 69, 73, 31 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1941), a joint owner with anundivided one-ninth interest in a commercial property served hertenants with notice of her intent to enforce a forfeiture provisionin the lease three years after all the joint owners had servednotice of their intent to enforce the forfeiture provision on thebasis of a different alleged lease violation. The First Districtfound the second notice deficient on the ground one joint ownercould not forfeit the lease on behalf of her co-owners and thenanalyzed the effectiveness of the earlier notice. Hinrichs, 308Ill. App. at 73-74, 31 N.E.2d at 396.

In affirming the trial court's injunction enjoiningenforcement of the forfeiture clause under either notice, the courtnoted "'[i]n this State and elsewhere[,] forfeitures are notregarded with favor.'" Hinrichs, 308 Ill. App. at 75, 31 N.E.2d at397, quoting Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 Ill. 284,295, 167 N.E. 69, 736 (1929). One reason for this disfavor is thefact enforcing a forfeiture requires a court to interfere withcontractual obligations between parties. Hinrichs, 308 Ill. App.at 74-75, 31 N.E.2d at 397. In Hinrichs, for example, more than 70years remained on a 99-year lease when the joint owners sought toterminate the lease under the forfeiture clause. Hinrichs, 308Ill. App. at 70, 31 N.E.2d at 395. This consideration is notimplicated where joint owners seek not to renew a year-to-yearlease contract. Another reason not to enforce a forfeitureprovision is to prevent injustice that may result from ejecting thetenant. See Hinrichs, 308 Ill. App. at 75, 31 N.E.2d at 397,quoting Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 355 Ill. At 295, 167 N.E. at 73 ("'its prevention is within the protecting care of equitywhenever wrong or injury will result from its enforcement'"). Thisconsideration is implicated where some but not all joint ownersseek to end a year-to-year tenancy.

In further support of his position, plaintiff points tothe recognized principle that consent of all joint owners isnecessary to create a lease. See, e.g., Cameron v. Bartels, 214Ill. App. 3d 69, 75, 573 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1991) (one joint ownercould not bind his co-owner to a timber deed without her consent);Hall v. Boyd, 347 Ill. App. 60, 62-63, 106 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1952)(one joint owner cannot bind others to a lease; where no practicalmanner exists to sever the validly leased portion of the propertyfrom the remainder, the lease in its entirety is invalid); Gridleyv. Wood, 206 Ill. App. 505, 509 (1917) (one joint owner cannot bindthe other joint owners to a lease of the property without writtenauthority from them to do so unless they ratify the lease). Thegist of plaintiff's argument appears to be that the logicalcorollary to this rule is a symmetrical requirement of unanimousconsent of all joint property owners to terminate a lease. We findthe necessity of unanimous consent to create a lease more logicallysupports the opposite conclusion, at least with respect to year-to-year tenancies such as those here at issue. A lease for anindefinite term is a year-to-year tenancy, which the partiesthereto may renew each year by failure to give the notice toterminate. Winn, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 293, 371 N.E.2d at 172. Arequirement of unanimous consent of all joint owners to renew thelease each year is more consistent with the requirement ofunanimous consent to create the lease in the first instance thanwould be a requirement of unanimous consent to terminate the lease. Where, as here, some of the joint owners wish to terminate thetenancy, unanimous consent to renewing the lease does not exist.

Cases holding joint owners have the authority toterminate year-to-year leases only as to their own interests are problematic. Treating nonrenewal of a lease as divisible leavesthe lessee in the same position as treating forfeiture rights asdivisible by allowing some joint owners to create a new lease withthe lessee but not others. Such a rule requires joint owners whodo not consent to a lease renewal to remain obligated to the lesseenevertheless. In Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 130, 302 N.W.2d at 683, forinstance, a referee sold the land at the partition sale togetherwith the growing crops. The court found principles of unjustenrichment required both the joint owners who had terminated thelease as to their interests and the joint owners who had not doneso to compensate the tenant farmer for his labor and expenses inplanting the unharvested crops. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 133-34, 302N.W.2d at 683-84. The trial court calculated the amount of thevalue of the crops each owner had to pay the tenant farmer on thebasis of the lease. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at 131, 302 N.W.2d at 683-84. The supreme court affirmed this determination. Ahrens, 208 Neb. at134, 302 N.W.2d at 685.

Similarly, in Cook v. Boehl, 188 Md. 581, 592-93, 53 A.2d555, 561 (1947), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held notice toterminate a year-to-year lease by one joint owner effective only asto her interest. When the tenant remained in the building untilpartition, the court held, "there is no justification for fixing ofrent payable by the lessee other than that agreed upon by theparties." Cook, 188 Md. at 593, 53 A.2d at 561.

By contrast, in Meier v. Johannsen, 242 Iowa 665, 47N.W.2d 793 (1951), a case closely analogous to that at bar, theSupreme Court of Iowa treated a year-to-year oral crop-share leaseas effectively terminated in its entirety by service of a notice toterminate by less than all of the property's joint owners. There,a mother and her son and two daughters jointly owned three farms. The son had farmed all three tracts as a tenant farmer while hisfather, from whom he and his mother and sisters inherited thefarms, was alive. Meier, 242 Iowa at 666, 47 N.W.2d at 794. Shortly after the parties inherited the three farms, the mother andtwo daughters served the son notice to terminate his tenancy andthen filed an action for partition of the properties. The soncontinued to farm the three tracts of land despite the notice toterminate. Meier, 242 Iowa at 667, 47 N.W.2d at 794. Afterpartition, the referees brought an action to recover rent from theson. He argued he should have been considered a lessee holdingover under the oral crop-share lease and the measure of the rentthey could recover should be based thereon. Meier, 242 Iowa at669, 47 N.W.2d at 795-96. He did not challenge the efficacy of thenotice. Although the court did not discuss the authority of theother joint owners to terminate the year-to-year lease absent hisconsent, it stated the son and his wife "had been advised by thenotice served upon them *** the lease was terminated." Meier, 242Iowa at 670, 47 N.W.2d at 796. Despite lacking the consent of alljoint owners, the notice terminated the lease in its entirety.

The facts of Meier are nearly identical to those in theinstant case with respect to Farm No. 1167 and Farm No. 1738, whereall joint owners other than the tenant farmer agreed to terminatethe lease. If all the joint tenants terminate the lease as totheir own share, the only joint owner remaining on the lease as alandlord is also the tenant farmer. The logical inconsistency ofleasing his interest in the land to himself leads to a conclusionthe consent of all joint owners other than an owner who is also thetenant effectively terminates the lease. Farm No. 1001 presents adifferent question because another joint owner, Grace Dye, wishesto renew the lease. Meier does not address that situation.

We find this court's discussion of new leases in Hall,347 Ill. App. at 63, 106 N.E.2d at 138, more instructive. There,this court discussed the inability of one joint tenant to bindothers to a new lease. Although, theoretically, a joint owner hasthe power to create a lease as to his or her own interest in theproperty absent the consent of all joint owners, where no practicalmanner exists to divide that portion of the property from that ofthe other joint owners, the entire lease is void. Hall, 347 Ill.App. at 63, 106 N.E.2d at 138, citing Fredrick v. Fredrick, 219Ill. 568, 581-82, 76 N.E. 856, 861 (1906). The most logicalextension of this principle would be to allow joint owners who wishto remain obligated to a lessee on a year-to-year lease to do soonly if a portion of the property representing their interest canbe severed from the rest of the property so as not to prejudice therights of the other owners. Conversely, if the property is notreadily divisible, neither should be the lease, and unanimousconsent should be required to renew it. See Hall, 347 Ill. App. at63, 106 N.E.2d at 138 ("there would be no way of severing thevalidly leased portion of the premises from the balance withoutunduly prejudicing the *** cotenant's rights").

Plaintiff argues unanimous consent should be required toterminate the leases at issue because, "[w]hether one woulddescribe this as a partnership or joint venture," it is "more thanthe a usual cotenancy ownership situation." The crop-share leaseshave more to do with the business of farming the land than withplaintiff's possession of it; however, the same can be said of thecrop-share leases involved in Ahrens and Meier, and yet those caseswere decided on principles having to do with real property. SeeMeier, 242 Iowa at 668, 47 N.W.2d at 795 (discussing division ofthe crops between landlords and tenant as a term of an oral crop-share lease). Further, plaintiff cites no authority and makes noargument to guide a decision based on principles of partnershiplaw. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (appellant's brief must includearguments and citation to supporting authorities).

In these circumstances, it is logically inconsistent totreat lease obligations as divisible. The approach Illinois courtshave taken to joint property owners' authority to enter into newleases leads us to conclude the most sensible rule is one allowingjoint owners to terminate a year-to-year tenancy in its entiretyonce unanimous consent to continue the tenancy no longer exists. The trial court properly concluded defendants had the authority toterminate the leases.

B. The Start Date of the Lease

Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in determining the lease began March 1 and ended February 28 each year because(1) Grace Dye's testimony conclusively established the partiesactually intended a January 1 start date, (2) the evidence wasinsufficient to support a finding March 1 is the customary andusual start date for oral crop-share leases in Piatt and DouglasCounties, and (3) knowledge of the customary and usual start datesfor crop-share leases in East-Central Illinois is not widespreadenough to render judicial notice thereof proper. We disagree.

In determining the terms of a contract, the intent of theparties controls. Courts may look to custom and usage to determineterms of the contract only where they cannot discern the parties'actual intent from the evidence. See Winn, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 293,371 N.E.2d at 173 (custom and usage used to ascertain the intent ofthe parties as to the start date of an oral crop-share lease onlyafter court determined the parties did not agree to a start date). Plaintiff contends Grace Dye's brief testimony irrefutablyestablished the parties intended the lease to run from January 1 toDecember 31 each year, thus eliminating the need to look to customand usage to supply a missing term. We disagree.

Grace Dye has an interest in only one of the three farmsat issue; thus, even if her testimony is enough to establish theparties to that lease intended a January 1 start date, it does notobviate the need to look to custom and usage to supply a start datefor the lease terms on the other two farms. Further, we concludeher testimony did not preclude the trial court from finding theparties never specified a start date for the lease on Farm No.1001.

Where a trial court's factual finding reflects areasonable inference arising from conflicting testimony, a court ofreview will not overturn the finding unless it is contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence. Winn, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 371N.E.2d at 172. Grace Dye, who is 92 years old, testified onlybriefly. She testified the lease term on Farm No. 1001 ran fromJanuary 1 to December 31 each year. She further testified shewanted plaintiff to farm her land and did not support defendants'efforts to oust him. Defendants' attorney did not cross-examineher. However, her testimony, along with that of the otherwitnesses, supports the trial court's apparent conclusion theparties had never agreed to specific dates the leases were to run.

None of the other witnesses, including plaintiff,testified to any specific agreed-upon start dates for any of thethree leases. No witness testified they had ever discussed startdates for the leases. All agreed they settled financial obligations relating to the farming operations on or near January 1 eachyear. Plaintiff testified he asked defendants and Grace Dye to payhim after January 1 each year to coincide with the calendar yearfor tax purposes. Defendants' expert witness, Ernest Moody,likewise testified parties to crop-share leases in East-CentralIllinois normally settle their finances around the calendar yearfor tax purposes, regardless of the actual lease term.

The limited testimony as to the general terms of thefamily's lease agreements supports a conclusion they wereundetailed informal agreements among then-amicable family members. Grace Dye testified, "it's his farming, mostly, and about how muchdo I have and what does the other fellow have." James Daughertytestified he had never discussed any of the terms of any of theleases with plaintiff and did not personally know when the leasesbegan or ended. Bill Hanfland, Helen Short's son-in-law, who hasa power of attorney to act on her behalf in matters involving herfarm property, testified he believed the lease on Farm No. 1167 ranMarch 1 to February 28 each year because that is the usual practicein East-Central Illinois and he had no knowledge of any specificagreement to the contrary.

Plaintiff argues in his brief, "the only witness who knewwith certainty the lease term was Grace Dye *** and yet, the trialcourt never mentioned her testimony in its opinion. *** [S]he hadmore experience than any of the three parties who testified as tothe farm operation from a landlord perspective." Nothing in therecord indicates she is more involved in the running of the farm ormore aware of the terms of the crop-share lease than the otherabsentee landowners involved in this dispute. Plaintiff's attorneyasked Bill Hanfland the basis for his assertion the lease on HelenShort's land runs from March 1 to February 28 but elicited nosimilar explanation from Grace Dye. Plaintiff never testified toa specific agreed-upon start date for the lease. The trial courtcould properly conclude she assumed the lease on Farm No. 1001 runswith the calendar year due to the parties' practice of settlingtheir finances at that time, particularly in light of plaintiff'sfailure to identify a specific lease period.

From this evidence, the trial judge properly couldconclude the parties had never discussed, much less agreed upon,specific dates the leases were to run. Thus, looking to custom andusage to supply this missing term was appropriate.

Plaintiff argues Ernest Moody's testimony as to thecustomary March 1 start date for farm leases in East-CentralIllinois was insufficient to support the court's finding because(1) Moody lacked the requisite knowledge of practices in thespecific counties where the land in question is situated; and (2)as a professional farm manager, Moody handled written farm leasesalmost exclusively and, thus, was not familiar enough with oralcrop-share leases to render an opinion. We disagree.

Plaintiff does not challenge Moody's qualifications totestify as an expert regarding the customary and usual terms ofcrop-share leases in East-Central Illinois; rather, he assertsMoody's knowledge of practices in the two specific counties inwhich the farms at issue are located is insufficient despite thefact both counties are within the region for which his qualifications were established. In Winn, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 371N.E.2d at 172, this court affirmed the ruling of a trial courtwhich had relied on evidence of custom and usage in East-CentralIllinois to supply a missing lease term. Plaintiff fails toexplain why farm leasing practices in Douglas and Piatt Countiesvary from those in the surrounding counties of East-CentralIllinois significantly enough to require us to do otherwise.

Similarly, plaintiff contends Moody's knowledge of oral,as opposed to written, crop-share leases is insufficient to allowhim to testify as an expert. Moody testified he had encounteredapproximately 30 to 50 oral crop-share leases in the five yearspreceding trial. The trial judge sustained an objection to hisproffered testimony as to the number of written crop-share leaseshe had encountered in the same time period on grounds it exceededthe scope of defendants' cross-examination. Based on his testimonyregarding his primary use of written crop-share leases, however,the court could properly infer he had encountered a significantnumber of such leases in addition to the 30 to 50 oral leases hehad encountered. Assuming, arguendo, Moody's experience with oralcrop-share leases alone was insufficient to qualify him as anexpert, plaintiff does not explain how the custom and usage variessignificantly enough to require a finding of expertise relatingspecifically to oral leases. In fact, the record supports theopposite conclusion. In addition to managing farms and appraisingrural properties, Moody conducts an annual survey for the Illinoischapter of the American Society of Professional Farm Managers andRural Appraisers. That survey asks several questions about farmleases, including what dates they run, but does not ask whether theleases are oral or written, indicating the professional organization does not consider this difference relevant. Further, theMarch 1 start date coincides with the growing season. Plaintifftestified he began preparing the ground and planting crops in thespring of 1977 and did not need possession of the farm prior tothat time. We see no reason seasonal dictates would have anydifferent impact on farmers leasing land on oral leases than onfarmers operating under written leases.

Plaintiff argues the testimony of more than one witnessis necessary to support a finding of custom and usage, citingMarler v. Moultrie-Shelby Farm Service, 11 Ill. App. 3d 204, 207,295 N.E.2d 744, 747 (1973). We disagree. In Marler, 11 Ill. App.3d at 207, 295 N.E.2d at 747, this court stated usage or custom"should generally be established by more than one witness so as toraise a presumption that others knew it or should have known it"(emphasis added). Further, although Moody was the only expert togive an opinion as to the customary and usual start date for crop-share leases in East-Central Illinois, other testimony supports theconclusion that date is March 1. Timothy Flavin, plaintiff'sexpert witness, testified, "[m]ost are a March 1 to February 28type lease, but not all." Defendant Bill Hanfland testifieddefendants served the original notice to terminate in October 1999because they assumed the lease ran March 1 to February 28 becausethat is when such leases normally run. We conclude the recordsupports a finding crop-share leases usually and customarily runMarch 1 to February 28 in East-Central Illinois, including Piattand Douglas Counties.

Finally, plaintiff contends the trial court improperlytook judicial notice of the customary and usual start date of crop-share leases in East-Central Illinois. He argues the trial judgerelied on his personal knowledge of farming practices in East-Central Illinois from his involvement in the case underlying Winn. We find this argument unpersuasive.

In his memorandum of opinion, the trial judge foundadequate support for Ernest Moody's opinion testimony regarding thecustomary and usual March 1 start date for crop-share leases. Hethen cited Brookhart v. Langford, 128 S.C. 350, 353, 122 S.E. 866,867 (1924), in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina statedknowledge of local usages and customs having to do with tenantfarming and marketing of South Carolina's "staple crop" (cotton)was widespread enough within the jurisdiction for courts to takejudicial notice of those usages and customs. He then stated,"[f]urther, this court participated in the case of Winn v. Turner[citation]." He did not clarify whether he was relying on hispersonal experience with Winn, the authority he cited, or both intaking judicial notice of the customary and usual March 1 startdate. We have already concluded the evidence supported a findingof a March 1 start date. We may affirm a trial court's ruling ifany reason exists in the record to do so. Gernand v. IllinoisCommerce Commission, 286 Ill. App. 3d 934, 943, 676 N.E.2d 1384,1389 (1997). We find the record supports a factual determinationthe usual and customary start date for crop-share leases in East-Central Illinois is March 1. The trial court did not err in soholding.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.