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April 13, 2001

NO. 4-00-0524

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

We must determine whether the City of Springfield or the Village of Chathamhas jurisdiction to regulate the subdivision of property that is contiguous toSpringfield and within its statutory planning jurisdiction but subject to aconflicting annexation agreement between the property owner and Chatham. Likethe trial court, we find that Chatham has the power to regulate the use of theproperty at issue and affirm summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

In 1988, Springfield adopted a comprehensive land development plan pursuantto the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1 through11-152-4 (West 1998)), which extended Springfield's planning jurisdiction tounincorporated contiguous land within 1.5 miles of Springfield's corporatelimits. 65 ILCS 5/11-12-5 (West 1998) (any municipality may adopt developmentplan applicable to contiguous land within 1.5 miles of municipality's corporatelimits and not included in any other municipality). The Judith Jones DietschTrust (owner) owns a 36-acre tract of land near Chatham Road on County Highway40 in unincorporated Sangamon County, Illinois. The property is contiguous toSpringfield's corporate limits. The property is not contiguous to Chatham'scorporate limits, but Chatham provides municipal services to this area.Traveling by land over unincorporated property and around a portion of LakeSpringfield, the property is 1.8 miles from Chatham. However, the straight-linedistance to the property, traversing the lake, is between .25 and .6 miles fromChatham's corporate limits.

In 1998, the property owner decided to develop the property and sell lots forsingle-family residences. The owner did not submit the subdivision plans toSpringfield for review. Instead, the owner entered into an annexation agreementwith Chatham pursuant to the Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1998)(municipality may enter into annexation agreement with owners of unincorporatedproperty, providing for control of the property and contemplating futureannexation when land becomes contiguous to the municipality). Chatham approved apreliminary plan for subdividing the property. The owners then proceeded withthe development and began marketing the lots. The subdivision plans containedminor deviations from Springfield's subdivision requirements, but internal Cityof Springfield documents indicate that the plans were "workable."

In October 1999, Springfield filed a complaint seeking declaratory andinjunctive relief against the Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, Judith Jones,personally and as trustee of the Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, and the Village ofChatham (collectively referred to as defendants). The suit specifically sought(1) a declaration that Springfield had statutory jurisdiction to regulate thesubdivision of property within 1.5 miles of its corporate limits and (2) toenjoin the defendants from proceeding with the development of a subdivisioncontiguous to Springfield's corporate boundary under the defendants' annexationagreement.

In April 2000, Chatham filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that theMunicipal Code gave it subdivision and zoning jurisdiction over the property byvirtue of the annexation agreement. Springfield then filed a cross-motion forsummary judgment, arguing that Springfield had statutory jurisdiction to applyits land subdivision ordinance to property that is contiguous to Springfield'sboundary, within Springfield's planning jurisdiction, and more than 1.5 milesfrom Chatham.

On June 1, 2000, the trial court issued an order granting Chatham's motionfor summary judgment and denying Springfield's cross-motion for summaryjudgment. The trial court held that Chatham's annexation agreement prevailedover Springfield's ability to regulate land use within 1.5 miles of itsboundary. We review the trial court's decision de novo.

Resolution of the issue before us depends upon the interpretation of theMunicipal Code. Since municipalities are creatures of statute, they have nojurisdiction beyond their corporate boundaries unless that jurisdiction isconferred by the legislature. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d233, 243, 137 N.E.2d 371, 377 (1956). Thus, extraterritorial jurisdiction of amunicipality is strictly controlled by statute. See City of Carbondale v. VanNatta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 485-86, 338 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1975).

An examination of the Municipal Code shows that the legislature has grantedextraterritorial jurisdiction in limited circumstances. Defendants note in theirbrief that such jurisdiction has been granted in only seven instances, includingthe two that are at issue here.

Section 11-12-5 allows a municipality with a comprehensive development planto exercise jurisdiction over subdivisions up to 1.5 miles outside of itscorporate limits. That section provides:

"Every plan commission and planning department authorized by this division 12 has the following powers ***:

(1) To prepare and recommend to the corporate authorities a comprehensive plan for the present and future development or redevelopment of the municipality. Such plan may be adopted in whole or in separate geographical or functional parts, each of which, when adopted, shall be the official comprehensive plan, or part thereof, of that municipality. This plan may include reasonable requirements with reference to streets, alleys, public grounds, and other improvements hereinafter specified. The plan, as recommended by the plan commission and as thereafter adopted in any municipality in this state, may be made applicable, by the terms thereof, to land situated within the corporate limits and contiguous territory not more than one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits and not included in any municipality. Such plan may be implemented by ordinances (a) establishing reasonable standards of design for subdivisions and for resubdivisions of unimproved land and of areas subject to redevelopment in respect to public improvements as herein defined ***." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-12-5 (West 1998).

Section 11-12-9 permits municipalities to enter into jurisdictionalagreements with each other regarding extraterritorial subdivision authority andprovides that, absent agreement, the respective jurisdictions meet halfwaybetween their boundaries. It also provides that there is no intention to limitthe power that any municipality has to annex additional territory.

"If unincorporated territory is within one and one-half miles of the boundaries of two or more corporate authorities that have adopted official plans, the corporate authorities involved may agree upon a line which shall mark the boundaries of the jurisdiction of each of the corporate authorities who have adopted such agreement. On and after September 24, 1987, such agreement may provide that one or more of the municipalities shall not annex territory which lies within the jurisdiction of any other municipality, as established by such line. In the absence of such a boundary line agreement, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as a limitation on the power of any municipality to annex territory. ***

***

In the absence of such agreement, the jurisdiction of any one of the corporate authorities shall extend to a median line equidistant from its boundary and the boundary of the other corporate authority nearest to the boundary of the first corporate authority at any given point on the line." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-12-9 (West 1998).

At all times relevant to this case, Springfield's land subdivision ordinanceprovided for subdivision jurisdiction to land within 1.5 miles of the corporatelimits. The ordinance also provided that when the 1.5-mile jurisdiction ofSpringfield and that of another municipality overlapped, jurisdiction wouldextend to a line equidistant from the corporate boundaries. For purposes of thiscase, Springfield argues that the jurisdiction granted to it in section 11-12-5supersedes Chatham's annexation agreement.

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that, once the annexation agreement wasexecuted, jurisdiction over the property vested in Chatham. Defendants alsoassert that the Municipal Code specifically contemplates annexation agreementsrelating to noncontiguous property. Defendants cite the annexation agreementprovisions in division 15.1 of the Municipal Code in support of their argument.Section 11-15.1-1 sets forth the parameters of an annexation agreement andprovides:

"The corporate authorities of any municipality may enter into an annexation agreement with one or more of the owners of record of land in unincorporated territory. That land may be annexed to the municipality in the manner provided in [a]rticle [VII] at the time the land is or becomes contiguous to the municipality. The agreement shall be valid and binding for a period *** not to exceed 20 years from the date of its execution.

Lack of contiguity to the municipality of property that is the subject of an annexation agreement does not affect the validity of the agreement whether approved by the corporate authorities before or after the effective date of this amendatory [a]ct of 1990.

This amendatory [a]ct of 1990 is declarative of existing law and does not change the substantive operation of this [s]ection." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1998).

Section 11-15.1-2.1 grants jurisdiction over the territory to be annexed tothe annexing municipality, without regard to whether the property is contiguous,except in Cook County, its collar counties, and the St. Louis metro-east area,where the property must be contiguous for the annexing municipality to assertjurisdiction. That section states:

"(a) Property that is the subject of an annexation agreement adopted under this [d]ivision is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that lies within the annexing municipality's corporate limits.

(b) This [s]ection shall not apply in (i) a county with a population of more than [3 million], (ii) a county that borders a county with a population of more than [3 million,] or (iii) a county with a population of more than 246,000 according to the 1990 federal census and bordered by the Mississippi River, unless the parties to the annexation agreement have, at the time the agreement is signed, ownership or control of all property that would make the property that is the subject of the agreement contiguous to the annexing municipality, in which case the property that is the subject of the annexation agreement is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects the same as property owned by the municipality that lies within its corporate limits." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 1998).

The Municipal Code sections concerning annexation agreements were firstenacted in 1963. Preannexation agreements serve to further importantgovernmental purposes, such as the encouragement of expanding urban areasuniformly, economically, efficiently, and fairly, with optimum provisions madefor the establishment of land use controls and necessary municipal improvements.Village of Orland Park v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 135Ill. App. 3d 520, 526, 481 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1985). Prior to 1989, section11-15.1-1 lacked explicit provisions allowing annexation agreements withnoncontiguous property owners. Nevertheless, municipalities entered intoannexation agreements with noncontiguous property owners, and the developersconsented to be bound by the annexing municipality's ordinances. In Villageof Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Co., 188 Ill. App. 3d 751, 756, 544N.E.2d 836, 839 (1989), the Second District held such annexation agreements tobe illegal. The court noted that allowing annexation agreements withnoncontiguous property owners was improper because:

"[T]he practical effect of such a finding would authorize a municipality to enter into an annexation agreement for property anywhere within the State and, pursuant to the agreement, exercise its police power over that property. We do no think such a result was intended by the legislature." Village of Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 760, 544 N.E.2d at 842.

Springfield makes the same argument here. However, we find Springfield'sargument lacks merit when viewed in light of the statutory language andlegislation after Village of Lisle.

At the outset, we note that courts have no legislative powers and courts maynot enact or amend statutes. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186Ill. 2d 381, 394, 712 N.E.2d 298, 305 (1998). The responsibility for the justiceor wisdom of legislation rests upon the legislature. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2dat 394, 712 N.E.2d at 305. A court must interpret and apply statutes in a mannerin which they are written. A court must not rewrite statutes to make themconsistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public policy. Henrich,186 Ill. 2d at 395, 712 N.E.2d at 305.

Public Act 86-1169 (Pub. Act 86-1169,