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MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 1999, plaintiff, Timothy S. Applegate, wasdischarged from his employment at defendant, the State of Illinois Department of Transportation (Department). Plaintiff fileda grievance, and in February 2000, defendant, Kirk Brown, Secretary of the Department (Secretary), issued a final administrativedecision finding that Applegate had been properly discharged. InMarch 2000, Applegate filed a complaint for administrative review. In November 2000, Applegate filed a second-amendedcomplaint for judicial review by common-law writ of certiorariand for declaratory judgment. In June 2001, the circuit courtheld that Applegate's employment was wrongfully terminated and hewas entitled to be reinstated with back pay. The circuit courtalso denied Applegate's request for attorney fees under section10-55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Administrative Procedure Act) (5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 1998)). Defendants appeal, and Applegate cross-appeals. We affirm inpart, reverse in part, and reinstate the Secretary's decision.

The record before us contains the following facts. Atthe time of his June 1999 discharge, Applegate was permanentlyemployed full-time with the Department as a certified engineeringtechnician IV. As a technical employee, he was exempt from theIllinois Department of Central Management Services' personnelcode. The Department's personnel policies manual clearly statesat the front that it "does not constitute a contract of employment." However, section 4-11(D)(1) of the manual states that"[a]n employee may be discharged only for just cause."

In November 1991, Applegate was arrested outside ofworking hours and charged with driving under the influence ofalcohol (DUI). People v. Applegate, No. 91-TR-1962 (Cir. Ct.Cumberland Co.). Applegate also had his driver's license summarily suspended. In March 1992, the charge was amended toreckless driving, to which Applegate pleaded guilty. Pursuant tosection 8-3(C)(3)(a) of the Department's personnel policiesmanual, Applegate requested and received an unpaid general leaveof absence, effective April 1, 1992, not to exceed 90 days untilhe obtained a license or permit. On May 12, 1992, the circuitcourt of Cumberland County rescinded Applegate's statutorysummary suspension after finding no reasonable grounds to believethat he committed a DUI. Applegate returned to work the following day.

In March 1999, Applegate was again arrested outside ofworking hours and charged with DUI. People v. Applegate, No. 99-DT-27 (Cir. Ct. Christian Co.). After Applegate's license wassummarily suspended in May 1999, the Department suspended himwithout pay and notified him of a pretermination hearing todiscuss the charge of a second suspension of his driver's licensewhile employed by the Department. Applegate called during themeeting but did not attend. Following the meeting, the Department notified Applegate that his employment was being terminatedeffective June 2, 1999, for cause, that cause being the violationof section 8-3(C)(4) of the Department's personnel policiesmanual, which states, "A second suspension or revocation of anemployee's driver's license while employed by the Departmentshall be cause for discharge."

Following his termination in June 1999, Applegate fileda grievance with the Department pursuant to the procedures in itspersonnel policies manual. Applegate's grievance was denied atthe local and intermediate levels. Applegate next submitted hisgrievance to the Secretary for final determination. Pursuant tothe grievance procedure, the Secretary appointed a three-memberpanel and a review moderator to hear the grievance at the finallevel.

In May 1999, Applegate filed a motion in the circuitcourt of Christian County to rescind his statutory summarysuspension. In August 1999, Applegate completed his statutorysummary suspension. In September 1999, Applegate was acquittedof DUI following a jury trial. On January 5, 2000, the circuitcourt of Christian County rescinded Applegate's statutory summarysuspension on the State's motion.

On January 11, 2000, the grievance panel convened, andprior to the hearing, the review moderator requested Applegateand his attorney turn off any tape recorders. Applegate'sattorney intended to tape-record the hearing because no courtreporter was present. Section 4-12(D)(3)(b) of the personnelpolicies manual states, "There will be no record made of thereview other than that made or ordered by the moderator." Applegate was able to present evidence and argument at thehearing. The panel recommended that the discharge was proper butsuggested that the Department revise its manual "to clarify thelength of time between suspensions" and "take into considerationthe judicial process in its totality" prior to taking finalaction. In February 2000, the Secretary concurred with thepanel's finding that Applegate violated section 8-3(C)(4) of themanual and was appropriately discharged.

In March 2000, Applegate filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Sangamon County. In May2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Administrative Review Law (735ILCS 5/3-101 through 3-113 (West 2000)) does not apply to theDepartment. In July 2000, Applegate filed an amended complaint,seeking judicial review of his termination by common-law writ ofcertiorari. In August 2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that certiorari is improper and would implicatesovereign immunity. In October 2000, Judge Thomas R. Appletonallowed defendants' motion to dismiss, determining that certiorari was improper without a formal record to review or anystandards against which to measure the Secretary's decision. Judge Appleton granted Applegate leave to file an amended complaint for declaratory judgment.

In November 2000, Applegate filed a two-count second-amended complaint, seeking declaratory judgment and judicialreview by writ of certiorari. In January 2001, the case wasreassigned to Judge Robert J. Eggers. Defendants filed a motionto dismiss. In February 2001, Judge Eggers granted Applegateleave to file an amended complaint including a count for writ ofcertiorari. In April 2001, the circuit court held an evidentiaryhearing, to which defendants objected and in which they refusedto participate. William Harris, Applegate's former attorney,described Applegate's Christian County DUI case and the grievanceproceedings before the hearing panel. Applegate next testifiedon his own behalf. Finally, Jean Klauber, a labor licensespecialist for the Department, testified as an adverse witnessthat he served as review moderator in Applegate's case. ToKlauber's knowledge, no report of proceedings or electronicrecording had ever been ordered by the moderator in a final panelhearing for technical employees.

In June 2001, the circuit court issued its final order,determining that Applegate could proceed by seeking a declaratoryjudgment and a writ of certiorari. The circuit court ruled thatApplegate's termination was wrongful because he did not have therequisite two summary suspensions after one was later rescinded. The circuit court held that Applegate was entitled to be reinstated with back pay. Finally, the circuit court denied Applegate's request for attorney fees because the action was not filedunder the Administrative Procedure Act. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

The State first argues that sovereign immunity appliesbecause Applegate's claim is essentially for breach of contractagainst the State. The State contends that the circuit courtlacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Applegate's claim, whichshould have been brought in the Court of Claims instead. Wedisagree.

First, Applegate sought declaratory relief to invalidate the Department's rule of not allowing a record of the finallevel grievance proceedings. Sovereign immunity does not bar acircuit court action seeking declaratory judgment to invalidatean administrative rule and recover attorney fees under section10-55(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10-55(c)(West 1998)). See Ackerman v. Department of Public Aid, 128 Ill.App. 3d 982, 984, 471 N.E.2d 931, 933 (1984). Applegate alsosought judicial review of his termination. Sovereign immunitydoes not bar a party from seeking judicial review of an agency'saction by common-law writ of certiorari. Moline Tool Co. v.Department of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 38, 101 N.E.2d 71, 73 (1951).

The State next contends that the circuit court shouldnot have reviewed the Secretary's decision under a common-lawwrit of certiorari. We disagree.

A common-law writ of certiorari is a general method forobtaining circuit court review of administrative actions when theact conferring power on an agency does not expressly adopt theAdministrative Review Law and provides for no other form ofreview. Alicea v. Snyder, 321 Ill. App. 3d 248, 253, 748 N.E.2d285, 290 (2001).

In this case, the circuit court properly reviewed theSecretary's decision pursuant to a writ of certiorari. TheSecretary exercised quasi-judicial power, which is reviewable bycertiorari, because he adjudicated facts and individual rights. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.Department of Central Management Services, 288 Ill. App. 3d 701,711, 681 N.E.2d 998, 1005 (1997). The circuit court could reviewthe correctness of the agency's decision pursuant to certioraribecause the standards of review under a common-law writ ofcertiorari are now essentially the same as those under theAdministrative Review Law. See Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d268, 272, 673 N.E.2d 251, 253-54 (1996). Meaningful objectivestandards existed by which the circuit court could review theSecretary's exercise of discretion because the personnel policiesmanual requires "just cause." Therefore, the Secretary's decision to terminate Applegate was not committed to his "completediscretion." Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 276, 673 N.E.2d at 255.

Finally, the circuit court did not err in conducting anevidentiary hearing regarding the Cumberland County and ChristianCounty dispositions of Applegate's summary suspensions andwhether Applegate was able to record the grievance hearing. Nothing suggests that the circuit court relied on anythingoutside of the administrative record in determining, as a matterof law, that Applegate was wrongfully terminated.

The State asserts that the circuit court erred infailing to defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the Department's personnel policies manual. We agree.

Review of an administrative agency's decision regardingdischarge for cause involves a two-step process. Grames v.Illinois State Police, 254 Ill. App. 3d 191, 204, 625 N.E.2d 945,956 (1993). A reviewing court first must determine if theagency's findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 204, 625 N.E.2d at956. The court must then determine whether the agency's factualfindings provide a sufficient basis for concluding "cause" fordischarge exists. Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 204-05, 625 N.E.2dat 956.

We give considerable deference to an agency's determination of "cause" for discharge because the agency is in the bestposition to determine the effect of an employee's conduct on itsoperations. Merrifield v. Illinois State Police Merit Board, 294Ill. App. 3d 520, 530, 691 N.E.2d 191, 199 (1997); see alsoEhlers v. Jackson County Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 83,89, 697 N.E.2d 717, 721 (1998) (a reviewing court shall respectan agency's finding of cause for discharge). A reviewing courtwill not decide whether a less stringent punishment is appropriate and will overturn the agency's decision as to cause only ifit is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirementsof service. Merrifield, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 691 N.E.2d at199.

"Cause" has been judicially defined as "'some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee's continuance inoffice in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiencyof the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his no longer holding the position.'" Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 625 N.E.2d at 956, quotingDepartment of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. CivilService Comm'n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 551, 426 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1981).

In determining that a rescinded summary suspensioncould not provide grounds for termination, the circuit courtrelied on People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769, 679 N.E.2d121, 123 (1997)(rescission of summary suspension undoes thesuspension if defendant obtains a hearing before it takes place),and People v. Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504, 745 N.E.2d 736,744 (2001) ("rescission undoes the administrative summary suspension, at least prospectively"). However, the appellate court inFocia held that a rescission does not retroactively reinstate adriver's license. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 769, 679 N.E.2d at123. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of a charge ofdriving while license suspended because the defendant's suspension remained in effect until rescinded. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3dat 769, 679 N.E.2d at 123. In contrast, vacatur restores thestatus quo ante, as though a judgment had never been entered. Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 745 N.E.2d at 744.

We defer to the Secretary's determination of the effecton the Department's operations of the two rescinded summarysuspensions that Applegate served. Although Applegate contendsthat the 1999 summary suspension was his first, he partiallyserved a summary suspension in 1992 and opted to take an unpaidleave of absence, missing six weeks of work. Although the 1992summary suspension was later rescinded, that rescission appliedonly prospectively under Focia. Applegate's driver's license,therefore, was in fact suspended in 1992 until the suspension was rescinded. When Applegate began serving a summary suspensionin May 1999, he had his second driver's license suspension whileemployed by the Department. Therefore, the Secretary's determination that cause for Applegate's discharge existed is notarbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements ofhis service.

As a ground for affirming the circuit court's order andreversing the Department's decision, Applegate cites the Department's failure to follow section 10-35(b) of the AdministrativeProcedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10-35(b) (West 1998)). Applegateargues a record of his grievance hearing was required because thehearing was a "contested case" as defined in section 1-30 of theAdministrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-30 (West 1998) ("anadjudicatory proceeding *** in which the individual legal rights,duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to bedetermined by an agency only after an opportunity for a hearing")). Applegate asserts the Department's personnel policiesmanual required a hearing and had the force and effect of law. We disagree.

The contested-case provisions of the AdministrativeProcedure Act did not apply because no opportunity for a hearingwas required by law in this case. Applegate was a technicalemployee exempt from the personnel code. Only the Department'spersonnel policies manual required a three-member panel to hear agrievance at the final level. We recognize properly promulgatedadministrative regulations have the force and effect of law. Craftmasters, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 269 Ill. App. 3d934, 940-41, 647 N.E.2d 607, 611 (1995). However, the Department's personnel policies manual concerned only internal management and was not a binding rule or regulation adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act and codified in theIllinois Administrative Code. See Kaszynski v. Department ofPublic Aid, 274 Ill. App. 3d 38, 45, 653 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (1995)(agency is not bound by statements in internal manual not adoptedin compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act); 5 ILCS100/1-70 (West 1998) (defining "rule" for purposes of Administrative Procedure Act to exclude agency statements concerning onlythe agency's internal management and not affecting private rightsor procedures available to persons or entities outside theagency). Therefore, the Administrative Procedure Act did notrequire the Department to make a record of Applegate's grievancehearing.

In his cross-appeal, Applegate asserts the circuitcourt erred in denying his request for attorney fees because heinvalidated an "administrative rule" in the Department's personnel policies manual. Applegate contends the Department's procedural rules are invalid because they do not allow for a record ofthe grievance hearing.

Applegate is not entitled to attorney fees because hehas not had an administrative rule invalidated by any court inthis case. This court has rejected Applegate's AdministrativeProcedure Act claim regarding the record of his grievance hearing. The circuit court did not rule in Applegate's favor in hischallenge to the Department's grievance hearing procedures. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Applegate'srequest for attorney fees.

Because the circuit court erred in concluding Applegatewas wrongfully terminated, we reverse the part of the circuitcourt's judgment entitling Applegate to be reinstated with backpay and ruling his termination was wrongful, and we reinstate theSecretary's decision. We affirm the circuit court's denial ofApplegate's request for attorney fees.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; Secretary'sdecision reinstated.

COOK, J., concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., specially concurs in part and dissents in part.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring inpart and dissenting in part:

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. Iagree that the circuit court correctly reviewed the Secretary'sdecision under a common-law writ of certiorari. However, Idisagree with the standard of review applied by the majority andthe result reached by the majority. Here, the standard of reviewis not the manifest weight of the evidence because there are noissues of fact. The standard for review of the certiorari actionis de novo. Callahan v. Department of State Police, 223 Ill.App. 3d 1081, 1085, 586 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1991). Moreover, theSecretary's decisions on questions of law are not binding on thiscourt. Village of Downers Grove v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 221 Ill. App. 3d 47, 53, 581 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1991);see also Richard's Tire Co. v. Zehnder, 295 Ill. App. 3d 48, 56,692 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1998).

Applegate was clearly discharged because he receivedtwo statutory summary suspensions. The grievance review panel'srecommendation, in which the Secretary concurred, stated:

"Based on Order 3-1, Chapter 8-C, ofIDOT's Personnel Policy Manual, we find thatthe discharge was proper in accordance to theabove provisions. However[,] we, the panel,find the existing provisions of the aforementioned Chapter 8 need to be revised to clarify the length of time between suspensionsand revocations of driver's license and thatbefore the Department takes final action,[it] should take into consideration the judicial process in its totality."

The panel and the Secretary clearly recognized the factthat Applegate's discharge ignored the judicial process, indirect contradiction of the Illinois Department of Transportation's personnel policies manual. That manual recognizes the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1998)) andthe Secretary of State's rules and regulations governing statutory summary suspensions. The policy at issue here is in factentitled "Statutory Summary Driver's License Suspension" andpermits first offenders a 90-day unpaid leave for the term of thestatutory summary suspension. The policy also provides that asecond suspension results in discharge. However, nowhere in themanual is "first offense" or "statutory summary suspension"defined. Since the Secretary has recognized the Secretary ofState's process set forth in the Illinois Vehicle Code, it isbound by its definitions.

Applegate, at the time of his initial discharge, wasactually a first offender because his first suspension had beenrescinded:

"For the purposes of interpreting Sections 6-206.1 and 6-208.1 of this Code,`first offender' shall mean any person whohas not had a previous conviction or court[-]assigned supervision for violating Section11-501, or a similar provision of a localordinance, or a conviction in any other statefor a violation of driving while under theinfluence or a similar offense where thecause of action is the same or substantiallysimilar to this Code or any person who hasnot had a driver's license suspension forviolating Section 11-501.1 within 5 yearsprior to the date of the current offense,except in cases where the driver submitted tochemical testing***." 625 ILCS 5/11-500(West 2000).

See also People v. Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504, 745 N.E.2d736, 744 (2001), citing People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767,769, 679 N.E.2d 121, 123 (1997) (the rescission of the summarysuspension undoes the administrative summary suspension, at leastprospectively). Applegate was, therefore, also entitled to takea 90-day unpaid leave and was not subject to discharge for causebased on two suspensions. To hold otherwise would invalidate theunderlying judicial proceeding that rescinded the statutorysummary driver's license suspension and dismissed the DUI. As amatter of law, Applegate's discharge was wrong.

While this court recognizes the employer's need for itsemployees to possess a driver's license, this court also recognizes the need for the Secretary to follow its own manual, thelaws of this state, and the rulings of our courts. For thesereasons, I would affirm the circuit court and reverse the rulingof the Secretary.