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No. 3--03--0206

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, Rose M. Trent, James C. Trent and James Clark,filed a pro se complaint under our state's Freedom of Information Act(the Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2002)) against the defendants,the office of the coroner of Peoria County and Daniel Heinz, in hisofficial capacity as Peoria County coroner. The plaintiffs areattempting to obtain medical records of C.N., a deceased minor. Thetrial court ruled that the plaintiffs are not entitled to receiveC.N.'s medical records. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that thetrial court erred in ruling that the records they seek are exemptfrom disclosure under the Act (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002)) eventhough the plaintiffs have acquired a signed authorization from thedeceased child's mother, Katrina Harden. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Trent and Katrina Harden are currentlyincarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Theywere both convicted of murdering C.N., who was four years old at thetime of her death on July 20, 1996. Harden pled guilty and agreed totestify against Trent in exchange for the State's agreement not toseek the death penalty. James Trent appealed to this court in Peoplev. Trent, 315 Ill. App. 3d 437, 734 N.E.2d 1 (2000). The factsstated in that appeal set forth the brutal murder of this four-year-old child. While James Trent and Harden were living together, theyrepeatedly struck C.N. with a belt, a metal spatula and a metal pole. Trauma from this severe beating caused C.N.'s death.

The remaining plaintiffs, Rose Trent and James Clark, filedvarious requests under the Act in an attempt to obtain C.N.'s medicalrecords. On April 15, 1999, Rose went to the Peoria County coroner'soffice and orally requested to inspect and copy various documentsrelated to C.N.'s death. Rose asserted that her request for thedocuments was pursuant to the Act. Initially, the coroner's officedenied Rose's request.

On May 4, 2000, Rose submitted a written request for thedocuments under the Act. Accompanying this written request was asigned authorization from Harden directing the coroner's office torelease C.N.'s medical records to Rose. On May 8, 2000, the PeoriaCounty coroner denied Rose's request in writing.

On November 15, 2000, James Trent sent a similar request fordocuments to the coroner's office. On November 28, 2000, thatrequest was denied.

On January 26, 2002, James Clark submitted a written requestfor the documents under the Act. This request also was accompaniedby a signed authorization from Katrina Harden. On February 4, 2002,Clark's request was denied.

The plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remediesregarding their requests. Then, on January 2, 2003, the plaintiffsfiled their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief underthe Act. Among other documents, the plaintiffs sought C.N.'s medicalrecords from (1) Saint Francis Medical Center; and (2) MethodistHospital.

The defendants filed their answer on January 17, 2003. Theycontend that C.N.'s medical records are not subject to disclosureunder the Act.

Eventually, the coroner's office supplied the plaintiffs withsome of the documents they had requested, but not the decedent'smedical records. At the hearing on the complaint, the trial courtstated that the medical records were exempt from disclosure under theAct. The court commented that the authorization signed by KatrinaHarden "might apply, if at all, to a request for these recordsdirectly from the hospitals." Plaintiffs appeal.

ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by ruling theywere not entitled to disclosure of the medical records under the Act.

We are called upon to interpret portions of the Act and otherIllinois statutes. It is axiomatic that when interpreting a statute,we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislaturewhen it enacted the statute. Heck v. Central Illinois Light Co., 152Ill. 2d. 401, 405, 604 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1992). The language of thestatute itself provides the best indication of the drafters' intent. Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 165, 549 N.E.2d 348, 349 (1989). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court ofreview must give it effect as written, without reading exceptions,limitations or conditions into the statute. Davis v. Toshiba MachineCo., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999).Because interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our reviewis de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254,659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995).

Under the Act, "Each public body shall make available to anyperson for inspection or copying all public records, except asotherwise provided in Section 7 of [the] Act." 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West2002).

" 'Public records' means all records, reports, forms,writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, *** and allother documentary materials, *** having been prepared, orhaving been or being used, received, possessed or underthe control of any public body." 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West2002).

"(1) The following shall be exempt from inspectionand copying:

***

(b) Information that, if disclosed, wouldconstitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personalprivacy, unless the disclosure is consented to inwriting by the individual subjects of theinformation." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002).

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the coroner'soffice is a "public body" under the Act. C.N.'s medical records are"public records," as defined by the Act, because the records wereused, received, possessed and under the control of the defendants.

There is also no dispute that an individual's medical recordsconstitute "[i]nformation that, if disclosed, would constitute aclearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 ILCS140/7(1)(b) (West 2002). An individual's medical records fallsquarely within this exemption for documents, the disclosure of whichwould constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Therefore, the issue is whether the authorization signed by thedecedent's murderer, who also happened to be the decedent's mother,is sufficient to require disclosure under the Act. For the reasonsset forth below, we hold it is not.

Documents otherwise exempt from disclosure under section7(1)(b) may be released only if "the disclosure is consented to inwriting by the individual subjects of the information." 5 ILCS140/7(1)(b) (West 2002).

The "individual subject of the information" sought under theAct was C.N. The Act makes no provision for a written consent to besubmitted by a third party in the event the subject of theinformation is deceased. The plain language of the Act only permitsdisclosure of privileged information with the written consent of "theindividual subjects of the information." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West2002). Here, the plaintiffs do not possess written consent fromC.N., which is necessary to release medical records under the Act. We will not read an exception into the Act by grafting into itlanguage from the Code of Civil Procedure regarding physician-patientprivilege release provisions.

Plaintiffs cite section 8--802 of the Code of Civil Procedure(the Code) (735 ILCS 5/8--802 (West 2002)) and suggest this allowsthem to obtain C.N.'s medical records in light of the signedauthorization they have acquired from C.N.'s mother. We disagree.

Section 8--802 of the Code governs the physician-patientprivilege. It states:

"No physician or surgeon shall be permitted todisclose any information he or she may have acquired inattending any patient *** except only *** with theexpressed consent of the patient, or in case of his or herdeath[,] *** [a] person authorized to sue for personalinjury ***." 735 ILCS 5/8--802 (West 2002).

We are aware of no authority that allows a mother convicted ofmurdering her child to sue for that child's personal injuries.

Only the personal representative of a decedent may bring anaction under the Wrongful Death Act. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2002). Aperson who has been convicted of a felony may neither be appointedguardian of a child's estate (755 ILCS 5/11--3(a) (West 2002)) nornamed administrator of an estate of a decedent who dies intestate(755 ILCS 5/9--1 (West 2002)).

We also find relevance in section 2--6 of the Probate Act of1975 (755 ILCS 5/2--6 (West 2002)) commonly known as the slayerstatute. It provides, in relevant part:

"